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Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

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by Bart Schultz


  possible, a philosophical school in Cambridge” (M ). By , he was

  lecturing on moral and mental philosophy and, as noted earlier, busily

  defining the Cambridge school by contrasting it with Oxford’s Literae

  Humaniores. Ultimately, he would expand the role of Lecturer to encom-

  pass more individual teaching.

  With the return of Maurice, as Knightbridge Professor, it looked as

  though Cambridge philosophy would have a decidedly reformist bent.

  As Rothblatt has argued, Maurice “was an Apostle who had returned

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  to Cambridge especially to guide the new generation.” Whether it was

  Maurice or Sidgwick who did the guiding is unclear, but in any event

  they worked together at close quarters – notably in the discussion society

  known as the Grote Club – until Maurice’s death, in .

  The Grote Club, it should be added, was a singularly important venue

  for this work. Its origins are somewhat hazy, but it seems to have included

  from the start at least John Grote, Sidgwick, J. B. Mayor, and Aldis Wright,

  and to have been a faculty discussion group largely devoted to philosophy.

  Grote, who was both Knightbridge Professor and vicar at the parish at

  Trumpington, was the senior member and host, once the meetings ceased

  being held in various members’ rooms and were moved to his vicarage.

  As a (slightly) later member, John Venn, noted, Grote was an admirable

  moderator: “Nothing escaped his keen and critical judgment, and he as-

  serted himself just sufficiently to draw out the thoughts of those who were

  shy in expressing themselves, and to keep the conversation from strag-

  gling into side issues.” He also had an “extreme aversion to any dogmatic

  statement,” and Sidgwick found this most Apostolic, as he explained in

  an  letter to Dakyns:

  The kind of talk we have at Trumpington, my “Apostolic” training makes me in

  some respects appreciate peculiarly. Consequently, I am a sort of Thaliarchus at

  that feast of reason, i.e. other men may be truer , in fact, I know they are,

  but I am a genial !. But at Cambridge there is a good deal of the feast

  of reason if you know where to look for it, and if you evade shams. But there is

  very little of the flow of soul. We communicate in one kind (this is not a ribald

  joke, but a profound allegory).

  Distinguished names – but ’tis, somehow,

  As if they played at being names

  Still more distinguished.

  This is becoming a motto of mine, not of course with regard to Cambridge, but

  to our age. (M )

  Apparently, the Apostles and the Grote Club were for Sidgwick the two

  speculative societies at Cambridge that especially encouraged the flow of

  soul. According to John Gibbins, “Grote trained Sidgwick in impartiality,

  fair-mindedness, and the rigorous enquiring style that is generally held to

  be the most characteristic and praiseworthy feature of The Methods of Ethics

  of , and of George Moore’s Principia Ethica of . He also helped

  reform Trinity College, the Knightbridge Chair of Moral Philosophy and

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  the Moral Science Tripos significantly, before Sidgwick.” For his part,

  Sidgwick would sometimes wonder just what he had got from Grote; as

  he put it to Dakyns, in a letter of :

  I have less of a creed, philosophically speaking. I think I have more knowledge of

  what the thoughts of men have been, and a less conscious faculty of choosing the

  true and refusing the false among them.

  I wonder whether I shall remain a boy all my life in this respect. I do not say

  this paradoxically, but having John Grote in my mind, who certainly retained,

  with the freshness, the indecisiveness of youth till the day of his death [sic].

  I wonder whether we are coming to an age of general indecisiveness; I do not

  mean the frivolous scepticism of modern Philistines (I almost prefer the frivolous

  dogmatism of ancient ditto), but the feeling of a man who will not make up his

  mind till mankind has. I feel that this standpoint is ultimately indefensible, because mankind have never made up their mind except in consequence of some individual

  having done so. Still there seems to me to be a dilemma. In the present age an

  educated man must either be prophet or persistent sceptic – there seems no media

  via. (M –)

  As the following chapter will suggest, this emphasis on doubt and con-

  sensus was given formal expression in the epistemology of the Methods.

