Somme
Page 42
On the ground the outlook was a good deal less optimistic. Faced once again with three German lines to overcome before any breakthrough could possibly be achieved, Rawlinson reverted to his usual caution and the proposals that he initially submitted to Haig were once again for a carefully staged approach. He was minded to attack at night, pause for a day or so, move up his artillery, and only then attack again. He considered that the gap between the new First, Second and Third German lines was cumulatively too wide to allow his field artillery to bombard the rear lines without moving forward. In this he was undoubtedly correct as the 18-pounders and 4.5-in howitzers, which made up the bulk of his artillery, only had an effective range of about 6,500 yards and they could not reach such distant targets. In addition, even the medium and heavy batteries that were capable of firing at long range were hampered by the carefully sited rear-slope positions of the German Second and Third Lines. Even with the best observational assistance of the Royal Flying Corps this was a crippling handicap to an accurate barrage.
When it came to the use of tanks, Rawlinson was equally cautious. When he had seen the tanks training in late August he was impressed by their obvious potential but was equally aware of their unresolved problems. He was left with a neatly balanced quandary that he found somewhat difficult to resolve.
The presence of the fifty ‘tanks’ however raises entirely new, but at the same time somewhat problematical, possibilities. Should they prove successful we might lose valuable time and miss an opportunity by confining our operations only to the capture of system (a) [the Combles–Martinpuich line] On the other hand we may, by expecting too much of the ‘tanks’, be tempted to undertake an operation which is beyond our power, and which might cause very heavy losses to the ‘tanks’ themselves and to the infantry engaged in their support. Moreover, if the attack failed, the secret of the ‘tanks’ would be given away once and for all. Setting aside the enormous value of first surprise the chief asset of the ‘tanks’ will be lost when they cease to be an unknown quantity. Till the enemy know exactly what they have to deal with they cannot arrange or prepare an antidote. We must therefore endeavour to keep them a mystery as long as possible.5
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Headquarters, Fourth Army
It is unsurprising that he built this desire to keep the nature of tanks a secret for as long as possible into his overall plan for a night attack aimed only at overwhelming the German front line. He reasoned that having seized their objectives before dawn the tanks could be withdrawn before daylight and hence leave the Germans none the wiser as to their true nature. Sadly, although he had grasped the tanks’ vulnerability to artillery fire he had failed to realise that in the dark, with their already severely restricted visibility, the tanks could not be driven over a rough, obstacle strewn terrain without very quickly coming to grief.
There is no doubt that Haig was considerably under-whelmed by the cautious nature of Rawlinson’s plans. Once again he felt Rawlinson was not aware of the necessity of maximising the potential gains of the attack. Already disgruntled by the overall failure of the August operations Haig was not willing to compromise.
I studied Rawlinson’s proposals for the September attack and for the use of the ‘Tanks’. In my opinion he is not making enough of the situation and the deterioration of the enemy’s troops. I think we should make our attack as strong and as violent as possible, and go as far as possible.6
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Haig still hoped for a breakthrough battle. He was increasingly aware of the agitation from dissatisfied politicians and the ‘stellenbosched’ generals who had their own reasons for criticising the conduct of operations on the Western Front. And, of course, he was egged on by the encouraging intelligence reports originating from Charteris. Haig was keen to capitalise on the ‘known’ weakness of the German Army by making a vigorous effort to cut the Gordian knot of trench warfare once and for all.
During the two months that the Battle of the Somme has lasted the enemy has suffered repeated defeats and heavy losses, and has undergone many hardships. All this has undoubtedly told on his discipline and morale, and signs of deterioration in his troops are not wanting. The general offensive on all his fronts, which will be continued, has placed a great and prolonged strain on his power of resistance which strain will now be increased by the entry of Romania into the war. The reserves at the enemy’s disposal to meet a renewed attack are very limited and consist mainly of tired troops which have already suffered severely. Moreover, it is not unlikely that he will be compelled to transfer some of his reserves to his Eastern Front. The combined attacks to be launched by the French and British troops during the first week of September, and the counter-attacks by the enemy that are likely to result, will weaken him further and wear down the divisions now opposed to us. On our side several fresh divisions are still available to be thrown into the scale after these combined attacks have been carried out. We shall also have a new weapon of offence (some fifty tanks) which, coming as a surprise to the enemy, are likely to be of considerable moral and material assistance to us. In short, we are approaching a stage in the battle when bold and energetic action may give great—perhaps decisive—results, provided the requisite preparations are made in time and all ranks put forth their utmost efforts.7
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
At this stage in the Somme campaign Rawlinson was not in any position to attempt to contradict or thwart his increasingly impatient commander-in-chief. Any credit he had earned for his bold plan for 14 July had long since evaporated in the arid six weeks that had followed, devoid of any significant success. Yet Haig’s proposals were themselves flawed.
