An Englishman Abroad

by Gianluca Barneschi

  Having decided that the agent would be parachuted into the area of operations, a further condition was also applied to the Pallinode mission, one that applied only every four weeks: a full moon. Usually, except in emergencies, SOE was given priority for parachute delivery of both matériel and agents when the moon was full. Weighing up the risks and benefits between active and passive visibility, it was decided that the needs of pilots, who often had to recognize light signals marking out drop zones, and those of parachuting agents, who preferred the best visibility possible even if this made them more visible and easier to intercept, should prevail.

  On 14 January, a message was sent to Bern, the apparently banal contents of which help contextualize the situation at the time and, in particular, the lasting confidence that SOE’s leadership placed in agent 900. When Cairo station proposed giving the special agent arriving in Trieste 130,000 lire in notes and diamonds (a very large sum), the Swiss station was asked for its opinion, given that, on the one hand, this benefitted Bern as its available funds for both agent 900 and its other activities would thus not be depleted, while on the other it might look as if the organization had granted agent 900 too much financial freedom and control.

  With the wisdom of Solomon, a proposal was made to provide the agent with a hidden reserve of 30,000 lire, while at the same time making it appear that he continued to depend on agent 900 for his maintenance. A message dated 15 February reveals the matter was concluded by giving the agent a further 100,000 lire destined for 900’s group.

  Bern assented, but warned Cairo on 18 February that the possession of currency would considerably increase risk if the agent was captured or investigated. This was one of the Swiss station’s few commendable acts of foresight.

  In the meantime, ‘agent Olaf’ had come into existence. The first time this codename was assigned to Mallaby for the mission comes in a ‘double message’ dated 17 January.13 Even by British standards, Mallaby was evidently northern-European looking.

  A further double message the following day from Bern stated that his arrival in Trieste could not take place before 7 February.14 News from Trieste stated that the occupants of the apartment at No. 14 Via Diaz had decided to move away because of the Allied bombing, and so a new address was given, care of Mrs Paoletti, No. 65 Via dei Porta.

  The original pass phrase had changed little: agent Olaf would present himself saying that he had been sent by Remo Dussi, to meet Mr Marco.

  Mallaby continued his training in Cairo, whilst still acting as a radio-telegraphy instructor. Two further lunar phases passed by, but still the mission did not begin. In all the uncertainty, Dick Mallaby threw another party.15

  The Italians, meanwhile, were not sitting twiddling their thumbs: Dick Mallaby continued, randomly or otherwise, to be a subject of attention for the Italian intelligence services.

  A confidential memo from the Ministry of the Interior, dated 11 February 1943, indicated that he was to be found in Addis Ababa with the Intelligence Service ‘attending special training courses, together with some Italian subjects resident there, for eventual acts of sabotage on Italian territory’. The information was mostly correct, apart from the geographical location, and showed that, beyond Italy and Switzerland, gaps in SOE’s veil of secrecy had appeared in Africa too.

  In the same memo it was reported that Dick’s father Cecil Mallaby had made a conspicuous gift of 1,000 lire to the Fascist Federation of Siena in the last weeks of 1935, with an accompanying letter in which he expressed his ‘disdain for the unjust and disloyal behaviour of Great Britain towards Italy and his solidarity with Mussolini’s Italy’. Over the following years, however, his attitude towards the Fascist regime had changed radically, so much so that, in 1940, the Centro CS (Counterespionage Centre) in Florence had him filed as follows: ‘diehard Anglophile, openly opposed to Axis policy, holds hostile feelings towards the Regime, which he makes no attempt to hide’.