  In any event, Grote powerfully reinforced the Apostolic and Mauricean

  elements in Sidgwick’s work, and the Grote Club, along with the Apostles,

  oiled the machinery for the further reform of Cambridge and Cambridge

  philosophy, what with Grote being succeeded by Maurice. Although

  some of their work was visible to the (educated) public eye, much would

  take place behind the scenes or appear only in that guarded, masked

  form that Maurice had done so much to perfect. Indeed, Apostolic se-

  crecy had at this point become formal Apostolic policy. As Lubenow

  records:

  [I]n the s, the question had been addressed when a quarrel broke out amongst

  the Brethren about the extent to which secrecy was binding in the apostolic tra-

  dition. John Jermyn Cowell, the future barrister and sometime secretary of the

  Alpine Club, wrote to the greatest living Angel, Lord Houghton, about ‘the tra-

  ditions of the Elders’, to settle the dispute. Houghton thought little good would

  come from talking about the Society ‘to the general world who are more likely to

  mistake its objects & misunderstand its principles’, and urged a policy of secrecy.

  Concluding with a suitable apostolic salutation, Houghton authorized Cowell to

  use his letter in discussions about the question.

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  In any event, now many of Sidgwick’s practical reformist concerns

  would take definite shape: educational reform, higher education for

  women, the Charity Organization Society, the working men’s colleges, the

  Free Christian Union, the cabinetmakers cooperative – these were matters

  of common cause with the older, more experienced Maurice. Sidgwick the

  social and educational reformer was not, however, lingering in the back-

  ground. According to Rothblatt, Sidgwick “must be considered a central


  figure in any account of the generation of the s. His hand, sometimes

  his inspiration, was in every major administrative or teaching reform in

  that critical period in which modern Cambridge was born.”

  But again, as important as the reform of Sidgwick’s home base surely

  was, it was but one battle in a much larger war. Even in , he had

  presciently explained to Dakyns that “[i]f I stay at Cambridge I should like

  to divide my time between general scepticism as free as air, and inductive

  ‘Politik’ as practical & detailed as I can get it, to secure me from being a

  dreamer,” and that he wanted to “form a Liberal Mediative party on the

  principles of J. S. Mill” (M ). Once he awoke from “the thralldom” of his

  historical investigations, he was apt to “agree with Mill against Comte” as

  to the impossibility of history standing on its own as a science, and to think

  that “Politick, besides, is so infinitely more important just now” (M ).

  This it would have been hard to deny. After all, the era in question was

  that leading up to the Second Reform Bill, the great reform act of ,

  which marked the first real extension of the franchise to the working class

  and hence the first real move to something like representative democracy.

  The great battles between Palmerston, Russell, Derby, Gladstone, and

  Disraeli kept the public fascinated and frightened – no one was sure quite

  what to expect. Nor would the economic setbacks of the seventies and such

  upheavals as the French Commune do much to reassure those who worried

  about the winds of political change. As Eric Hobsbawm has framed the

  dilemma of nineteenth-century liberals:

  What indeed, would happen in politics when the masses of the people, ignorant and

  brutalized, unable to understand the elegant and salutary logic of Adam Smith’s

  free market, controlled the political fate of states? They would, as likely as not,

  pursue a road which led to that social revolution whose brief reappearance in 

  had so terrified the respectable. In its ancient insurrectional form, revolution might no longer seem imminent, but was it not concealed behind any major extension of

  the franchise beyond the ranks of the propertied and educated? Would this not,

  as the future Lord Salisbury feared in , inevitably lead to communism?

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  And J. S. Mill, whose Logic and Principles of Political Economy had become the textbooks of the nation, was increasingly being revealed as a voice for

  radicalism; as MP for Westminster, he dared to propose granting the vote

  to women, the first such effort ever made in Parliament. But even Mill wor-

  ried about what would happen when political empowerment came to a class

  that was largely illiterate and subject to a wide array of evils. True, he did

  not share the contempt for the working class expressed by Robert Lowe,

  in : “If you want venality,” Lowe asked, “if you want drunkenness

  and facility for being intimidated . . . if . . . you want impulsive, unreflecting and violent people . . . do you go to the top or the bottom?” Still,

  Mill himself had warned the workers that strong drink and weak morals

  did not make for healthy political participation, and his Considerations on

  Representative Government urged that one’s ballot power be proportional

  to one’s education. His socialism, he later explained, made him less

  sympathetic to democracy, under the circumstances.

