Rescind Order

by Natasha Bajema

  Please don’t make me raise it.

  Morgan rubbed her hands together in anticipation. She knew what she had to do. Her head throbbed, and each beat of her heart pulsated in her temples.

  “Yes, ma’am,” Admiral Waller said. “It wouldn’t make sense for China to attack the United States with only two submarines. They don’t carry enough warheads to take out our entire arsenal of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. If China were planning a first strike, they would want to reduce the amount of damage to Chinese territory when we retaliate. And as I said before, the Chinese would launch their land-based missiles first and save their sea-based missiles for their second or third moves.”

  When he stopped speaking, Morgan’s pulse spiked. She opened her mouth, but nothing came out. Her chest tightened as she attempted to move her body out of her chair.

  It’s now or never.

  Morgan rose slowly, clenching her fists to hide the trembling, and took a few steps toward the conference table. “Um… Madam President, I believe there’s another possibility we haven’t considered.”

  All heads around the table turned toward her in unison, some with wide eyes and others narrowed. Her boss, David, craned his neck and gave her a perplexed look. As she approached the table, the temperature in the room seemed to drop. Her hands were suddenly cold and clammy, and she struggled to keep her mind from turning into complete mush.

  Morgan caught a slight scowl appear on Tolley’s face, followed by a subtle nod.

  “Yes, Dr. Shaw… please do enlighten the room with your theory.” Tolley’s tone was flat and emotionless.

  Welp. If this doesn’t go over well, she may fire me for this.

  A heavy pit dropped in Morgan’s stomach as she tried to find the right words—something that would make her idea sound more reasonable. But none came to mind. Only a simple but radical question rested on her lips. “What if the submarines are attempting to defect?” Her voice squeaked as she forced the words out.

  The room went silent for what felt like an eternity. Unfriendly faces stared back at her as she waited for someone to say something. No one responded. The only sound was that of her heart pounding in her ears.

  Morgan took a deep breath and said, “Okay. We have two missing submarines. As Dr. Whitaker pointed out earlier, it doesn’t make sense that they would disappear the day before the war game is set to—”

  “Let me get this straight,” Burke said, his hand gestures bordering on dramatic as he continued. “You’re proposing that two Chinese submarines operated by two different commanders may be attempting to defect from China to the United States or Canada? At the same time? I thought I’d heard plenty of nonsense this morning, but your ill-formed theory takes the cake.”

  In a panic, Morgan floundered for a rationale that didn’t sound half-baked.

  Okay, maybe only one submarine is defecting?

  “Um… yes, sir,” Morgan stammered. “Perhaps they aren’t defecting at all but rather going rogue. What if one Chinese commander plans to start a conflict with an unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons? There are no technical barriers preventing naval commanders from launching their nuclear weapons. It’s also possible that only one submarine is defecting, and the other is chasing it. I’m only suggesting these as possible scenarios for your consideration.”

  Burke’s eyes bulged. “That’s preposterous. The submarine commander can’t launch nuclear weapons without help from the crew. Everyone on the boat would have to be in on it.”

  “Actually, it wouldn’t take that many crew members to pull it off,” Morgan said. “Maybe the captain and the executive officer. They have the keys to arm the—”

  “Sweetheart, I’m afraid you’ve watched one too many movies,” Burke said. “It would require at least four crew members located in different parts of the submarine to launch the nuclear weapons. If just one of them refuses to participate, the launch would fail.” He turned back to the president. “Plus, why would a submarine commander ever want to start a nuclear war? The choice would be a death sentence.”

  “But perhaps one submarine is defecting, and the other is giving chase?” Morgan asked, pressing forward in desperation.

  Burke whipped his head back toward her, his lips curled. “Then how would you explain the behavior of the other attack submarines? They didn’t even attempt to follow the others. If one of the submarines is attempting to defect, then why hasn’t the commander communicated with us or with Canada about their intentions? And why hasn’t the Chinese government said anything about this?” He turned back to the president. “Are we really going to waste our time listening to this?”

