2. The historical portrait of T'ang T'ai-tsung's role and activities in the founding and consolidation of the T'ang dynasty has been the subject of considerable reevaluation and revision in recent times. It is generally thought that the emperor heavily influenced the official records from which posterity would fashion the dynastic history. Thus his father's role-which is much diminished in the traditional accounts-should probably be augmented and his determination, intelligence, and overall abilities accorded significantly greater recognition. (See Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and T'ang China, pp. 38-47 on T'ang sources and pp. 155ff.)
3. T'ang T'ai-tsung's six horses are especially famous; they have been memorialized by stone reliefs and even became the subject of early Western articles (see the notes to Appendix B). His actions in deposing and imprisoning his father and murdering his elder brother were of course contrary to all the ethical dictates of Confucianism.
4. Unlike the earlier military classics, the textual history of Questions and Replies has not benefited from any startling discoveries or recently recovered renditions. Consequently, although analytical studies have become more incisive, the fundamental question of authorship and the period of composition remain essentially unresolved.
In the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, orthodox scholars reviled the text as a forgery characterized by uncouth language, limited concepts, and erroneous interpretations of historical events. (For examples, see Chang Hsin-ch'eng, ed., Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, Vol. 2, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 [reprint of 1939 ed.], pp. 810-812; and LWK CC, pp. 84-96.) In the last century a few voices have begun to cautiously criticize these strident expressions of personal opinion, but no one has yet ventured to attribute the book to Li Ching or to assert that it constitutes an actual record of the conversations.
Briefly summarized, there are two main views: One holds that the book is a forgery of the Northern Sung period, the other that it was compiled by unknown scholars late in the T'ang or early Sung. These views are based mainly on the absence of any reference to a book by this title in the bibliographical sections in either the History of the T'ang or the History of the Sung (which does, however, suddenly contain the names of seven works associated with Li Ching) and on claims of Northern Sung military scholars to have seen a draft of the work by Yuan I, who purportedly forged it. The concurrence of several contemporaries regarding these claims prompted later generations of orthodox thinkers, who were already predisposed to view the text as an inferior work, to readily accept the forgery story as fact. Finally, the T'ung-tien, which was compiled by Tu Yu at the end of the eighth century A.D., contains numerous excerpts from a work entitled Li Ching ping-fa and quotes Li Ching extensively but without ever mentioning the Questions and Replies.
Evidence discrediting the Yuan I forgery theory is based on Emperor Shen-tsung's edict mandating the study and exegesis of "Li Ching's ping-fa" because the text (or texts) had become unreadable in the Northern Sung. Thereafter, the emperor also ordered the compilation and editing of the ancient military works, resulting in the present Seven Military Classics. The latter's initial circulation is believed to have predated the forgery story by about ten years; therefore, the Questions and Replies must have been in existence prior to its supposed creation by Yuan I. Furthermore, analysts question how the best military scholars-in a period when they were fervently investigating military theory for the urgent purpose of defending the state-could all have been deceived. Accordingly, they conclude that the forgery story must be false.
Wu and Wang (LWK CC) have suggested that historical references to the emperor ordering the exegesis of "Li Ching's ping-fa" should be understood as referring to his military writings in general rather than to a particular text entitled Li Ching's Art of War, which is similar to Sun-tzu's Art of War. After condensation and editing, the resulting integrated work was retitled Questions and Replies, thereby eclipsing the texts from which it was derived. (Unfortunately, although they discredit the forgery theory, Wu and Wang do not offer any alternatives. See LWK CC, pp. 1-5.)
Adherents of the Yuan I theory generally assumed he based his draft on material from the T'ung-tien. However, Wang Tsung-hsi's analysis in the Ch'ing era proved this view to be erroneous. (Wang compiled a text entitled Wei-kung ping-fa chi-pen from the extant materials attributed to Li Ching that were preserved from early sources. Although based mainly on the T'ung-tien, the text was supplemented by quotations from Tu Yu's commentary on Sun-tzu's Art of War and later encyclopedic works. Comparing the contents of his work with the Questions and Replies requires a separate study. For further discussion and analysis, see Teng I-tsung, Li Ching ping-fa chi-pen chu-i, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990; Chung-kuo Chun-shih-shih Pien-hsieh- tsu, Chung-kuo chun-shih-shit, Vol. 5: Ping-chia, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 433-436; and Wang Hsien-ch'en and Hsu Pao-lin, Chung-kuo ku-tai ping-shu tsa-t'an, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1983, pp. 84-86.) Others who accepted the forgery theory believed that rather than amplifying original materials, Yuan I developed his own military concepts, enhancing them with the borrowed veracity of a famous strategist.
