by Hall Gardner
Another dilemma is that Beijing represents the second most powerful political-economic actor in the world, if not the very first in some categories. In 2015, for example, China possessed the world's four biggest banks. And among the world's one hundred largest banks, China possessed the most at the top, with thirteen banks in total, while the United States placed second, with eleven banks.10 By some measures, China will surpass the United States in terms of gross domestic product by 2018, after already surpassing the country in terms of purchasing power parity in 2014–2015.11 And given its burgeoning financial, economic, and technological prowess, Beijing could, in just another decade, challenge the United States and its remaining allies in military terms, particularly in its own region—if Washington does not play its cards right. (See chapter 6.)
THE REGIONAL CHALLENGE
For Beijing, the state that possesses hegemony over Taiwan in turn possesses control over what the US Navy calls the “sea lines of communication” from Japan to the Arab-Persian Gulf and to the Suez Canal. Japan, South Korea, and Australia all rely upon shipping routes that pass close to Taiwan, through which an estimated $5–$7 trillion worth of goods are transported each year. Some two-thirds of South Korea's energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan's and Taiwan's, and 80 percent of China's crude oil imports, flow through the South China Sea.12
In addition to the geo-economic importance of who controls the sea routes through the South China Sea, there are significant amounts of resources in the region. Optimistic estimates claim that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil. Pessimists claim that the proven reserves of oil may be only about 1.1 billion tons. For China's energy needs, cheaper alternatives are readily available, particularly given the currently low oil prices. But for the Philippines and Vietnam, losing access to the South China Sea's potential oil and gas wealth would be far more significant in economic terms than it would be for China. Another major concern is that fish stocks in the South China Sea area have fallen 70 to 95 percent from their levels in the 1950s, and in the next twenty years they could decline an additional 59 percent from their 2015 levels.13 The decline of fish stocks has already led China to look in waters beyond the South China Sea and as far as West Africa.
According to the Pentagon, Beijing has built up more than 3,200 acres of islands by dumping rocks in at least seven areas it occupies in the waters, in strategic positions near the disputed Spratly Islands. This provides China with long-term “civil-military” outposts from which it can project power.14 In addition to expanding its claims to fishing areas, resources, and energy deposits in the South China Sea and elsewhere, one of the main reasons for China to construct artificial islands in the South China Sea, which are far more extensive than those of Vietnam, for example, is to provide a barricade to protect its fleet of advanced nuclear submarines, which is based on the southern tip of Hainan Island.15
China has not yet formally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea in 2013. (See further discussion, below.) An ADIZ would identify, monitor, and control all civilian and military aircraft in the region—in a form of anticipatory self-defense. Nevertheless, Beijing has repeatedly threatened to declare an ADIZ, particularly after the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled unanimously in July 2016 in a suit filed by the Philippines against the legal basis for China's Nine-Dash Line territorial claims to the South China Sea.16 China sees the PCA's decision against its irredentist claims as illegitimate: In effect, China is seeking to justify its demands to establish a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine for the East and South China Seas.
Beijing furthermore sees itself as potentially “encircled” by the United States, Japan, and India; this is because China considers all three to be strengthening their military presence in the Indo-Pacific. China's fears of encirclement have led Beijing to develop the concept of “forward edge defense.” This is China's new strategic doctrine that calls for the projection of its strategic capabilities from land toward the ocean. This new defense concept appears designed to establish a Chinese “arc-shaped strategic zone that covers the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean.”17 Beijing has accordingly sought to develop a defense umbrella to counter US military strategies involving anti-area denial and air-sea battle concepts that could bring a potential conflict to the Chinese mainland. (See chapter 6.)
The major focus of China's defense spending remains building its capabilities to seize Taiwan—particularly in the assumption that the latter country will be defended by Washington. The problem is that, in Beijing's view, Taiwanese independence continues to represent a real “threat” that has been given greater credence by Trump's conversation with the Taiwanese president. In addition, Moscow's rapid yet relatively peaceful annexation of Crimea may have given Chinese elites the idea that they might be able to capture Taiwan in a somewhat-similar way—but only if the United States is distracted by other events or if Washington appears willing to appease Beijing.
JAPAN AND CHINA
Tokyo has sought to bolster its alliance contributions through the revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines in April 2015. Tokyo has also insisted that the United States extend its nuclear deterrent to cover Japanese claims, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, rather than simply relying on the US nuclear umbrella.18 In addition to developing its own missile defense system involving the deployment of US Patriot and Aegis missile defense systems (but not yet THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), Tokyo has increased its military spending for the past five years since 2012.19 At the same time, the Abe government has urged the revision of its “pacifist” constitution. So far, Tokyo has extended the ability of its self-defense forces to engage in overseas operations under the United Nations—or alongside allied forces.
