Somme
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The collective failure of generalship within the Fourth Army can never be adequately explained or excused. Rawlinson should have knocked his corps commanders heads together, should have insisted on a properly coordinated attack or attacks. But Rawlinson was a believer in the convention that the general in command merely ‘pointed the gun’ by setting the overall objectives and then left the ‘details’ to the subordinate commanders. It was clear that this ‘laissez-faire’ view of generalship was endemic and stretched down to encompass Rawlinson’s corps commanders and many of his divisional commanders. Such a view was, in fact, an abrogation of clear responsibility to personally oversee the performance of command tasks. Not everything can be delegated if hundreds of thousands of men in disparate units are to successfully operate together with a coherent common purpose. The bulk of the Fourth Army were left as hapless bystanders as their comrades fought and died under their very noses. If lieutenant generals and major generals evade their responsibilities then their brigadiers and colonels can only order attacks by battalions or even mere companies—and so it came to pass. Men serving in the proud battalions that were smashed in these attacks would nurse a grievance against ‘High Command’ that would endure throughout what remained of their lives. Such men could only judge with the evidence of experiences seared into their very beings. They had seen little evidence of any ‘learning curve’. If anything these attacks were a dreadful step or two backwards to the dark ages of military tactics so tragically symbolised by the battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert in 1915.
Fortunately for the overall reputation of Sir Henry Rawlinson he was at the same time making plans for a new attack that was as well conceived as the so-called preparatory attacks that led up to it were monstrously foolish. The first emphasis was in securing an adequate artillery bombardment tailored to destroy the known menace of the German barbed wire, trenches, strong points and artillery batteries. This time there was no evading the necessity for concentration. In all 1,000 guns were amassed, of which some 311 were the all-important heavy artillery. Although numerically less than that used in the bombardment prior to 1 July, this was actually a far more potent assemblage. For instead of being required to fire on a front line of 22,000 yards and attempting to saturate the multiple defence lines that lay behind it, the artillery was to attack on a front of just 6,000 yards, behind which the Germans had not yet had time to build a multi-layered new trench system to match the original Byzantine complex of strong points and switch lines. In essence it has been calculated that 66 per cent of the original guns available would be firing on just below 5 per cent of the original total of targets.58 This meant that the bombardment would have the real power that it was mistakenly believed to have had prior to 1 July. This time it would not just look impressive, but would guarantee to land large numbers of shells on and in close proximity to all of the German defence works and to allow far more British batteries to be devoted to suppressing any identified German artillery batteries. This unprecedented concentration of artillery was to fire half a million shells over the three-day preliminary bombardment.
Yet not all the artillery lessons of 1 July had been properly digested. Counter-barrage fire was still low on the list of the priorities of the artillery batteries, despite the clearest possible demonstrations on 1 July of the killing power of unfettered German guns. Furthermore, it was obvious that the concept of the creeping barrage was still regarded as merely theoretical, and was not yet built into the overall framework of recommended attack tactics for the assault divisions.
One serious problem, certainly, was boldly addressed by Rawlinson and his planning staff. It was clear that the attacking troops would, even at best, be facing a No Man’s Land that would stretch uphill over 1,500 yards in front of them. Rawlinson proposed that a night attack would allow the attacking battalions to edge forward under the cover of darkness to take up position on carefully laid white marker tapes, ready to launch an attack at dawn from right under the Germans’ noses. This was an audacious plan that required careful planning, an exact reconnaissance of the ground and a skilful execution by the attacking troops. There was clearly little or no room for error. Disaster would be likely if the alarm was raised amongst the Germans. Given the risks it is easy to see why these plans worried Haig and on 11 July he took the unusual step of intervening to forbid the employment of such tactics on a grand scale.
Our troops are not highly trained and disciplined, nor are many of the staff experienced in such work, and to move two divisions in the dark over such a distance, form them up, and deliver an attack in good order and in the right direction at dawn, as proposed, would hardly be considered possible even in a peace manoeuvre.59
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Put in such a forceful manner, Haig’s views certainly had some resonance. His alternative proposals were, however, nonsensical. He envisaged a breakthrough from a narrow-front attack to be launched by the XV Corps from Mametz Wood towards Bazentin-le-Grand Wood, followed by a vigorous exploitation to roll up the German line. If all went well, there would be an all-out direct assault next day by the XIII Corps on Longueval. This over-ambitious plan was ill-conceived and laid so many hostages to fortune that it was never properly spelt out—at a conference called later that day even Rawlinson’s corps commanders summoned the nerve to express their doubts about attacking Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval separately. Backed up by his subordinates, Rawlinson decided that he must protest and with considerable courage engaged in a direct dispute with Haig in an effort to retain his original concept of a night attack. To Haig’s credit he treated this opposition to his wishes seriously and reconsidered the proposals root and branch.
I thought carefully over Rawlinson’s amended plan and discussed it in detail with Kiggell, Butler and Davidson. General Birch also gave me his opinion of the artillery situation, which was satisfactory viz. that advancing certain guns he felt fairly sure that we could dominate the enemy’s artillery. I put four questions to the General Staff:
Can we take the position in the manner proposed?
