by Ian Kershaw
249. RSA, IV/2, 111 n.1. Hitler did not appear in two parallel meetings addressed by leading Nazis. Illness was given as the reason.
250. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 242–3; Hoffmann, 159; also, implicitly, Wagener, 358; and H. v. Schirach, 205. Long after the war, Hitler’s sister, Paula, suggested that everything might have been different had Hitler married Mimi Reiter (Peis, ‘Die unbekannte Geliebte’).
251. Hoffman, 155–6; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 243–4. Hanfstaengl regarded it as a politically inspired, somewhat pathetic but unconvincing display of grief.
252. Falter et al., Wahlen, 94. Tyrell, Führer, 383, has 25.9 per cent.
253. Falter et al., Wahlen, 100; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 352.
254. Falter et al., Wahlen, 95.
255. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 357; RSA, IV/2, 123–32.
256. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 352–8; RSA, IV/2, 159–64; Turner, German Big Business, 189.
257. Turner, German Big Business, 167–71.
258. Turner, German Big Business, 144.
259. Turner, German Big Business, 144–5.
260. Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, London, 1955, 279.
261. Schacht, 279–80.
262. Turner, German Big Business, 145.
263. Cuno had been persuaded by some of his supporters – including the powerful Ruhr industrialist Paul Reusch – to consider making a political comeback and standing for the Reich Presidency. Retired Admiral Magnus Levetzow, one of those most keen to see Cuno stand, arranged for him to meet Hitler in Berlin in the hope of winning the backing of the NSDAP (Turner, German Big Business , 129).
264. Turner, German Big Business, 129–30.
265. Turner, German Big Business, 130–32.
266. Turner, German Big Business, 146, 150; Wagener, 368–74.
267. Turner, German Big Business, 142, 187.
268. Turner, German Big Business, 128, 181–2.
269. Turner, German Big Business, 191–203.
270. Otto Dietrich, Mit Hitler an die Macht. Persönliche Erlebnisse mit meinem Führer, 7th edn, Munich, 1934, 45–6; Turner, German Big Business, 171–2.
271. Henry Ashby Turner, ‘Big Business and the Rise of Hitler’, in Turner, Nazism and Third Reich, 93–7 (originally publ. in American Historical Review, 75 (1969), 56–70).
272. Turner, German Big Business, 204–19. Many leading industrialists were in any case conspicuous by their absence. Dietrich, Mit Hitler, 46–9, depicts Hitler winning the hearts and minds of his initially cool audience. In his post-war memoirs, Dietrich emphasized the limited financial contributions of big business to the Nazi Party before 1933 (Otto Dietrich, Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler, Cologne (n.d., 1955?), 185–6).
273. Turner, German Big Business, 208–10, 213–14; text of speech, RS A, IV/3, 74–110; and in Domarus, 68–90.
274. Turner, German Big Business, 217–19.
275. See the character sketch in Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933, London, 1996, 39–41.
276. Turner, ‘Big Business and the Rise of Hitler’, 94, 97.
277. Turner, German Big Business, 111–24; Henry Ashby Turner and Horst Matzerath, ‘Die Selbstfinanzierung der NSDAP 1930–32’, 59–92.
278. Wagener, 221–2.
279. Turner, German Big Business, 148–52, 157; Wagener, 226–9.
280. Wagener, 227; Turner, German Big Business, 152.
281. See Turner, German Big Business, 47–60.
282. Above based on Turner, German Big Business, 153–6. Hitler’s income tripled in 1930 to reported gross taxable receipts of 48, 472 Reich Marks. This rose further by 1932 to 64, 639 Reich Marks (Hale, ‘Adolf Hitler: Taxpayer’, 837). See also, for Hitler’s earnings around this time, Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 216; and B.v. Schirach, 112–13.
283. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 142–3; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert – Hindenburg – Hitler, Hamburg, 1950, 216.
284. TBJG, I.2, 106 (7 January 1932); Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 370–72; Papen, 146.
285. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 372; Walther Hubatsch, Hindenburg und der Staat, Göttingen, 1966, 309–10.
286. The exchange was published by the Nazis in a brochure: Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Brüning. Kampfschrift, Broschürenreihe der Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP, Heft 5, Munich, 1932, 73–94. Hitler’s open letter to Brüning, dated 15 January 1932, is reprinted in RSA IV/3, 34–44.