Generally speaking, military historians perceive advances over previous texts in theory and conceptualization in the Questions and Replies and believe the book must come from the hands of an experienced strategist, even if it does not record the actual discussions between Li Ching and T'ang T'ai-tsung. (This does not preclude court notes or other material having been available.) Consequently, it might have been compiled or forged at the end of the T'ang or early in the Sung and presumably was modeled on the Chen-kuan cheng-yao-a summary of government discussions, achievements, and policies during Tang T'ai-tsung's administration (cf. Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and T'ang China, pp. 240-241). However, based on certain textual material, the authors of the Chung-kuo chiin-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 208-210, conclude that such concepts as "infantry dominating cavalry"-which are expressive of Sung thought-inevitably consign it to the Northern Sung.
Detailed, specialized studies of the text's provenance are clearly required. However, we can tentatively conclude that final compilation probably occurred in the Northern Sung-perhaps under Emperor Shen-tsung's mandate-from earlier materials. Whether the original materials were extensively supplemented or were simply rephrased in contemporary language and judiciously expanded upon remains unknown. (For further analysis and attribution of materials, see Chung-kuo Chun-shih-shih Pien-hsieh-tsu, Chung-kuo chi n-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 158-162, 204-210; Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 5: Ping-chia, pp. 428-436; and Hsu Pao-lin, Chungkuo ping-shu t'ung-chien, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 130135.)
5. The translation of Li Ching's biography follows the version found in "Lieh- chuan" 18, 93:1A-6A, in the T'ang shu (Erh-shih-wu shih, Vol. 26: Tang shu, Vol. 2, 1-wen yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, undated, pp. 1308-1310), supplemented with reference to his biography in the Chiu Tang shu ("Lieh-chuan" 17, 67:1A-8A, Erh-shih-wu shih, Vol. 23: Chiu Tang shu, Vol. 2, pp. 1199-1202). The biography and useful notes are also found in Tseng Chen's modern translation of the entire military classic, LWK CCCY, pp. 1-30, and very extensive materials in the 1980 monograph on Li Ching by Lei Chia-chi (Li Ching, Lien-ming wen-hua, Taipei, 1980). Translations of the complex T'ang dynasty titles follow Charles O. Hucker's A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1985).
6. The Chiang River refers to the Ch'ang-chiang, best known in the West as the Yangtze.
7. Han Hsin, Pai Ch'i, Wei Ch'ing, and Huo Ch'u-ping. Pai Ch'i was a famous Ch'in general whose exploits are recorded in Warring States writings. Wei Ch'ing was an outstanding Han major general noted for his success against barbarian forces in remote regions. (His biography appears in chuan 111 of the Shih chi and has been translated by Burton Watson ["The Biographies of General Wei Ch'ing and the Swift Cavalry General Ho Ch'u-ping," in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New York, 1961, pp. 193-216].) For Han Hsin, see note 11 belo
w; for Huo Ch'u-ping, see note 15 to the translation.
8. The "K'o-han" (as phoneticized in Chinese) is better known as the "Great Khan," or Qaghan.
9. Li Ling was a famous but ill-fated Han general who went deep into Hsiung-nu territory with a small force, fought heroically, and was finally captured (or surrendered) after protracted fighting against insurmountable odds for days in succession. A brief biography appears within the portrait of Li Kuang in the Shih chi (cf. Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 2, pp. 153-154), and a fuller record of his life is found in the Han shu, chuan 54. (For a translation, see Burton Watson, Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974, pp. 24-33.) Ssu-ma Ch'ien's vocal but ill-advised defense of Li Ling resulted in his own condemnation and punishment.
