Somme
Page 35
Private P. Kinchington, 3rd Australian (New South Wales) Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Australian Imperial Force
In such circumstances, it was imperative that risks were taken if the Australians were to maintain a foothold in Pozières. Ration parties were sent back towards Contalmaison to try and get some desperately needed water. Sergeant Preston volunteered to lead a party in this prosaic but excessively dangerous mission.
Big shells were falling thickly. We could see them like black streaks coming down from the sky just before they hit the ground. Often times we were thrown to the ground with concussion, great clods of earth showering us and making our steel helmets ring. One member of the party, Private Fitzgerald, was partly buried, but was quickly dug out and left in the nearest trench to await the stretcher bearers. Eventually we reached Contalmaison, got some water in benzene tins, and made our way back to the front. On the way we passed Fitzgerald, badly wounded, but still alive. The water, as can be imagined, had a strong benzene flavour.29
Sergeant H. Preston, 9th Australian (Queensland) Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, Australian Imperial Force
At 0830 on 25 July the long-expected, major counter-attack at last materialised from the direction of the windmill further along Pozières Ridge.
As I happened to be on the right flank, I found myself right in the thick of it. The enemy came over the ridge like swarms of ants, rushing from shell hole to shell hole. Our men, full of fight and confidence, lined the parapet and emptied magazine after magazine into them. Some of the boys, anxious to get a shot at the Germans, pulled one another down from the firestep in the midst of the fight. Under this fire and that of our machine guns and the artillery, which tore great gaps in the advancing lines, the enemy attack withered. The survivors were later seen retiring beyond the ridge, which was barraged by our artillery.30
Sergeant H. Preston, 9th Australian (Queensland) Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, Australian Imperial Force
The Australian lines held, but by the time they were finally relieved by their comrades of the 2nd Australian Division they had lost over 5,000 casualties.
Gough was a vigorous commander and he remained determined to launch a resumption of the drive through Pozières as soon as possible. Partly in consequence the 2nd Australian Division was inveigled into launching an attack without adequate preparation. The fresh troops had no chance to settle in to their new surroundings and reconnoitre the ground ahead of them. At 0015 on 29 July, the 7th Australian Brigade attacked the OG1 and OG2 lines and then the Pozières Windmill that lay beyond them. A stretcher bearer watched the doomed advance of the proud ANZACs of the 28th Battalion.
They marched across No Man’s Land as if they were on the parade ground with their own shells screaming in droves over their heads and the German shells blowing them to bits. The men dropped like flies, the German wire remained intact and they could go neither forward nor back. They tore at the barbed wire with their hands, searching for openings under one of the most intense machine-gun barrages Australians ever faced.31
Private Tom Young, 27th Australian (South Australia) Battalion, 7th Brigade, 2nd Division, Australian Imperial Force
Trapped in front of the thick barbed wire the survivors had little or no chance and most took shelter in shell holes. On their flanks the other battalions of the 7th Brigade faired better and overran part of the OG1 line, but floundered against the wire of the OG2 line. This was of small consolation to the men of the 28th Battalion.
We left a long line of the best and bravest boys that Australia ever produced lying along that wire; some fell across it with the wires in their hands. Others died with the wire cutters still on the wire, but they were glorious lads every one of them. I got into a shell hole right under his wire and could go no further forward, so I sent my supply of bombs in the direction of his machine gun right in front of me. I cannot vouch for the result. By this time everything was in a state of chaos and I took the risk of going from shell hole to shell hole trying to get the boys together for another try. The word came up for us to withdraw to our original front line. They all did this, but I stayed and did my best for several wounded fellows.32
Corporal Percy Blythe, 28th Australian (West Australia) Battalion, 7th Brigade, 2nd Division, Australian Imperial Force
Amongst the men he was able to assist was Private Norgard, who had been badly hit in the first rush.
