Calamity at Chancellorsville

by Mathew W Lively

  5 “Stonewall Jackson’s War Horse,” New York Times, November 27, 1887; Douglas, I Rode with Stonewall, 206-207. Jackson paid the Confederate government $150 for the Morgan horse after his army captured a livestock train at Harper’s Ferry, (West) Virginia, in April 1861. Originally named “Fancy,” the horse quickly become known as “Little Sorrel” once Jackson started using the gelding as his regular mount.

  6 Beverly Tucker Lacy, “Narrative,” in Dabney-Jackson Collection, box 2, LVA.

  7 Fitzhugh Lee, “Chancellorsville – Address of General Fitzhugh Lee before the Virginia Division, A. N. V. Association, October 29th, 1879,” in SHSP (1879), vol. 7, 562; John Esten Cooke, Stonewall Jackson: A Military Biography (New York, NY, 1866), 212.

  8 Jedediah Hotchkiss, Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer, ed. Archie P. McDonald (Dallas, TX, 1973), 136.

  9 Fitzhugh Lee, “Chancellorsville,” 562; OR 25, pt. 2, 762.

  10 G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 2nd ed. (London, England, 1913), vol. 2, 481; Jennings C. Wise, The Military History of the Virginia Military Institute from 1839 to 1865 (Lynchburg, VA, 1915), 133; Lacy, “Narrative.”

  11 Ibid.

  12 Ibid.

  13 Ibid.

  Chapter Three

  Press On

  Stonewall Jackson arrived at General Anderson’s position stretching across the Plank Road and the Old Turnpike west of Fredericksburg at 8:30 a.m. on May 1, 1863. The rainy and cool weather of the previous few days had given way to more pleasant conditions—“a genuine May day,” as cartographer Hotchkiss recorded in his journal. Jackson arrived at Zoan Church well ahead of his three divisions that were rapidly marching along the roads from Hamilton’s Crossing.

  In compliance with previous orders, Anderson’s men were actively digging and building breastworks to prepare for a defensive stand against the Union force occupying Chancellorsville. Jackson immediately ordered the soldiers to drop their shovels and prepare to advance on the enemy. Although Lee’s instructions were to “make arrangements to repulse the enemy,” the aggressive Jackson decided the best way to repulse the Federals was to attack them. The order to advance came as no surprise to artillery colonel Edward P. Alexander, who, when he saw Jackson coming up the road, knew immediately that “all our care and preparation at that point was work thrown away.”1

  It was several hours before enough of Jackson’s men had arrived to begin an advance; meanwhile, Hotchkiss had also arrived and distributed his newly drawn maps to the division commanders. Finally, at 10:30 a.m., Jackson gave the order to move out. He sent two columns marching toward Chancellorsville, one along the Old Turnpike and the other on the lower Plank Road.

  Three miles to the west, General Hooker was ordering an advance out of Chancellorsville along the same two roads. Anticipating little resistance, he intended to have his troops directly in the rear of Fredericksburg by evening. Unaware that Anderson had been reinforced, Hooker thought his army would encounter only a small force of Confederates dug in at Zoan Church; instead, as his men marched into clearings outside of Chancellorsville, they walked headlong into the advancing Rebel army.

  The initial contact between the two forces occurred on the Old Turnpike as Confederate skirmishers from a Virginia regiment met a unit of Federal cavalry from Pennsylvania. The fighting prompted Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commander of the Union forces marching along the turnpike, to order his lead brigade ahead at the double-quick. Driving the Rebel skirmishers back, Sykes’ men encountered the advancing Confederate army under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, at which point “quite a brisk little engagement” ensued.2

  Meanwhile, along the Plank Road to the south, the lead elements of the Union army under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum were advancing more cautiously. Moving rapidly toward them from the other end of the road was Richard Anderson’s division, followed by the men of Jackson’s corps. The combination of Sykes’ double-quick movement on the upper road and Slocum’s tentative advance on the lower path caused an unequal distribution of Union forces across the parallel roads. Slocum’s location on the Plank Road when he met Anderson’s men was nearly two miles behind Sykes’ position on the Turnpike to the north.

