The Omnibus Homo Sacer

by Giorgio Agamben

  bureau is today mainly closed, because the thoughts that constitute its foundations have

  lost their roots”: Troeltsch, p. 36). Inasmuch as it involves the radical putting in question of the connection between the Church and Israel, the reopening of the eschatological

  bureau is a thorny problem. It is unsurprising that a thinker like Benjamin, who positioned himself at the singular intersection of Christianity and Judaism, did not need to wait for Moltmann and Dodd to carry it out without reservations, yet he preferred to speak of

  messianism rather than eschatology.

  1.5. Peterson begins his argument by quoting the Homeric verse ( Iliad, 2, 204)

  that concludes Book L of Metaphysics, “that is, the treatise we are used to calling Aristotle’s theology” (Peterson 1994, p. 25): “The world must not be governed

  badly. ‘The rule of many is not good; let there be one {sovereign}.’” According

  to Peterson, the point at issue in this passage is the critique of Platonic dualism

  and, in particular, of Speusippus’s theory of the plurality of principles, against

  which Aristotle intends to show that nature is not generated by way of a series of

  episodes, like a bad tragedy, but has a single principle.

  Although the term “monarchy” does not yet appear in Aristotle in this context,

  we need to emphasize that its meaning is, however, already present precisely in

  the semantic duplicity according to which, in divine monarchy, the single power

  ( mia archē) of the single ultimate principle coincides with the power of the single ultimate holder of this power ( archōn). (Ibid.)

  In this way, Peterson is suggesting that the theological paradigm of the Aristo-

  telian unmoved mover is somehow the archetype of the following theological-

  political justifications of monarchic power in Judaic and Christian circles. The

  pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De mundo, which Peterson analyzes shortly after, in this sense constitutes the bridge between classical politics and the Judaic notion

  of divine monarchy. While in Aristotle God is the transcendent principle of any

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  movement, who leads the world as a strategist leads his army, in this treatise, the

  monarch, hidden in the rooms of his palace, moves the world as the puppeteer

  leads his puppets on strings.

  Here the image of divine monarchy is not determined by whether there is one or

  more principles, but rather by the problem of whether God participates in the

  powers that act in the cosmos. The author wants to say: God is the presupposi-

  tion of power [ . . . ] to act in the cosmos, but precisely for this reason he is not

  power ( dynamis). (Ibid., p. 27)

  Quoting a motto dear to Schmitt, Peterson summarizes this image of divine

  monarchy in the formula “Le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas” (ibid.).

  It is only with Philo that something like a political theology appears clearly

  for the first time in the form of a theocracy. Analyzing Philo’s language, Peterson

  shows that political theology is clearly a Judaic creation. The theological-political

  problem is posed for Philo “in the concreteness of his condition of being a Jew”

  (ibid., p. 30).

  Israel is a theocracy, that single people is governed by the single divine monarch.

  One only people, one only God [ . . . ] But given that the single God is not only the monarch of Israel, but also of the cosmos, for this reason that single people—“the people most loved by God”—governed by this cosmic monarch, becomes minister and prophet for all mankind. (Ibid., pp. 28–29)

  After Philo, the concept of divine monarchy is taken up by the Christian Apol-

  ogists, who use it for their defense of Christianity. In a brief survey, Peterson

  reads from this perspective Justin, Tatian, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Hippolytus,

  Tertullian, and Origen. But it is only with Eusebius, a court theologian—or, in

  Overback’s venomous witticism, the friseur of the theological wig of the Emperor

  Constantine—that a Christian political theology is comprehensively formulated.

  Eusebius sees a correspondence between the coming of Christ on earth as savior of

  all nations and Augustus’s establishment of a global imperial power. Before Augus-

  tus, man used to live in polyarchy, among a plurality of tyrannies and democracies,

  but “when the Lord and Savior appeared and, at the same time as his advent, Au-

  gustus, first of Romans, became king of the nations, pluralistic polyarchy was dis-

  persed and peace covered all the earth” (Eusebius, Commentary on the Psalms, 71,

  in PG, 23). Peterson shows how, according to Eusebius, the process that was begun

  with Augustus is brought to completion with Constantine. “After Constantine

  defeated Licinius, political monarchy was restored and, at the same time, divine

  monarchy was secured [ . . . ] the single king on earth corresponds to the single king in Heaven and the single sovereign nomos and Logos” (Peterson 1994, p. 50).

  THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY

  381

  Peterson follows Eusebius’s descendants through John Chrysostom, Pruden-

  tius, Ambrose, and Jerome up to Orosius, for whom the parallelism between the

  unity of the global empire and the accomplished revelation of a single God be-

  comes the key to interpret history:

  “In the same year, Caesar—predestined by God for many mysteries—ordered

  a census of all men in every province of the empire. God made himself seen as

  a man then, he wanted to be a man then. Christ was born at that time: he was

  registered shortly after his birth during the Roman census” [ . . . ] A single God

  who, in the times when he decided to reveal himself, established this unity of

  the kingdom is loved and feared by all: the same laws rule everywhere, the laws

  of those who are subject to the single God. (Ibid., p. 55)

  At this point, in an abrupt reversal, Peterson tries to show that, at the time of

  the disputes on Arianism, the theological-political paradigm of divine monarchy

  enters into conflict with the development of Trinitarian theology. The procla-

  mation of the dogma of the Trinity marks, from this perspective, the waning of

  “monotheism as a political problem.” In only two pages, political theology—to

  whose reconstruction the book had been dedicated—is entirely demolished.

  The doctrine of divine monarchy had to fail in the face of the Trinitarian dogma

  just as the interpretation of the pax augusta had to fail in the face of Christian eschatology. In this way, not only is monotheism as a political problem abolished theologically and the Christian faith freed from its link with the Roman

  empire, but a break with any “political theology” is also produced. Something

  like a “political theology” can exist only in the field of Judaism or Paganism.

  (Ibid., pp. 58–59)

  The note to this passage that concludes the book reads as follows (it is as though

  the entire treatise were written in view of this note):

  To the best of my knowledge, the concept of “political theology” was introduced

  in the literature by Carl Schmitt’s Politische theologie (München, 1922). His brief considerations at that time were not laid out systematically. Here we have attempted to demonstrate by means of a concrete example that “political theology”

  is theologically impossible. (Ibid., p. 81)

  א Eusebius’s thesis on the solidarity of the advent of a single global empire, the

  end of polyarch
y, and the triumph of the only true God shows some analogies with

  Negri and Hardt’s thesis according to which the overcoming of nation-states in a single

  global capitalist empire paves the way for the triumph of communism. However, while

  the doctrine of Constantine’s theological hairdresser had a clear tactical meaning and

  was the effect not of an antagonism, but of an alliance between Constantine’s global

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  power and the Church, the meaning of Negri and Hardt’s thesis can certainly not be

  understood in the same way and thus remains enigmatic to say the least.

  1.6. A passage from a Cappadocian theologian of the fourth century, Greg-

  ory of Nazianzus, plays a key strategic role in Peterson’s argument. According to

  the drastic summary provided by Peterson, Gregory conferred upon the Trinitar-

  ian dogma its “ultimate theological depth” opposing the “monarchy of the triune

  God” to the “monarchy of a single person”:

  Christians [ . . . ] recognize themselves in God’s monarchy; certainly not in the

  monarchy of a single person in the deity, because this brings with it the germ of

  internal division [ Zwiespalt], but in a monarchy of the triune God. This concept

  of unity cannot be found in human nature. With this development, monotheism

  as a political problem is eliminated theologically. (Ibid., pp. 57–58)

  However, it is strange that, in his belated answer, Schmitt uses the same passage

  analyzed by Peterson to draw conclusions that are in certain ways the opposite

  of Peterson’s. According to the jurist, Gregory of Nazianzus introduced a sort of

  theory of civil war (“a genuine politico-theological stasiology”) into the core of the Trinitarian doctrine (Schmitt 2008a, p. 123) and, in this way, could be said to

  be still using a theological-political paradigm, one that would refer back to the

  opposition friend/enemy.

  The idea that the elaboration of the Trinitarian theology is in itself sufficient

  to eliminate any theological-political conception of a divine monarchy is, after

  all, far from evident. Speaking about Tertullian, Peterson himself evokes the

  attempts of the Christian Apologists to reconcile the Trinitarian theology with

  the image of an emperor who exercises the power that is his alone by means

  of governors and ministers. But even the passage from Gregory of Nazianzus’s

  oration, which Peterson quotes in an offhanded manner, appears to be far from

  probative when it is brought back to its proper context.

  This text is part of a group of five orations that we normally refer to as “theo-

  logical” because they constitute a veritable treatise on the Trinity. The theology of

  the Cappadocians, of whom Gregory of Nazianzus was the greatest representative

  together with Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, was engaged in the elim-

  ination of the last Arian and Homoousian resistances and in the elaboration of

  the doctrine of the single substance in three different hypostases that was finally

  established at the Council of Constantinople in 381. It was a matter of adapting

  the Monarchian understanding of the deity, which is implicit in the concept of

  the homoousia, to the assertion of the three hypostases (Father, Son, and Holy

  Spirit). The difficulty and paradoxical nature of this reconciliation is evident in

  THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY

  383

  the text by Gregory that is here in question and whose title is Peri Yiou, “About the Son.” The passage quoted by Peterson should be understood within this context:

  The three most ancient opinions concerning God are Anarchia, Polyarchia, and

  Monarchia. The first two are the sport of the children of Hellas, and may they

  continue to be so. For Anarchy is a thing without order; and Polyarchy is like

  civil war [ stasiōdes], and thus anarchical, and thus disorderly. For both of these tend toward the same thing, namely disorder; and this to dissolution, for disorder

  is the first step to dissolution. But Monarchy is that which we hold in honor. It

  is, however, a Monarchy that is not limited to one Person, for it is possible for

