Black Hawk Down

by Mark Bowden

  6 “Specialist John Stebbins ... as they zipped past,” Stebbins, Galentine. “Up the street ... not seen again,” Steele. “Across the alley ... Was this the right thing?” M. Goodale, K. Goodale. Kira Goodale choked up reading the passage from Mike’s letter over the phone. The only photograph I know to have been taken from the ground during the early part of this fight was snapped by Lechner looking west from Chalk One’s southeast blocking position. Through the dusty haze it shows Goodale and Williamson crouched behind the car hulk, and Stebbins prone covering an alley south. In the distance you can see the members of Chalk Three spaced out along the south wall of the target. The target house itself rises above the wall in the background. One of the fast ropes is stretched out across the alley. “At his corner ... woman fell dead,” Perino. Somalis I interviewed vehemently denied that women and children were used as human shields, although they did say women and children helped as spotters. Nearly all the Rangers who roped into the fight told me independently of witnessing women and children spotting for and shielding gunmen, especially early in the fight.

  7 “As he roped in ... most of the fire,” Waddell. “Nelson had been ... the top of the wall,” Nelson, Waddell, Yurek. DiTomasso’s concerns and actions were recorded in detail in his extensive written account. “The fire was not ... and enter blasting,” Yurek. “From his position ... Goddamn!” Nelson, Waddell, Yurek, Twombly.

  8 Bray’s written account, Hooten’s written account, P. Howe, Dave McKnight.

  9 “After the helicopter force ... an assistant gunner,” Streucker, Burns, Othic, Spalding, and Schilling. “Dom Pilla was ... their next skit,” Nelson. Diemer was the soldier Steele questioned about going to church. “Streucker and the rest ... convoy at the hotel,” Struecker, B. Thomas. “Before the convoy ... returning fire,” Gay, who told me of this in an interview and who also wrote a detailed, colorful account of his actions and observations during the battle, entitled “Post-Op Report/Strong Point Assault/10-3-93.” It is also recorded in SEAL Homer Nearpass’s written account. When he returned to the States, Gay hoped to make some money endorsing the Randall knife for the manufacturer. Not many people could say their knife blade stopped a bullet. The manufacturer expressed no interest. “Struecker was assigned ... silence followed,” Struecker, B. Thomas, and the written account of SEAL Richard Kaiser.

  10 Ali Hussein.

  11 Struecker, B. Thomas.

  12 “Private Clay Othic ... ‘tough go cyclic,’” Othic, Spalding, P. Howe. “Othic’s Missouri buddy ... fast and accelerated,” Spalding. “For Sergeant John Burns ... with amazement,” Burns. “One Humvee back ... moving again,” Kallman. “From his turret ... took the gun,” Othic.

