by Ian Kershaw
43. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 165 (16 September 1932), 167 (20 September 1932), for the quotation; TBJG, I.2, 243–4, 246–7. For extensive reports from regional and local party organizations of financial difficulties hampering the campaign, see Childers, ‘Limits’, in The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933 , 236–8.
44. Lüdecke, 438.
45. Domarus, 137. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 176 (4 October 1932); TBJG, I.2, 254–5 (5 October 1932). See also Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 174 (2 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 252 for Hitler’s conveying of optimism to others, and Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I87 (28 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 265 where Hitler was said to be ‘very certain of victory’.
46. Lüdecke, 461–2, 469, 475–6.
47. Lüdecke, 476.
48. Lüdecke, 479. Above account based on Lüdecke, 475–9; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I74 (2 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 252.
49. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 402–3 notes forty-nine speeches, but does not include Regensburg on 5 November; Domarus, 138–42 has forty-seven, including Regensburg, but omitting Gummersbach, Betzdorf-Walmenrot, and Limburg; Hauner, 85, lists forty-seven but omits Schweinfurt, Würzburg and Betzdorf-Walmenrot.
50. Maser, Hitler, 317 and n.
51. Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler, 55–7. Hoffman, 161–2, dates the incident to summer 1932. For other suicide attempts of women who knew Hitler, see Maser, Hitler, 313.
52. Domarus, 141.
53. VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.
54. VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.
55. IfZ, MA-731, NSDAP-HA, Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Hof, 15 October 1932.
56. Domarus, 138.
57. Above quotations from IfZ, MA-1220, HA, Reel IA Folder 13.
58. IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel I Folder 13.
59. See Childers, ‘Limits’, 236, 246–51.
60. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I91 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 268. Goebbels may, like Hitler, have been deceived into over-optimism by the type of reception he had at his meetings. After a speech in Stettin on 31 October, he wrote in his diary: ‘The mood is excellent everywhere. We are making mighty inroads.’ His adjoining comment revealed, however, his concern: ‘If it goes on like this, 6 November won’t be all that bad.’ And the next day he was already consoling himself for an impending defeat: ‘It’s not all that bad if we lose a few million votes’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I90 (31 October 1932, 1 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 267).
61. IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Nbg, 14 October 1932.
62. BHStA, MA 102144, RPvNB/OP, 19 October 1932.
63. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I95 (5 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 271. Even in early October, Gregor Strasser had predicted a loss of forty seats (Stachura, Strasser, I04).
64. Falter et al., Wahlen, 41, 44.
65. Falter, Hitlers Wähler, I09.
66. Falter, ‘National Socialist Mobilisation’, 219.
67. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 272.
68. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I92 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 269 where Goebbels had spoken of the lack of funding in the campaign as ‘a chronic sickness’. On the very day before the election, he noted, it had been possible to drum up 10,000 Marks ‘at the last minute’, which were immediately thrown into the last efforts of propaganda (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I95 (5 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 271). The DΝVP’s propaganda had been better funded and, it was accepted, as a result quantitatively superior (Childers, ‘Limits’, 238).
69. Childers, ‘Limits’, 243–4; and see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 272.
70. BHStA, MA 102151, RPvUF, 21 September 1932.
71. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), ΤΒJG, I.2, 272.
72. Childers, ‘Limits’, 238–42.
73. The strike, called by the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition (RGO)) – the factory-cell organization of the KPD – was in protest at wage reductions imposed on Berlin transport workers. Initially swingeing, these had been reduced to more modest levels, but were still sufficient to provoke the Communists into declaring a strike, opposed by the SPD-linked unions, but backed by the NSBO. The strike began on 3 November and was broken off by the strikers four days later. The underground was brought to a complete standstill; trams and buses attempting to leave the depots were in the main halted by pickets. There was a good deal of public disorder, including clashes between strikers and the police which ended with three dead and eight injured as police shot into a crowd. See Winkler, Weimar, 533–5. Goebbels, overjoyed, described the mood as ‘revolutionary’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I94 (4 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 270). For the KPD, the strike probably played a part in the increased vote in the November election, and also shored up the already existent over-confidence in the party’s ability to cope with a National Socialist government. (Christian Striefler, Kampf um die Macht. Kommunisten und Nationalsozialisten am Ende der Weimarer Republik, Berlin, 1993, 177–86).
