The Peace of Amiens

by Nicholas Sumner

  ​Thus the powers agreed to managed building schedules rather than a moratorium on new construction. [4] Consequently, except in Britain, very few new ships were laid down; the various governments preferring instead to complete ships already begun. There was certainly a widespread belief that the treaty would probably be renewed or replaced by a modified one that also limited new construction.

  From ‘The Great Submarine Debate 1922 – 30’ by Robert Trent writing in Man O’ War 2007

  At the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, Arthur Balfour, the head of the British Empire Delegation, gave a speech in which he said that the experience of the Great War had shown that submarines were completely ineffective as weapons of war when used against other warships. Furthermore, they were mostly ineffective when used against civilian trade in defiance of the rules of warfare. [5] He based his contention on the fact that the German submarines had been unable to counter the strength of the Grand Fleet, had proved unable to interfere with their operations to any great extent and that they had failed to substantially degrade British commerce and trade after the introduction of convoy and other tactics. He also stated that on a ton for ton basis, submarines cost two to two and half times as much as battleships. He went on to stress that the Germans, in their various submarine campaigns of the Great War had contravened international agreements and international law that restricted submarines to using cruiser rules when preying on merchant vessels. He noted that if they had complied with international law they would have been rendered useless as a weapon.

  The speech caused uproar in naval circles and the debate, continuing long after the conference ended, was conducted across the pages of The Times and even found its way in to Brassey’s Naval Annual. Balfour has been extensively criticised for delaying the general publication of volume III of the British Official History of the Great War. This document dealt with the German U–boat campaign of 1917-18 [6] and restricting its distribution by having it declared secret and placed under the Twenty-five Year Rule was an act clearly designed to support a deception, but he had seized the political initiative and this was crucial.

  ​Clearly, Balfour wanted to counter the perception that submarines were highly effective weapons, but his arguments were relatively weak. He used hyperbole to overstate the points in support of his position while ignoring those that ran counter to it. While German submarines may not have sunk many British warships at sea, they certainly were able to circumscribe the Grand Fleet’s operational areas and they made operations difficult for the Royal Navy during the late 1916 sortie by the High Seas Fleet. Similarly, British submarines did manage to torpedo a number of German capital ships on the few occasions that they had the opportunity, even if they didn’t manage to sink any.

  ​Nevertheless it paved the way for the conference to include limitations on the total tonnage of submarines. While most professional naval officers had misgivings about Balfour’s argument, many of their political masters took an opposite view. Balfour’s comment on costs was felt particularly keenly and went to the heart of the reasons the conference had been called in the first place. In peacetime, decisions concerning military spending are rarely based on strategic or operational requirements, but on the short- to medium-term availability of financing. Balfour caused a reappraisal of both the potential and significance of submarines and helped divert attention away from them and back towards more conventional avenues of naval thinking.

  ​It is possible that the fleets of the world would have developed in somewhat different ways had Balfour not effectively pulled off a political master stroke. His undoubted mendacity was certainly an attempt to do Britain and the Commonwealth a service, but it must be noted, that of the contracting powers, only France and Italy were greatly affected. The United States and Britain had no plans to embark on large submarine construction programmes. For Japan, on the other hand, the role of the submarine was essential and their actual plans for submarine building greatly exceeded what the treaty permitted. The French signed the treaty before properly formulating a post-war naval policy and, unlike the Japanese, strived to keep within the treaty’s limits. The Italians tended to assess their strategic needs with a view to countering the French and were to find their construction priorities severely cramped by the weakness of their economy in any case.

  From ‘Mackenzie King and the Royal Canadian Navy’ by John W. Olds writing in Man O’ War 1989

  At the Washington Conference, the issue of training ships proved extremely contentious and became embroiled in the issue of the independence of the navies of the Commonwealth nations. The opening British position was that warships under the command of the navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa should not be counted in the Royal Navy’s total, an argument that was wholly unacceptable to the United States delegation.

  As part of the United Kingdom’s efforts to compel the Dominions to bear a greater part of the financial burden of Empire defence; Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa had all been persuaded to fund their own naval forces and had each agreed to purchase and maintain a capital ship. All had been promised assistance from the British treasury and in the case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand ships had already been earmarked for transfer. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, these were incomplete hulls.

  The South African’s however, seized on American resistance as an excuse to back away from their commitment to Empire defence. Canada also proved reluctant to pursue the matter, but was in the middle of an election campaign as the conference convened. Because none of the candidates wished to be seen as unpatriotic, the British were able to apply a certain amount of leverage on them. One of William McKenzie King’s first acts as Prime Minister after his election victory on 6th December 1921 was to send the following letter to the American President.

  Dear President Harding

  I have the honour to refer to recent events at the current Washington Naval conference and in particular to allegations of gerrymandering made by the American delegation in reference to the formation of independent Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Navies. For my part, I am commissioned and required to speak only for Canada, though the intent of this letter may have some bearing on the conduct of all of these nations.

