Somme

by Peter Hart

  Private Harry Baumber, 10th Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, 101st Brigade, 34th Division

  To the right of them the situation was a little better where the 15th Royal Scots had managed to make considerable progress.

  Prior to the attack, the No. 1s of each Lewis gun tossed up for the ‘honour’ of one gun to go with the bombers detailed to rush the crater after the mine had been blown. I tossed for B Company, No. 1 gun and won, amidst muttered remarks from the gun crew that I would ruddy well win a toss like that, and, expecting dirty work we took the reserve gun crew with us, twelve men, and myself in charge, making the thirteenth, as some bright gem quickly pointed out. We went out with the bombers five minutes before zero hour to positions as near as we thought was safe, so that we could work round the crater, after the mines were detonated. This was accomplished with slight loss, and as we lay down, the whole earth seemed to sway sideways. The debris went up hundreds of feet in the air, and above the bombardment we could hear the debris falling, unfortunately burying several of the party. I remember covering my head with my arms and waiting for the first clout. I was lucky and advanced with the rest of the survivors, round the right-hand side of the crater. I was firing at the retreating Germans in front of their third line, when the last remaining Lewis gunner was killed as he handed the another magazine. So I had to carry on with the Lewis gun, spare parts, haversack, and eight full magazines, not forgetting my rifle. When I dropped into their fourth line it was full of Jerries, and, much to the benefit of my trousers, they promptly put up their hands. I made such a noise that they thought my whole battalion had arrived.85

  Corporal Harry Beaumont, 15th Battalion, Royal Scots, 101st Brigade, 34th Division

  Realising they could get no further without considerable reinforcements they dug in where they were in Round Wood, where they managed to link up with the forward parties from the neighbouring 21st Division.

  Still flying high above them was Second Lieutenant Cecil Lewis who was desperately trying to work out what was going on down below. He soon realised that there was an unbridgeable gulf between the theory and practice of contacting men in action on the battlefield.

  We had all our contact patrol technique perfected and we went right down to 3,000 feet to see what was happening. We had a klaxon horn on the undercarriage of the Morane—a great big 12 volt klaxon—and I had a button which I used to press out a letter to tell the infantry that we wanted to know where they were. When they heard us hawking at them from above, they had little red Bengal flares, they carried them in their pockets, they would put a match to their flares. All along the line, wherever there was a chap, there would be a flare and Bob’s your uncle! It was one thing to practice this but quite another for them to really do it when they were under fire and particularly when things began to go a bit badly. Then they jolly wouldn’t light anything and small blame to them because it drew the fire of the enemy on to them at once. So we went down looking for flares and we only got two flares on the whole front. We were bitterly disappointed because this we hoped was our part to help the infantry and we weren’t able to do it.86

  Second Lieutenant Cecil Lewis, 3 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps

  Yet some of the contact patrols were occasionally able to help the beleaguered infantry. Their value was illustrated when at one point later in that awful day the British artillery began to land shells dropping short on to the crater.

  For some unknown reason, our artillery started shelling us with whizz-bangs. Our planes were sailing close overhead and though I shone a mirror up they took no notice. In the end I sent an orderly to Colonel Howard to ask for permit to use a red flare, which he gave. As soon as we lit it, our planes went straight off home and our batteries shut up, but of course the Boche redoubled his efforts, though we escaped without further casualties.87

  Second Lieutenant JohnTurnbull, 10th Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, 101st Brigade, 34th Division

  Cut off as they were it was difficult for the officers to make sure that the men kept their sense of purpose and indeed that they did not begin to panic. Although he had been wounded before he reached the crater, Turnbull insisted on staying put with his men. He knew he was needed to help bolster up the men’s morale.