74. Childers, ‘Limits’, 238.
75. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I92 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 268–9.
76. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I94 (4 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 270.
77. Childers, ‘Limits’, 240.
78. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 416 (3 November 1932, 6 November 1932).
79. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 417 (7 November 1932, 9 November 1932).
80. Winkler, Weimar, 536–7.
81. TBJG, I.2, 274 (9 November 1932).
82. IMT, vol.35, 223–30, Docs. 633-D and 634-D; Domarus, 144–8; AdR, Kabinett von Papen, ii.952–60; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I99 (9 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 276; Papen, 212–13; Bracher, Auflösung, 659–60 and n.31; Winkler, Weimar, 543.
83. AdR, Kabinett von Papen, ii.951–2 (meeting of Papen and Schäffer, 16 November 1932). See also Winkler, Weimar, 541, 543.
84. Hubatsch, Hindenburg, 353.
85. Papen, 214; Winkler, Weimar, 543.
86. Printed in Eberhard Czichon, Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? Zum Anteil der deutschen Industrie an der Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik, Cologne (1967), 3rd edn, 1972, 69–71.
87. Based on Turner, German Big Business, 303–4; see also Winkler, Weimar, 540–41.
88. Lüdecke, 413.
89. Hubatsch, 350–52; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 206 (20 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282.
90. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 207 (20 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282.
91. Hubatsch, 350–52, here 352; Domarus, 149; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 207–8 (20 November 1932, 21 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282–3.
92. Domarus, 150 (21 November 1932).
93. Hubatsch, 353–6; Domarus, 151: communiqué of the second discussion of Hindenburg and Hitler on the morning of 21 November 1932.
94. Hubatsch, 354–5; Domarus, 152 (21 November 1932); Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 208 (21 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 283.
95. Hubatsch, 356–7; Domarus, 153–4 (22 November 1932); Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 208 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 283.
96. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.
97. Hubatsch, 358–61; Domarus, 154–7 (23 November 1932).
98. Domarus, 157 n.274.
99. Hubatsch, 361–2; Domarus, 158 (24 November 1932).
100. Domarus, 159, Hitler’s final letter on the matter, written on 24 November; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209–10 (24 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.
101. Hubatsch, 365–6.
102. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 104–5; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.
103. Stachura, Strasser, I07. Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 25, states that Schleicher’s hope was not to split the NSDAP but to win the backing of the whole party for such a strategy. He was sufficient of a realist, however, to recognize that, without Hitler’s blessing, this was hardly likely.
104. TBJG, I.2, 288 (2 December 1932); Domarus, 161. Hitler, in Weimar on account of the Thuringian local elections (Gemeindewahlen), had declined to travel to Berlin to meet S
chleicher.
105. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105 and n.44.
106. Papen, 216–23; Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105–7, 110–11 and n.65; Winkler, Weimar, 547–50, 553–5; see also Kolb and Pyta, 170–77. Schleicher’s expectations of support from the SPD would probably have proved illusory, though the party thought of him as a lesser evil than Papen or Hitler. He did, however, have good connections with the Reichsbanner. And the trade unions were inclined to give Schleicher a chance.
107. Peter D. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”: Strasser, Hitler, and National Socialism, 1930–1932’, in Stachura, Shaping, 88–130, here 88.
108. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 281. The quoted comments of Spengler are a further illustration of the dangerous dismissal of Hitler by right-wing intellectuals. Spengler, made famous by his book on the decline of western civilization, became effectively the philosopher of the culturally pessimistic anti-democratic Right. His dislike of the vulgarity of the Nazis persisted, however, until his death in 1936.
109. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 217–18 (6 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 294.
110. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 103, 108.
111. Turner, German Big Business, 311–12.
112. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 90–91.
113. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 94–95; Turner, German Big Business, I48–9.