  The memo concluded by stating that ‘at the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Great Britain, Mallaby and his wife, although not subject to internment restrictions, were however required not to leave Poggio Pinci [their residence in Asciano] without permission. Their property was seized and handed to the Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank’.16

  On 4 February, Cairo sent word that the operation would begin around 14 February, with the destination firstly Split and then Trieste. But once again the mission start date was postponed, due partly to the unavailability of transport, but also to doubts concerning the validity, security and functionality of the Maraschino and Maraschino Orange cryptographic codes (which used decryption keys taken from Giovanni Papini’s 1939 work Italia mia – My Italy).17

  At Cairo station, having relayed the postponement with a certain degree of resignation, all that remained to keep the mission on the boil was to confirm agent D/E 42’s return to barracks, stating that his successor, D/H 449, was proving to be ‘far more satisfactory’ for the ‘new way ahead’ identified. Given the lingering uncertainty, coupled with the new agent’s perceived value, the possibility of assigning him to another operation was mooted, and from the message it can be understood that this ‘new way ahead’ consisted of a secret overseas mission and the delivery of matériel, in particular radios, into enemy territory.

  The unknown author of this top-secret memo was forced to admit that the lack of aircraft caused considerable problems, hence the need for alternative solutions.

  Thus the idea of using Mallaby in an operation connected to the Tigrotti group (the Tiger Cubs – another fictitious Italian resistance group that had infiltrated SOE, run by Italian secret agent Luca Osteria and managed by OVRA) took shape, for which he would travel by sea and provide operational support to agent Galea. The agent, whose real name was Giacomino Sarfatti, had been personally recruited by McCaffery in 1940 and his installation in Italy (arranged with the help of agent 900) was considered one of SOE’s greatest successes on the Italian peninsula.

  Once again McCaffery and his team had not the faintest idea how things really stood.

  Agent Galea was in fact another example of model counterespionage. Sarfatti was Jewish just like Klein, but in contrast to agent 900, he was also a genuine anti-fascist at a time when they were few and widely dispersed; however, his actions were similarly controlled and managed by SIM, whose personnel sought to achieve even greater results.18

  On 19 February 1943, agent D/H 449’s personnel card was formalized. The key identification data was as follows:

  Sergeant Cecil Richard Mallaby, unmarried, not interested in politics, able to speak perfect English and Italian, very good French and also good German; completed schooling in Italy and England.

  real age: 23

  apparent age: 21

  height: 1.79m

  weight: 70kg

  face: Long. Fresh, clear complexion.

  front profile: Oblique and irregular.

  eyes: Sky blue and deep set.

  nose: Straight. Nostrils visible.

  mouth: Full.

  chin: With a light dimple, well defined and clean-shaven.

  hair: Straight, combed back, blond but credibly brown for operational purposes.

  distinctive marks: Scars on the right cheek, right elbow and both shins. Heart-shaped tattoo on the left forearm, red spot on the right thigh. Walks in a very upright manner.

  This card failed to foresee Mallaby’s future operational roles, given that (whether due to secrecy, a lack of updating or pure carelessness) it stated he could have made a useful employee, or at best an electrician!

  The card specified, among the relevant notes, his familiarity with the area around Modena (and almost all of Tuscany), his marked Tuscan accent and his Nordic appearance.

  In his application form for his training course, which was probably written for formal reasons on 23 March 1943, Mallaby declared himself to be a Catholic, and listed his order of preference for service duties: in special assault troops; in the secret services; or the infantry. He also highli
ghted having attended parachute, sabotage and assault courses. In the section completed by his commanding officer, all this was confirmed, as was his excellent skill in radio transmissions and sabotage, as well as his sound military attitude and good discipline.

  In the weeks that followed, exchanges between Cairo and London reveal that Mallaby’s first mission was still the subject of confused and wavering proposals and significant operational difficulties. These did not only come from transport and radio communications issues, but also the political and military situation in Italy, which was deemed unfavourable. Mallaby, eager to enter the fray, asked if he could take part in other operations, provided they were in a more advanced state of execution.

