by Hall Gardner
KASHMIR
Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and other regions is concurrently beginning to interlink with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Given the poor nature of US-Pakistani relations, at least since the US assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 on Pakistani territory, Russian President Putin has begun to open discussions with Pakistan and even with the Taliban—to the chagrin of India and other regional powers that fear the potential formation of an Islamist state in Afghanistan or in other places in southwest Asia. For its part, China has opposed a number of differing Uighur Islamist movements in Xinjiang province—which China hopes to make the hub of its BRI in Central and South Asia.
The key issue is that Pakistan has been supporting differing pan-Islamist movements in Afghanistan and in Indian-controlled Kashmir. In Afghanistan, Pakistan's goal has been to somehow achieve “strategic depth” versus India by aligning itself with pan-Islamist forces. In Kashmir, Pakistan hopes to press Indian troops out of the Indian occupied zones. Pakistan has likewise supported various major terrorist strikes on Indian territory. Indian-Pakistani conflict came close to going nuclear in the dispute over Kargil in 1998—a conflict that was largely mitigated by US diplomacy.
Moscow's rapprochement with Pakistan appears to be in accord with Moscow's close alliance with China and Beijing's plans to extend the BRI into Pakistan—but in areas that India finds strategically sensitive. Relations between Putin and Indian Prime Minister Modi thus far appear to be positive in the areas of general economic cooperation, defense and arms sales, and nuclear energy.55 Moscow claims it wants to sustain its “special” relationship with India, and that its relations with Pakistan are strictly economic.56 Yet the Indian concern is that Russian and Pakistani relations appear to be warming. This was illustrated by joint Russian-Pakistani military exercises in Pakistan in September 2016—at a time when relations between New Delhi and Islamabad were tense. Moscow has also begun to discuss with Islamabad a wide range of regional issues and key areas of mutual interest—but which may or may not coincide with Chinese interests as well.
Beijing has additionally been expanding its sphere of influence and security into Pakistan, raising Indian concerns. As part of China's BRI, China is implementing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This means the development of transport and energy infrastructure roads, from China's western Xinjiang province to the Chinese-built port of Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Indian Ocean. This consequently creates an alternative direct transport link between western China and the Indian Ocean. It permits China to bypass the South China Sea by land, if strategically necessary, while developing areas of western China along the historic Silk Road from China's Xinjiang province.
While China's plans in Pakistan have not been entirely finalized, there is a possibility that some elements of the CPEC project will cross into the highly insecure and militarized territories of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan—areas that are still claimed by India. Given the uncertain nature of security in this entire region, Beijing has been urging the Pakistan Army to take the leading role in CPEC, as opposed to civilian authorities. This could make China “a major target of Pakistani extremists and separatists,”57 in which some secessionist groups could possibly be backed by India. In addition to perceived manipulation of the Pakistani military, China's tendency to use its own engineers and a large Chinese labor force while only hiring a minimum number of Pakistani workers could cause a popular backlash among local impoverished populations.
On the one hand, if the CPEC project succeeds, and the Chinese economy does not face its own financial meltdown in its global efforts to finance such a large number of gargantuan overseas projects, while Beijing also attempts to boost domestic incomes, repress domestic protest, and put its severe problems of pollution under control, then the CPEC could benefit Pakistan's infrastructure development and economy in the long run. But the CPEC project could also entangle Pakistan in China's global network. This could link the Pakistani military and police to Chinese political-economic and military interests. In effect, Chinese BRI and CPEC ambition raises the Kashmir dispute to the forefront of Chinese and Indian relations.
KASHMIR: FOCAL POINT OF CONFLICT
Initially, when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government came to power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared to offer an olive branch to Pakistan. But the quest for peace did not last very long. In August 2016, terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish e-Mohammed, among many previous attacks, led India to engage in a crackdown on the Indian side of Kashmir.58 At that time, India crossed the “line of control” that divides Kashmir and purportedly engaged in “surgical strikes” on the Pakistani side. Concurrently New Delhi threatened to block Pakistan's water supply by means of speeding up the building of new hydropower plants along the three rivers that flow into Pakistan.59 If so, this would have been in violation of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. And it could cause a negative counteraction by Pakistan's ally, China, which controls much of the water that flows into India before it enters Pakistan.
On Pakistani Independence Day, August 14, 2016, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called directly for the freedom of Kashmir. In effect, this statement overtly admitted Pakistani support for Kashmiri insurgence against India. In response, on Indian Independence Day, August 15, Prime Minister Modi then sent his greetings to “people of Baluchistan, Gilgit [and] Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.”60 This statement in effect raised the prospects that India could more overtly support anti-Pakistan movements, such as the Baluchistan Republican Army and the Sindhudesh Liberation Army, in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. If India does strongly support these movements, such actions would in turn raise tensions in the Pakistani-controlled regions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, which are in turn claimed by India.