  Jackson quickly realized that his forces were in an ideal position to unleash his favorite surprise attack: the flanking maneuver. Recognizing that his men on the lower Plank Road were in line with the Union forces on the Turnpike above, Jackson turned Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes’ division north, directly into the right flank of the upper Federal army.

  George Sykes’ position suddenly became perilous. He was extended and isolated from the rest of the Union forces, hotly engaged in his front, and now the enemy was closing in on his flank. He needed help soon, and he sent a message to Hooker informing him of the critical situation.

  * * *

  Back at headquarters in the Chancellor house, Hooker was realizing that his grand strategy to defeat Lee was no longer going as planned. He had underestimated the boldness of the Southern commanders, just as others had before him. It had been easier during his time as a subordinate general, because there was always someone else to blame for apparent inaction. But now, as commander of all Union forces, “Fighting Joe” himself balked. When Hooker learned of Sykes’ dilemma, he decided to order all forces back to Chancellorsville rather than provide the reinforcements Sykes had requested. Months later, when asked about the battle, he was said to remark, “For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it.”3

  As the Union army withdrew to the safety of its Chancellorsville defenses, Stonewall Jackson’s men were hot on their heels. “Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,” Jackson once advised, “and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow.” Jackson also received a dispatch from Gen. Jeb Stuart that his cavalry force to the west was closing in on Chancellorsville from the south. “I trust that God will grant us a great victory,” Jackson wrote back to Stuart. “Keep closed on Chancellorsville.”4

  Running due west out of Fredericksburg and two miles south of Chancellorsville was the path of an unfinished railroad. The route ran east-west a short distance below the Plank Road and had been graded but not yet laid with rails, making it a good road for infantry. In a continued effort to outflank the Union army by moving left, Jackson sent a brigade of Georgians west on the right-of-way to link up with Stuart’s cavalry.

  The two groups of Confederates met in the Wilderness a mile and a half southwest of Chancellorsville at a structure called Catharine Furnace. Built in 1837, the furnace was part of an iron ore industry that had developed in the Fredericksburg area in colonial times, and the near-impenetrable woods of the region were a testament to the extent of its past operations. The old-growth timber of the area had long ago been harvested on a massive scale to provide charcoal for the furnace. In its place grew the dense entanglement of brambles, second-growth pine, and scrub oak that gave the Wilderness its name. The furnace had stopped production in the 1840s, due in part to a lack of available timber, but was reactivated in 1862 to supply iron for the Confederacy. Charles C. Wellford, who lived nearby with his family, was the proprietor and operator of the furnace.

  Robert E. Lee arrived on horseback as Jackson was pushing his men along the Plank Road and directing McLaws to “press on up the turnpike toward Chancellorsville.” After a brief consultation, Lee rode north to reconnoiter other potential avenues for advance against Hooker, while Jackson and his brother-in-law, Joseph Morrison, headed southwest into the Wilderness.5

  Riding down the Furnace Road, Jackson and Morrison met Jeb Stuart at Catharine Furnace. Pleased to find each other in the dense woods, the two generals briefly discussed the situation before deciding to take a better look at the Union position. To their left, a Confederate battery had posted itself on a small knoll, and the group rode to the top for a better view. Jackson and Stuart were unable to see the right of th
e Union position from the crest of the hill, but they did observe Yankee cannon less than a mile away on a patch of high ground at a farm called Hazel Grove. With the Georgia infantry positioned on the unfinished rail bed below, Jackson ordered the men to advance through the woods toward the Union forces. As the Confederate battery opened fire in support of the movement, Union cannon from Hazel Grove and beyond barraged the knoll with a murderous return volley. As exploding shells began kicking up dirt around them, Stuart remarked, “General Jackson, we must move from here.” Moments later, a shell fragment struck Stuart’s adjutant, mortally wounding him.6

