The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

by Ralph D Sawyer

  27. The tactical exploitation of confined spaces to restrict the movement of both chariots and men is advanced in many military writings. This might suggest a common body of tactical knowledge, extensive cross-borrowing, or simply common sense developed through bitter experience.

  28. This is obviously an explicit reference to employing cavalry as a battlefield force rather than just using horses to perhaps carry the officers. Similar references follow in this chapter.

  29. This passage is commonly understood as referring to Wu Ch'i, the speaker, suggesting that if it (the state of Wei) fails it will be laughed at; therefore, he has forged a force that has the total commitment of the enraged bandit in the marketplace. However, this runs contrary to the logic of persuasion because if Wei fails with only a limited force, although its audacity might be laughable, defeat would be expected. However, if-contrary to all expectation-the mighty Ch'in should be vanquished, they would certainly be laughed at, and Wei's army would be correspondingly glorified for its great accomplishment.

  30. Also cited in TPYL, 33:7.

  Wei Liao-tzu

  Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books

  Notes to the Translator's Introduction

  1. These and other issues regarding the historical Wei Liao and the evolution of the text are discussed at the end of this translator's introduction.

  2. The interrelationship of these texts, especially the Wei Liao-tzu and Six Secret Teachings, remains to be clarified. Their sequence of completion and whether they incorporate passages from other, now-lost works cannot be resolved until the discovery of new textual materials. The Wei Liao-tzu clearly postdates Sun-tzu's Art of War, the Mo-tzu, Sun Pin's Military Methods, and the Wu-tzu; it adopts and advances many of Wu Ch'i's concepts and principles. (In his notes to the individual chapters, Hsu Yung discusses Wei Liao-tzu's thought in relation to Sun-tzu and Wu Ch'i but oddly neglects the numerous materials borrowed from the Six Secret Teachings. Some points regarding the latter and many other common concepts are found in our notes to the translation, but space precludes more than cursory references.)

  3. PRC orthodox military historians now regard the Wei Liao-tzu as the earliest work to systematically discuss military training. See, for example, Tung Chien, "Ch'ien-t'an Wei Liao-tzu to `ping-chiao' ssu-hsiang," in Chun-shih li-shih yen-chiu- hui, ed., Ping-chia shih-yuan, Vol. 2, Chun-shih k'o-hsiieh ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 283-291.

  4. The dates for King Hui's reign are discussed in the section on textual history.

  5. The first book of the Mencius begins with several interviews between Mencius and King Hui (and King Hui's son, King Hsiang, after he ascends the throne) and therefore has traditionally been entitled "King Hui of Liang." Mencius strongly condemns King Hui in VIIB1.

  6. A main theme of the Wei Liao-tzu is relying on human effort rather than looking to the Heavens or spirits, as is discussed in textual notes 1-9 below.

  7. "Annals of Ch'in Shih Huang," Shih chi, chuan 6. The translation is based on Takikawa Kametaro, Shiki kaichu kosho, I-wen yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1972 (one-volume reprint of original 1934 edition), pp. 107-108.

  8. The style of the characters and the presence of characters that should be avoided if the scribe were copying the text after the Han's ascension indicate that the slips, and thus the Wei Liao-tzu, are pre-Han.

  9. The Wei Liao-tzu thus reflects the massive population displacements resulting from the large-scale warfare seen in the middle and especially the late Warring States period.

  10. The Wei Liao-tzu also incorporates Taoist concepts, although Legalismsomewhat modified by Confucian concerns with benevolence and virtue-predominates. Key passages are noted in the translation as they arise.

  11. In,contrast to the Wei Liao-tzu, from the Legalist view concepts of virtue, righteousness, and shame are detrimental.

  12. Wei Liao recognized the importance of cities as economic centers and the vital need for trade and other commercial activities to create the wealth required to finance military forces and campaigns. Thus his policies differed radically from Lord Shang's condemnation of commercial enterprise (see Chung-kuo Chun-shih-shih Pien-hsieh- tsu, Chung-kuo chun-shih-ship, Vol. 5: Ping-chia, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, p. 140). At the same time, these activities must be directed to the state's benefit and not be permitted to injure the people and their primary occupations. His tactics include principles for attacking and defending cities and further advancing concepts found in Mo-tzu's and Sun Pin's writings while clearly reversing Sun-tzu's advice to avoid becoming entangled in sieges and city assaults (as discussed in the translator's introduction to the Ssu-ma Fa). Wei Liao also identified economic conflict as the root cause of war (see WLT CS, pp. 40-41).