By contrast with his 2016 India Independence Day speech, in August 2017, Prime Minister Modi pledged that he would focus on domestic development and social issues that are confronting Indian society, so that India could be “free of terrorism, corruption, dynasty politics, communalism and casteism.”61 But on Kashmir, he stated: “Neither gaali (abuse), nor goli (bullet) will bring a change. The change will take place when we embrace every Kashmiri.” For his part, on Pakistani Independence Day, Prime Minister Sharif criticized the “expansionist designs of India” and urged the “international community to play its role in the resolution of the regional conflicts, particularly the Kashmir dispute in conformity with the UN Resolutions on the subject with a view to ensuring durable peace in the region.”62 Here it appears essential for the Trump administration to address the Kashmir question despite Indian reluctance, and before it is too late to prevent the conflict from escalating. (See chapter 9.)
WAR? OR CONCERTED DIPLOMACY?
Russian and Chinese ties to Pakistan and to the Taliban consequently raise major concerns for India—despite the invitation of both India and Pakistan into the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017. But while the SCO will provide a forum for bilateral discussions, and could possibly help build relations between Indian and Pakistani military forces and intelligence, it appears dubious that the SCO will help India and Pakistan to find a solution to the question of terrorism and counterterrorism, and to the Kashmir problem. Nor will the SCO help find a solution of their nuclear disputes.
In addition, any Russian deal with Pakistan tightens Russian relations with China as well. Russia may hope to play intermediary between China, Pakistan, and India, but this will not prove easy, as the United States and its allies will seek to draw India closer to their geostrategic and political-economic interests through security cooperation and arms sales. These include the major sale of the thirty-six advanced French Rafale fighter jets to India in 2016—at the same time that the United States has cut assistance to Pakistan. France has also been limiting arms sales to Islamabad, while selling to New Delhi. The US Senate had blocked a deal with Pakistan f
or eight F-16 fighter aircraft in May 2016 and refused $300 million in defense aid to Islamabad in August 2016. These steps have led Pakistan to buy Chinese JF-17 fighter jets.63
In accord with US and Japanese policy, India has strongly opposed China's maritime and naval buildup. New Delhi has moreover rejected China's claims to islands in the South China Sea, in the demand for freedom of navigation for all states in the region—which corresponds with US concerns. Despite Russian efforts to bring India into closer relationship with China, the above factors could press India closer to the new global alliance that is forming between the United States, France, Australia, and Japan.
In sum, India is hesitant about joining the Chinese-backed RCEP, and while New Delhi has hoped to maintain strong ties to Russia, Moscow appears to moving closer to China. Moreover, India's skepticism of the goals of China's CPEC and BRI combined with Modi's provocative statements with respect to Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan against Pakistani claims to support Jammu and Kashmiri independence raise the risk of Indian conflict with Pakistan.64 And since India additionally claims Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, which are presently controlled by China and because China claims Arunachal Pradesh (calling it South Tibet), which is controlled by New Delhi, Indian-Pakistani conflict could potentially set off a wider confrontation.
Trump's Indo-Pacific policies have flipped like a fish in a frying pan since he came to power in January 2017 up until his visit to South Korea, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan in November 2017. Whether he will obtain a better grasp of the region after his visit remains to be seen, but Trump has so far flipped from supporting Taiwan, to fawning upon China, to threatening to “totally destroy” North Korea. Kim Jung Un upped the ante by repeating threats that he would soon explode a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean in the process of developing nuclear missiles capable of striking the continental United States.1
But, perhaps even more incredibly, Trump actually told Secretary of State Rex Tillerson not to engage in even a half-hearted attempt at diplomacy. As he put it in one of his (in)famous tweets: “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful secretary of state, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”2 In effect, Trump's tweet signals to North Korea that the United States is interested not in a diplomatic solution but in regime change.
In addition, even if Trump does eventually opt for a diplomatic path, his tweet has already helped to undercut the credibility of his secretary of state, at the same time that Tillerson is attempting to restructure the State Department in accord with Trump's directives, by shutting down more than thirty special envoys offices and trying to eliminate at least 2,300 employees.3 This situation creates a tense working atmosphere that will make it even more difficult for the State Department to effectively deal with a number of critical issues discussed in this book, including the truly existential threat posed by North Korea.
The argument of this chapter is that there is absolutely no alternative to diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jung Un except for a war that could kill more than a million people. It is crucial for the United States to engage in effective diplomatic leadership that would seek a settlement between South Korea and North Korea through multilateral negotiations, and that would involve Japan, Russia, and China; and that would soon lead to direct US-North Korean talks.
TRUMP AND HIS TAIWAN-CHINA FLIP-FLOPS
As presidential candidate, Trump had questioned the One-China policy that has governed US, Taiwanese, and Chinese relations since the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 and that is fundamental to sustaining positive US-Chinese relationship. In an effort to obtain political, military, and economic concessions from Beijing, which Trump has seen as the primary threat to the US economy and US interests abroad, Trump threatened to play the Taiwan independence “card.” By backing Taiwan, Trump had hoped to obtain the support of anti-Communist Asian American voters. Trump also hoped to alter China's expansionist political-economic and military policies in the Indo-Pacific region.