  With evening falling and the advance at Catharine Furnace checked by the strong Union position on Hazel Grove, Jackson left the woods and rode back to the Old Turnpike to assess progress on that front. To his dismay, he discovered that Federal resistance was stiffening everywhere, as Hooker’s forces had withdrawn back into the defenses they had left at the start of the day. It was nearly 7:30 p.m., and a frustrated Jackson now made his way back to the intersection of the Plank and Furnace Roads, where he again met General Lee. A Yankee sharpshooter perched in a distant tree was shooting at nearby artillerymen, so the generals dismounted and took shelter in a line of trees along the side of the road. Sitting down on a log, Lee motioned for Jackson to sit next to him. The two leaders reviewed the day’s action and began to form a battle plan for the next day—a plan that would eventually become even more daring than the last. After the war, while touring the battlefield during an interview, Joe Hooker would point to the spot where Lee and Jackson sat and lament it as being the place where “the mischief was devised which came near ruining my army.”7

  * * *

  As the sun set on the first day of the battle of Chancellorsville, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson sat together on the fallen log in the thick forest of the Wilderness. So far, their gamble had paid off: the Rebel army’s sudden attack had surprised Hooker and caused him to withdraw his forces back into a defensive position. Now Lee and Jackson needed to devise a plan that would keep the pressure on Chancellorsville while trusting the two Union corps at Fredericksburg to remain stationary and not overrun the solitary division the Confederates had left behind.

  Jackson thought the Yankees were on the run and would keep running. They had yet to attack Fredericksburg and, when pressed, their army had quickly retreated to Chancellorsville. “By tomorrow morning there will not be any of them on this side of the river,” Jackson exclaimed. Lee saw it differently. While he hoped Jackson was correct in his projection, he was of the opinion that Hooker was going to stay where he was and wait for the Confederates to attack. If Lee was correct and the Federals were still in front of them in the morning, he wanted to be ready with a plan to resume the battle. He opened a map and began studying the layout.8

  The two started their discussion by describing what each had discovered in reconnaissance that afternoon. Lee had ridden to the right of the Old Turnpike and found no room on that side to get around the Union army. Jackson related how the attack on the other end at Catharine Furnace had stalled due to the strong Federal position on the high ground at Hazel Grove. That left the middle of Hooker’s line. It was likely to be well-defended, but perhaps it could be broken by a direct assault.

  They needed more information on Hooker’s strength to be sure. Nightfall was quickly approaching, but the nearly full moon would provide sufficient light for a reconnaissance of the Union defenses. The generals summoned Lee’s aide, Maj. Thomas M. Talcott, and Jackson’s chief engineer, Capt. James Keith Boswell, a young Virginian whose nickname was “Preserves” because he was so fond of eating jelly. They sent Talcott and Boswell to scout the Federal line and ascertain whether a frontal assault was possible.

  As Lee and Jackson continued to discuss the possibilities of where and how to attack Hooker, Jeb Stuart arrived with news that would abruptly change the focus of their conversation. Stuart reported that Fitzhugh Lee, nephew to the commanding general and one of Stuart’s brigade commanders, had ridden unmolested to the extreme right of the Federal position and discovered that Hooker’s right flank, three miles west on the Plank Road, was “in the air,” or unsecured by any natural obstacle. Additionally, the Union defensive breastworks on that end of the line faced south, not west. Lee and Jackson realized their golden opportunity: if the Rebel army could march far enough to the left, it could outflank the Union position and attack the unprotected end of that line.

  The keys to completing such a maneuver would be secrecy, speed, and good roads. They needed roads of sufficient size to move a large body of infantry and artillery through the Wilderness while remaining out of the Federals’ view. Stuart was not sure whether such roads existed, but he offered to find out. With a wave of his plumed hat, the cavalier officer jumped back on his horse and galloped off into the darkness.

  Talcott and Boswell returned to the roadside headquarters around 10:00 p.m. and reported that a frontal assault was out of the question. Hooker had set up a strong defensive arc across the front of Chancellorsville, which, in combination with the thick woods, left little opening for attack. That settled the matter in the mind of the commanding general: they would go after Hooker’s right flank.

  “How can we get at these people?” Lee asked, as he stared at the map by candlelight.