Can we hold it after capture?
What will be the results in case of a failure?
What are the advantages, or otherwise, of proceeding methodically, viz. extending our front and sapping forward to take the position by assault? They all agreed that Rawlinson’s new plan materially altered the chances of success, and there seemed a fair chance now of succeeding. They thought we could both take the position and hold it. In the case of failure, the supporting points must be held, and we can then proceed by deliberate methods—extending our front and sapping up. The disadvantage of the deliberate method at once is that we must hold the German troops in our front. If the attack was allowed to die down, they might continue the attacks at Verdun or elsewhere. The news this morning shows the Germans again attacking at Verdun. Also to encourage the French, we must keep on being active.60
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Finally, Haig was convinced that the British artillery would be strong enough to guarantee the kind of domination of the German artillery on the battle front that made his earlier concerns almost irrelevant. Rawlinson was given the go-ahead on condition that he addressed more attention to the vital importance of suppressing the German artillery by organising a far more comprehensive programme of counter-battery fire. So it was agreed that there would indeed be a combined attack by the XV Corps (21st and 7th Divisions) and the XIII Corps (3rd, 9th and 18th Divisions). In all, four divisions would be launched forward in the main dawn attack with the 1st (III Corps) and 18th Divisions engaging in flanking attacks. The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was earmarked to exploit any breakthrough by swooping forward on High Wood and then on to the village of Flers. In view of all the time that had been spent waiting to secure French cooperation in a joint attack it was particularly ironic that the French looked on the whole Rawlinson plan with utter horror and refuse
d to have anything to do with it—they would remain on the defensive until the British had captured the German Second Line along the Bazentin Ridge. Nothing would budge them and all the waiting had been in vain.
Even before the plans had been finalised, the massed British artillery had begun their three-day bombardment. The field batteries were tasked to cut the German barbed wire well before the attack and to that end sent observers into No Man’s Land, where they edged as close as was physically possible to ensure that there was no mistake. Meanwhile the heavier guns and howitzers pounded all identified German strong points. At night the guns kept up a harassing bombardment meant to hamper the damage repairs and targeted their communications behind the lines.
To preserve the maximum possible surprise as the infantry formed up in No Man’s Land it was planned to unleash the final hurricane bombardment just five brief minutes before the moment of assault. The infantry lined up on their tapes deep in No Man’s Land with nothing to protect them but darkness and their own disciplined silence. Even such an imperturbable character as Sir Douglas Haig seemed to have some difficulty in sleeping that night. His, after all, was the ultimate responsibility.
Very heavy artillery bombardment about 2.30 and then at 3.30 a.m. I looked out at 2.30, it was quite light but cloudy. Just the weather we want. The noise of the artillery was very loud and the light from the explosion of the shells was reflected from the heavens on to the ceiling of my room ...61
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
The men crawling forward were aware of the risks they were being ordered to take. The 8th Devons had already felt the vicious impact of a German barrage line and the lash of concentrated machine-gun fire two weeks earlier on 1 July. They knew what would happen if anything went wrong.
From 2.30 a.m. to 3.20 a.m. was a period of horrid suspense. Everything depended on whether or not the Boche got wind of what was happening. The 8th were engaged during this time in crawling up the 1,000 yards that separated Caterpillar Wood from the Snout. If the Boche had spotted them a few shells and machine guns might have spoiled everything. I listened and listened. The night seemed quieter than usual and only an occasional shell fell on either side. Still the suspense continued till 3.20 when I knew the hurricane bombardment of five minutes was due to start. 3.00 all quiet; 3.05 all quiet; 3.10 a few of our own machine guns just behind me pipping away; 3.15 all quiet again; 3.18; 3.19; 3.20. Then every gun for miles around gave tongue and as the shells hurtled overhead I almost felt sorry for the Boche. One thing was already certain. The surprise had succeeded.62
Chaplain Ernest Crosse, 8th and 9th Battalions, Devonshire Regiment, 20th Brigade, 7th Division
It may have been only five minutes; but what a five minutes.... This was everything that the original Somme bombardment was supposed to have been, but in the end had failed to deliver. This truly was the essence of destruction.
The whole world broke into gunfire. It was a stupendous spectacle—the darkness lit up by thousands of gun flashes—the flicker of countless bursting shells along the northern skyline, followed a few minutes later by a succession of frantic SOS rockets and the glare of burning Hun ammunition dumps.63
Major Neil Fraser-Tytler, D Battery, 149th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, 30th Division
Under the cover of the bursting shells the infantry moved still closer to the German line, intent on giving the survivors no chance of recovery when the barrage lifted. Although the artillery arrangements had once again been left in part to the discretion of the attacking divisions, there was overall a much greater emphasis on creating a genuine creeping barrage, moving in lethal synchronicity just in front of the attacking infantry, lifting some 50 yards in range every one and a half minutes to keep pace with their advance. So that the troops could get as close as possible to the barrage, it was even arranged to fire only HE shells with delayed action fuses to avoid them being detonated early from contact with any remaining trees and thus exploding prematurely, directly above the troops. The end result was a stunning success. At 0325 the assaulting infantry pressed forward on the very heels of the line of bursting shells and they crashed into the remnants of the German front line, where they found little but the dead and dying. In many sectors there was almost no serious opposition: there was no one left to oppose; there were no trenches left worthy of the name. The Germans had been simply swept away in the tide of bursting shells.