  Morgan clenched her fists. The tension in the room was palpable. Whitaker looked like her face might explode. Grayson sat stiffly in his chair, shoulders hunched. Even Admiral Waller, the paragon of calm and collected, appeared piqued at her suggestion.

  Not wanting to dig her grave any deeper, Morgan nodded deferentially, backed up a few steps, and then sank back into her chair. In that moment, she surrendered to all potential consequences of her foolish outburst. Her face burned hot, and she couldn’t even steal a glance at Luis to confirm the impending disaster that was her career.

  18

  Normal Accident Theory

  DREW

  0820

  Georgetown University

  Washington D.C.

  Drew leaned his elbows on the table in front of him, his brow creased. The professor’s voice droned on in the background about the many problems with U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy. But Drew couldn’t shake his most troubling revelation. In his concern about autonomous weapons systems, he’d forgotten all about thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at U.S. cities and military targets.

  In an era when autonomous weapons systems sped up the pace of warfare, what would that mean for nuclear deterrence? Would leaders of nuclear-armed countries be able to resist using nuclear weapons in a conflict taking place in mere nanoseconds?

  Suddenly, Drew wasn’t worried about robots on the next battlefield anymore.

  We might not even make it to see such a world.

  Staring in a thick daze at the whiteboard at the front of the classroom, he thought he heard his name called in the distance.

  “Drew? Would you like to answer the question?” Professor Johnstone asked.

  A rush of adrenaline shooting through his body, Drew’s eyes opened wide, and he refocused on the professor’s face like a laser. “Um, I didn’t hear the question.”

  Johnstone threw his head back in a hearty chuckle. “Didn’t get enough sleep last night?”

  Drew’s face flushed. “Yeah. Sorry. I was just thinking about everything you said earlier and got distracted.”

  “That’s okay,” Johnstone said. “I asked the class about other ways that nuclear deterrence can fail.” He turned back to the class. “Even if nuclear deterrence ‘succeeds’ in preventing intentional nuclear war, we may still experience the massive destruction of a nuclear weapon one day because of nuclear accidents, false alarms, or unauthorized use. U.S. nuclear weapons are designed with redundant safety measures to prevent accidental detonation, but we’ve come close to disaster on a number of occasions. Can anyone talk about an example from the readings?”

  Marie raised her hand. “In 1961, a B-52 bomber broke up midair and crashed into pieces on the ground in North Carolina. On the way down, two hydrogen bombs with megaton yields fell out of the plane. When the parachute on one bomb failed to deploy, it plummeted to the ground and broke into pieces. The parachute on the other bomb deployed, but the weapon nearly detonated on the ground after five of its six safety switches failed. That means the nuclear blast was stopped by a single safety switch.”

  “Thanks, Marie,” Johnstone said. “That was a really close call. But it’s not just accidents we need to worry about. Nuclear forces are designed for rapid action and can be ready for combat operations in mere minutes. Since the U.S. has planned to launch its nuclear weapons on warning of
a nuclear attack, false alarms could lead to unintentional nuclear war. In your reading for today, did any of the past incidents hit a chord with you?”

  Jay raised his hand. “I couldn’t believe we nearly launched our entire stockpile of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in 1980 due to a janky computer chip.”

  Drew’s jaw dropped. He must have missed that example in the readings.

  Johnstone smiled. “Care to enlighten the rest of the class on the details of that incident?”

  “Yeah, man,” Jay said, pushing back a few dreads that had fallen forward. “We thought the Soviets were attacking, like for real. There was an official alert and everything. Brzezinski—he was the national security advisor, right?” The professor nodded, and Jay continued. “Well Brzezinski was about to wake up President Carter so the U.S. could drop nukes on the Soviets. But then the alert was called off a few minutes later. Turns out the whole thing was just a freak accident caused by a dollar-menu computer chip.”