10. An interesting comment from the T'ai-tsung because the historical records do not portray the Wei River confrontation as the ignominious defeat (or coercion) it ap pears to have been. In A.D. 626, shortly after the T'ai-tsung usurped the throne, the Eastern Turks advanced far down the banks of the Wei River, close to the capital. The T'ai-tsung failed to defeat them militarily and was probably forced to propitiate them through extensive bribes, perhaps even on the advice of Li Ching (see Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and T'ang China, pp. 220-221).
11. Han Hsin, a great general and strategist, was instrumental in the founding of the Han dynasty. The incident regarding T'ang Chien is similar in that the king of Han (the future Han Kao-tsu) had already dispatched an emissary to persuade Ch'i to submit to his authority, although without rescinding Han Hsin's mandate to attack Ch'i. Han Hsin therefore proceeded with the campaign and-availing himself of Ch'i's newly relaxed defenses-effected a considerable, victorious advance. Naturally, the envoy was killed when Han Hsin's attacks materialized contrary to the promised truce. (Han Hsin's biography, which preserves the outlines of his strategies and contains several interesting applications of principles from Sun-tzu's Art of War, appears in the Shih chi [chuan 92] and has been translated in full by Burton Watson ["The Biography of the Marquis of Huai-yin (Han Hsin)," in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 208-232].)
12. Li Ching's enfeoffment as duke of Wei (Wei Kung) is thus reflected by his formal name in the book's title: Li, Duke of Wei.
Notes to the Text
1. During the Three Kingdoms period (57 B.C. to A.D. 668) in Korea, Koguryo (phoneticized as Kao-li in Chinese) occupied roughly the north, Paekche (Pai-chi) the southwest, and Silla (Hsin-lo) the southeast. From the Han on, Chinese dynasties had attempted-with varying degrees of success-to exercise suzerainty over the Korean peninsula. At the outset of the T'ang, they were opposed by Koguryo in the north but received grudging recognition and requests for support from Silla, which was being militarily pressured by the alliance of Koguryo and Paekche. Silla eventually came to dominate when T'ang forces defeated Koguryo in A.D. 668; thereafter, it began to resist Chinese attempts to directly rule the area. (See LWK CCCY, pp. 31-36; and Twitchett and Fairbank, Sui and Tang China, pp. 231-235 for background.)
2. Yon Kae-so-mun-a charismatic leader who deposed the king-wielded despotic military power, fervently opposed the T'ang, and forged the alliance that challenged Silla.
3. The concepts of ch'i and cheng, "unorthodox" and "orthodox," dominate Li Wei-kung's strategic thought. (For definitions and discussion of these terms, which perhaps originated with Sun-tzu, refer to the translator's introduction and footnotes to the Art of War translation.) They are discussed concretely with reference to earlier historical conflicts and to the battles culminating in the T'ang's overthrow of the Sui. (For a strategic overview of the T'ang conquest, see "T'ang t'ung-i Chung-kuo to chancheng," in Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 2, Part 2: Ping-lueh, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988, pp. 43-75.)
4. The pacification campaign against the Turks is summarized in Li Wei-kung's translated biography in the translator's introduction.
5. The famous, often romanticized strategist in the Three Kingdoms period.
6. A famous general who was active in the mid- to late fourth century A.D. in the Western Chin period (see LWK CCCY, pp. 41-43).
7. A famous diagram created by Chu-ko Liang for deploying combined troops-including infantry, chariots, and cavalry. However, it also had precursors that were attributed to various figures.
8. Commentators disagree on whether the chariots were simply narrow chariots that were specially constructed or modified for use on constricted terrain or were a different type of vehicle, such as a cart (cf. LWK CCCY, pp. 44-45; and LWK CC, p. 3).
9. "Deer-horn chariots" apparently were named for the blades affixed to the front, which protruded out to prevent an enemy from approaching. The commentators differ as to whether these were permanently affixed or were mounted when the chariots were deployed in a circular formation to protect the encampment. In such a configuration, they would presumably have been "head to tail," perhaps mounting the blades just to the outside. However, because the commentators generally emphasize that this deployment equally constrained the men within the camp, the use of permanently mounted blades turning within cannot be completely ruled out. Yet another view holds that the name is derived from the overall formation, with the horns being spikes partially buried in the ground just next to the chariots. Because the number of spikes was apparently small, they probably did not constitute a palisade. (See LWK CC, p. 3; LWK CCCY, p. 45; and TLWT WCHC, IV:2-4.)
