An Englishman Abroad

by Gianluca Barneschi

  Evaluating its cost-benefit ratio in concrete terms, Operation Sunrise could be considered a profitable example of the pragmatic and dynamic interaction between espionage, diplomacy and military activities, resulting from the action of special forces.

  It is clear that the decision of the United States to agree to negotiate with one of the most important members of Germany’s most criminal military organization helped avoid further Nazi crimes, wanton destruction and violence.

  Dick Mallaby, for the second time, had been at the centre of the most secret and historic negotiations. In the first mission, he was decisive strategically, though by chance, and his role, however fundamental and remarkable, was essentially a passive one. In his second mission, what Mallaby achieved in an improvised manner was decisive and was the fruit of his abilities, enlivened by the desperation of the moment.

  Winning is hard enough, but turning two disasters into triumph is a very rare achievement.

  Furthermore, analysis of Mallaby’s last mission brings out further testimony regarding the German betrayal of the RSI, and the contrastingly loyal behaviour of Italy’s leaders, who, after Mallaby’s capture and initial interrogation, handed him over to their allies.

  In Erich Kuby’s Il tradimento tedesco (The German Betrayal), the deceptions perpetrated by the Germans against the Italians are summarized, as further reflections of the Mallaby–Wolff affair: Mussolini’s suspicions, following news of the release of Parri on Wolff’s order (labelled the ‘ultimate limit of infamy’ against Il Duce); the launching of various enquiries and of the surrender negotiations, with the Italians kept completely in the dark; and Wolff’s overriding of the attempts to negotiate based around Cardinal Schuster and his right-hand man, Monsignor Giuseppe Bicchierai.37

  Wolff and his family ran great risks. In the atmosphere of the general decay of the Third Reich, which pitched all against all even within the monolithic structure of the SS, his negotiations, which were more or less known to Himmler and SS Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, could have brought him before the firing squad.

  Adding confusion to confusion and danger to danger in those days, crude opportunistic moves were also made by those taking advantage of the moment for their own unrealistic purposes. A further, well-documented threat to achieving the ‘surrender of the 800,000’ came from the head of the autonomous Tyrol/Vorarlberg Province, Franz Hofer, who risked wrecking the negotiations between the Germans and the Allies in order to further his own unrealistic aim of creating an enlarged Tyrolean state including parts of Austria, Alto Adige and Bavaria.38

  The Americans, to all intents and purposes, repaid Karl Wolff following the German surrender. He was first helped to escape and then received very favourable treatment in the post-war trials. In fact, he should by right have been one of the defendants, and convicted, at the Nuremberg trials.

  According to Smith and Aga-Rossi: ‘On the basis of the recently declassified documentation, it is now possible to state that Allen Dulles, who until that time seemed to have lost interest in Wolff, played a crucial role in the decision taken by the Commission to exclude him from the Nuremberg list.’

  Thus, in a telegram to the head of the OSS, Donovan, sent on 23 August 1945, Dulles wrote: ‘I think it is possible that Wolff will be included in some list for the trials against war criminals. Instead, I propose that he not be included in the first group, so as to prevent him from using his version of Sunrise to defend himself.’39

  Thus, the Nuremberg trials, against Göring, Hess, von Ribbentrop and the others, saw Wolff appear only as a witness, as a result of the fear instilled deliberately and cunningly by Dulles that Wolff could reveal too much about the surrender negotiations. Wolff, however, was kept in protective custody by the Americans while other countries requested his extradition, and was interned in a psychiatric hospital for acute paranoia until the spring of 1946. Subsequently, he managed to escape trial even when investigations by the British started for the crimes that took place in Italy between 1943 and 1945.