In opposition to the One-China accord, Trump had stated that he did not see why he must be “bound by a ‘one China’ policy” unless the United States could make a deal with China “having to do with other things,” including trade, devaluation, border taxes, their military buildup in the South China Sea.4 He continued, “and, frankly, they're not helping us at all with North Korea…You have North Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that problem. And they're not helping us at all.” But Trump also added as part of his bargaining strategy: “I wouldn't want them to know what my real thinking is.”
Trump then offended Beijing by accepting a phone call from the Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen, whom Beijing has refused to recognize as a leader.5 This is because Beijing sees Taiwan as a secessionist province that must eventually be reunified with the mainland—and by the use of force if necessary. Trump's efforts to play the Taiwanese card against Beijing consequently caused great popular resentment and protest in China—and continues to raise China's suspicions.
In mid-December 2016, much as it has done in the past at the beginning of the administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Beijing flashed its dragon claws. Just after Trump's telephone conversation with Taiwanese president, Beijing sailed its (former Ukrainian) aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, accompanied by three guided missile destroyers and two frigates, into the South China Sea. This resulted in a symbolic crossing—for the first time—through the waterway between Okinawa and Miyakojima Island near Japan. The aircraft carrier thus sailed only twenty nautical miles outside Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. This action forced Taiwan to deploy an unspecified number of F-16 fighter jets.6
China was also purported to have flown a nuclear-capable Xian H-6 bomber along the so-called Nine-Dash Line which outlines China's territorial claims to roughly 90 percent of the South China Sea. Chinese claims clash with the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines to their own exclusive economic zones as determined by the international law of the sea. China's Nine-Dash Map, which is ironically based on Chinese nationalist Kuomintang party claims, sets China's boundaries in permanent dispute with the claims of almost all of China's neighbors, whose claims in the same area are not as extensive. Even if the Chinese bomber did not possess nuclear weaponry, these actions nonetheless represented symbolic statements that were intended to demonstrate that Beijing would be willing to use nuclear weaponry in order to defend its territorial claims. The incident also involved Japan, which reportedly sent out two of its fighter jets in response to the flight of the Chinese bomber.7
Trump's Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, had already warned China during his congressional confirmation hearings: “We're going to have to send China's leaders a clear signal: that, first, the island building stops and, second, your access to those islands is not going to be allowed.”8 And according the US reports, China has appeared to be upping the ante, at least since Trump came into office, by installing antiaircraft and antimissile systems, among other weaponry, on all seven of the artificial islands it has built in the South China Sea. With Beijing ramping up the pressure, Trump suddenly backed off and was forced to capitulate just a few weeks after becoming president. This reversal of policy was taken in large part as the Chinese President Xi Jinping would not agree to speak with Trump until after he had publicly acknowledged the One-China policy. Both Tillerson and Trump then radically softened their statements toward China.9
THE ONE-CHINA POLICY
Trump's policy reversal was largely due to the fact that the One-China policy has been at the heart of a more or less stable US relationship with the People's Republic of China since at least the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, when President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began to reach out to China. At that time, Washington brought the People's Republic of China into the UN Security Council (UNSC) by way of dismissing the Republic of China (Taiwan) from UNSC membership.
The One-China policy is deliberately ambiguous in that it permits a Sino-US modus vivendi. In other words, the United States has publicly agreed to accept Chinese claims to unify with Taiwan, but Washington is nevertheless permitted to sell arms to Taiwan, without formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. Yet there is another essential issue: as Washington did not press Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan when agreeing to the One-China policy, US defense support for Taiwan gives China more reason to look to Russia for arms. And it gives Moscow more reason to play the China card against the United States—so as to obtain greater concessions. Pressing China and Taiwan to mutually renounce the use of force will be key to peace. (See chapter 10.)
Beijing fears that Taiwanese independence would undermine the Communist Party's legitimacy to control “all” of China, and that US support for Taiwanese independence would impact China's claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing furthermore fears that Taiwanese demands for independence could spark other independence movements inside the mainland (e.g., Tibet, Xinjiang province, and Inner Mongolia). For Beijing, Taiwan is nonnegotiable: Taiwan cannot be part of a Trump bargaining strategy that swaps trade and financial questions.
Trump has nevertheless appeared to be offering China a positive trade deal if Beijing will help “contain” North Korean nuclear ambitions. On the one hand, Trump's threats to engage in economic sanctions and military actions against China give Beijing very little incentive to pressure North Korea, even if Beijing does fear that the North Korean nuclear program could lead both Japan and South Korea to develop nuclear weaponry that would in turn threaten both North Korea and China itself. On the other, Trump's efforts to forge a new trade deal with China, as a possible reward for its role in dealing with North Korea, could be opposed by the US Congress as well as by Trump's domestic Republican and Independent base of support, who oppose Chinese economic competition.