Desmond Young - Rommel, The Desert Fox

by Unknown

  But on the evening before he was due to be handed to the Italians, Clifton asked to go to the lavatory, where he got out of the window and vanished without trace. All troops were at once warned by wireless. A few days later some of my staff officers were hunting gazelle when they suddenly saw a weary foot-traveller coming across the desert, carrying what seemed to be a water-bottle in his hand. Closer observation revealed him as the much sought-after Clifton. He was at once arrested and brought in to us again. I expressed to him my recognition of his courage; for not every man would contemplate such a trek through the desert.

  He looked very exhausted, which was not surprising. To stop any more attempts at escape, I had him sent at once to Italy.

  Later I heard that he disappeared from the Italian prison camp in the disguise of a Hitler Jugend leader, with shorts and badge of rank, and in this uniform crossed over the frontier into Switzerland.

  [Rommel's information was incorrect.']

  EL ALAMEIN

  [Before going sick to Germany, Rommel made his plans to resist the expected British attack at El Alamein.]

  In attacking, the British were forced to aim at a penetration of our positions. It was clear to us that the British military machine was well-suited for this purpose. The whole of British training was based on the lessons drawn from battles in the First World War, in which everything revolved around material. The technical lessons had been learned but had not brought about any revolutionary change. Although the tactical deductions about mechanisation and armour had been outstandingly made by British military critics,* the responsible British leaders had not ventured to apply them since they had not yet been tried in practice-as the foundation of their training in peacetime, ready to be brought into play in case of war. The British had been suffering under this shortcoming for a long time and it put them at a great disadvantage. But it did not affect the coming battles for penetration of our position as, owing to the extensive minefields, the armoured units were deprived of their freedom of movement and were compelled to operate as infantry-supporting tanks. In training and command we were, as all previous battles had shown, considerably superior to the British troops in the open desert. Though it could be assumed that, as far as tactics were concerned, the British had learnt a good deal from the many battles and skirmishes which we had with them, they could not possibly have profited fully from them as their shortcomings were not primarily due to their command but to the ultra-conservative structure of their army, which was in no way suitable for war in the open desert, though excellent for fighting on fixed fronts. In spite of all this, we could not take the risk of shifting the main weight of the defensive action on to operations in the open desert for the following reasons:

  (a) The proportionate strengths of the motorised divisions had become too unequal. While our adversary was constantly being reinforced by motorised units, we received only non-motorised forces, which, in the open desert, were as good as useless. We were forced, therefore, to choose a form of warfare in which they too could play their part.

  (b) The British air superiority, the new air tactics of the R.A.F., and the resultant tactical limitations on the use of motorised forces, to which reference has already been made. (c) Our permanent shortage of petrol. I did not want to get myself again into the awkward situation of having to break oft a battle because we were immobilised by a shortage of petrol. In a mobile defensive action shortage of petrol means disaster. * General Bayerlein says that Rommel was here referring to General Fuller and Captain Liddell Hart. Speaking of the latter, Bayerlein states that his theories of armoured warfare “made the greatest impression on Field-Marshal Rommel, and highly influenced his tactical and strategical conceptions... not only General Guderian but Rommel, too, could be called Liddell Hart's 'pupils' in many respects.”

  BACK TO AFRICA

  The F�hrer's call came through. The situation at El Alamein had developed in such a way that he must ask me to fly to Africa to take over command. I set off the next morning. I knew that there were no more laurels to be earned in Africa, for I had learnt from reports of my officers that supplies there had fallen far short of the minimum demands which I had made. It very soon became clear, however, that I had not had any idea of just how bad the supply situation really was.

  When I arrived in Rome towards 11 A.M., I was met at the airport by General von Rintelen, Military Attache -and German General attached to the Italian forces. He informed me of the latest events in the African theatre. After powerful artillery preparation, the enemy had occupied parts of the positions to the south of Hill 31; several battalions of 164th Division and of the Italians had been completely wiped out. The British attack was still in progress and General Stumme was still missing. General von Rintelen further reported to me that only three issues of petrol remained for the Army in the African theatre, for it had not been possible in recent weeks to send more across, partly on account of the sinkings by the British, partly because the Italian Navy did not provide the transport. This situation was disastrous, since petrol for only 300 km. per vehicle between Tripoli and the front was so little that a prolonged resistance on our part was not to be expected. Shortage of petrol would completely prevent our taking the correct tactical decisions and would impose tremendous limitations upon our planning. I was extremely angry, for at my departure there had been at least 8 issues left for the Army in Egypt and Lybia and, in comparison with the minimum essential 30 issues, even that had been ridiculously little. Experience had shown that one needed one issue of petrol for each day of battle.*

  [* An issue in Africa appears to have been petrol for 100 km.]

  Without it one was crippled and the enemy could operate without one being able to take practical counter-measures. General von Rintelen regretted this situation and said that he had unfortunately been on leave and had thus been unable to give sufficient attention to the supply question!