  Drew sat back in his seat and let out a slow breath, shaking his head at hearing the account.

  Johnstone clapped his hands. “Good. And that brings us to our key lesson for today. Has anyone heard of the normal accident theory?”

  The classroom went dead silent, and Drew scratched his head, stealing a glance at the syllabus.

  Did I forget an assignment?

  Johnstone chuckled. “Don’t worry, it’s not a trick question. There weren’t any readings on this topic. But does anyone want to guess what it is?”

  More silence.

  “Okay, has anyone heard of the Three Mile Island accident?” Johnstone asked.

  Most of the class put up their hands, including Drew.

  “Jay, want to give us a quick overview?” Johnstone asked.

  “Sure,” Jay said. “Some nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania had a meltdown in 1979… I think it was because their cooling system was out of whack. Then the people working there made some mistakes, and radioactive gas leaked into the atmosphere. That’s about the gist of it.”

  Johnstone nodded. “Yep. In the 1980s, Charles Perrow, a sociologist at Yale University, was trying to make sense of what happened at Three Mile Island. He developed some concepts that he called the normal accident theory, which argues that accidents are normal and nothing is failure proof. Perrow claimed that accidents are inevitable, especially when complex systems are tightly coupled.”

  Drew pinched his lips as a lightbulb went on in his head.

  Like nuclear weapons?

  “The biggest disasters start small and produce cascading effects,” Johnstone continued. “In many cases, these disasters do not happen due to a major equipment malfunction but rather as a result of operator error and a lack of understanding of how the complex system functions.”

  Drew shot his hand in the air, causing Johnstone to stop talking and point at him. “I think I get the connection you’re making,” he said. “You’re saying that nuclear weapons, with their many redundant safety features, are complex systems that are launched by other complex systems that control them. They are also delivered by complex systems such as bombers or ballistic missiles. So for nuclear weapons, we’re not even talking about a single complex system, but rather multiple interconnected complex systems.”

  Johnstone nodded. “Yes, and the more tightly those complex systems are coupled together, the more likely we will see accidents in which the features of different complex systems interact in unexpected ways, leading to operator error and catastrophe. Small margins of error in each feature compounds as one thing leads to another.”

  “Is there any way to prevent normal accidents?” asked a male student in the back of the classroom.

  Johnstone bobbed his head. “Perrow recommended that we reduce system complexity whenever possible and make sure that all systems designed to oversee complex processes can operate faster than a cascading incident.”

  “Wait a minute,” Jay said, scratching his head. “Didn’t the Department of Defense launch its new Autonomous Retaliatory Capability system several months ago?”

  Drew shuddered at the thought of the system. The potential risks of ARC felt suddenly more real to him when he considered the destructiveness of a single nuclear weapon. He’d read about it a few times in his research but most of the information about ARC remained highly classified. Before Drew had perceived nuclear weapons and deterrence as abstract concepts compared to the more tangible idea of robots fighting wars on the battlefield.

  I wonder how many other Americans have no idea about any of this…

  Johnstone smiled broadly, showing his teeth. “Yes. The ARC system is designed to detect a nuclear attack, determine an appropriate nuclear response, and then give the retaliatory order without any human input.”

  “Wait, that thing can launch nuclear weapons?” Marie asked, her mouth dropping open. “I mean, I’d heard of it, but I thought autonomous weapons systems were illegal in our country.”

  Drew shook his head but held his tongue. He regretted not digging into the ARC system further and felt caught off guard by his own ignorance.

  Johnstone crossed his arms and leaned against the desk. “Well, yes and no. ARC is a semi-autonomous system. Some of ARC’s functions are carried out autonomously, but a human decision-maker can still intervene if necessary. It is also considered a defensives system rather than an offensive weapons system. In the press, the Department of Defense has justified ARC as a means of keeping us safe and considers it to be a semiautonomous system capable of responding faster than humans.”