  13 Galentine, Eversmann, Diemer, Berendsen.

  Black Hawk Down

  1 “Mohamed Hassan Farah heard ... was too much,” details of the July 12 attack on the Abdi House are drawn from my interview of Mohamed Hassan Farah in Mogadishu and an interview there with Abdullahi Ossoble Barre. Both men were injured inside the house. The surprise missile attack was also witnessed by former Canadian military officer Matthew Bryden, who was working for an international aid organization in Mogadishu at the time. I interviewed Bryden in Nairobi, where he was working for an organization called the Wartorn Societies Project. He heard Cobra helicopters move in low over the city and, stepping outside, watched as they formed a semicircle around the target house and began shooting. An experienced hand in Somalia, Bryden left the city, warned by a Somali friend that there would be trouble. Four Western journalists, Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, and Anthony Macharia of Rueters and Hansi Kraus, a German photographer working for the Associated Press, rushed to the scene after the attack and were set upon and killed by an angry mob. The incident was widely reported around the world after it happened, but the emphasis in the stories was on the deaths of the four journalists. In fact, the Abdi House attack represented an unprecedented step by the UN, what Washington Post reporter Keith Richburg, in his book Out of America, called “the UN’s first-ever officially-authorized assassination” (p. 79). The incident was provoked by Aidid’s escalating violence. The warlord had taken to assassinating Somalis employed by the UN. The July 12th attack did more than any single act to stir up local support for Aidid and the Habr Gidr, and turned many moderate Somalis who had supported the intervention against the international mission. In my interviews with J. Howe, he told me that he believes there was a separate meeting of Habr Gidr elders going on in the neighborhood at the same time, and that propagandists have deliberately confused that with the one under way in the Abdi House. I think he is mistaken. The eyewitness accounts of Farah and Barre agree in every particular, and correspond to the official version of the attack in the UN Blue Book, Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996 (The UN Blue Book Series, p. 404). The initial casualty counts differed. UNOSOM acknowledged 20 deaths, all men—while videotape taken at the scene showed women among the dead (Richburg, pp. 79–80). The International Committee of the Red Cross said there were 215 Somali casualties, including 54 dead. Aidid’s supporters distributed a list of 73 dead, including women and children. According to Richburg, American officials in Somalia at the time conceded the Red Cross estimate was probably correct (p. 80), and every eyewitness I interviewed placed the number of dead at 70 or more. Oakley accepts the higher figure. Bryden, Farah, and Barre all said many of the Somalis killed were well-respected moderates opposed to Aidid’s murderous acts against the UN. The attack still stirs up deep anger and bitterness among the Somalis from all walks of life I interviewed in Mogadishu. The deaths of the four journalists prompted most Western news organizations to pull reporters out of Mogadishu. The AP hung on until September, when Aidid started threatening to kidnap American journalists. When the battle happened on October 3, there were no American journalists in Mogadishu. The videotape and most of the still photos seen on TV and in the world press were shot by Somali stringers, with the exception of still photos by Toronto Star photographer Paul Watson. “Bashir Haji Yusuf heard the helicopters ... and harrassed,” Yusuf. I was skeptical of the story about the baby, but Burns confirmed it. He said that on one mission after fast-roping down, he and his men went looking for an infant that had been swept from its mother’s arms as they descended. The flex-cuffed woman screamed hysterically until a translator arrived to explain. Burns said he found the baby unhurt. It had been blown through the wall of a nearby rag hut. The diary of a member of the 160th who asked not to be identified also notes the phenomenon—“the Black Hawk blew the baby right out of her arms and [it] rolled down the street.” “Yusuf was disappointed ... the shooting start,” Yusuf. The September 9 incident is noted in the UN Blue Book (p. 407), which officially notes one Pakistani soldier killed, two Paki soldiers injured, and three U.S. soldiers injured. The official account notes the use of TOW missiles and cannon by QRF Cobra helicopters, but does not estimate the number of Somali dead. It notes, “This incident was followed by media accusations of indiscriminate fire by UNOSOM, on Somali crowds. UNOSOM, admitting ‘numerous’ casualties on the Somali side among the combatants, denied the allegations, which remain unconfirmed.” The diary of the l 60th member records the skirmish and the Paki death and injuries, and goes on to say, obviously secondhand: “Well, it did not take long for the place to [be] considered a free fire zone, and in came the Cobras. They put two TOW missiles into the dozer so the locals could not get it, and the 20 mm cannon took out 30 to 40 of the bad guys.” The next day’s entry notes, “Well, as it turned out the skinnies are real pissed off, the Cobras killed as many as 100, they were shooting into crowds where they were taking fire. Remember, it was a free fire zone, for some reason, these people are strange, or maybe smart depending on how you look at it. They will use women as cover and concealment for when they shoot at us to make it harder to see who is doing the shooting, if we can see them at all. Then they call us killers of women and children when we shoot the very same people who are shooting at us and we kill some of the people that th
ey are using for cover.”

  2 Waddell, Nelson, DiTomasso.

  3 Dowdy, Frank, J. Yacone, B. Yacone, radio tapes.

  4 Nelson, DiTomasso, Diemer, Eversmann, Twombly, and radio tapes.

  5 Aden. His account of Super Six One’s downing and subsequent events checked out perfectly with battle video and accounts of men who survived the crash. Few unpaved streets in Mogadishu have official names. I have relied on Aden and on Bushir Sudi, a Mogadishu native who now lives in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, who assured me the streets around the first crash site were widely known as Marehan Road and, one block west of the crash, Wadigley.

  6 Battle video. Insights into Garrison’s predicament came from interviews with Dave McKnight, P. Howe, Marsh, and others.