  I kind of dozed most of the time, but woke up and thought of things now and again, i.e. got Corporal Turton to see rifles were all cleaned etc. He was a brick that day. I found my flow of language, which I am afraid I am rather free with ordinarily, good and bad, very useful several times. Especially when some of the fit men wanted to bolt for it, and leave a good one hundred wounded who couldn’t walk. I asked them what the ****** they thought they were doing and ordered them back, and they all meekly went back, much to my surprise.88

  Second Lieutenant John Turnbull, 10th Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, 101st Brigade, 34th Division

  Despite all the German pressure the scattered parties around the Lochnagar crater and in Schwaben Höhe managed to maintain their position until nightfall. That night a Russian sap was opened up to provide communications and slowly the positions were connected and consolidated.

  Back at the headquarters of the 8th and 34th Divisions the staff officers were left face to face with a failure that was far beyond their comprehension. Many had been worried by their onerous responsibilities, had feared that there might be hard fighting, had dreaded heavy casualties. But they had never imagined anything like this.

  I soon realised the ghastly nature of our failure. And, from my advance observation post, I reported, very bluntly I’m afraid, to General Williams that no objectives had been gained and the left wing (102nd Brigade) had suffered heavily in the attack. Soon after sending that message, General Cameron (103rd Brigade commander) was carried into my trench—he had been wounded in the stomach. He smiled, in that nice way of his, told me to carry on, he’d be all right, and was taken down to the dressing station. From then on it was terrible—to see my division wiped out, on the left, in the centre and on the right. In desperation I grabbed a rifle and tried to silence one machine-gun section out in the open near the La Boisselle craters, mowing down our slow-moving infantry coming down on the left of Chapes Spur. After the attack was held, I went down to 102nd Infantry Brigade headquarters, to send messages to divisional headquarters, and I had a few words with General Ternan. He had read some of my earlier messages and was inclined to think I was in error (about the failure of the assault on the left, his brigade) in my estimation of the way the battle was going, but I gave him the details which did nothing to relieve his anxiety.89

  Captain D, H. James, Trench Mortar Officer, Headquarters, 34th Division

  On the whole of the III Corps front the overall picture was one of unremitting failure, which could not really be redeemed by trivial gains and lodgements that would never have been countenanced as success before the attack began. Yet the strength of the German positions was such that, with hindsight, it can be said that the outcome was almost inevitable. The alternate spurs and re-entrant valleys almost guaranteed exposure to deadly criss-crossing machine-gun fire, the British bombardment had been insufficient to destroy the defence works and the inadequate counter-battery fire had left the German guns free to roar their destructive defiance. No troops in the world could have achieved such overly ambitious objectives in front of Ovillers and La Boisselle on 1 July 1916. In trying to achieve what was impossible the 8th Division suffered an appalling 6,380 men killed, wounded and missing with a further 5,121 casualties in the 34th Division.

  XV Corps: Fricourt and Mametz—hard fighting

  The XV Corps was under the command of Lieutenant General Henry Horne. They faced two more of the many little spurs running down from the Pozières Ridge: namely the Fricourt and Mametz Spurs, which were separated by the valley of the Willow stream. Here again the ground was almost ideal for defence and the Germans had taken full advantage. The two villages had been converted into fortresses with a supporting trench system and deep dugouts of labyrinthine complexity. They l
ay behind a front line that carefully followed the winding contours of the downland to create miniature salients, which time and time again enfiladed much of No Man’s Land. Two intermediate lines further bolstered the defence before any interloper could get anywhere near the Second Line system. The XV Corps plans called for the assaulting 21st and 7th Divisions to overrun both spurs and to make a substantial further advance right up to the second German intermediate line (White Trench to Quadrangle Trench) where they were to consolidate. The village of Fricourt was not itself to be directly assaulted, but pinched out by attacks driving in from either side to isolate the defenders. Later the corps reserve, 17th Division, was to continue the advance through Mametz Wood to a line through Bazentin-le-Grand and Ginchy. Although they were attacking a position that combined natural and man-made defensive strength, one thing in their favour was that in this sector of the front the German artillery had been thoroughly targeted and to some extent silenced. This success rendered the German defences substantially more vulnerable than would otherwise have been the case. The gap between the front lines was also considerably less than in many sectors assaulted—narrowing in places to just 100 yards. A further advantage to the assaulting troops was the use of a definite form of creeping barrage. Although the heavy artillery would lift directly to the next designated barrage line the divisional artillery was to move forward at a rate of just 50 yards per minute.