  A new plan was drawn up that envisaged arrival by submarine in the area between Pescara and Bari, before probably heading for Naples. On 24 February, a message from Cairo objected that the submarine option would be even dicier than the parachute one, and pointed out that:

  1while agent Olaf might be in agreement, it should be considered as to whether the proposed change of destination introduces further risks, given his decidedly Nordic appearance;

  2the new cryptographic keys would be given to the agent only when the operational agreements with the Tigrotti and the details relating to transport had been finalized;

  3on the basis of previous experience, changes to missions tended to disturb agents, especially when the alternative plan was not yet confirmed;

  4given the apparent difficulty in getting in touch with the Tigrotti group, all decisions should be left to London;

  5for sake of his morale and trust, it was important to assign agent Olaf to some form of mission.

  A message dated 4 March from Cairo, which announced yet another postponement of the operation until April’s full moon due to a lack of transport, stated that agent Olaf was not showing signs of exhaustion.

  Time continued to pass, but little certainty ensued.

  Further messages in May 1943 reveal how erratic the situation was: on the 5th, SOE’s Bern station suggested that Mallaby could reach Italy via the same route used by agent Galea, pointing out that entry into Switzerland from France would become more difficult after 17 May. A parachute entry was thus proposed.

  The following day’s reply revealed total confusion, signalling the preference for a drop over France ‘in consideration of its non-hostile population’ and asking for agent 900’s help in organizing a reception team. Massingham, however, on 7 May noted that the drop over France might be dangerous if the agent did not speak good French. On 10 May, Cairo, more lucidly, stated that Mallaby’s false identity needed to be that of an Alsatian, considering the fact that Mallaby did not speak excellent French (and had an accent) and his appearance was decidedly Nordic.

  Although this might suggest that a new mission was being planned on French soil (which consistently absorbed a significant part of SOE’s European activities), it was in fact merely exploring different ways of getting the agent to Italy.

  Indecision continued to reign supreme, as further messages of this period mention Monte Nevoso – the highest point in the Karst region, which marked the border between Italy and Yugoslavia between 1920 and 1947 – as an alternative drop zone.

  Mallaby’s deep desire to ‘enter the fray’ would have been wiped out by his instinct for self-preservation if he knew of the lack of certainty hanging over his first mission. Things remained vague and unclear, and agent Olaf was even at risk of being replaced and sent on another operation (Operation Cockney).19

  The messages sent between Algiers, Cairo and London on 13 May 1943 confirm again the operational difficulties; the only new aspect was the mention of a mysterious agent 1400, who was attempting to organize Mallaby’s arrival in Italy in the Lake Garda zone.20

  At last, after a few more days, the fundamental elements of the mission began to come together, when the RAF announced that finally a plane in North Africa was ready to transport agent Olaf to the objective.

  What was still missing, however, was the objective itself.

  There was still little certainty regarding the so-called ‘reception committee’ (those on the ground who were supposed to help Mallaby facilitate his mission); thus, the pragmatic – yet even riskier – proposal to send Mallaby in blind (i.e. without a reception committee) began to form, provided he could be guaranteed a safe house.21

  All the delays and indecision did have some positive side effects. Had Mallaby entered action as planned in the first part of 1943 and up to 25 July, he would have automatically become one of the many agents caught – and most likely shot, if counterespionage attempts to interrogate and/or turn him had not succeeded. Alternatively, he might have been exchanged for Italian prisoners, should there be a desire to do so on the Italian side.

  In the meantime, a further mission detail was finalized, with the creation of Mallaby’s fictitious identity, which was as follows: Aldo Guazzini, son of Giuseppe and Maria Winter (whose foreign surname would explain his Nordic features, blond hair and blue eyes); born 28 April 1923 in Sinalunga; resident at No. 27 Via Pisana, Florence; occupation – student.

  Sinalunga is in Siena Province, a few kilometres from where Mallaby had spent his childhood and adolescence. Guazzini is a fairly common Tuscan surname and two Guazzinis – Aldo and Alfio, coincidentally from Sinalunga – had been friends and schoolmates of Mallaby’s at the Convitto Nazionale Celso Tolomei in Siena a few years earlier, as the young Mallaby’s diary testifies. Guazzino is also a district of Sinalunga town, about 20km from where the Mallaby family continued to live.