287. Meissner, 216–17.
288. TBJG, I.2, 120–21 (3 February 1932). See Fest, Hitler, 439–40.
289. TBJG, 1.2, 130–31 (22 February 1932), 134 (27 February 1932).
290. Rudolf Morsey, ‘Hitler als Braunschweigischer Regierungsrat’, VfZ, 8 (1960), 419–48; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 373–6.
291. See Papen, 147.
292. RSA, IV/3, 138–44 (quotation, 144);Domarus, 95; TBJG, 1.2, 134 (27February 1932).
293. Domarus, 96.
294. TBJG, I.2, 140–41 (13 March 1932).
295. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 381; Falter et al., Wahlen, 46.
296. RSA, V/1, 16–43; Domarus, 101–3.
297. Falter et al., Wahlen, 46.
298. TBJG, I.2, 152–3 (8–11 April 1932).
299. Saxony, Baden, Hessen and Thuringia were the largest states, with a total population of just over 10 million, not voting on that day. Roughly another 2 million lived in the smaller states which were not holding Landtag elections on 24 April. The population of those states going to the polls that day numbered close on 50 million. Figures taken from Falter et al., Wahlen, 90–113.
300. RSA, V/1, 59–97; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 385–6; Domarus, 106–7.
301. Miesbacher Anzeiger, 19 April 1932.
302. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 404–5; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 386–7; RSA, V/1, 97 and Doc.61 n.1–2 (and 92–6, Doc.60, for the speech).
303. Falter et al., Wahlen, 89, 91, 94, 101; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 387–8.
304. TBJG, I.2, 160 (23 April 1932).
305. Domarus, 105; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 154.
306. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in einer Demokratie, Stuttgart/Düsseldorf, 1955, 481 and n.2; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 153–4.
307. Ulrich Herbert, Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989, Bonn, 1996, 111–19.
308. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 363.
309. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 159 for membership growth in early 1932.
310. TBJG, I.2, 139 (11 March 1932).
311. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 153.
312. TBJG, I.2, 150 (2 April 1932).
313. TBJG, I.2, 154 (11 April 1932). Goebbels had noted in his diary on 17 March that the Prussian Interior Minister Severing, following house-searches in Berlin, was apparently planning a ban on the SA (TBJG, I.2, 144).
314. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 154.
315. RSA, V/1, 54–6; Domarus, 105–6. Hindenburg had wanted the ban extended to the Communists (Papen, 149).
316. Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 136–7.
317. TBJG, I.2, 162 (28 April 1932); Winkler, Weimar, 461–2. Schleicher had already had talks with Röhm and Graf Helldorf, the Berlin SA leader. See also Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1962, 188–9.
318. TBJG, I.2, 165 (8 May 1932).
319. Papen, 153; see Winkler, Weimar, 462–3.
320. TBJG, I.2, 166–7 (10–11 May 1932); Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 821.
321. TBJG, I.2, 168 (12 May 1932); see Winkler, Weimar, 465.
322. TBJG, I.2, 169 (13 May 1932).
323. Brüning, Memoiren, ii.632–8; Winkler, Weimar, 470–72.
324. Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei. Eine historische Darstellung in Tagebuchblättern (Vom 1. Januar 1932 bis zum 1. Mai 1933), 21st edn, Munich, 1937, 103–4 (30 May 1932); TBJG, I.2, 177.
325. Papen, 150–56.
326. Papen, 162.
>
327. Falter et al., Wahlen, 98, 100.
328. Falter et al., Wahlen, 95.
329. Papen, 163; Winkler, Weimar, 404.
330. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 111 (14 June 1932); TBJG, I.2, 185.
331. For evidence of the strong support offered to the NSDAP from the well-to-do middle classes, see the examination of votes cast at holiday resorts or on cruise liners in July 1932 in Richard F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton, 1982, 220–28.
332. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 392–3; Winkler, Weimar, 490–93. And see, for the local background to the violence in Altona, Anthony McElligott, ‘“… und so kam es zu einer schweren Schlägerei”. Straßenschlachten in Altona und Hamburg am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Maike Bruns et al. (eds.), ‘Hier war doch alles nicht so schlimm.’ Wie die Nazis in Hamburg den Alltag eroberten, Hamburg, 1984, 58–85.