To this goal, Tokyo has acquired surveillance drones, fighter jets, naval destroyers, and amphibious vehicles to counteract China's military activity in the region. In 2016, the Abe government sought to purchase an additional submarine and new fighter aircraft. The government proposed deploying roughly 1,300 soldiers from Japan's Self-Defense Force on the southern islands of Kagoshima and Okinawa—which are close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands also claimed by China.20 Tokyo has deployed a new amphibious unit modeled on the US Marines. The latter could be called on to respond to Chinese naval and aerial activity near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.21
One of the main concerns that could provoke war between China and Japan has been the Japanese “nationalization” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2013. This nationalization (the purchase of three islands from their private owner by the Japanese government) then inadvertently led to a confrontation between contending Chinese and Japanese claims. Japan has claimed the islands since the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, at a time when they were said to be uninhabited. Chinese claims go back to the Ming period, when they were said to be linked to Taiwan. China has considered Taiwan to be an inalienable part of its territory—even if the Taiwanese do not see it that way.22
China then proclaimed an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the East China Sea in late 2013. Here it can be argued that international law has ironically begun to force a number of confrontations. Even though international law (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS) is intended to help states resolve disputes, international organizations have also begun to insist that states define their territorial boundaries instead of emphasizing joint sovereignty. Due to the complex situation and emphasis of national sovereignty over territorial control, both Japan and China would probably have preferred to let the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue rest in its ambiguous format.23
China's claims to an ADIZ not only clash with Japanese claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands but also, to a limited extent, South Korean and Taiwanese ADIZ claims.24 Foreign aircraft must now identify themselves before entering the Chinese air-defense zone. The Pentagon responded with what it calls Freedom of Navigation Operations, which are i
ntended to demonstrate that China cannot try to maintain these areas as an exclusive defense zone. As a provocative demonstration that the United States does not accept China's ADIZ, the Pentagon flew a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber over the East China Sea. With respect to Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Rex Tillerson said the United States had “made a commitment to Japan in terms of a guarantee of their defense.”25 Tillerson stated that Beijing's unilateral declaration in 2013 of an air defense identification zone overlapping Japanese airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was “illegal”—even if it was Japan that had first declared its own ADIZ. Tillerson nevertheless affirmed that the United States needed to defend Japan in accord with Article 5 of the US-Japanese security treaty. This Article 5 is similar to the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Japan has consequently accused China of violating international law, while Tokyo has also tightened its defense relations with the United States. Washington has clearly backed the Japanese position and has not attempted to play honest broker. At the same time, a Japanese conventional military buildup is not sufficient to defend Japanese interests unless the United States is also pressed into playing the role of nuclear gendarme—a role that Trump appeared not to want to play as presidential candidate, but has threatened to play after becoming president.
RUSSIA, CHINA, AND ASIA-PACIFIC COUNTRIES
Joint Russian-Chinese military exercises have in part been intended to press regional states to work more closely with both China and Russia. Throughout the Cold War and up until recently, Moscow has largely sought to counterbalance the interests of Vietnam with those of China—but now it seems to be somewhat tilting toward China. For its part, China has used Russian military backing to support its own claims to expansion in the South China Sea and East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), against Japan and against Taiwan, in addition to seeking to divide the ASEAN alliance. In many ways, due to Chinese “sweet and sour” policies (promises of trade and investment, coupled with military threats), Cambodia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and now the Philippines appear to be moving closer to both China and Russia—in part because of China's promises of financial assistance through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). (See chapter 6.)
Moscow has only recently begun to open political-economic relations with Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, while seeking trade with Japan, Russia continues to pressure Japan through a military buildup on the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories, largely in response to the Japanese military buildup. Concurrently, Moscow has also been keeping a rising China on guard. Moscow has, for example, doubled the number of S-400 air defense systems that it deploys in its Far East region, while it has also deployed the S-400 system in its southern coasts near Japan, while its S-500 system is in development. These systems could potentially be used against either Japan or China.
Russia has likewise been building up its Pacific Fleet. The main goal of its Pacific Fleet is to control the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic—which creates tensions with the other Arctic powers, which are primarily NATO members. This includes the stationing of new offensive missile complexes on the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories.26 (Because the United States is to head the Arctic Council until 2017, US-Russian cooperation will be key to avoiding conflict.)
While Moscow has not overtly backed China's claims in the Indo-Pacific, Moscow has wanted to demonstrate to the United States that Moscow and Beijing are now working together militarily in both the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific. This cooperation is intended to provide a possible Sino-Russian joint defense of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For its part, Beijing may want to engage in joint Sino-Russian maneuvers in order to demonstrate, to countries such as Vietnam, that Russia, despite its promises, might not protect them—in case of potential conflict with China.