The general officer commanding Fourth Army, while pressing the attack on his whole front, will direct his main efforts to the capture, as quickly as possible, of Morval, Lesboeufs, Flers and Gueudecourt. Then, as soon as the necessary gap in the enemy’s defences in that area has been made, as strong as possible a force of cavalry, supported by other arms, will be passed through to establish a flank guard of all arms on the general line Morval–Le Transloy–Bapaume, and assist rolling up the enemy’s lines of defence to the north-westwards by operating against their flank and rear in cooperation with the attack which will continue to be pressed against their front. All arrangements are to be made with a view to overwhelming the enemy at the outset by a powerful assault, and following up every advantage gained with rapidity and vigour.8
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
These proposals were radical indeed and repeated some of the mistakes made on 1 July. In trying to take all three lines and break through the German defences, Haig was running the risk of diluting the artillery preparation and thereby falling at the first hurdle. He was also intent on committing almost all the available reserves to the initial attack, which left little capacity to respond to unexpected developments, be they good or bad. The plan was also noticeably optimistic as to the chance of getting cavalry forward across the broken ground that would inevitably result from such a battle. Yet Rawlinson had no choice but to back down and he duly conformed to Haig’s intentions. They would indeed attack on a wide front, with each attacking corps using all three divisions on narrow fronts to maximise the impact of the attack. The main thrust, however, would be concentrated on the narrower front centred on Flers.
Once again, the artillery bombardment would be at the very centre of the British plans. Over the previous months the Royal Artillery had gained much experience in both theoretical and practical gunnery. The debate as to the best type of artillery barrages in support of major attacks had been heated. Should they be long and pounding or short hurricane waves of destruction? Should the infantry be covered by creeping barrages of high explosive or shrapnel shell? How close could the infantry get to the back of the barrage before the ‘friendly-fire’ casualties outweighed
the advantages? How many guns should be brought up ready to go forward just behind the infantry to extend the support given by the artillery in the event of success?
For the Battle of Flers-Courcelette to be launched on 15 September 1916, there would be approximately one field gun per 10 yards of front, with a medium or heavy gun every 29 yards of front. This was approximately twice the concentration achieved on 1 July. The day of the really heavy bombardment was dawning. In the three day preliminary bombardment some 828,000 shells were fired. The concept of a creeping barrage was now firmly accepted by all, although the attacking corps still made its own arrangements in dividing up its artillery between a creeping barrage moving at 50 yards per minute some 100 yards ahead of the advancing infantry and a stationary barrage continually pounding the objectives. The vital question of counter-battery fire was still not sufficiently well appreciated, but, on the other hand, improvements had been made, with some fifty-six guns and howitzers being specifically assigned to the task with observation supplied by the Royal Flying Corps. Meanwhile, arrangements were made to move as many of the guns as close to the front as possible. This would allow the heavier guns to continue to support the advance for as long as possible, while batteries of field artillery were readied to move forward with special bridges to allow them to cross the trenches as soon as it was feasible after the infantry had taken their objectives. The power of the guns was growing exponentially.
After closely debated discussion it was decided that the tanks would be employed in small groups scattered along the front line with the aim of moving ahead of the attacking troops to suppress identified German strong points. More imaginatively some eighteen tanks were to spearhead the XV Corps assault on the village of Flers, which Rawlinson considered to be the key to the integrity of the new German Second Line defences. Despite this important role assigned to the tanks, there could be no doubt that Rawlinson was not to any great extent pinning his hopes on the success of the tanks. To him they were a potentially useful auxiliary weapon and nothing more.
I do not think the tanks will actually capture anything for you. They are only accessories for the infantry and the latter must work in conformity with them ...I think we had better issue some definite instructions in regard to the employment of tanks with the artillery. Personally, I am strongly in favour of not making any changes in our ordinary method man is absolutely necessary, in order to allow the tanks to work, ...we will place ...chief reliance on the methods which we are practising, looking on the tanks as an auxiliary to help us by every possible means.9
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Headquarters, Fourth Army
Whatever the differences in opinion over tactics there is no doubt that both Haig and Rawlinson were still absolutely wedded to the concept of the primacy of artillery. The tanks were seen as a promising addition to the book of war, not yet deserving any greater status than an addendum. It is therefore particularly ironic that, in their efforts to accommodate the tanks into their plans, they fatally diluted the power of the guns and thereby rendered the infantry appallingly vulnerable if the tanks failed.