333. Winkler, Weimar, 495–503; Broszat, Machtergreifung, 148–50.
334. TBJG, I.2, 155 (15 April 1932).
335. Childers, Nazi Voter, 203.
336. See Allen, 322, for the high percentage of Nazi meetings in the Lower Saxon town of Northeim that consisted of little beyond pageantry.
337. RSA, V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115; Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn, London/New York, 1973, 31.
338. Hamilton, 326.
339. RSA, V/1, 210–94; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 394; Domarus, 114–20.
340. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 267.
341. RSA, V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115–17 (Adolf-Hitler-Schallplatte: ‘Appell an die Nation’).
342. Falter, et al., Wahlen, 44. The turn-out, 84.1 per cent, was the largest for a Reichstag election during the period of the Weimar democracy.
343. TBJG, 1.2, 211 (1 August 1932). The published ‘Kaiserhof’ version had a more optimistic tone: Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 135–6 (31 July 1932). The following day, in his unpublished diary entry for 2 August, Goebbels again expressed Hitler’s agreement that the time for power had arrived. The only alternative was ‘sharpest opposition’. There could be no more question of toleration of the Papen government (TBJG, I.2, 212–13).
344. TBJG, I.2, 214 (3 August 1932).
345. TBJG, I.2, 215 (5 August 1932).
346. TBJG, I.2, 217 (7 August 1932).
347. See Winkler, Weimar, 509.
348. Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers gegenüber der NSDAP 1932’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 86–118, here 89.
349. Hubatsch, Hindenburg, 335–8, Nr.87 (Meissner’s minutes from 11 August 1932).
350. Winkler, Weimar, 509.
351. TBJG, I.2, 218 (9 August 1932).
352. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 140 (8 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 218.
353. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 93–8; Winkler, Weimar, 509–10.
354. TBJG, I.2, 221 (11 August 1932). For Gayl’s speech, see Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, ‘Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter Papen und Schleicher’, in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933, Munich, 1992, 155–81, here 160.
355. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 142–4 (11–12 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 222–3; see also Papen, 195.
356. Papen, 195–7; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 144 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 224.
357. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 144–5 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 224.
358. Hubatsch, 338–9, Nr.88; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 397–8; Papen, 197. Hitler objected to Meissner’s wording of the official communiqué and within hours dispatched his own version, put together, he said, together with Frick and Röhm immediately after they had returned from the meeting. This stressed Hitler’s denial that he would demand all cabinet seats for his party, if he were given the leadership. It mainly, however, concentrated on the subsequent exchange in the corridor and on Hitler’s resentment that he had been called to the meeting when, in fact, the decision had already been taken in advance of it by Hindenburg. Unsurprisingly, neither Papen nor the Reich Chancellery were prepared to alter anything in the published communiqué (IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.165–71).
359. IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.169, ‘Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 13.8.32’, signed by Röhm, Frick and Hitler.
360. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 145 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 225.
361. See Lüdecke, 351–2.
362. See Winkler, Weimar, 511–12.
CHAPTER 10: LEVERED INTO POWER
1. For the splits in élite strategies and aims during the final phase of the Weimar Republic, see the contributions by Henry Ashby Turner, Jürgen John and Wolfgang Zollitsch (together with the subsequent discussion) in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933, Munich, 1992, 205–62.
2. A point emphasized by James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail?, 30–57, here 55; see also the perceptive analysis by Gerald D. Feldmann, ‘Der 30 Januar. 1933 und die politische Kultur von Weimar’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 263–76. Eberhard Jäckel is adamant that Hitler’s takeover of power did constitute a ‘works accident’, though on his own analysis (Das deutsche Jahrhundert, 126–58) of the behaviour of the national-conservative, pro-monarchist élites it was at the very least an accident waiting to happen.
3. Letter from Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder, 26 December 1932, cit. in Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86.
4. Winkler, Weimar, 511; Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 964; Domarus, 123–4.
5. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86–7.
6. Joachim von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop Memoirs, London, 1954, 21. This was the first time Ribbentrop had met Hitler, who told him he was prepared to work with other political forces but insisted upon the Chancellorship. Ribbentrop came away very impressed, convinced that only Hitler and his party could save Germany from Communism, and joined the NSDAP straight away.
7. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 87–8.
8. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 99–100 n.29; Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Viermal Deutschland. Aus dem Erleben eines Seemanns, Diplomaten, Politikers 1895–1954, Berlin, 1954, 303–4.
9. See Domarus, 123 for such an inference.
10. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 279. How accurate Hanfstaengl’s recollection of Hitler’s exact words was might justifiably be doubted. In his wartime interview for the American OSS, he had Hitler saying: ‘We’ll see. Perhaps it’s better like this’ (‘Wir werden ja sehen. Es ist vielleicht besser so’) (NA, Hitler Source Book, 911).
11. RSA, V/1, 304–9; Domarus, 125–9.
12. RSA, V/1, 316.
13. The following is based on Paul Kluke, ‘Der Fall Potempa’, VfZ, 5 (1957), 279–97 and Richard Bessel, ‘The Potempa Murder’, Central European History, 10 (1977), 241–54.
14. RSA, V/1, 317; Domarus, 130 (dated 23 August, when the telegram was published in the press).
15. Goebbels acknowledged that public opinion was against the party (TBJG, I/2, 230 (25 August 1932)).
16. RSA, V/1, 318–20 (quotation, 319); Domarus, 130; Kluke, 284–5.
17. Papen, 200. Hindenburg, on the other hand, claimed on 30 August at a meeting with Papen, Gayl and Schleicher in Neudeck that he was swayed only by legal, not political, considerations. Since the deed had been committed only an hour and a half after the decree came into effect, Hindenburg suggested that it could not be presumed that they had knowledge of it. This dubious argument was accepted by Papen and advanced as the reason for leniency (Winkler, Weimar, 514).
18. Kluke, 286.
19. Kluke, 281.
20. Kluke, 281–2, cit. VB (11 August 1932).
21. Kluke, 285, cit. VB (26 August 1932).
22. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 89, 110.
23. Brüning, ii.658; see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 154–5, TBJG I.2, 235–6 (31 August 1932, 2 September 1932), where Hitler points for the first time to intrigues and opposition which he saw as emanating from Strasser and his ‘clique’.
24. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 160, TBJG, II.2, 239 (9 September 1932).
&nb
sp; 25. Brüning, ii.657–9.
26. Winkler, Weimar, 519–20; Papen, 215–16.
27. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 101.
28. Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, ‘Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter den Regierungen Papen und Schleicher’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 155–81, here 161.
29. Winkler, Weimar, 518–19; Kolb and Pyta, 165–6. For wide-ranging hopes invested in a revised constitutional arrangement see Hans Mommsen, ‘Regierung ohne Parteien. Konservative Pläne zum Verfassungsumbau am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 1–18, here esp. 3–4.
30. Kolb and Pyta, 166.
31. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 401; Papen, 207; Winkler, Weimar, 521; Mommsen, Dieverspielte Freiheit, 474. Göring’s extensive contacts with the national-conservative élite had been important to Hitler and promoted his own advancement within the Nazi Party (though he never became a ‘party man’ as such) and in the Reichstag, which he had joined as a Deputy in 1928.
32. Winkler, Weimar, 521.
33. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 159–60 (8 September 1932, 10 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 239–240.
34. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 152 (28 August 1932), and also 153 (30 August 1932), TBJG, I.2, 233–4.
35. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 159 (8 September 1932), TBJG, 1.2, 238. Goebbels noted the demand for a Hitler Chancellorship again on 9 September. ‘Only Strasser speaks against’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 160, TBJG, I.2, 239 (9 September 1932)).
36. Papen, 208.
37. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 162 (12 September 1932), TBJG, 1.2, 241; Papen, 208.
38. The above account is based on Akten der Reichskanzlei. Das Kabinett von Papen, ed. Karl-Heinz Minuth, Boppard am Rhein, 1989, ii.543–5; Papen, 208–9; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 162–3 (12 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 241–2; Lüdecke, 433–4; Winkler, Weimar, 522–4; Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 993–4; Bracher, Auflösung, 627–9; Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 475–6.
39. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 163 (12 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 242.
40. Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 476.
41. Kolb and Pyta, 166; Winkler, Weimar, 528.
42. Broadcasting was controlled by the government, which allowed little time for political broadcasts. The Nazis had had no access to the radio before the summer of 1932 (Zeman, 31).