Nevertheless, despite Japanese-Russian disputes over the Kurile Islands or Northern Territories, Japan's primary security concern is with North Korea and China—and not with Russia. This is due to North Korea's close political-economic ties to China, plus China's not-so-long-term threat to control sea lines of communication to the Arab-Persian Gulf. In August 2016, for example, after China had sent a warship close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in June, North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile toward Japan. Throughout 2017, North Korea launched a number of missiles over Japanese airspace, while concurrently testing its nuclear weaponry.
The dual North Korean and Chinese “threats” have consequently led Tokyo to try to prevent Russia from more strongly backing China. These factors accordingly led Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in May 2016 to advocate an eight-point plan for Vladivostok that was designed to ameliorate Russia-Japanese tensions. In effect, due to its assessment of a truly threatening situation, Japan began to both break the US and EU sanctions regime placed on Moscow after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and engage in a rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin (See chapter 9.)
PHILIPPINES
By May 2016, the election of Rodrigo Duterte, as Philippine president, has led to a new Filipino-style of rebalancing to China and Russia in response to Obama's policy of “rebalance” or “rebalancing” to Asia.27
In the case of the US ally, the Philippines, Manila has looked to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to provide it with $24 billion in economic assistance—even if it is not certain whether China can fulfill its promises given its present economic downturn.28 While Washington has hoped that it could help Manila to stand up to China in the South China Sea, backed by the ruling of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, Washington has not concurrently been able to provide sufficient aid and assistance to help improve Philippine infrastructure. Nor has Manila perceived the United States (and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, IMF) as helping to improve living conditions in that highly impoverished country—in part because US and World Bank loans generally require countries to engage in significant market-oriented domestic-economic reforms.
In addition, President Barack Obama's criticism of Philippine President Duterte's repressive actions against individuals accused as being involved in the underground drug trade has led the Philippines to try to better balance its relations (including arms purchases) between the United States and the authoritarian states of China and Russia. Duterte hopes Beijing can put pressure on China's drug mafias that deal in the Philippines so as to better control drug-related criminality. How long Manila's balancing act can continue remains to be seen.
Given Obama's strong criticism of Duterte's human rights abuses in his war on drugs (which include an estimated seven thousand extrajudicial killings by March 201729), Trump purportedly told Duterte, “I just wanted to congratulate you because I am hearing of…what a great job you are doing and I just wanted to call and tell you that.” When Duterte replied by calling drugs the “scourge of my nation,” Trump responded: “I…fully understand that and I think we had a previous president who did not understand that.”30 Trump's approach appears to represent a vulgar realist effort to draw Duterte closer to the United States, but will dubiously succeed.
VIETNAM
In the case of the former US rival Vietnam, Moscow and Hanoi became strategic partners in 2001. That relationship was then upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. A Russia-Vietnam military cooperation pact then formalized the two governments’ defense cooperation. Moscow promised arms to help to protect Vietnam's offshore energy interests and defend its claims in the South China Sea.31 Yet, in order to hedge its bets, Vietnam has also sought defense cooperation with India, the Philippines, and the United States—in the aftermath of then President Bill Clinton's diplomatic recognition of Vietnam in 1995—largely to counter Beijing's claims to portions of the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by Hanoi.
RISK OF ANOTHER KOREAN WAR
In one 2016 interview, Trump had stated in reference to the 28,500 US troops deployed to South Korea: “We get practically nothing compared to th
e cost of this. Why are we doing this?”32 Yet he would subsequently reverse this position by February 2017, after he became president. When North Korea threatened to test an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), Trump tweeted what appeared to be a “red line”—suggesting that if North Korea does test an ICBM, the United States will somehow be able stop it: “it won't happen.” But then Pyongyang tested a number of nuclear weapons systems anyway.
One of the rationales for Trump's decision to bomb Syria in April 2017, after the latter purportedly used chemical weaponry against its own population, was to send a message to North Korea, China, and Russia that Washington was prepared to use force to assert its interests and values. As a show of force, Trump made the decision to bomb Syria at the very time that he was dining with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Florida. Issues discussed with Xi included the $310 billion US trade deficit with China; Taiwan; Tibet; and China's military expansion in the South China Sea. Before Xi arrived in Florida, Trump had warned that he was prepared to go it alone to remove the threat presented by North Korean nuclear and missile programs—if China fails to control its closest ally.
In April–May 2017, Trump's Peace through Strength policy was blatantly challenged by North Korea in a show of conventional forces. Yet Trump's display of force in Syria did not halt North Korean missile and nuclear testing. Although Pyongyang's missile launches failed go off on schedule in April, Pyongyang successfully tried again in May with a long-range missile that could potentially strike the US military base in Guam. It has been estimated that North Korea will be capable of deploying as many as one hundred warheads by 2020 (up from twelve in 2017)—if its nuclear weapons and long-range missile program cannot be frozen in the near future by diplomatic agreement. In addition to developing a long-range missile that could strike the US continent, North Korea has purportedly been able to miniaturize its nuclear warheads.33