  The people of the United States saw fit to throw off what they perceived to be the injurious yoke of colonial government at a time and in a manner that the people of Canada, presented with identical circumstances, did not choose to emulate. I would submit that at a distance of some one hundred and fifty years from those events, it is not the provenance of the government of the United States to dictate to other nations with a similar history and antecedents, the manner in which they may choose to become independent or pursue the rights that pertain to independent nations.

  I would respectfully remind the president that Canada has been an independent sovereign nation and self-governing since 1867, that Australia has been since 1901 and that New Zealand has been an independent Dominion since 1907. I would further remind the president that alliance notwithstanding, the Navy of Canada is at the command of the people of Canada through the medium of its duly elected government.

  For more than a century past, relations between the United States and Canada have remained cordial and within the past decade our two nations shared in the great struggle of the war. There can be no doubt that these current minor misunderstandings will be set aside and the happy state of affairs on this great continent which our nations share will continue to pertain.

  Very Sincerely Yours

  William Lyon McKenzie King, Prime Minister.

  For diplomatic correspondence the wording of the second and third paragraphs are quite blunt. Some historians have speculated that Mackenzie King was trying to undermine the British position by forcing them into too aggressive a negotiating stance in the hope that an equally aggressive American response would compel a re-appraisal of Canada’s commitment to purchase and maintain a capital ship. The style of the letter i
s very different from Mackenzie King’s normal mode of communication and it seems possible that it was written by someone else with his approval.

  If that is the case then the letter backfired in its intent. It was seen in Washington as a reflection of British unwillingness to cooperate on the issue. Instead, the Americans raised the idea of permitting the capital ships to be retained as training ships. After long and occasionally acrimonious discussion, a compromise was reached whereby the Australian capital ship would be included in the Royal Navy’s total tonnage, while those of Canada and New Zealand would be disarmed but retained as training vessels. The South African delegation were relieved that their country was to be excused the financial burden of capital ship operation. [7]

  From ‘A New Naval Race Avoided’ by Michael Hargeaves writing in USNI Measures 1954

  Under the Washington Treaty of 1922, the tonnage allowance for submarines for each power was set at the ratio of 5/5/3/1.75/1.75 (expressed as US/UK/Japan/France/Italy). The actual tonnage figures were approximately 75,000/75,000/45,000/26,500/26,500. While submarines certainly didn’t disappear from the world’s navies, fewer were built during the term of the Washington Treaty than might otherwise have been the case. [8]

  ​The British Commonwealth was happy to see a limitation on submarine tonnage in place, though disappointed at the failure to obtain an outright ban. There was only a minor effect on their building programmes. The United States on the other hand, had agreed to give up about a quarter of its existing submarine force in number of hulls. However, an appraisal of the oldest subs in the USN in 1922 indicated that this would entail only the sacrifice of small, obsolescent and poorly regarded boats. The H, K, L and N classes were small coastal submarines and suffered from many engine problems, while the T class were a good size but were considered unsuccessful and due to be laid up in 1922 anyway. All of these boats had been designed prior to American entry into World War One and all compared poorly with examples of captured U-boats. All were of only limited effectiveness and the coastal boats could not make long voyages unescorted.

  ​Japan entered into the Washington Treaty negotiations with a large number of submarines that they considered generally satisfactory. In Japanese doctrine they were supposed to cause attrition in the fleet of an enemy before the decisive encounter with the main battle fleet. While this was certainly important, it was judged less important than having a powerful battle line, especially as the IJN wanted to keep as close as possible to 70% of US strength.

  ​Japanese naval policy was fixated on the notion of a decisive battle and under the Washington Treaty they were permitted to build or retain 12 battleships and battle cruisers. The Kanto earthquake of 1923 forced them to some difficult choices, but their desire to commission the battleship Tosa, and two Amagi class battle cruisers was an overriding priority. Between 1922 and 1933 the IJN constantly re–appraised its construction programs. [9]

  ​The Marine Nationale was required to keep its submarine tonnage to roughly its pre-treaty level (28,116 tons). However, the French had committed themselves to treaty limitations before deciding on the future direction of their naval strategy. This was yet another symptom of the lack of a coherent French naval policy after the war. [10] Italy, the weakest of the powers, enervated by the conflict and convulsed by political upheaval went along without too much protest. [11] Thus the limits placed on submarines at Washington perhaps forestalled the start of another naval race where submarines became proxies for battleships. [12]

  From ‘The British Empire from 1914 to 1948’ by Ian Shaw, Longacre 2005

  British defence policy allowed the nations of the British Commonwealth and their immediate neighbours to enjoy the benefit of what the economist Peter Pugh calls ‘common goods’. This refers to benefits that all the individuals in a group enjoy, whether or not they contribute to providing it. Although a ‘common good’ is advantageous to all, paying for it is not, because from the point of view of each individual, the advantages of the common good are not lessened if they do not pay for it. In fact, the avoidance of paying for a ‘common good’ is a definite economic advantage for those other than the main supplier of the benefit, because the funds saved can be used for other purposes.