  The former SS-Obergruppenführer was finally charged in June 1949 in a fairly minor trial in Hamburg. His defence benefitted from sworn affidavits (sanitized so as not to create diplomatic embarrassment with the Soviet Union) from the main Allied protagonists of Operation Sunrise, as well as the in-trial testimony of Allen Dulles’ colleague Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz.40

  Despite his high rank and his clear knowledge of and participation in the criminal activities of the SS in Italy, Wolff was sentenced to the minimum term of four years and then released, his period in custody having already been taken into account.41

  But in January 1962, just when the heavy responsibilities of the past seemed to have been lifted from his shoulders, Karl Wolff suffered an interruption to his business career and was arrested for trial once again, for his active participation in the Holocaust. This time, out of his former collaborators in Operation Sunrise, only one, Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz, came forward to testify in his favour.

  Wolff was sentenced to 15 years in prison for collaborating in the murder of 300,000 Jews. He was released after six years for health reasons. He continued to live in the German Federal Republic, where he died in 1984.

  Dick Mallaby’s last mission has also been explored by other authors, highlighting some interesting details about the overall situation in Italy in the final part of the war.

  In Giuseppe Parlato’s Fascisti senza Mussolini, the author explains why Rodolfo Graziani refused to meet Dick Mallaby. Based on comments by Junio Valerio Borghese, a hard-line fascist and RSI naval commander, Parlato records that Graziani did not consider it appropriate to have contact with Mallaby ‘due to excessive loyalty’. Moreover, on the basis of OSS documents, held in the United States, the author reveals that Borghese ‘had ordered that the British officer be tracked down, in order to continue the negotiations that, nipped in the bud by Graziani, were then concluded with the Germans; unfortunately, contact was not possible since the British officer had already reached Switzerland.’42

  Sergio Nesi provides details on Junio Valerio Borghese’s assessments and proposals (and also his erroneous information and assumptions). According to Nesi, Graziani informed the Germans and Mussolini of the arrival of Mallaby-Tucker, and the Germans ‘took over the British officer, forced him to speak and precluded any possibility of him contacting the head of the Armed Forces of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana’. Borghese commented:

  The failure to meet with Tucker, which was due to German prevarication and, it must be said, to the questionable behaviour of Graziani, was fatal. In fact, the armistice agreement signed in Caserta between Wolff and Alexander, which excluded representatives of our Armed Forces, had witnessed, among the intermediaries, the same Captain ‘Tucker’.43

  Moreover, on the basis of specific statements made by Borghese in the post-war period, it is clear that he knew from Wolff, with whom he was in constant personal contact, about his negotiations with the Allies.

  In all this, the not so well informed (albeit suspicious) Mussolini remained loyal to the Germans, but finally had a rude awakening on 25 April in the Archbishopric of Milan, when he officially learnt of the German betrayal.

  Rodolfo Graziani, the Minister of Defence in the RSI, recalls the events in his published memoirs as follows:

  Captain Tooker [sic], who spoke excellent Italian, declared that he had been tasked with an important mission involving me by Field Marshal Alexander, but he was not allowed to disclose it to anyone other than me … He confirmed the plan of Field Marshal Alexander, to make contact with me, to get the Germans to withdraw from Italy to avoid destroying the industrial infrastructure, works of art and more. In truth this was superfluous, because its object was the same as one of my principal purposes. Di [sic] Leo, having completed the first interrogation, had to direct the officer to Colonel Helferik [sic], a German liaison officer in the SID, who put him in contact with General Haster in Verona. General Wolff later announced that he had been sent back to Switzerland
with a special mission, which he did not specify.44

  Cesare Rossi, one of the original fascists, and Mussolini’s former press officer in the 1920s, in his Trentatré vicende mussoliniane (Thirty-Three Mussolini Episodes) provides some interesting points on what Mussolini actually knew of the affair:

  One day, between February and March 1945, the Lecco Brigate Nera arrested at the Swiss border a guide, a priest and a British officer, who gave his name as Captain Toocker [sic] and claimed to be on a mission from Field Marshal Alexander to Graziani …