  “Keep us safe? That’s so not cool, man,” Jay said, his eyes bulging. “ARC can launch the world’s most destructive weapons and kill millions of people. I don’t care what they want to call it to make us feel better. This thing is a doomsday device. Didn’t anyone in our government stop to think how this could lead to an epic fail? As in, we’re all dead like that.” He snapped his fingers.

  Johnstone nodded. “Congress held a number of hearings before authorizing the development of the ARC system more than a decade ago. And then it fell off the radar of the general public until recently. Experts argue that ARC will ensure credible nuclear deterrence in the event of a first-strike attack by one of our adversaries. If our enemies do not perceive the president to be able to retaliate with a massive nuclear attack, nuclear deterrence won’t hold.”

  “But I thought the president has the sole authority to use nuclear weapons,” Marie said. “Are you saying we just handed over that decision to a machine?”

  “That’s a good question, but no,” Johnstone said. “ARC’s designers took presidential authority into account. The president still has the sole authority to use nuclear weapons. But instead of giving the order to launch them, he or she must give the rescind order.”

  Rescind order?

  Drew furrowed his brow. He considered the mere minutes it would take to launch U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles from the many silos across the Western plain region. Once such missiles were airborne, they couldn’t be called back. And that meant an all-out nuclear war would begin.

  But would the president have enough time to stop the attack?

  19

  Nuclear Options

  SUSAN

  0830

  Situation Room

  The White House

  We’re getting absolutely nowhere.

  After more than an hour, Susan still didn’t have a clear path forward in the China crisis, and her team of advisors was more divided than ever. Susan stole a glance at the clock, trying not to wince as Burke and Beth went at each other’s throats again. Of course, Morgan’s harebrained proposal had not helped Susan maintain control of Burke’s temper. Instead, it led him to hold sway over the majority opinion in the room while her advisors with outlier views cowered.

  I may have overestimated Morgan’s potential for helping me with Burke.

  As he flapped his arms, Burke’s strong, musky cologne wafted past Susan’s nose, making her want to snee
ze. It wasn’t unpleasant, but it was overpowering, just like his personality. Susan could always detect when Burke was in the room, or even if he had been there recently, just by that scent. Sometimes, she’d pick up his residual aroma in the hallways of the White House when he was long gone.

  She studied the room, still tuning out the cacophony of chatter. Susan wanted a decision in advance of her press briefing, but her advisors seemed to prefer starting another round of vicious back-and-forth insults. Beth insisted on a concerted response to the Mong Kok Massacre in defense of democratic principles. Meanwhile, Burke demanded they avoid any escalation that would lead to military action or war with China.

  To them, the dead protesters and the lost submarines were opposite and incompatible sides of a political coin. The tense conflict with China also meant that Susan’s hard work over the past six months to reach a clean energy deal hung in the balance.

  I need to talk to Ambassador Chen. Maybe we can dig ourselves out of this mess.

  In the midst of Burke’s latest rant, Susan hesitated to intervene. It was way too early in her term as president to make enemies—especially one as powerful and dangerous as Burke. He enjoyed widespread support from President Monroe’s base, and she did not. To get anything done within Congress, Susan would need to cultivate a cooperative relationship with him. But that didn’t mean she had to like him or allow him to harass her allies.

  She cleared her throat loudly, and her advisors finally stopped bickering for a moment. Beth mouthed the words, I’m sorry. Burke, on the other hand, wouldn’t even look her straight in the eyes.

  Yeah, he’s not sorry.

  Folding her hands together, Susan gazed at her cabinet members and said resolutely, “The State Department has issued a strong condemnation about the Mong Kok Massacre. We’re also going to pursue economic sanctions at the UN Security Council and get independent confirmation from our intelligence services about the number of casualties in Hong Kong. But I’d like to table the discussion on further responses to the massacre for now.”