  7 Nelson, DiTomasso, Waddell, Steele, Yurek.

  8 “Piloting the Little Bird ... up the alley.” Jones, battle video, Goffena, J. Yacone. “Lieutenant DiTomasso ... round the corner,” DiTomasso, Nelson. “As the rest ... coming out,” Jones, radio tapes. The quote from Busch is reported in the May 30, 1994, commemorative issue of The Army Times.

  9 Durant, Goffena, Jones, Frank, and B. Yacone. Some of the background on Durant came from reporting at the time of his capture by The Philadelphia Inquirer and The New York Times.

  10 “Admiral Jonathan Howe’s first inkling ... slipped away,” J. Howe, Oakley, Lake, Powell. Additional insights into Aidid are from Richburg’s Out of Africa, and from Michael Maren’s The Road to Hell, which argues that the UN and U.S. manhunt for Aidid significantly strengthened the warlord’s standing in Mogadishu. “Legend on the streets ... into a folk hero,” The story of Aidid’s escape from the UN cordon, which may be apocryphal, reflects the warlord’s growing local stature through this ordeal. It was told to me by Mohamed Hassan Farah. “The decision to attack ... Howe relented,” J. Howe, who still believes only about twenty Somalis were killed, and only key military planners for Aidid’s militia. “Howe kept pushing ... America’s white whale,” J. Howe, Lake, Powell, and Elizabeth Drew’s On the Edge, an account of Clinton’s first years in the White House. Drew’s is the best account I’ve read of the Somalia episode from the White House’s perspective. My requests to interview President Clinton were denied. “Task Force Ranger ... out of business,” January 5, 1994, memo from Garrison to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarizing the entire Task Force Rangers mission (hereafter “January 5 Garrison memo”). “Howe had initially ... razor wire,” J. Howe, January 5 Garrison memo. “Aidid was feeling ... very tense,” transcript of a September 26 interrogation of a clan “colonel.” This was the day after the 10th Mountain Division Black Hawk was shot down. The colonel told his interrogators, “As a result [of the downing] Aidid has received increased support and encouragement. Up until now the people did not believe he could destroy a helicopter, now they do. They are not as afraid of the helicopters as they were before.” The colonel also warned that Aidid was trying to assemble five hundred men to assault the airport Task Force Ranger base. “In late August ... Garrison’s pressure,” J. Howe, Oakley, Lake, On the Edge. “Peace had been the reason ... once and for all,” J. Howe.

  11 Abdi Karim Mohamud, who on several occasions acted as a guide for Peter Tobia and myself in Mogadishu. Abdi Karim and his friend Abdi Tahalil visited us several times and sat up late discussing the story. They brought us eyewitnesses to the fighting. Abdi Tahalil’s wife was shot on one of the earlier Ranger missions. She recovered, but will be unable to bear children. His brother was killed in the fighting around the target house on October 3. According to Abdi Tahalil, his brother was driving a taxi and got caught up in the assault. They found his charred remains inside the burned vehicle. A number of the American soldiers I interviewed expressed surprise at the employment of Somalis to perform work in and around U.S. compounds. Abdi Karim was employed at the old U.S. embassy, but there were Somalis who were contracted to do electrical work at the Task Force Ranger hangar and to service the portable toilets outside. Given that the Ranger base was considered secret enough to confiscate film from those who just snapped pictures of it from the outside, it seems odd that Somali workers were allowed inside. The workers all got a pretty good eyeful of the task force’s numbers, weapons, and locations inside the fences, information that would have been helpful to know—even just for the mortar crews who nightly lobbed rounds into the airport base.