  The barrages will not exactly lift from one point and be put on to another; they will gradually drift forward, leaving certain lines at certain hours (which may be changed). The line of the barrage must be constantly watched by the infantry, whose front lines must keep close up to it.90

  Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Fitzgerald, 15th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade, 21st Division

  On the left, the 21st Division faced the fortress village of Fricourt. They were to be helped by the detonation of three mines of 25,000 lbs, 15,000 lbs and 9,000 lbs under the German lines opposite the small British salient, known as the Tambour, which gave them their collective name. In this case the mines were a pure diversion as the craters were not to be rushed, and it was hoped that the lips thrown up around them would provide an interruption to the deadly flanking fire of the German machine guns. On the left the 64th Brigade, and to a lesser extent the 63rd Brigade, made some considerable progress despite the dangerous irritation of flanking fire from Fricourt itself and La Boisselle on the left. As the leading battalions pushed forward, the support battalions followed hard on their heels. The combination of rattling machine-gun fire, whistling rifle bullets and occasional shells was enough to daunt even the bravest.

  Left trench 7.30 a.m. Couldn’t have faced it unless afraid of funking before the men. Scrambled from shell hole to shell hole, through the wire and craters and awful havoc, terrible sights. Terrible slaughter by the Hun artillery and machine guns, the latter with snipers hurling bullets from every direction. Even behind us men were mown down right and left. Hun trenches simply myriads of shell holes. Not so many casualties as expected, as they crowded into deep dugouts and surrendered to attackers. Stopped a bullet on my head about 8 a.m.—dazed for about an hour or so. My steel helmet saved my life without a doubt, it cannot stop a direct bullet hit, but this one was glancing—a huge dent. Can remember shooting Hun officer who was shooting into backs of our men in front. Had dozens of close shaves and admit to being in frightened stew throughout the whole advance. One Hun machine gunner held up his hands but this line could not stop to secure him prisoner, leaving this for the second line. As soon as first line passed over he turned his gun and mowed them down from behind. Can vouch for this. Such cases makes you want to skin every Hun you see alive. Never stopped to explore Hun dugouts or prisoners. 9.15 a.m. saw four Hun lines (1,200 yards) cleared. Still murderous machine-gun fire. Dug in.91

  Captain Rex Gee, 15th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade, 21st Division

  Later that afternoon, the mixed remnants of the assaulting and support battalions tried to push forward from their positions in Crucifix Trench on to Shelter Wood. The result was disastrous. As they went further forward, away from their reserves and the cover of their field artillery, the Germans just grew stronger and ever more threatening.

  Attempted two charges from our hasty trenches, but no use. Was only survivor from second charge. Critical situation, strong enemy position in front, attackers on left withdrawing, leaving our left flank exposed. Held on firmly all day and repulsed two enemy attacks to bomb us out. Very trying. Relieved shortly after midnight. Am only officer left in the company. Cannot understand how anyone escaped alive, never mind capture and hold Hun trenches. Haven’t got much left in the way of nerves. Had no sleep for fifty hours and no proper meals or rest. Am dog-tired and not worth much. Everything was horrible, ghastly and awful. May I never experience the same again. Saw scores horribly wounded, horribly killed. Am being converted to conscientious objector. Words cannot express the horrors of it all.92

  Captain Rex Gee, 15th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade, 21st Division