  ​A closely integrated economic and military alliance, such as the British Commonwealth, is unquestionably a common good for all its members. But, for each individual within that alliance the most advantageous strategy is to spend as little as possible for its own security while depending on the others for it. However, there invariably comes a point when such reliance by an individual nation compels its allies to re-appraise the terms of their protection and possibly remove that protection entirely.

  ​At the Imperial Conference of 1930, which was held in London in the autumn, Admiral Lord Jellicoe delivered a speech to the delegates that had these truths firmly in view. He began by pointing out that because of the underlying strength and broad base of her economy and because she was able to float Government Bonds at a lower rate than all other nations except for the United States. Britain was therefore still able to finance a major war against two Great Powers. However, she was no longer monetarily or militarily able to win a global war against three. He went on to say that although the government and people of Britain felt strong ties of sentiment and of trade (in many cases these were quite literal family ties) to the independent Dominions of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, all of these had, (compared to the mother country) very modest defence budgets. While these nations were certainly effective allies in time of war, they sought in peace to deflect as much of the financial burden of defence onto Britain as they could.

  ​He closed by saying that throughout the British Empire, maintaining the Washington Treaty was seen as a positive stratagem. He also stressed that from the point of view of those territories which were in, or adjacent to, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Treaty was the best safeguard against Japanese expansion. The Royal Navy was the mainstay of Empire defence and he sought to persuade the Dominions to persist with the work begun prior to the Great War to enlarge both their naval forces and their areas of responsibility.

  ​Jellicoe’s speech was the start of a concerted diplomatic effort on behalf of the British to get the Dominions to bear more of the costs of Imperial defence. Canada had made some strides in that regard and in the past had resisted pressure to expand her naval squadron even more, despite having announced a desire to acquire three battleships before the Great War and even set aside funds for two of them. But Canada’s new Prime Minister, Richard Bennet, was prepared to accept that the Dominions should bear more of the burden of Empire defence. He overcame strong pressure from United States President Hoover and Canada eventually matched the levels of spending on the Navy that Australia and New Zealand maintained.

  If the British could be satisfied with the contribution made to defence spending by the Dominions bordering the Pacific, the same was not true of those bordering the Indian Ocean. The governments of India and South Africa, emphasising the political sensitivity of heavy defence expenditure in their territories, never managed to substantially raise their spending. This was perhaps a blessing in disguise. Until the crises of the mid 1930’s, the RSAN was neither the most enthusiastic or effective member of the RN’s family of fleets and the Royal Indian Marine was little more than a farce.

  CHAPTER 2: WEDNESDAY 19TH OCTOBER 1993

  “And now for part seventy nine of Radio 4’s ‘Voices From the Past’ an oral history project for the BBC produced by Hermione Miller. Today we are at the home of Warrant Officer Arthur Leighton in Weymouth, Dorset. Good morning Mr. Leighton…”

  ​“Morning.”

  ​“Now we are here today in your home in Weymouth, in Dorset and I understand that you have recently had a birthday?”

  ​“Yes, I’m ninety five years old.”

  ​“That’s wonderful Mr. Leighton, congratulations.”

  ​“Thank you, yes, but you better be quick with this interview, I m
ight not make it to the end.

  ​(Laughs) “That’s wonderful Mr. Leighton. Now you also have a son who was in the Royal Navy too.”

  ​“Yes, my son John was a pilot in the Royal Navy Air Arm.”

  ​“You were on HMS Revenge during the German Invasion, but you also served in the Great War…”

  ​“Yes I did, I was in three major actions during that time. I was a steward on the battle cruiser Lion which was the flagship of the battle cruiser force under Admiral Beatty at Dogger Bank and at Flamborough Head and a while after that, I was transferred to the Revenge and I served on her at Jutland and for the rest of the war.”

  ​“So you served on the Revenge twice?”

  ​“Yes that’s right; she was named for Francis Drake’s flagship you know...

  “Oh really...”

  ​“...yes that’s right. I left the Navy in 1920 and got a job at The Dorchester in London, it was better for my family but I missed the sea and I joined up again in 1938, my son was about grown by then – he joined up around that time.”

  ​“Can you tell us about the battles you were in Mr Leighton?”

  ​“Which one?”

  ​“Well, what was that one you mentioned er… Flamborough, er…” (Papers rustling.)

  ​“Flamborough?”

  ​“Yes, er yes, Flamborough, tell us about that…”

  ​“Well, that was when I was with the battle cruiser force. We were off Scarborough, well outside the minefield, guarding the gap in it. It was early afternoon, I was below decks. When we were at action stations most of us stewards made up first aid parties. It could be quite nerve racking. We had no idea what was going on. Of course you could hear the guns firing and you could feel it if the ship was hit, but not being able to do much set your nerves on edge until the call came. Then you had to go and try to help the injured. There was a heavy sea that day and the ship was rolling a lot. It was just past six bells of the afternoon watch, that’s about ten past three, and we were sailing south west when we sighted the enemy.”