  Mussolini also learned of the capture of the two and on that occasion complained that neither Ambassador Rahn nor Wolff had ever informed him about their movements. He added: ‘Yet I know that they are negotiating with the CLN’, a suspicion that he should not have found to be completely unknown and defenceless. On the afternoon of April 25, in Schuster’s antechamber, he learned the unwelcome news of the agreement reached for the surrender of German troops.45

  A secret message, undated but clearly from February 1945, reveals further key details. It was written by Paolo Porta, Commander of the Brigate Nere Cesare Rodini di Como, and is among the declassified documents in the British archives. It also helps us to understand the atmosphere of ‘dog eat dog’ that dominated the final months of the RSI. Porta’s message was stimulated by Mussolini himself, as it starts with the phrase: ‘Duce in accordance with your request’. According to Porta’s message, following his capture, Mallaby’s urgent request for a meeting with Rodolfo Graziani was immediately reported to Brigadier-General Facdouelle, who, after his meeting with Mallaby, was told to inform Mussolini about the matter.46

  According to Vincenzo Alberto Mellini Ponce de León, Foreign under secretary of the RSI, Mussolini later commented with bitterness: ‘I’ve learned that the infamous British captain about whom – when he was in our hands – a big fuss was made, has been set free and tasked with communicating messages from the Allied Supreme Headquarters. Neither Rahn nor Wolff mentioned anything to me about this either.’47

  Dick’s father, Cecil Mallaby, had been officially informed on 22 March 1945 that Dick was safe and well, although it would take a little over a month before father and son were reunited. Eventually, after a long period of absence, Dick was able to return to his Tuscan home, to spend his birthday with his family.

  A precise reconstruction of the closing stages of Dick Mallaby’s wartime service is made possible by his father’s diaries. Dick’s own private memoirs, after a detailed summary of his second mission, end by recalling: ‘after a few more weeks in Bern I was sent to France and then to Naples and our base in Siena’, evidently not wishing to mention the most bitter phase of his wartime service.

  In the euphoric spring of 1945, the Mallaby family’s properties in Asciano, given their proximity to Siena, became a kind of after-work club for No. 1 Special Force’s personnel. Often, as on 26 April, marking Mallaby’s 26th birthday, large-scale dance parties were organized, and among the participants were numerous famous figures from SOE and the Italian resistance, many of whom mentioned the place in their memoirs. SOE agent Henry Boutigny, who was perhaps the most frequent visitor to the Mallaby house, met his future wife at one of these convivial gatherings.

  But this time Dick Mallaby’s efforts were not recognized: he received no award or honour for the results of his second mission.

  Roseberry, now no longer a part of SOE, sent another letter to Mallaby on 28 August 1945, in which, among other things, he informed him that his successor (caustically known as ‘Pipsqueak’) had not been best pleased to read the history of SOE’s Italy department, which Roseberry himself had penned. Roseberry concluded: ‘Pity you didn’t call in at the office; they might have let you read a copy and see how much space I gave to your little escapade’.

  Roseberry’s letter ended on a note of bitterness that he decided to share with Mallaby:

  Strange, but I feel almost a relief that in the case of most of the old crowd, I need never bother to see them again. I think I stayed on too long. While the work was hot, one did not have time to observe all the petty intrigue and jockeying for personal advancement. It stood out miles when it became necessary to reduce staffs.

  A few months later, by which point the tensions and paranoia of the time had mostly dissolved, it was the turn of Dick Hewitt, head of No. 1 Special Force in the final months of the war, to send a heartfelt, unconventional note of personal thanks to Dick Mallaby. The handwritten letter, dated 12 September 1945 and on a No. 1 Special Force letterhead, began:

  My dear Dick.

  I wanted to send you a few lines, now that the unit has broken up, to thank you very much indeed for all that you did for us both in the field and at base. It was a contribution quite unsurpassed by anybody, and I want you to know that I am deeply grateful to you for all the support you gave me.