114. Turner, German Big Business, 311–12.
115. Krebs, 191–2; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 96–7. Hans Zehrer, a political journalist in his early thirties, had, together with a number of like-minded colleagues, used the periodical Die Tat since 15)29 to expound his views of the cleansing nature of Weimar’s crisis. He saw it as bringing about the end of capitalism and ushering in a new system of ‘national socialism’. In this, he was close to the ideas of Gregor Strasser. The ‘Tat Circle’ developed links with General Schleicher in the summer of 1932. (Kurt Sontheimer, ‘Der Tatkreis’, Vfz, 7 (1959), 229–60; Benz-Graml, Biographisches Lexikon, 375–6; Winkler, Weimar, 525, 551; Mommsen, ‘Regierung ohne Parteien. Konservative Pläne zum Verfassungsumbau am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 5–9, 15–17; Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken, 205–6, 268–9).
116. For Strasser’s inability to cope with probing questions on his economic ideas by the American journalist H. R. Knickerbocker, see Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 281–2.
117. Tyrell, Führer, 316.
118. In late August and September 1932, prompted by his good connections with Brüning, Strasser had pressed energetically for the NSDAP to come to terms with the Zentrum (Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 101). On 23 March 1932, he had written to Graf Reventlow insisting that the party must be ready to enter coalitions (even if that could not be broadcast too loudly). And earlier still, in a letter to Gauleiter Schlange of Brandenburg on 12 September 1931, he had suggested that the way to power was via a ‘right-wing cabinet’ (Tyrell, Führer, 316, 343–5).
119. Stachura, Strasser, I03.
120. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 97–100.
121. Wagener, 477–80; Stachura, Strasser, I03–4.
122. Frank, 108.
123. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I54 (31 August 1932), TBJG, I.2, 235.
124. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I56 (3 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 236.
125. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I59–60 (8 and 9 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 238–9.
126. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I69–70 (25 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 248.
127. Stachura, Strasser, I08.
128. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 282.
129. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 216 (5 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 292–3; Stachura, Strasser, I08.
130. Stachura, Strasser, I08–12; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 108–9.
131. Hinrich Lohse, ‘Der Fall Strasser’, unpubl. typescript, c.1960, Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburg, sections 20–22.
132. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 218 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 295.
133. Text of the letter in Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 113–15.
134. Lohse, section 23.
135. Lohse, sections 23–8. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 219 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 295.
136. TBJG, I.2 295 (unpublished entry, 9 December 1932); the published version (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 220 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 296–7) adds ‘with the pistol’.
137. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 220 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 297–8.
138. Domarus, 166.
139. Lohse, section 30; Orlow, i.293–6.
140. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 112.
141. Lohse, sections 30–33, Domarus, 165; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 112; Orlow, i.293.
142. Domarus, 165; TBJG, 1.2, 299 (10 December 1932, unpubl.).
143. TBJG, I.2, 299 (10 December 1932, unpubl.).
144. Domarus, 166–7; Orlow, i.293; see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 226 (16 December 1932), TBJG , 1.2, 309; Lohse, section 31.
145. Stachura, Strasser, I16, 118–19.
146. Lohse, section 33; TBJG, 1.2, 340 (17 January 1933); Domarus, 180.
147. Goebbels, Kaiserhof 243, (16 January 1933), TBJG, I.2, 340–41. The unpublished diary entry is more prosaic: ‘No more demand… He will end as nothing, as he deserves’ (TBJG, I.2, 340–41, 17 January 1933).
148. BDC, Gregor Strasser, Parteikorrespondenz, Antragsschein zum Erwerb des Ehrenzeichens der alten Parteimitglieder der NSDAP, 29 January 1934; Besitzurkunde, 1 February 1934.
149. BDC, OPG-Akte Albert Pietzsch, Gregor Strasser to Rudolf Heß, 18 June 1934.
150. See Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 110.
151. See Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 113.
152. BAK, ΝS22/110, ‘Denkschrift über die inneren Gründe für die Verfügungen zur Herstellung einer erhöhten Schlagkraft der Bewegung’; see Orlow, i.294–6. The directions for the reordering of the party’s apparatus that followed the memorandum, drafted by Ley, put into operation the changes in the organizational structure which had been determined on 9 December (Orlow, i.293 and n.234, 294 and n.239). Goebbels showed a copy of the memorandum to Hitler at a crisis-point in the war, in January 1943, remarking in his diary that the memorandum contained ‘such classical arguments’ that it could still be used without any amendment. Hitler had completely forgotten about the document (TBJG, II.7, 177 (23 January 1943)).