  Feeling that we would fight this battle with but small hope of even a defensive success, I flew across the Mediterranean in my Storch and reached my battle headquarters at dusk. In the meantime the body of General Stumme had been found at about midday and taken to Derna. The circumstances of his death had been roughly these: General Stumme had driven along the track to the battlefield and had been fired upon in the region of Hill 21 by British infantry with anti-tank and machine-guns. Colonel B�chting who accompanied him received a mortal wound in the head.

  The driver, Corporal Wolf, immediately turned the car. General Stumme leapt out and hung on to the outside of the car while the driver drove furiously out of the enemy fire. General Stumme must have suddenly had a heart attack and fallen off the car. The driver noticed nothing. On Sunday morning the General was found beside the track, dead, but without any injury.

  General Stumme had always had far too high a blood pressure for Africa and was not therefore really fit for tropical service. We all deeply regretted his sudden death. He had spared no pains to command the army well and had been day and night at the front. Just before setting off for his last journey on October 24th he had said to his deputy that he felt it would be wise to ask for my return as, with his own short experience of the African theatre and in view of the tremendous British strength and the disastrous supply situation, he did not feel wholly certain of being able to bring the battle to a successful conclusion. I, for myself, was no more optimistic.

  [After a detailed description of the battle, too long to include here, Rommel gives a text of a telegram which reached him on the evening of November 1st and shows, as he says, how the situation was misunderstood in Rome.]

  "For Field Marshal Rommel:

  The Duce has authorised me to convey to you his fullest appreciation of the successful counter-attack led personally by you. The Duce conveys to you further his complete confidence that the battle now in progress will, under your command, be brought to a successful conclusion."

  It soon became obvious that the F�hrer's Headquarters had no better knowledge of the African situation. It
is sometimes a misfortune to enjoy a certain military reputation. One knows one's own limits but others expect miracles and set down a defeat to deliberate ill will.

  [After describing the concluding days of the battle, Rommel sums up.]

  EL ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT

  We had lost the decisive battle of the African campaign. It was decisive because the defeat resulted in the loss of the major part of our infantry and of our motorised forces. The consequences defied estimation. The amazing thing was that official quarters, both on the German and Italian side, attributed the trouble, not to the failure of supplies, not to our Air inferiority, not to the order to conquer or die at El Alamein, but to the troops and the Command. The military career of most of these people who made such accusations against us was characterised by a continual absence from the front on the principle “weit vom Schuss gibt alte Krieger”-“far from the battle makes old soldiers.”

  It was even said that we had thrown away our weapons, that I was a defeatist, a pessimist in defeat or in critical situations and therefore largely responsible. The fact was that I did not sit down under the constant reproaches which were levelled at the gallant troops and this gave rise in the future to many a quarrel and bitter argument. These people, in particular, who had formerly been envious of me, now, after the defeat, suddenly had the courage to spread slander about us, where previously they had had to keep silent. The victim of this slander was the army, which, after my departure, fell into British hands in its entirety, while highly-qualified armchair strategists were still thinking about operations against Casablanca.

  It is no good denying that there were men in high places who were by no means lacking in the intelligence required to understand what was happening, but who lacked the courage to face soberly the unalterable conditions and to draw the necessary conclusions from them. They preferred to put their heads in the sand, live in a sort of military pipe-dream and look for scapegoats, whom they usually found in the troops or in the field com- manders.

  With all my experience, I can confess to only one mistake- that I did not circumvent the “Victory or Death” order 24 hours earlier or did not disregard it altogether. Then the army, together with all its infantry, would in all probability have been saved in a more or less battleworthy condition.

  In order to leave no doubt for future historians about the conditions and circumstances under which the Command and troops were labouring at the battle of El Alamein, I include the following summary:

  An adequate supply system and stocks of weapons, petrol and ammunition are essential conditions for any army to be able successfully to stand the strain of battle. Before the fighting proper, the battle is fought and decided by the Quartermasters. The bravest man can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition and guns and ammunition are of little use in mobile warfare unless they can be transported by vehicles supplied with sufficient petrol. Supply must approxi- mate in quantity to that which is available to the enemy and not only in quantity but also in quality.

  In future the battle on the ground will be preceded by the battle in the air. This will decide who will have to suffer under the operational and tactical disadvantages detailed above and who will, therefore, from the start be forced into tactical compromise.

  None of the conditions to which I have referred were in any way fulfilled and we had to suffer the consequences.

  As a result of the British command of the air and hence of the seas in the Central Mediterranean, and of other reasons detailed elsewhere, the army's supplies were hardly sufficient to enable it to eke out a bare existence even on quiet days. It was out of the question to think of building up stocks for a defensive battle. The quantities of material which were available to the British far exceeded our worst fears. Never before in any theatre of war had such a concentration of heavy tanks, bombers and artillery with inexhaustible supplies of ammunition been engaged on so short a front as at El Alamein.