  12 Schilling, USSOC report, battle video, radio tapes.

  13 Durant, Matthews, radio tapes, battle video, Goffena, J. Yacone.

  14 “After they had ... right rear window,” McLaughlin, Carlson. “About a hundred yards ... ‘We’re driving over,’” Eversmann, Steele. In his book To Fight with Intrepidity, Major John D. Lock notes Eversmann’s actions here as a significant lapse: “Eversmann informed his company commander that he was moving out when, in reality, he had no intention of doing so. Only by luck and accident were he and his men discovered by LTC McKnight when he drove by the squad’s position with his convoy. If it weren’t for this fortuitous moment, there would have been an additional twelve Rangers added to the KIA total.” Perhaps. I think Major Lock overstates the point. Eversmann did intend to follow Steele’s order to move his men out on foot, even though he didn’t convey to the captain how difficult this was going to be. Had Chalk Four not been picked up by the convoy and been stranded, it certainly is possible that they would all have been killed. It’s also possible they would have been spotted from the air, or been able to move to the crash site on foot. “Schilling provided ... still, unscathed,” Schilling, Eversmann, Gay. “Nobody in the rear ... fret over it,” Spalding, Gay, Burns, Othic, P. Howe, Schilling, McLaughlin, etc.

  15 Goffena, J. Yacone, radio tapes, Durant.

  16 “Yousuf Dahir Mo’alim ... ran on ahead.” Mo’alim. The description of the nature of Aidid’s militia comes from Mo’alim and also my interview with militia leader Sharif Ali Mohamed and with Oakley and Bryden. In the September 26 interrogation of the cooperative Habr Gidr “colonel,” he explained, “First you must understand you are dealing with essentially two different groups of people here. The first group are Aidid’s ‘Revengers’ who are given money and khat prior to an operation. If they complete an operation successfully, they receive the remainder of their pay. These people will not lay down their weapons as long as Aidid continues to pay them. The second group are the innocents, the ones who live in the neighborhoods the revengers launch their attacks from. Once the U.S./UNOSOM launch a reactionary or counterattack, innocent people have their homes damaged, and are sometimes killed and/or wounded. These events Aidid follows up with such propaganda as, ‘First they will kill your family, then enslave you, then force you to change your religion.’ Most families don’t understand what is going on, and know if they speak up the revengers will kill them. Aidid has no solid, organized force. His tendency is to use small groups like revengers, of which there are no more than 50 or 60. They hide within the people—because he knows your response will hurt the people, turning them against you.” Radio warnings of approaching Aidid militia conform in time, description, and direction of approach to the movement of Mo’alim and his men. There were other groups moving at the same time and in the same manner and direction. “Ali Hussein ... the running crowd,” Ali Hussein.

  17 “In ordinary circumstances ... from those places,” Matthews, battle video, Burns, Schilling, Gay, P. Howe. “There was an added ... situation really was,” McMahon. “Eversmann, still lying ... the hornet’s nest,” Eversmann, Schilling. Schilling went to great lengths to help me with this chapter. His friend and former colleague, Technical Sergeant Tim Wilkinson, had strongly urged me to phone Dan months earlier, but I didn’t get around to contacting him until after the first version of this chapter had already appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer. My mistake. Dan clarified the meandering course taken by the convoy, and helped me understand how and why the confusion took place (although that’s an issue that deserves even more scrutiny than I’ve been able to give it here). We did sever
al phone interviews, and Dan wrote a compelling sixteen-page narrative that has vastly improved my account, and now forms the backbone of this chapter. He was able to place the events that occurred on this terrible drive in chronological order, and even drew a detailed map of the convoy’s convoluted course. Critics of the battle have focused primarily on the political decisions that dictated what equipment the troops had, and on General Garrison’s decision to commit the force in daylight (although three of the previous six successful missions had been done in daytime). To me, the communications mix-up that left five soldiers dead and dozens badly injured was the single biggest snafu of the battle. “The convoy was bearing south ... pushed on,” radio tapes, Schilling. “Heavy fire ... to shape things up,” Eversmann, P. Howe. Howe spoke at length to Rierson in the days after the fight and recorded his buddy’s angry recollections of the lost convoy in his diary. I walked the streets around crash site one, and found them particularly deceptive because, while they appear to form a neat grid, they in fact often do not. Just when you think you have the pattern fixed in your head, you find a road that strays off at one angle or another. To the eye of a foreigner, every block looks the same. “As they passed ... right over him,” McLaughlin, Carlson, Spalding, and an account of A. Rodriguez’s experience recorded by an army historian. “The convoy stopped ... ‘he’s gonna die!’” Spalding, Hand, Carlson, Gay. “The convoy lurched forward ... shrieked with pain,” Schilling, Burns, Spalding. “The volume of fire ... own pouches,” Schilling.