I ‘stopped it’ and promptly dropped into a shell hole. I took what was left of my boot off and bandaged the wound as quickly as possible. Our poor chaps were falling like ninepins everywhere. I assumed a very painful crawl and got back to our starting point with a couple more minor hits on the ribs. Percy Blythe got me safely back to the aid post.33
Private E. R. Norgard, 28th Australian (West Australia) Battalion, 7th Brigade, 2nd Division, Australian Imperial Force
For his earlier determination and courage in assisting the wounded Blythe was awarded the Military Medal. A few trivial gains were made but on most of the 7th Brigade front the men ended up back in their jumping-off trenches. Their casualties had been sobering—the 28th Battalion lost some 467 men.
As the news trickled back Haig blamed the over-confident attitude of the ANZACs for the failure. It is easy to see why the brash confidence of the Australians might grate on his more restrained susceptibilities, but it was still unfair.
The attack by the 2nd Australian Division upon the enemy’s position between Pozières and the windmill, was not successful last night. From several reports I think the cause was due to want of thorough preparation. After lunch I visited headquarters Reserve Army and impressed upon Gough and Neill Malcolm that they must supervise more closely the plans of the ANZAC Corps. Some of their divisional generals are so ignorant and (like so many Colonials) so conceited, that they cannot be trusted to work out unaided the plans of attack.34
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Sometimes it seemed that the proverb, ‘more haste less speed’ could have been coined with the Somme in mind. Yet it was unwarranted to blame the Australian commanders, as they had been pushed into the attack with no chance for proper groundwork. To add further insult Haig took the opportunity to personally berate Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, during a visit to ANZAC Corps Headquarters by sharply lecturing him that they were not fighting the Turks now!
Early August 1916 Pozières Ridge
Before the australians had any chance to redeem themselves with another attempt on the redoubtable OG1 and OG2 lines, the 8th Royal Fusiliers and the 6th Buffs of the 12th Division, who stretched alongside them to the left of Pozières, launched a night attack at 2315 on 3 August. Their objective was Fourth Avenue.
There were 300 or 400 yards to go to their trench and because of the attacks that had gone before, there was no wire—we knew there was no wire between us and the Germans. We lay out under cover of darkness about 100 yards in front of our front line. There was a short five minutes or so of mortar barrage, no artillery barrage. When the mortar barrage ended we were to advance. We did and jumped into the trench which was full of Germans. They were sheltering from the bombardment of our mortars. We were all armed and they immediately surrendered. There was as many Germans in the trench as their were British soldiers, it was a bit embarrassing for a bit but they were gradually ushered away and forced to go back over No Man’s Land. We had wounded Germans in the trench and unfortunately they had to stay there because our stretcher bearers were so busy that they took our own men first, naturally. Our men were kind to them, they gave them water, cigarettes, it depends how badly they were wounded. We tried to tie them up or put a tourniquet on.35
Corporal Arthur Razzell, 8th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 36th Brigade, 12th Division
They took ninety-two prisoners in all. Some British bombers managed to work their way up the communications trenches to gain a tenuous foothold in Ration Trench, which marked the next major obstacle to progre
ss. The next day the 2nd Australian Division attacked towards Courcelette, finally overrunning the tough German resistance centred on the strong OG1 and OG2 lines. At the same time, 2115, the neighbouring 12th Division made another gallant attempt to take Ration Trench.
The order came, ‘Platoon sergeants to come to headquarters!’ Well, we went along and there was Captain Cazalet, and this is the sort of orders we got: ‘We are going in behind curtain fire, we don’t know exactly how far this trench is, but it’s between 200 and 300 yards. Sergeant Turnbull will take the first wave, I will go over with the first; Mr Firefoot will go over with the second; Sergeant Quinnell, with your platoon, you’ll be in the second wave. Now go along and tell your men to be ready and as soon as the curtain fire starts, we move!’ Back along the trench we went and told our men what to do. Well my men in the second wave, the tip I gave them was to: ‘Run like hell and catch up with the first wave!’ That wasn’t an order it was just a tip, because my experience told me that when you’re out in No Man’s Land you’re standing there naked, but if you catch the first wave, the sooner you get over and get your job done, the fewer casualties you’ll have.36
Sergeant Charles Quinnell, 9th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 36th Brigade, 12th Division
The British knew there was no barbed wire in front of them, which of course simplified matters enormously. The Germans had not had any chance to attend to this defensive necessity in the maelstrom that was Pozières Ridge.