  On the right the 20th, 22nd and 91st Brigades of the 7th Division were faced with capturing the village of Mametz. Here six much smaller mines were to be used to assist the attacking troops and to provide a local diversion. The largest of 2,000 lbs was drilled out under Bulgar Point; most of the others of only 500 lbs each were located opposite Hidden Wood, which was not to be directly attacked. The 20th Brigade had a somewhat complicated set of objectives as it was to move forward and then swing round to form a firm defensive flank facing Fricourt. Once this had been achieved the 22nd Brigade, which initially would remain in the trenches, would advance directly on Fricourt. When the assault went in at 0730, there was little German artillery fire in response although the ubiquitous machine-gun fire caused considerable casualties. Nevertheless, some progress was made, for the German front line was overrun and fierce fighting commenced amongst the maze of trenches, dugouts and machine-gun posts that lay behind.

  Amongst the battalions were the 9th Devons charged with advancing through Mansell Copse. Here the poetically minded bombing officer, Lieutenant Noel Hodgson, faced his personal Calvary. No one can ever know what was in his mind as he led his men over the top from the assembly trenches. As the men moved forward they were crucified by lethally criss-crossing machine-gun fire every step of the 400 yards that lay between them and the German front line. One man went forward with them into mortal danger, but did so in an entirely voluntary capacity—their Chaplain Ernest Crosse.

  It was a great thing to think that the church was ready to go where the men had to. Quite apart from anything specific they might do, it is important to realise the significance of their presence on the battlefield. From a military point of view it was far from negligible, because they alone were not under orders to be there—and as such they could hardly fail to encourage the men, who had no option in the matter. From a religious point of view it showed to the men far better than any preaching could do, God’s care for them. If a padre’s presence was appreciated in the trenches at normal times, it was doubly so in those awful periods in the small hours of the morning waiting for the moment of attack. A young sergeant once remarked to me, ‘Damn me, if this isn’t the best battalion I ever was in. The CO goes round the tape just before you are going to kick off; the second-in-command comes almost up to the line just to see you get a hot drink at the last possible moment; and the padre follows you over the top!’93

  Chaplain Ernest Crosse, 8th and 9th Battalions, Devonshire Regiment, 20th Brigade, 7th Division

  During a battle the divisional complement of chaplains were carefully allotted to their battle posts. Each field ambulance was given a chaplain and an extra one was assigned to the main dressing station. Only then was permission granted for the remaining chaplains to volunteer to accompany their men into action if they so desired. In this capacity Chaplain Ernest Crosse saw it as his role to work closely with the battalion medical officer and to assist h
im as and when he could.

  Wounded soon began to come back but our stretcher bearers seemed to move very slowly. Nearly all the first lot of wounded were Borderers. Then the welcomed sight of Boche prisoners passing by looking mad with terror. Doc and I went out to reconnoitre but the CO recommended staying where we were at the junction of 69 and Reserve. I met Trigillis on the top, just going up to support the 9th. Wished A Company of the 8th the best of luck. A journey round our front line revealed four badly wounded in a dugout. I helped Hicton to drag them out and then went for the stretcher bearers. About 3.30 p.m., Doc, Gertie and myself walked down the road to Mansell Copse. The road was strewn with dead. Almost the first I looked at being Martin. In every shell hole all across the valley and up to the German saps were badly wounded who feebly raised a hand or cried out lest they should not be seen. I bandaged up a few as best I could and then went with Gertie to collect all the stretcher bearers. Down Suffolk Avenue I found about eight loafing about with stretchers all over the place. With them and all available stretchers we returned. We now had ten stretchers and about thirty bearers. I gave orders to take the wounded only as far as 67 Support, so as to get as many as possible into our lines before dark, in case the Boche counter-attacked. The RAMC took the wounded back on our stretchers leaving us none. I told the stretcher bearers to use trench ladders instead and in this way we got in practically everybody up to the German line before dark. Met Gertie in the road and cursed about the stretchers. A shell pitched 20 yards from us. Went with Doc to examine Boche dugouts for use as an aid post. We could have taken anything we liked but had no time for it. We decided to move up in the morning. Being deadbeat I returned to Wellington Redoubt and lay down till dawn.94