  Sidgwick, as we shall see, for all his candor and sympathy, was not

  capable of this degree of Millian forthrightness, and he fell rather short

  of Mill in his radicalism. He wrote to Oscar Browning, in November of

  :

  As for Rent, I for one do not mind the Ricardo-rent of land getting accumulated in

  large masses, provided care is taken (by giving long leases, etc.) that this does not interfere with the amelioration of the soil: and then you have your "

  at once. What I want to do is to put an end to the existing and threatening strife

  between Labour and Capital by any possible means.

  Browning had worried that Sidgwick and political economy generally were

  hostile to the “families of ancient wealth” supposedly necessary for a high

  degree of culture. Sidgwick assured him that this was not so, in his own

  case at least, though he notes that

  of course people who make the lucky hits are uneducated generally, but that is

  just the point; if you could get all classes properly educated in the highest sense

  of the term, a man who came into a fortune by ‘striking ile’ would not waste it:

  and if he did not become a patron of Art himself, he might bring up his children

  to be so. (M –)

  Education was the indispensable key, according to both Mill and

  Sidgwick. Both could not help but admire, whatever their theological

  qualms, Maurice’s work for Christian socialism, workingmen’s colleges,

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  and so on – efforts to reach out to and culturally encompass the alien-

  ated workers. But the issue here was first and foremost the educational

  quality of the larger cultural sphere of society, rather than institutional

  or curricular changes. One inevitably colored the other; school and so-

  ciety were never quite distinct (as Dewey would go on to spend a ca-

  reer arguing). Consider Sidgwick’s explanation of why he wanted to join

  the Freemasons: “My reasons for joining the fraternity are partly gen-

  eral, for, though I do not at all know what the object of it is and am

  aware that the ‘Great Secret’ must be humbug, I am still desirous of

  helping the mingling of classes, wh. I conceive freemasonry does.” He

  admits, however, that his main hope is that it will give him “at least a

  slight additional means of penetrating the life of foreign countries: for

  Freemasonry is all over the world.” Although it is not known just what

  became of this particular strategy, Sidgwick’s reasoning is extremely re-

  vealing of his quest to conquer otherness, at home and abroad. As with

  the Apostles, it was through the work of a society famous for shrouding

  its workings in secrecy that understanding and reform were supposed

  to come.

  Some sense of the complex web of Millian educational reformism can be

  gleaned from Alan Ryan’s comparison of Mill with another great culture

  critic of the period, Matthew Arnold, author of the famous Culture and

  Anarchy, published in . As Ryan rightly insists, there are some inter-

  esting allegiances between Mill the utilitarian and Arnold the perfectionist

  champion of literary culture:

  Both,
evidently, think of the ideals of liberal education as even more important

  for an industrial and commercially minded society than for its simpler prede-

  cessors. Against the critics of liberal education in nineteenth-century America,

  who thought a more utilitarian, practical, and vocational education should replace

  traditional liberal education, their reply is that just because the society offers so many incentives to acquire the vocational and practical skills we require, it is all

  the more important to balance these pressures by disinterested, non-instrumental,

  and in that sense impractical instruction.

  This is quite accurate, and suggests how in order even to begin to think

  sensibly about Mill’s utilitarianism (and Sidgwick’s), one must forget the

  image of soulless, antipoetical utilitarianism popularized in Dickens’s

  Hard Times. The call for a clerisy, common to Arnold, Mill, and Sidgwick,

  was not a celebration of the virtues of Mr. Gradgrind.

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  But the differences between the two are still more important:

  Mill’s ideal of a liberal education was firmly rooted in an attachment to the classics, as his rectorial address to St. Andrews University insisted. What the classics were

  to teach was another matter. Mill admired the Athenians for their politics, for the

  vitality of their citizens’ lives, and for their democratic aspirations. Athenians did not confine their interests to a literary education, and they were not superstitious

  about the wisdom of their ancestors. In short, a concern for the classics was to feed a concern for a lively democratic politics, and for a kind of political and intellectual ambition that Mill thought Victorian Englishmen lacked. It followed that when

  Mill asked the question whether we should seek an education for citizenship or

  an education in the classical tradition, he inevitably answered Both, and when he

  asked whether such an education ought to be a scientific or a literary education he

  unhesitatingly answered Both once more. These were not Arnold’s politics, nor

  Arnold’s educational ideals.

  Ryan suggests that we might take away from Mill v. Arnold the “half-

 

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