  13. The first chapter of the Ssu-ma Fa advocates identical concepts and measures.

  14. Bonding into squads of five remained the foundation of military organization throughout Chinese history. Contemporary Western military theory, based on behavioral analysis of performance in World War II, recognizes small groups of six or seven men as constituting the basic identifiable and motivational unit-essentially validating the ancient insight.

  15. Also see Tung Chen's discussion, "Ch'ien-t'an Wei Liao-tzu to `ping-chiao' ssuhsiang," pp. 283-291.

  16. These issues are considered extensively in the Ssu-ma Fa as well. Military historians will recognize contemporary Western theory in these powerful manipulations.

  17. See Wu Ju-sung's foreword to Hsu Yung's Wei Liao-tzu ch'ien-shuo, pp. 5-12. For the concepts of hsing (form, shape) and shih (strategic configuration of force [or power], advantage conveyed by the strategic deployment of force), which largely originate with Sun-tzu, refer to the translator's introduction to the Art of War.

  18. The text rarely mentions unorthodox tactics by name, but Hsu Yung's detailed analysis identifies them in Wei Liao-tzu's concrete tactics and measures. (See WLT CS, pp. 34-35, and his notes to the individual chapters. Also see the translator's introduction and notes to Sun-tzu's Art of War for an elucidation of ch'i and cheng. ) The absence of any mention of the cavalry in the Wei Liao-tzu, evidence for a fourth-century composition date, confines the possibilities for implementing unorthodox tactics to chariots and infantry. However, note that Sun Pin already employs cavalry, which raises further questions about the chronological relationship of the texts-although cavalry may have been considered in the now-lost portions of the extant Wei Liao-tzu.

  19. As Hsu Yung points out, Wei Liao valued a spirited, highly trained, and disciplined force over large numbers. See WLT CS, p. 38.

  20. The "miscellaneous" category contains books whose contents were not attributable to a single school, such as the Confucians or Taoists. Thus "miscellaneous" refers to the amalgamated contents of an individual work, not to a collection of various books.

  The Han shu bibliography (Chapter 30), based essentially on Liu Hsiang's and Liu Hsin's earlier Chi lueh, contains a "military" section subdivided into four classifications: "Ping mou-ch'uan," or "Military Plans and Balance of Power"; "Ping hsing- shih, " or "Military Shape (or Disposition) and Advantage Conveyed by Strategic Deployment of Force"; "Yin-yang"; and "Ping Chi-ch'iao," or "Military Techniques and Crafts." (For further discussion, see Robin D.S. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on Their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," TP 74 [1988], pp. 211-247.)

  21. See note 17 above for hsing and ship.

  22. For example, see Yao Chi-heng's comments collected in the Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao (ed. Chang Hsin-ch'eng), Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint) (original ed., 1939), p. 803. Yao also opportunely condemns the view that some historical commanders deliberately sought out transgressions immediately prior to battle so as to dramatically execute up to one hundred soldiers and vividly affect the troops.

  Note that Hsu Yung vigorously disputes the traditional understanding of this phrase, believing it refers to a commander fighting with forces reduced by the indicated amo
unt-such as half or 30 percent-in comparison with the enemy. (See WLT CS, pp. 167-175. Also see notes 174-177, which accompany the translation for this passage.) Hua Lu-tsung, among contemporary scholars, embraces the view that this "killing" refers to the degree to which the commander is willing to inflict capital punishment to enforce discipline and compel his troops to fight fervently (Wei Liao-tzu chu-i, Chung-hua shu-chu, Peking, 1979, p. 6).

  23. Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 803. This is hardly a crippling criticism because Mencius is not necessarily the originator of the saying, whereas Wei Liao may have been reacting to and appropriating a statement that accorded with his own thoughts. See, for example, the contemporary view advanced in Ping-chia, p. 144.

  24. Yen Shih-ku cites a statement from Liu Hsiang's (no longer extant) Pie lueh. However, if Wei Liao had his interview in King Hui's last year (320 B.c.), unless he were already over forty it is unlikely that he could have studied with Lord Shang, who died in 338 B.C. Furthermore, Lord Shang was active in the foreign state of Ch'in, whereas Wei Liao was presumably from Wei.

  25. The recent Chung-kuo chun-shih-ship (Chieh-fang-chiin ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988), for example, focuses mainly on the continuation of Lord Shang's ideas in its brief analysis. See Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 102-103.