In the 9th Division sector the Scots burst through the front line and vaulted across two more trench lines in their initial impetus preceded as they were by the barrage of bursting shells. Naturally, in places, there remained pockets of resistance that had to be broken down. The 9th Scottish Rifles were involved in some bitter hand-to-hand fighting as they attacked the Longueval Redoubt.
A German fired point-blank at me and I thought he had blown part of my face off, the pain was so intense, but instinctively lowering my rifle like a pistol, I blew the top of his head off as he came up at me; my reaction to this being, ‘Gosh, just like lifting the lid off a boiling pot!’ In the light of the flares going up all over the front, I saw that the bullet fired point-blank at me had hit the German stick bomb I was carrying in my left hand, taking a crescent shaped piece out of the rim, to make a scar which is still with me today. The remainder of the garrison seemed to be centred on the middle of the redoubt and I found myself in a trench with several other ranks from various units. A private of my own company and my shadow since the action began, Bill Crowe, was a slightly built lad from Lancashire and it was remarkable how this sprat had been caught up in the mesh of war, for he was obviously still under age, his driving force the ambition to win a medal for his mother. We all tried to shield his tender years and frail physique, but Billy regarded danger as a part of the apprenticeship he had to serve. His moment of glory was near. The other three in the trench with me comprised of a lieutenant and sergeant of the Royal Scots and a sergeant of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. We decided to winkle Jerry out from our end by lobbing bombs over the traverses and under cover of the explosion, dash round the traverse to put him to the bayonet. Rushing round into one of the bays there was a rather undersized black-visaged private of the Bavarian Regiment crouched on the firestep, and as I lifted the stick bomb to club him, the arm he lifted up in defence of the blow was just a gory mess. While I attended to his wound, the lieutenant was speaking urgently to him in German, ordering him to take a message to his commandant that the fort was now surrounded, but that if he surrendered with his men, they would guarantee safe conduct to the rear and then to England. Our commiseration for his young soldier must have impressed the garrison commander favourably, for suddenly about 200 soldiers erupted from the trenches to crowd into the sunken road leading back to Montauban, milling round crying, ‘Kamerad! Kamerad!’ until the tall figure of a German captain appeared to line them up in the roadway and they were marched off, dazed and shaken from their ordeal.64
Private Barney Downes, 9th Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 27th Brigade, 9th Division
They were escorted off by young Private Bill Crowe. Downes himself did not have long to savour their triumph. As he gazed at the relatively unspoilt countryside that lay behind the village of Longueval he was caught all unawares, in a near-fatal moment of inattention.
The increasing daylight showed corn growing in the fields with trees no longer defoliated with the recurrent blasts of war. While enjoying this rustic scene in the morning sunlight, I was caught off guard when a sniper who had crept back to our new positions shot me point-blank through the chest. The impact was frightful, and the pain terrific as the thrust of the bullet leaving me pitched me forward. The bullet went through my right lung, just missing my spine. I started losing consciousness as the severe haemorrhage drained the lifeblood from a chilled body, warming only when the flow of blood streamed down my back. As the stretcher bearer carried me away, I was told that the sniper had been winkled out and, ‘Left as full of holes as
a pepper pot!’ But I was singularly free of animosity for this brave man. Now barely conscious of events, I was handed over to a stretcher bearer of the new Red Cross unit, the ‘Non-Combatant Corps’ mainly recruited from the white-livered element of our society—the so-called conscientious objectors. On the way to the field hospital they dumped me in a shell hole, one saying to the other, ‘Come on, leave the big Jock here, he’s not going to live anyway!’ And off they went.65
Private Barney Downes, 9th Battalion (Scottish Rifles), Cameronians, 27th Brigade, 9th Division
During the highly pressurised fighting the inexperienced troops of the South African Brigade moved into the attack. As they pushed forward it was apparent that the German resistance was stiffening.
We all knew that we were going against a pretty tough enemy—but we didn’t expect anything like what actually happened. While going up to Longueval my friend next to me said, ‘Man, but there’re a damn lot of bees around here!’ I said, ‘Bees be blowed! Those are bullets flying around.’ Unfortunately about four minutes afterwards a bullet caught him and killed him right out. Then I began to see that things were getting bad. Then another went over. Then another. Then I thought, ‘It’s my turn next.’ There were machine-gun posts at the flour mill at Longueval and we got it very heavy from there. I got hit at the beginning of the wood. The lower part of my jaw was shot away, they reckon by a ricochet. It felt like a mule-kick.66
Private Sidney Carey, 1st South African Infantry Regiment, South African Brigade, 9th Division