My men got over, we caught up with the first wave behind this curtain fire and we were into the Germans with the first wave—we ran like hell. When we got to the German trench, there was this German kneeling on the floor of the trench and the poor bugger was dead scared. At any rate, while I’m wondering whether to stick him or shoot him, a German jumped out of the trench away to my left, another one on the right, so I jumped down on this German, pinned him down, knelt on his shoulders, shot the German on my left, worked my bolt, put another one up the spout and shot the German who was running away on the right. By this time all our men had reached the trench and I went along to report to the captain. He said, ‘Good, now let’s have a quick roll call!’ I counted my men and I’d only lost three coming over, which was a marvellous performance. It was a surprise attack you see, and the Germans didn’t have time to drop their barrage down. Once we were over there and in the German trench, the barrage came down behind us and my tip paid off, otherwise we would have caught the barrage.37
Sergeant Charles Quinnell, 9th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 36th Brigade, 12th Division
As this incident illustrates, the learning curve did not only apply to the generals. The ordinary soldiers that had the good fortune to survive their first experience of battle swiftly learnt how to maximise their chances of staying alive in the most deadly of environments.
The German bombardment, when it came, was a dreadful experience for the 8th Royal Fusiliers in Ration Trench as it eroded their strength one by one.
Of course they knew the range to the yard and they began a terrific bombardment which went on hour after hour. About two in the morning, when the bombardment had been on for a couple of hours or more, a sergeant asked me to see how many men we had left in our platoon, because we were getting casualties all the time. The trench was no longer a trench it was just a series of shell holes. I went along where the trench had been and I found an odd man here and an odd man there. I went back to him and I wrote a little chit saying we had six men in our platoon. He was sitting at a ‘T’ junction with a communication trench and at that point the trench was in rather good condition. So I sat next to him on the floor, gave him the chit and was talking to him when there was an explosion quite near and I felt my helmet go and I realised that I was wounded.38
Corporal Arthur Razzell, 8th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 36th Brigade, 12th Division
As Corporal Razzell set off back to the rear for medical assistance, for those left behind in Ration Trench there was little or nothing to alleviate the overall gloom. In the absence of a general advance in that sector they were left merely occupying a tenuous lodgement in the German front line. Barricades were established to both left and right flank and in all communications trenches leading forwards and then the men sat down to await their fate. Sergeant Quinnell and his men were fortunate in that they entirely escaped the German shelling that had devastated their neighbours. It was their considered opinion that in the mad tangle of trenches the German artillery simply did not know where they were. But there were other weapons available to the Germans and their response was to use one of the most loathed advances in the noble art of warfare—the flammenwerfer.
Over this barricade on our right flank came a German with a canister of liquid fire on his back; squirting liquid fire out of a hose he burnt twenty-three of our chaps to death. I plonked one into his chest, but he must have had an armoured plated waistcoat on, it didn’t stop him. Someone threw a Mills bomb at him and it burst behind—he wasn’t armoured plated behind, he went down. But at any rate he’d done a lot of damage. The bombers bombed the Germans back from the barricade. Plenty of chaps were wounded with this liquid fire as well as those that were killed; it practically wiped out Tubby Turnbull’s platoon. Then we got an order from the Captain. I hope I never hear it repeated again. We must shorten our front—so he gave us an order to make a barricade of the dead, the German dead and our dead. We made a barricade of them and retreated about 40 yards back towards my platoon. Now I’d got a barricade on my left to look after, there was the front, plenty of Germans out there and sniping from behind. I’d got these chaps—green as grass! When we went over we only had two bombs apiece which we had in our tunic pockets. Everybody handed their bombs into the right-hand flank, because that was the danger point, all our bombs were taken to the barricade there. That afternoon these Germans behind us were winkled out of their trench and that night our pioneer battalion dug a 7-foot communication trench from our own British front line to where we were. They must have worked like Trojans—they were a battalion of Northamptons.