  26. Hu Ying-lin is prominently identified with this view. Chung Chao-hua, in an article emphasizing the distinctiveness of the descriptions for each category, concludes that all the extant texts are variants of the same original and that the miscellaneous text has been lost. (See Chung Chao-hua, "Kuan-yu Wei Liao Tzu mou-hsieh wen-t'i to shang-ch'ueh," WW 1978, No. 5, pp. 60-63, or the slightly abridged reprint in the Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao [ed. Cheng Liang-shu], Hsueh-sheng shu-chu, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1639-45.)

  27. For example, see Hua Lu-tsung's introduction to his modern edition, WLT CY, pp. 1-4. (An abridged abstract is also found in the Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 16311632.) Also see Chung Chao-hua, WLT CC, pp. 3-5; and Hsu Yung's summary of this position, WLT CS, pp. 16-17. All historical references are confined to individuals who lived before King Hui's time; the absence of famous generals thereafter is presumed to indirectly establish the latest date of composition. Another issue is the question of "shih chiang," or hereditary generals. Their mention is considered evidence of early composition; however, Yates has pointed out that this view appears mistaken (see "New Light," pp. 226-227. Also see Hsu Yung, WLT CS, pp. 24-25).

  28. These issues are discussed below. For a comprehensive overview, see Hsu Yung, WLT CS, p. 17. Among the main contentions is that Wei Liao's reference to armies of two hundred thousand would only be accurate late in the Warring States period. However, as Hsu points out, armies varied in size, and the sentence might refer to a state's entire standing army rather than a campaign force (see WLT CS, p. 25).

  29. This view apparently originated with Ch'ien Mu. See Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzu-liao k'ao-pien, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 489; and Hsu Yung, WLT CS, p. 23.

  30. Obviously, if it were not for the distinct character of the two halves of the present book, the issue of authorship could be simply resolved by attributing it to the original Wei Liao, allowing for accretions and revisions and perhaps assuming the second historical figure is simply an erroneous reference.

  31. Chang Lieh's article ("Kuan-yU Wei Liao-tzu to chu-lu ho ch'eng-shu," Wen shih, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1980], pp. 27-37) is cited from the abridged reprint in the Hsu Weishu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1646-1652.

  32. Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1647. In support of the text being properly attributed to the earlier Wei Liao, Hua Lu-tsung makes a similar argument: Ch'in's historical enmity with Wei would have (theoretically) prevented Wei Liao from illustrating his thoughts with references to Wu Ch'i when speaking to the king of Ch'in (WLT CY, p. 3; also see Ping-chia, pp. 139-140).

  33. Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1648-50. Note that other scholars dismiss Hsun- tzu's view as incomplete, as idealistically favoring benevolence while neglecting the realities of military power and operations (see Wu Jung-sung's foreword to the WLT CS, p. 8).

  Whether the military texts first synthesized benevolence and military might-perhaps on a Confucian basis in response to the growing scope of warfare and social upheaval rather than simply incorporating a preexistent position-seems to be an interesting, open question. Hsun-tzu could equally well have borrowed from the Wei Liao tzu if it had been composed late in the fourth century B.C. (Note Change Lieh's comments on the sudden increased scope of brutality under the Ch'in, perhaps stimulating a realization that benevolence and a humane approach to warfare were essential. See Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1649-1650.)

  34. Ibid., pp. 1650-1651.

  35. Ibid., p. 1652.

  36. "Wei Liao-tzu ch'u-t'an," WW 1977, No. 2, pp. 28-34. An abridged reprint, in traditional characters, is also found in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1632-1639. (All citations refer to the original article.) A simplified character transcription of the bamboo fragments also appeared in the same issue of WW- "Yin-ch'ueh-shan chien-pen Wei Liao-tzu shih-wen," pp. 21-27.

  37. The Ch'un-shu chip-yao, compiled in the T'ang dynasty, abstracted the essential chapters from the classics, histories, and philosophers-thereby preserving many valuable materials that would otherwise be lost.

  38. For detailed analysis, see "Wei Liao-tzu ch'u-t'an," pp. 28-31.

  39. Ibid., pp. 32-33. (Also see Ping-chia, pp. 139-140.) Apart from Wu Ch'i, who instituted strong administrative policies in the regions under his authority (see the translator's introduction to the translation of the Wu-tzu), Li Li and Hsi-men Pao were particularly prominent. Ho believes that Wei Liao is more appropriately identified with them than with Lord Shang, who had also been influenced by this earlier heritage.