  It is therefore clear that Mallaby not only participated in the construction of this false identity, but that he also – given that his mind would be bristling with cryptographic codes, information and various cover stories – made use of familiar references from his past, which could be simply recalled using mnemonic hooks.

  This constructed reality, based on true and false elements, remained a constant in his missions and in the explanations he gave in moments of difficulty.

  On 29 May, a further piece of the puzzle fell into place. Mallaby received an order to go to Algiers – officially for further specific training, but actually for the launch of his mission.22 Once again, Mallaby had to request an advance on his salary to pay for a farewell party for his comrades.

  At long last, in the first days of June 1943, Dick Mallaby reached the base officially known as Inter-Services Signals Unit 6, but universally known by the few who were aware of this secret institution by its codename Massingham.

  Massingham was established in November 1942 in Africa and located, from February 1943, near a secluded pine grove in Guyotville, 24km west of Algiers, at a former bathing establishment, the ‘Club des Pins’.

  Massingham was both an operations and a training base, a rare occurrence, and served both SOE and American OSS personnel; it also hosted agents from all the European nations in which SOE operated, including, after September 1943, Italy. Logistically, the base was well located, in that not only was it close to Blida airport and Allied Force HQ in Algiers, but the beach and the surrounding dunes made for excellent training sites for parachute jumps and water landings.

  In the words of Douglas Dodds-Parker, who was commander of the base from January 1943 and became a senior Conservative MP and junior minister after the war, Massingham was primarily a ‘playboy’s paradise’ and was established ‘for wide-ranging, but undefined tasks; it was to serve as a base for subsequent operations to the north, in France and Corsica and possibly in Italy, whose secret police, OVRA, were the most efficient in Europe’.23

  Mallaby’s mission was top secret – so much so that, exercising extreme caution, all technical equipment was to travel separately from the agent. Officially, even in the eyes of his Massingham colleagues, Mallaby was a regular member of the Cairo broadcasting section, sent to the base for a cypher refresher course, at the end of which he would return to Egypt.

  Yet the plan for Mallaby was altogether different – as wa
s his destination. Dick Mallaby was heading for Italy and would never return to Cairo.24

  Up to that moment, SOE had achieved little of significance in terms of special operations within the Kingdom of Italy’s European territory. In general terms, between 1940 and 1943, things had not gone the way the British had expected – indeed quite the opposite, as demonstrated by the disastrous outcome of Operation Colossus, the British attempt in February 1941 to destroy the Apulian Aqueduct and deprive the ports of Bari, Brindisi and Taranto of fresh water.25

  The next document concerning Mallaby is dated 8 June 1943 and indicates that the operation was scheduled for the night of 16/17 June.

  It seemed like the time was finally right, as on 10 June 1943, a highly detailed report was circulated among the few relevant departments regarding agent Olaf, his training and the matériel with which he would parachute into Italy. Mallaby was to travel with a toilet bag containing a quartz crystal oscillator hidden in a shaving brush and seven more inside a box, and three sets of cryptographic codes – Maraschino Orange (for communications with Massingham), Maraschino (for those with London) and Pallinode (for Cairo) – as well as a very large amount of money.26

  In addition to the identity card in the name of Aldo Guazzini issued by Florence Comune (the city’s municipality), Mallaby carried the following: a blank identity card; a blank driving licence issued by Florence Comune and another issued by Trieste Comune; a temporary unlimited leave document; various photo cards; a letter of presentation addressed to Francesco Parisi (a warehouse owner, whose role will soon be revealed); and various small items.

  The person who drafted the inventory, noting that Mallaby had become a high-level radio operator, recommended a careful check before his departure, especially regarding his clothing, as agent Olaf was not a fan of some of the items and was suspected of wanting to get rid of them. On the document, which pointed out that Mallaby ‘was almost ready to make a few disappear’, a handwritten note exclaims, ‘The follies of youth!’27