The Peace of Amiens

by Nicholas Sumner

  ​The Chilean-Argentine war, coming so soon on the heels of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian war, was something of an annoyance to the Willkie administration which was embarrassed by the squabbling in America’s back yard. The conflict flared up over the Beagle Channel dispute which had been festering since the 19th century. Argentina, with some encouragement from Germany, had been involved in several diplomatic conflicts with its neighbours. Threats against both Uruguay and Paraguay had caused disquiet in Brazil as well as Washington.

  ​Ramón Castillo, the president of Argentina from June 1942 until June 1943 leaned towards the Axis powers and, although he was deposed in a military coup, his successors Generals Rawson, Ramírez and Farrell (who was president until the elections in 1946) were also supporters of the fascist alliance.

  *

  In understanding the events that led to the resumption of hostilities, it must be realised that the League of Nations after the war of 1940 was completely marginalised, seen by the major powers as an irrelevance and therefore unable to fulfil its brief. The world temporarily returned to the style of diplomacy that had pertained before the First World War.

  ​The German annexation of Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway in 1944 and 1945 raised the question of the Dutch and Belgian colonies. Germany claimed sovereignty over the Congo, Suriname and the Netherlands East Indies, but this claim was rejected by the United States which had recently installed the Dutch Government in Exile in Batavia.

  ​In early March 1945, in one of his first acts as President, Harry S. Truman, in concert with the government of Australia, supported an immediate change in the status of the Dutch East Indies. The Willkie Administration was unwilling to countenance their takeover by the United States. There was no appetite in Washington for the acquisition of a new colony by America. Truman however, was determined to take a strong line against the Axis powers and in a flurry of diplomatic correspondence between Washington, Canberra, London and Batavia it was decided that the United States would support the continuance of Dutch rule over the territory of the Netherlands East Indies. What this meant in practice was that it was to be ruled by the Dutch Government in Exile rather than the colonial administrators who had simply carried on after the German victory in 1940. At this point, the new administration was little more than an American puppet.

  ​This was immediately opposed politically by both Germany and Japan supported only slightly less vocally by the other Axis powers. The Dutch Government in Exile was not entirely happy at this turn of events. They saw direct American support, quite correctly, as a probable point of conflict with Japan, as well as a factor that would undermine what little authority they still possessed. On the other hand, indirect American support was believed to be the best way of maintaining the status quo and avoiding war. The Dutch were particularly alarmed by the American assertion that part of the reason for its backing, was that it would bring the goal of Indonesian independence closer. Eventually however, strong American diplomatic pressure, plus the fact of Holland’s diplomatic and military impotence bought acceptance of the new arrangement.

  ​An immediate result of this was that within a month, exports of strategic materials to Japan from the DEI, Malaya and north Borneo had ceased entirely although this did not prevent all supplies from getting through. The fact that the volume of materials reaching Japan from South East Asia was now greatly reduced combined with Japan’s inability to master the technologies involved with the creation of a synthetic fuel industry, meant the problem of fuel supply became critical. (See Appendices)

  ​Even if Japan’s immediate need for fuel could be ameliorated by their considerable strategic stockpiles of oil (at that time it stood at 80 million barrels [139]), they now saw the situation as presenting even more reason for aggressive military action. The natural resources of the DEI, British North Borneo, Malaya and the Philippines included petroleum, tin, nickel, timber, bauxite, iron ore, copper, cobalt, coal and even precious metals. An increasingly mechanised army, a growing and fuel-hungry navy and air force; operating ever more fuel-thirsty equipment meant that the securing of ‘The Southern Resources Zone’ was now of particular importance.

  ​An unspoken assumption by the Germans and Japanese was that they would act in concert against America. Each hoped that the other would divert a large portion of America’s strength. The news that the Germans were bringing forward the first phase of Betriebsplan drei (the annexation of the Azores), caused great satisfaction in Japan. It is important to note, that it was seen by the Germans as a preliminary operation, but the Japanese took it as signalling that war was imminent.

  ​Because access to the Fuhrer was controlled through Bormann, who was not an adept at international affairs, and because the Nazi hierarchy now consisted almost solely of sycophants whom Bormann trusted, no credible voice was raised against the plan. Both Keitel and Carls were prevented from seeing the Fuhrer and Goering, to whom Hitler might have listened, was becoming more withdrawn and disengaged from policy. His health problems and addiction to morphine meant that the Reichsmarschall was concerned less and less with Germany’s international position and more and more with spending time on his estate hunting deer. [140]

  Although Franco harboured serious reservations, Hitler was quite convinced that possession of the islands, while vastly improving the Axis’ strategic position, would not lead directly to war with the United States. He was in fact surprised when he received the American ultimatum on 5th May but nevertheless rejected it out of hand.

  ​The plan had been in process for a long time and required only the finishing touches. On Friday 4th May 1945, three battalions of German paratroopers dropped on Ponta Delgada, Angra and Horta while 10,000 Spanish troops were landed from requisitioned passenger liners at the major ports. The Government of Portugal, informed only one hour previously, ordered its forces not to oppose the landings, and though some sporadic and desultory fighting occurred, resistance quickly ceased.