  “You know best,” Jackson replied. “Show me what to do, and we will try to do it.”9

  Later in the course of the war, Lee would confess to an aide: “I had such implicit confidence in Jackson’s skill and energy that I never troubled myself to give him detailed instructions. The most general suggestions were all that he needed.” On this occasion, Lee simply traced his finger along the map in a broad direction through the Wilderness and around the Union right flank. Without further explanation, he looked at Jackson and said, “General Stuart will cover your movement with cavalry.” A smile beamed across Jackson’s face. Standing up and touching the brim of his cap, he stated, “My troops will move at four o’clock.”10

  * * *

  Friday, May 1, had been a long day, and Jackson was tired. Since determining the exact route of the flanking maneuver would have to wait until Stuart returned with information on the suitability of the roads, Jackson decided he had time to catch a few hours’ sleep before issuing specific orders for the movement. The Confederates had advanced so rapidly on the battle’s first day that the headquarters wagon containing Jackson’s baggage was still somewhere in the rear, leaving him without a tent or bedroll. So he simply leaned his sword against a tree on the edge of the clearing and spread his saddle blanket on the ground under some overhanging pine boughs. Using his saddle as a pillow, the fatigued general lay down for some much-needed rest.

  Jackson’s assistant adjutant general and chief of staff, Maj. Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton, noticed that Jackson was without a blanket and offered the general his overcoat for a covering. Pendleton—described by a fellow officer as “the most brilliant staff officer in the Army of Northern Virginia”—was a 22-year-old from Lexington, Virginia, who was so close to Jackson that the general reportedly “loved him as a son.” Jackson politely refused the use of Pendleton’s overcoat, but the young officer persisted, asking the general whether he would at least take the long cape of the coat. Jackson accepted the cape and, using it as a make-shift blanket, stretched out on the ground and fell fast asleep.11

  The clear spring night was cool and damp, and Jackson awoke two hours later feeling chilled. Getting up to shake off the cold, he noticed a courier had started a small fire in the clearing. He gently laid the borrowed cape over its sleeping owner and walked over to the fire. Along the way he picked up one of several large wooden cracker boxes that littered the area after being discarded by Union soldiers during their retreat the previous day. Placing the box next to the fire, he sat down and tightly closed his coat against the night air. As he warmed himself in front of the flames, Jackson realized that he was suffering the first symptoms of a developing head cold.12

 
Tucker Lacy, who had arrived in camp while Jackson was asleep, also approached the fire, and the general offered him a seat. Lacy initially declined, but, moving over to make room for him on the box, Jackson said, “Sit down. I want to talk to you.” Jackson related to his chaplain that Hooker was in a strong position around Chancellorsville, so attacking from the front would “cost a fearful loss.” Relying on Lacy’s knowledge of the area, Jackson asked, “Do you know of any way by which to flank either their right or left?”13

  “Yes,” Lacy replied. “There is a blind road leading from the furnace and nearly parallel to the Plank Road which falls into a road running northwards, which again leads into the Plank Road three and a half to four miles above Chancellorsville.”

  Opening one of Hotchkiss’ maps, Jackson had Lacy draw the road on paper. “That is too near,” he said after studying the route. “It will go within line of the enemy’s pickets. Do you know no other?” Lacy did not, but he presumed the Furnace Road itself intersected with the main road somewhere farther to the west, although he had not ridden it. Lacy thought Charles Wellford, the furnace proprietor, would know, and perhaps his son might be able act as a guide. Jackson instructed the pastor to wake Hotchkiss and for the two of them to visit Wellford in order to “ascertain whether those roads meet and are practicable for artillery.” Hotchkiss was to return with the information while Lacy secured a guide.14

  After Lacy and Hotchkiss departed, Jackson was alone again in front of the fire when Col. Armistead L. Long of Lee’s personal staff awoke and approached the warmth of the flames. After an exchange of pleasantries, Jackson complained to the colonel of feeling cold. Spotting cooks nearby preparing breakfast, Long walked over and obtained a cup of hot coffee for the appreciative general. As the two officers briefly chatted, the distinctive sound of clanking metal suddenly broke the surrounding quiet. They turned to see that Jackson’s sword, which had been leaning against a tree, had fallen over with no apparent cause. Long picked up the sword and handed it to Jackson, who thanked him and buckled it on without comment. The incident, however, immediately disturbed Long, who believed the fallen sword was a bad omen, much like a picture falling off a wall; the memory of the event haunted the colonel throughout the coming day.15