153. All the above from BAK, ΝS 22/110.
154. See Orlow, i.296.
155. Abelshauser, Faust and Petzina (eds.), Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1945, 327–8; Petzina et al., Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch III, 61, 70, 84.
156. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 411.
157. Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 328.
158. See Allen, 136–7; Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 343–4.
159. Siegfried Bahne, ‘Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands’, in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), Das Ende der Parteien 1933, Königstein/Ts., 1979, 655–739, here 662. For the radicalization of the unemployed, see Anthony McElligott, ‘Mobilising the Unemployed: The KPD and the Unemployed Workers’ Movement in Hamburg-Altona during the Weimar Republic’, in Evans and Geary, The GermanUnemployed, 228–60; and Eva Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933, London, 1983.
160. See Fischer, Stormtroopers, esp. 45–8 and ch.8.
161. See Detlev Peukert, ‘The Lost Generation: Youth Unemployment at the End of the Weimar Republic’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, I72–93, here esp. 188–9; and Peter D. Stachura, ‘The Social and Welfare Implications of Youth Unemployment in Weimar Germany’, in Stachura, Unemployment, I21–47, here 140.
162. Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, Katholisches Milieu und Kleinstadtgesellschaft. Ettlingen 1918–1939, Sigmaringen, 1991, 270.
163. A point emphasized by Dick Geary, ‘Unemployment and Working-Class Solidarity: the German Experience 1
929–33’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, 261–80; see also the contribution to the same volume (194–227) by Eva Rosenhaft, ‘The Unemployed in the Neighbourhood: Social Dislocation and Political Mobilisation in Germany, 1929–1933’.
164. Among many examples: BHStA, MA 102151, RPvUF, 5 January 1933; MA 102138, RPvOB, 5 December 1932.
165. See, e.g., BHStA, MA 102154, RPvMF, 19 October 1932.
166. BHStA, MA 102154, RPvOF/MF, 5 January 1933 (citing a report from the District Office (Bezirksamt) of Ansbach).
167. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 19 January 1933.
168. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP 3 February 1933.
169. BHStA, MA 102144, RPvNB/OP 6 December 1932.
170. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 3 February 1933, 20 February 1933.
171. See the analysis of ideological preference, levels of disaffection, and dimensions of prejudice in Merkl, 450–527.
172. BHStA, MA 102155/3, RPvNB/OP 16 December 1932 (citing Bezirksamt Ebermannstadt).
173. Heinrich August Winkler, ‘German Society, Hitler, and the Illusion of Restoration 1930–33’, Journal of Contemporary History, I1 (1976), 10–n; Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus, Cologne, 1972, 166–79.
174. See Michael H. Kater, ‘Physicians in Crisis at the End of the Weimar Republic’, in Stachura, Unemployment, 49–77; also – a study which graphically brings out the impact of the Weimar years on medical practice in the Third Reich, and on the attractions for doctors of National Socialism – Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler, Chapel Hill/London, 1989, here 12–15.
175. Based on: Peukert, ‘The Lost Generation’; Elizabeth Harvey, ‘Youth Unemployment and the State: Public Policies towards Unemployed Youth in Hamburg during the World Economic Crisis’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, I42–71; Stachura, ‘The Social and Welfare Implications of Youth Unemployment’; Elizabeth Harvey, Youth and the Welfare State in Weimar Germany, Oxford, 1993; Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 332–4; Stachura, The Weimar Republic and the Younger Proletariat; Peter D. Stachura, The German YouthMovement 1900–1945. An Interpretative and Documentary History, London, 1981; Peter Loewenberg, ‘The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort’, American Historical Review , 76 (1971), 1457–1502; Peter D. Stachura, Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic, Santa Barbara/Oxford, 1975; and Kater, ‘Generationskonflikt als Entwicklungsfaktor in der NS-Bewegung vor 1933’, 217–43.