  President Truman’s address to the 79th Congress of the United States; 7th May 1945

  “It is my duty to tell you today that I have received no satisfactory response from the German and Spanish governments to the ultimatum which we presented them two days ago; that if they did not immediately begin the withdrawal of their forces from the Portuguese territory of the Azores Islands that a state of war would exist between this country and theirs.

  The occupation of the Azores Islands cannot be interpreted in any other way than as an action designed to directly menace the continental United States. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defence. To pre-empt any other such action, I have today signed legislation to authorise the occupation of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands by forces of the United States Navy and Marine Corps.

  “It is no small thing to seek war with the United States, so let the leaders of Spain and Germany be in no doubt that we will take whatever measures we deem necessary to defend our shores from aggression and let the other members of the Axis Pact be aware, that the United States will not shrink from opening hostilities against any nation that chooses to threaten it.

  ​“I ask that the Congress declare today, that the United States is now in a state of war with Nazi Germany and the Republic of Spain.”

  Adolf Hitler’s address to the Reichsenat 8th May 1945

  “Germany does not wish for war, the German people desire only peace – but I tell you also that we shall not shrink before American aggression; that we shall not be dictated to by America or any other power. If they choose to attack us then our fury will descend upon them until they know the taste of total defeat!

  ​“It is the destiny of our race to dominate the world, those who stand against us will be utterly smashed! Obliterated as if they had never existed! The Americans are weak! Prosperity has made them soft! Their country is riddled with Jews! I tell you that they cannot stand against the might of our forces! Total victory shall be ours, America will rue the day it cho
se to threaten the German Reich!”

  Annexes

  ANNEX 1: LOSSES OF GERMAN CAPITAL SHIPS

  AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

  From ‘The Rule of the Waves’ by Michael Fanshaw, Twelvemonth 1963

  Moltke

  Moltke was the fourth ship in the 1st Scouting Group line. She was being fired on by Tiger, Australia and New Zealand during the run to the south and received an underwater hit on her starboard side, in the forward part of the hull from Tiger at 16:02 at approximately the same time that Indefatigable blew up. The result of this hit is unknown, but was probably limited to structural damage and flooding. From 16:08, the 1st Scouting Group also came under fire from the British 5th Battle Squadron and Moltke was hit at 16:16 by either Barham or Valiant below her starboard number 5 casemate and exploded. [141] Von Der Tann, the next ship in line, had to swerve violently to avoid the smoke cloud. Eyewitness reports from members of Von Der Tann's crew described an enormous deflagration amidships. Only seven members of her crew were saved.

  Seydlitz

  The first hit scored on Seydlitz was at 15:55 by a 1400lb 13.5 inch shell from the Queen Mary. It struck her starboard side above the battery deck forward of the foremast and caused substantial damage but did not reduce the ships fighting efficiency. Two minutes later, she was hit by Queen Mary again, the shell striking the 9 inch armour of her aft super firing barbette. It penetrated and caused the destruction of the turret but did not otherwise disable the ship.

  She was hit by another 13.5 inch shell (again probably from the Queen Mary) at 16;05 underwater in the region of the Starboard wing barbette. The shell is believed to have exploded just outside the torpedo bulkhead and splinters penetrated the magazine and adjacent engine room but the resultant flooding rapidly extinguished any fires thereby saving the ship. [142]

  A fourth 13.5 inch shell struck the 210mm armour at 16:17 just aft of her starboard rearmost 150mm casemate. It caused heavy damage, disabling the gun, wrecking a large area of the ship and forcing the temporary evacuation of the starboard turbine compartment.

  At 16:50 she was hit by a 15 inch shell on the starboard side of the focsle deck above her torpedo flat which exploded well inside the ship and caused major structural damage. [143] Strained by the hit on a weak part of her hull structure and the high-speed at which she was travelling, several bulkheads collapsed and the fore-part of the ship took on large amounts of water. By 16:55 she had slowed noticeably, and when struck by a torpedo from the destroyer Petard at 16:57 below and slightly aft of the spot where the shell had hit, she pulled out of line and slowed to four knots. The hull, already strained, was now riven by the explosion of the British torpedo and the subsequent explosion of several of her own torpedoes. Splinters penetrated as far back as her forward boiler rooms which began to flood.

  At 15:01, though heavily damaged, listing to starboard and down by the bows, the ship was saveable but unfortunately two British destroyers, Obdurate and Morris were approaching at 31 knots from the west on a bearing of east-south-east less than 10,000 yards on Seydlitz’ starboard beam, and seeing her in distress accelerated to 34 knots to attack. They were within firing range in two minutes and fired six of their eight 21 inch torpedoes at the stricken battle cruiser at a range of 8000 yards before turning away. Their approach and the launching of their torpedoes was masked by the smoke from the German 9th Destroyer Flotilla and the light cruiser Regensberg which were then steaming past Seydlitz to the west (i.e. between her and the British destroyers) steering north-north-east, though both the German destroyers and the cruiser engaged the British ships scoring several hits their intervention came too late to prevent the British launching torpedoes.