  Unity if [it is] at war with itself [ stasiazon pros heauto] to come into a condition of plurality; but one which is made of an equality of Nature and a Union of mind,

  and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity—a thing

  which is impossible to the created nature— so that although numerically distinct

  there is no severance of Essence. Therefore Unity having from all eternity arrived

  at Duality by motion, found its rest in Trinity. This is what we mean by Father

  and Son and Holy Spirit. The Father is the Begetter [ gennētōr] and the Emitter

  [ proboleus]; without passion of course, and without reference to time, and not in a corporeal manner [ . . . ] (Gregory of Nazianzus, Select Orations, XXIX, 2, p. 301) It is evident that Gregory is here concerned with reconciling the metaphysical

  terminology of the unity of the divine substance with that—more concrete and

  almost corporeal—of the Trinity (in particular in relation to the generation

  of the son in contrast to the nongenerated character of the deity, which had

  prompted particularly heated debates with the Arians and the Monarchians).

  For this purpose, Gregory resorts to a metaphorical register that, pace Peterson,

  can easily be defined as political (or theological-political): indeed, it is a matter

  of thinking the Trinitarian articulation of the hypostases without introducing a

  stasis in God, an internecine war. For this reason, using Stoic terminology freely,

  Gregory does not conceive the three hypostases as substances, but as modes of

  being or relations ( pros ti, pōs echon) in a single substance (ibid., 16, p. 307). And yet, he is so well aware of the inadequacy of his attempt and the insufficiency of

  any linguistic explanation of the mystery, that he concludes his oration with an

  extraordinary tour de force introducing the Son through a long list of antinomic

  figures. However, just before this, Gregory provides us with the key to interpret-

  ing the whole oration when, following a terminological tradition that was well

  established by his time, he claims that it can only be understood correctly by

  those who have learned to distinguish in God between “the discourse of nature

  and the discourse of economy [ tis men physeōs logos, tis de logos oikonomias]”

  (ibid., 18, p. 308). This means that even the passage quoted by Peterson can only

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  be read in the light of this distinction. It is all the more surprising that Peterson

  remains silent on this.

  א In other words, in Gregory, the logos of “economy” is specifically designed to

  prevent the Trinity from introducing a stasiological, or political, fracture in God. Insofar as even a monarchy can give rise to a civil war, an internal stasis, it is only a displacement from a political to an “economic” rationality (in a sense that we shall explain) that can

  protect us against this danger.

  1.7. An overview of the authors quoted above by Peterson in his genealogy of

  the theological-political paradigm of the divine monarchy shows that, from both

  a textual and a conceptual point of view, the “discourse of economy” is so strictly

  intertwined with that of monarchy that the fact that it is absent in Peterson lets

  us infer something like a
conscious repression. Tertullian is a paradigmatic case

  in this sense (but, as we shall see, we could say the same about Justin, Tatian,

  Hippolytus, Irenaeus, etc.). Let us focus on the quotation from the text Adversus

  Praxean with which Peterson opens his analysis of the Apologists’ attempt to

  reconcile the traditional doctrine of divine monarchy with the Trinity:

  “We hold,” they say, “to the monarchy”: and even Latins so expressively frame

  the sound, and in so masterly a fashion, that they would think they understood

  monarchy as well as they pronounce it. ( Tertullian’s Treatise Against Praxeas, 3, 2, pp. 132–133)

  The quotation ends here; but Tertullian’s text continues as follows:

  But while Latins are intent to shout out “monarchy,” even Greeks refuse to under-

  stand the economy [ sed monarchiam sonare student Latini, oikonomian intellegere

  nolunt etiam Graeci]. (Ibid., p. 133)

  Immediately before this, Tertullian contends that

  The simple people, that I say not the thoughtless and ignorant [ . . . ] not under-

  standing that while they must believe in one only [God] yet they must believe in

  him along with his oikonomia [ unicum quidem (deum) sed cum sua oeconomia], shy at the economy. They claim that the plurality and ordinance of trinity is a

  division of unity. (Ibid., 3, 1, p. 132)

  The understanding of the Trinitarian dogma on which Peterson’s argument is

  based thus presupposes a preliminary understanding of the “language of econ-

  omy.” We shall be able to identify what is really at stake in the debate between

  the two friends/enemies about political theology only after we have explored this

  logos in all its articulations.

  Threshold

  THE links between Schmitt and Peterson are more complex and intricate

  than the two authors are inclined to reveal. In his works, Schmitt refers to

  Peterson for the first time in the 1927 essay Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren; the reference concerns Peterson’s doctoral thesis on acclamations in the early centuries of Christian liturgy, which Schmitt considers “fundamental.” But, even

  here, what the two authors share also contains, as we shall see, the seed of their

  division.

  The short and inconspicuous preface to the 1935 book on monotheism fairly