10. One of Sun-tzu's main themes, techniques for which include manipulating the enemy as well as directly controlling one's own activities and degree of movement. (Cf. LWK CC, p. 3; and TLWT WCHC, IV:2-4.)
11. "Defense to the fore" rather than "moving against opposition," as sometimes suggested. The "deer-horn" chariots would be particularly effective in this regard. (Cf. LWK CCCY, p. 47; and TLWT WHCH, IV:2-4A.)
12. The term translated as "elite" cavalry originally meant "iron" cavalry, designating armored fighters (cf. LWK CC, p. 5).
13. Li Chien-ch'eng was the T'ai-tsung's ill-fated elder brother, who was eventually murdered as a preliminary to the T'ai-tsung displacing his father from the throne.
14. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations." Also see note 16 to the text.
15. One of Han Wu-ti's famous generals, noted for his achievements despite his pronounced disdain for the ancient military writings. His Shih-chi biography (chuan 111) is translated by Burton Watson as "The Biographies of General Wei Ch'ing and the Swift Cavalry General Ho Ch'u-ping," in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 2, pp. 193-216.
16. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat." This is a common theme in the military writings.
17. Ibid., Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations."
18. Duke Ts'ao, popularly known as Ts'ao Ts'ao, was a famous general and eventually a warlord who was active in the disintegration of the Han dynasty and the subsequent rise of the Three Kingdoms. He wrote the first known commentary on Sun-tzu's Art of War, and what remains of his thoughts are found therein, the Hsin shu being lost.
19. His statements are apparently based in part on Sun-tzu's analysis of tactics appropriate to relative advantages of strength in the Art of War, Chapter 3, "Strategies for Attack."
20. Ibid., Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power."
21. Ibid., Chapter 7, "Military Combat." (In the Ming edition, "combining" has inadvertently dropped out but is retained in the Sung version.)
22. An image from Art of War, Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains."
23. Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." However, note that the translation differs from our translation of Sun-tzu: "Thus if I discern the enemy's disposition of forces (hsing) while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate while the enemy is fragmented." Li Ching clearly takes the sentence to refer to creating false impressions and feigning deployments. Although this is one of Sun-tzu's basic techniques, in the Art of War this sentence refers to the contrast between fathoming the enemy and being unfathomable
oneself, as the chapter emphasizes (also see note 82 to the Art of War translation).
24. This echoes Sun-tzu's basic thought, especially as seen in ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance," and is one reason People's Republic of China scholars term him a Legalist thinker.
25. From Chapter 4 of the Wu-tzu, "The Tao of the General," a chapter more oriented to fathoming enemy generals than to focusing on tactics. Li Ching's memory of the text is unusually deficient; he has abridged and somewhat altered it.
26. His purported comment is recorded in Li Ching's biography.
27. From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power."
28. Fu Chien was emperor of a consciously sinicized Tibetan "barbarian" state, who was active in the early part of the so-called "Five Barbarian and Sixteen Kingdoms period." (The "Five Barbarians" refers to the five "barbarian" powers that established their authority over parts of China between 317 and 589, whereas the "Sixteen Kingdoms" refers to the successive states contending for power from 304 to 439.) At the battle of Fei River described in the text, Emperor Fu Chien-despite leading a millionman force-was defeated and his empire lost. A description of Fu Chien's achievements and defeat is found in the History of the Chin. For further discussion, see LWK CCCY, pp. 80-85. (Also note Yeh Shih's scathing comments on Li Ching's evaluation of Fu Chien's capabilities, LWK CC, p. 87.)
29. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations." This is the conclusion to the chapter and is translated differently from our Art of War version because the understanding appears different and the text is abridged. In the original, Sun-tzu is apparently discussing the use of tallies to calculate the probability of winning, whereas the T'ai-tsung's rough recpitulation seems to stress the planning aspect rather than the calculations. (See note 21 to "Initial Estimations"; and LWK CC, p. 12, which reflects one traditional understanding, as does the T'ai-tsung.)
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