  On 23 June 1946, Hewitt handwrote a reference letter for Mallaby, in which he highlighted the following:

  Captain C. R. Mallaby, M.C., served under my command for nearly two years in Italy, from September 1943 to August 1945, and during this time I came to know him well and to appreciate his fine qualities. He was employed in Italy on special service, and he performed two missions behind the enemy lines which called for the greatest courage, endurance, and initiative, with high success. Although he was continually pressing to be allowed to proceed on operational work, he was in fact engaged on the staff for some months; and there he showed real ability in administrative and office duties. He was, however, most happy when undertaking outdoor work of a hazardous nature. He speaks fluent Italian and good French and has a home in Italy. He is also a fully qualified signals officer, and he has a highly developed artistic sense. In addition to this, he is easy to get on with and was always well liked by his fellow officers and men.

  Captain Mallaby has an extremely distinguished war record, an attractive personality, and many of the qualities which should make him successful in civilian life. He fully deserves, and would amply repay, assistance of any kind.

  Eight days prior to this, Gerard Holdsworth had penned a similar reference for Dick Mallaby:

  Captain Mallaby, M.C., served under my command for upwards of three years. He volunteered for service behind the enemy lines and in due course was parachuted into Northern Italy some little while before the Allied Forces assaulted the European mainland. He was arrested by the Italian authorities, was taken to Rome for interrogation where he behaved magnificently under most rigorous handling. At this time secret armistice negotiations with Badoglio and his followers were commenced. They were handicapped by lack of direct and speedy communication. Mallaby is a highly skilled W/T operator and on the off chance that he still survived his name was passed to the Badoglio party as one suitable for the establishment of direct communication between Italy and A.F.H.Q. The Badoglio party discovered and released him from prison, and provided him with the necessary equipment with which he was quickly able to establish contact with A.F.H.Q.

  From that time onwards Mallaby was responsible for the receipt and transmission of all message between the Allied authorities and the armistice-seeking Italians. Weeks of the most arduous work followed, culminating in the Armistice and the Allied landings on the Italian mainland.

  I met Mallaby in Brindisi, and was amazed to find that, in spite of the great mental and physical ordeal through which he had passed, he remained the same calm, efficient and cheerful young officer I had despatched from a North African airport months before.

  He continuously volunteered for further service in enemy territory, but it was not until close on the final collapse of the Germans that I finally consented to his carrying out another mission. Through no fault of his own he was again arrested and would have undoubtedly been executed had he not conceived a brilliant stratagem which caused a member of the German High Command to send him to Switzerland as an emissary between himself and the Allied Authorities.

  The courage, resourcefulness and general ability of this young officer made an in
calculable contribution to the Allied war effort in the Mediterranean. Such astonishing achievements by one so young might well have turned his head, but Mallaby has not changed. He remains a quiet, self-effacing Englishman of the highest quality.

  The positive testimonies of those who knew Dick Mallaby were not, therefore, mere formalities, nor were they taken for granted, but coolly emphasized his qualities and the exceptional nature of his wartime activities, as well as his human gifts and artistic talents.

  Dick and Christine met up once again, but this time without the risk of losing each other, and began the journey of their life together…

  6

  Aftermath

  (Family – The end – Scattered and repressed memories)

  Truth is the daughter of time.

  Aulus Gellius (c. AD 125–180)

  Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing ever happened.

  Sir Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965)

  Cecil Richard Dallimore-Mallaby was officially promoted to captain for services rendered to his country on 17 August 1946, according to the War Office’s notification. By that date, his military escapades had long been over.

  His post-war life was certainly less adventurous, but was still lively and unusual, and still featured the odd special mission.

  Between 1945 and 1948, Mallaby lived mainly in Reading, where on 30 March 1946 (his mother’s birthday) he married Christine, who had left the FANY with the rank of sergeant. After the birth of their first child, Caroline Mary (in Milan on 24 April 1947), from 1949 to 1951 the Mallaby family lived in Southampton, where Dick attended the faculty of engineering from October 1949. It was there, on 19 June 1951, that their second daughter was born, Elizabeth Spray, whose unusual middle name reflected Mallaby’s passion for sailing.