Tanks will start movement at a time so calculated that they will reach their objectives five minutes before the infantry. The infantry will advance as usual behind a creeping barrage in which gaps, about 100 yards wide, will be left for the route of the tanks, some minutes before their arrival at these objectives.10
Instructions for the Employment of Tanks, Headquarters Staff, Fourth Army
In these seemingly sensible arrangements the seeds of disaster were planted. In the attack on the most dangerous German strong points, there would be no creeping barrage and if the tanks failed the infantry would be left to their own devices. This was made worse by the natural caution of artillery batteries, who inevitably left the gap wider to avoid possible mistakes and thus exacerbated the already dangerous situation. In assaulting the second objectives it was decided that the infantry and tanks would, wherever possible, advance together under a renewed uniform creeping barrage. The third objectives were far beyond the range of the field artillery, so it was intended that the tanks would be employed to flatten the wire for the infantry and then use their weapons to try to suppress the inevitable German defensive fire. Overall, it was clearly emphasised that if the tanks were held up for any reason, the infantry were not to wait but were to push on regardless; yet if the tanks succeeded and the infantry were checked the tanks must turn back and endeavour to assist them. The infantry were still the primary force on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the old story was being relived as the assault battalions began to move up into the line. The 47th (London) Division was one of the divisions earmarked for the attack and was assigned the particularly dangerous task of taking the dreaded High Wood. The Londoners seemed perfectly sanguine and indeed, like some chivalrous knights from a semi-mythical past, many were delighted that such a post of honour had been granted them in the coming battle.
The postmen from quiet little hamlets, or clerks who had spent their lives hitherto in snug offices, talked about these future regimental mortuaries with the homely names, with astonishing calmness. Rumour set an early date for the grand attack. The Guards and the ANZACs were concentrated in the region, and the Londoners thought it quite natural that they should march with them, so high had risen the esprit de corps of the London Division. But bad weather set in and no orders came. Day followed day and on the fringe of the vortex that would engulf them in turn, the battalion continued serenely to train. Not a detail was overlooked and by long hours of work in common, the officers got to know intimately their men, and the men the officers who were to lead them. Particular attention was given to night work. More than once in pitch darkness and blinding rain, companies were deployed in the broad stubble fields south of Framvilliers to practise keeping in touch and finally dig in as noiselessly as possible. Farewell joy rides were taken to Amiens, a dusty journey by lorry but where to share even briefly the animation and intense throb of life was like imbibing a tonic.11
Lieutenant Etienne de Caux, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
For many of the men a good ‘blow out’ in the local estaminet represented a last chance to enjoy themselves come what may before they went into battle. These were simple pleasures for men with simple tastes.
Most of us turned over the very few francs and centimes we happened to have and spent it. ‘Oeufs’ and ‘pommes de terre’ were on sale. Plus plenty of ‘Plink Plonk’ a cheap red or white wine. The shadows were darkening, particularly when at short notice one late afternoon we were all hustled on parade. The ‘high ups’ were going to give us a dose of moral courage. In one of the largest, recently harvested cornfields, that I remember, we were marched to join up with other regiments in the area. It was called a drum head service and in the far distance from where our company stood at ease, one could see two figures in white. We presumed they were padres and doing their duty.12
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Unsurprisingly, on the eve of battle, the padres found themselves in unprecedented demand from men determined to improve their chances in this world and the next.
We had some wonderful services on Sunday. To see fifty or sixty men in a dark building, lighted by only a few candles and one acetylene lamp is wonderful! Your cross is on the wall, two candles on the altar, the Union Jack underneath ‘a fair linen cloth’, and the singing very enthusiastic. The men are in great form. A good few are inwardly anxious, but they put a cheery face on it all. Sometimes this is from a highly religious motive, at other times a kind of fatalism, or, resigned dependence on God. ‘What has to be, will be’ they often say.13
Chaplain David Railton, 1/19th Battalion (St Pancras), London Regiment, 141st Brigade, 47th Division
Finally, during the afternoon of 12 September, the Post Office Rifles left their billets at Framvilliers and march
ed down the long Albert road. They were largely silent.
The great highway was dry and dusty, the morning air fresh. Steadily the long column marched towards the quavering lights ahead. Colonel Whitehead rode at the head of the battalion with the adjutant and myself. At hourly halts he dismounted and spoke to Captain Mitchell, or walked a little distance down the column. The men were silent, but for an occasional snatch of song. The usual unconscious irony, ‘There’s a sneaking feeling round my heart that I’d like to settle down....’ The merry words of the popular ‘Follies’ ditty floating out into the fields bordering the tree-lined highway, were laden with unconscious pathos. Dawn had come as the battalion breasted the last long hill, where the ragged screens of the old French camouflage still lined the road. Down in the hollow the red brick houses of the once prosperous little town, clustered round the remains of the red brick basilica with its shattered tower. Near the railway station a tall, slim factory chimney still defied the Hun. Beyond the valley, towards the rising light, stretched the grey slopes scarred by the white chalk of the old front lines.14