  The British command of the air was complete. There were days when the British flew 800 bomber sorties and 2,500 sorties of fighters, fighter-bombers and low-flying aircraft. We, on the other hand, could at the most fly 60 dive-bomber and 100 fighter sorties. This number moreover became continually smaller.

  Generally speaking, the principles of the British Command had not altered. Now as ever their tactics were methodical and cast to a pattern. On this occasion the British principles did in fact help the Eighth Army to success, for the following reasons:

  (a) It did not come to a battle in the open desert, since our motorised forces were forced to form a front for the sake "of the frontally engaged infantry divisions, who were without transport. The war took on the form of a battle of material.

  (6) The British had such superiority in weapons, both qualitative and quantitative, that they were able to force through any kind of operation. The methods used by the British Command for the destruction of my forces were a result of their overwhelming superiority. They consisted of the following:

  (a) Highly concentrated artillery fire.

  (b) Continuous bombing attacks by powerful bomber forces.

  (c) Locally limited attacks, which were carried through with lavish use of material and which revealed an extremely high state of training, entirely suited to the conditions.

  Apart from this, the planning of the British Command was based on the principle of exact calculation, a principle which can only be followed where there is complete material superiority. In actual fact the British did not attempt anything which could be called an “operation” but relied solely on the effect of their artillery and air force. As always, the British Command showed a marked slowness in reaction. When, on the night of November 2nd-3rd, we started on the retreat, it was a long time before the enemy were ready to follow up for the pursuit. But for the intervention of Hitler's unfortunate order, it is highly probable that we would have escaped to Fuka with the bulk of our infantry. As always the British High Command showed its customary caution and little forceful decision. For instance, they attacked time and again with separate tank formations and did not, as might have been expected, throw into battle the 900 tanks which they could, without risk to themselves, have employed in the northern front, thereby using their vast superiority to gain a rapid decision with the minimum of effort and casualties. Actually, under cover of their artillery and air force, only half of that number would have been sufficient to wipe out my forces, which were frequently standing immobilised on the battlefield. Moreover, the British themselves suffered tremendous losses for this reason. Probably their Command wanted to hold its tanks in the second line so as to use them for the pursuit, as apparently their assault forces could not be re-formed fast enough for the follow-up.

  In the training of their tanks and infantry formations, the British Command had put to excellent use the experience which they had gamed from their previous battles with the Axis troops, but it is true to say the new methods which were now being applied were only made possible by the vast quantity of their ammunition and new war material.

  In Germany, thanks largely to the efforts of General Guderian, the first traces of modern leadership in tank warfare began to crystallise in theory before the war. This resulted in the training and organisation of tank units on modern lines. The British Army, however, remained conservative and its responsible authorities rejected the principles of mechanised warfare which had been so eminently developed and taught by Englishmen in particular (Fuller & Liddell Hart).

  The British artillery demonstrated once again its well-known excellence. Especially noteworthy was its great mobility and speed of reaction to the requirements of the assault troops. Apparently the British tank forces carried artillery observers who could report the requirements of the front in the shortest possible time to the artillery groups. In addition to their abundant supplies of ammunition, the great range of the British guns was of tremendous advantage to them. Thus they were able to bombard the Italian artillery positions while the Italian guns, whose
range was often no more than 5-6 km., were quite unable to hit back. As by far the greater part of our artillery consisted of obsolete Italian guns, this was a particularly unpleasant state of affairs.

  The courage of the German troops and of many of the Italians in this battle, even in the hour of disaster, was particularly worthy of admiration. The force could look back on a glorious record of one and a half years, such as is seldom achieved by any army. Every one of my soldiers was defending not only his homeland but also the tradition of the Panzer Army, Afrika. The struggle of my army will, in spite of its defeat, be a glorious page in the history of the German and Italian peoples.

  BACK TO TUNISIA

  During the retreat from El Alamein in November, 1942, Rommel prepared a plan for future operations in North Africa and this formed the basis of his discussions with Bastico, Cavallero, Kesselring, Goering and Hitler. There follows an outline of it in his own words

  (a) In the existing conditions of supply, which permitted us neither the months-overdue replacements of tanks, vehicles and weapons nor a stock of petrol such as was necessary to carry through a mobile battle, we could not hope to be able to hold out against a powerful British attack in any position in Tripolitania. For all positions which were at all possible could be outflanked in the south and consequently it would be necessary to put the main burden of the defence on motorised forces. From title beginning, therefore, it was necessary to be prepared to evacuate Tripolitania in order to occupy the Gabes position, which, in the south-west, leant on the Schott Dscherid, and there finally come to a halt. In carrying out this withdrawal from Mersa-el-Brega to Tunisia there were two important considerations, on the one hand to gain as much time as possible and on the other to carry out the operation with the minimum losses of men and material.