As soon as the trench was dug, up came a Stokes trench mortar, also boxes and boxes of rifle grenades, like a pineapple on a stick. I’d been trained for firing rifle grenades—they had to be fired by a very powerful blank cartridge, it was a specialist job. By this time Tubby Turnbull was wounded, Mr Firefoot was wounded and that left Captain Cazalet and I. We had a consultation as to where to site this Stokes trench mortar, we put it about 50 yards back from the barricade. I trained three of these rookies how to load and prepare the rifle grenades. The next time an attack came over this barricade—the same performance: a man coming over with a liquid fire canister—he got a very, very hot reception. The Stokes trench mortar opened up and dropped the mortars just the other side of the barricade. I’d three men loading up these rifle grenades and I peppered the whole line—I couldn’t miss, I was in the same trench you see—peppered it from 75 yards to 200 yards and judging by the shouts and screams I was taking a very good toll. The Stokes was the barrage that prevented them coming over and I was doing the peppering with the rifle grenades. All told we had five attacks over this barricade. The first was the disastrous one, for which we paid very heavily, but in the other four we took a very, very heavy toll and we didn’t lose a man.39
Sergeant Charles Quinnell, 9th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 36th Brigade, 12th Division
Alongside the 12th Division, the battered 2nd Australian Division was finally relieved on 6 August by which time it had suffered some 6,800 casualties in two attacks. It had eventually attained the crest of the Pozières Ridge and thereby secured a tactically valuable vista extending over Courcelette, and Martinpuich towards Bapaume. As the tattered remnants moved back out of the line they were replaced by the 4th Australian Division. As the men of the 14th Australian Battalion moved up through Sausage Valley they had to cross the devastated hinterland, which all too clearly bore the scars and detritus of the awful events of the last few weeks.
We gained the
entrance to the communication trench and passed along it in single file. The trench was a particularly long one and uncomfortably narrow. Loaded up as we were, it was difficult to worm our way along it, and the knuckles of the hands became skinned in consequence. Ghastly sights were witnessed on that journey through the sap. Scores of bodies had been partially buried in the soft earth, and bloody hands and feet protruded at frequent intervals. Boxes of rations and ammunition were scattered about, telling plainer than words that the fatigue parties had come under violent artillery fire and had been annihilated.40
Corporal Charles Smith, 14th Australian (Victoria) Battalion, 4th Brigade, 4th Division, Australian Imperial Force
Corporal Smith who served with 5th Platoon was fortunate indeed in his officer, for it was none but the renowned Lieutenant Albert Jacka, who had already won a Victoria Cross as an acting lance corporal, when he had led a desperate counter-attack to throw the Turks out of their trench at Courtney’s Post, during the Turkish offensive on the small ANZAC beachhead at Gallipoli on 19 May 1915. But as all the Aussies of the 4th Division had discovered, the conditions on the Turkish peninsula were nothing compared to those on the Somme.
Dead were scattered everywhere. Broken trenches, twisted barbed wire, mutilated rations and military equipment, stretchers with their once human contents, and bearers now cold and stiff—all gave mute evidence of the recent carnage. Lieutenant Jacka was in charge of the platoon and such a cool level-headed officer seemed strangely suited to such grim surroundings, for he inspired confidence in all with whom he came into contact. Here indeed was a test of courage even before the firing line was reached. Leaving the company in the sap, Lieutenant Jacka and the officer commanding (Major Fuhrmann) hopped over the sandbags and went to investigate. After a time he returned and told us to leave the trench in parties of two and three and double across the open in a direction half-left, they leading the way. We did so, bullets whizzing uncomfortably the while. A number of partly connected shell holes formed the firing line, and into these we jumped.41