  40. "Wei Liao-tzu ch'u-t'an," pp. 33-34. This intellectual activity, made famous by Mencius, was probably well-known in the late Warring States period and thus was the probable basis for attributing the forgery to Wei Liao-tzu at the court of Liang. (Also see Chang Lieh, Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1651-1652.)

  41. See note 20, above.

  42. "New Light," p. 230. However, in a foreword to the WLT CS that focuses on the appropriateness of including the text in this category, Wu Ju-sung arrives at the opposite conclusion. He stresses the prewar development of surpassing strength (which he equates with hsing) and its rapid realization in execution (which he identifies as shih). See WLT CS, pp. 5-12.

  43. "New Light," p. 230.

  44. Ibid., p. 232.

  45. Hsu Yung, WLT CS, pp. 13-31.

  46. Ibid., p. 16.

  47. Ibid., p. 17.

  48. Ibid., p. 18. Based on the Shih chi, as corrected by the Bamboo Annals, King Hui's demise has generally been dated to 319 B.C. (See D. C. Lau, Mencius, 2 vols., The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1984,11:309-312.)

  49. Various dates are given for the respective interviews. For example, Hua Lutsung ascribes Wei Liao's audience to somewhat after 334 B.C.-when King Hui urgently sought external advice-and the subsequent appearance in Ch'in to 237 B.C. (WLT CY, p. 4). D. C. Lau believes Mencius probably visited Wei shortly before King Hui's death, or about 320 B.C. (Mencius, p. 310). Hsu's date would be about 312 or 311 B.C. Chung Chao-hua, in the introduction to his WLT CC (p. 3), espouses the standard view-calculating the time from the first year after King Hui's death (318 B.C., when other scholars think he may have had interviews with King Hsiang) to the certain date of his arrival at the Ch'in court, 236 B.C., as eighty-two years. Chang Lieh dates the arrival to 237 B.C. (Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1652).

  50. WLT CS, pp. 18-20.

  51. Ibid., p. 23.

  52. Ibid., pp. 27-28. Hsu Yung also discusses extensively the questions of accretion and loss raised by many historians over the years and the variations in the number of sections found in the different texts. For details of this specialized question, see ibid., pp. 26-30.

  Notes to the Text

  1. The title of this chapter, "Heavenly Offices," appears several times within it-apparently with two different referen
ts. Although some commentators (WLT CCCY, p. 2) take it simply as a book title, most consider that in some instances, it refers instead to a body of astrological judgments and proscriptions based on assigning auspicious and inauspicious interpretations to celestial phenomena. The translation follows the consensus in demarking such occurrences. (Cf. WLT CY, pp. 2-3; WLT CC, p. 2. Note that in WLT CS, it is never considered a book title. See WLT CS, pp. 46-47.)

  2. "Punishments and Virtue" is also subject to different interpretations. Although Hsu Yung (WLT CS, p. 46) takes it as a book title, as thus conjoined the terms are generally thought to refer to a system of beliefs about auspicious and inauspicious times. Hsing-"punishment"-is associated with yin, the dark (hsuan), and the (Earthly) branches in the double character cycle of days; whereas Te-"Virtue"-is associated with yang, the bright, and the (Heavenly) stems in the cyclic sequence. Each would have portents associated with it and in the military realm, appropriate times for the initiation of activities; the initial direction and orientation for the campaign could also be specified. "Punishment" is also associated with death, "Virtue" with life.

  3. The author of the Wei Liao-tzu thus defines punishment and Virtue in terms of government action, thereby focusing exclusively on human effort-human affairsrather than on structuring actions in accord with metaphysically auspicious phenomena. (All references to "Wei Liao-tzu" hereafter should be understood as generic, indicating the author or authors of the Wei Liao-tzu text rather than a historic person.)

  4. Many of the commentators take this occurrence of Heavenly Offices as a book title. The Sung edition includes additional characters meaning "According to the deployments in the Heavenly Offices...."

  5. Literally, "severed terrain," here translated as "isolated terrain" consistent with our translation of the term in the Art of War, where it appears in Chapter 8, "Nine Terrains." By deploying in this orientation, forces are arrayed inauspiciously with their backs turned to the water. This differs conceptually from a purely strategic evaluation that presumably would fault any deployment that lacked the possibility of ordered withdrawal.