  The breeze, which was from west-south-west [144] carried the funnel smoke of the German light forces towards the battle cruiser making observation difficult for her lookouts while her masts were clearly visible to the attacking British destroyers above the smoke. The torpedo tracks were not observed by the Seydlitz until 15:08 when they were less than 1500 yards away. Seydlitz started to turn towards the torpedoes in an attempt to ‘comb the tracks’ but the slowly moving ship did not answer the helm rapidly enough and four of the six torpedoes found their mark striking at 17:10. One exploded adjacent to the site of the 16:05 hit while two more struck very close together abreast of the aft boiler rooms.

  Seydlitz was stopped completely by 17:12 and there was no saving her at this point. Captain von Egidy gave the order to abandon ship at 17:14, she sank by the bows while also rolling to starboard and at 17:26 her stern was clear of the water, it finally disappeared at 17:31. 467 members of her crew were rescued.

  Derfflinger

  Derfflinger was leading the 1st Scouting Group line when she suffered a magazine explosion at 17:13. The shell was of 15 inch calibre and fired by either Barham or Valiant at a range of 18,000 yards and an angle of obliquity of approximately 33°. The shell is believed to have struck on the starboard side below the waterline in the region of the forward magazines. [145]

  Several historians have noted that had it not been for an incident at approximately 16:02, Hipper's flagship Lutzow would have been leading the line. This was a near collision between the flagship and one of the escorting destroyers of the 9th Flotilla. The 1st Scouting Group was executing a manoeuvre whereby they were turning from line abreast to line astern formation while changing course from east-south-east to south-south-east. While this movement was a well-practised one, it is possible that the helmsmen of Lutzow, Derfflinger and the destroyer S52 were distracted by the explosion of the Queen Mary which had just occurred and the destroyer came too close to the Lutzow causing a violent course correction by the flagship and a sudden loss of speed. It seems that the crew of the Derfflinger (also possibly distracted by the action) failed to notice the Lutzow’s turn and sailed past her to port, though Seydlitz both slowed down and manoeuvred to follow the Lutzow leaving Derfflinger slightly ahead of the rest of the squadron.

  S52 had exchanged fire with the British destroyers Morris and Obdurate at around 15:03 and a shell from Obdurate had struck her bridge killing many of its occupants and disabling the steering gear. Consequently the ship was being conned from the secondary steering position which had a restricted view. Furthermore the man conning the ship was not a senior rating (as would be normal practice) and the ship was under the command of a junior officer (the senior officers having been killed or injured when the bridge was hit).

  Hipper then ordered Derfflinger to take up position in the lead of the 1st Scouting Group , possibly because this would bring the ship’s back into formation more quickly and with less confusion than if Derfflinger had attempted to take up her old place in the line. [146] Hipper preferred to lead his force from the front, Scheer's flagship always took up a position in the middle of the German battle line.

  Konig

  The exact sequence of events in the loss of Konig is unclear, but during the third phase of the action between 18:15 and 18:35 she suffered many hits from the British battleships. It is believed that the shell that doomed her came from Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke which was credited with her destruction. She was observed to suffer multiple internal detonations which caused severe fires before she rolled over and sank. [147] The ship was lost with all hands.

  Helgoland

  In contrast to Konig, Helgoland was only hit once at 19:15 by a 15 inch armour-piercing shell from Valiant at 17,000 yards at an angle of roughly 45°. The shell struck above the torpedo flat on 6 inch vertical armour, but passed right through this to burst inside the ship causing sympathetic explosions of Helgoland’s own torpedoes. [148] Although the bulkhead forward of the magazine was holed by splinters it held, forward of this bulkhead the ship was open to the sea and many compartments flooded rapidly. Captain von Kameke ordered the ship to slow to a crawl and the rest of the HSF soon left her behind but her forward pumps were inoperable due to shock damage from the explosions in her torpedo flat and, like all German ships of this era, her watertight subdivi
sion was compromised by cable runs, voice pipes and other systems and she began to settle. By 20:09 her focsle was underwater and the sea was now entering the ship through her casemate embrasures. The situation became even worse at 20:24 when one of her remaining pumps failed and she foundered at 22:07.

  Lutzow

  The flagship of 1st Scouting Group received a tremendous battering throughout the action and by 18:40 her condition was extremely serious. She had endured a total of nineteen heavy-calibre hits, eight 12 inch, seven 13.5 inch and four 15 inch. The ship’s upper-works were wrecked, almost 8,000 tons of water were inside the hull and 25% of her boilers were out of action as were most of her guns. In addition, she was down by the bows and listing to port. Yet when at 19:13 Scheer ordered Hipper to charge the British line in a desperate bid to draw the Grand Fleet’s fire away from the fleeing van of the High Seas Fleet, Lutzow turned towards the hurricane of fire without a moment’s hesitation. It is possible that in the confusion Scheer was unaware that the 1st Scouting Group consisted now of only a single battle cruiser. Writing after the battle he said of Hipper ‘His devotion to duty was exemplary, his courage beyond praise’.

  Lutzow did not last long and the tactical sense, situational awareness and downright good luck that had helped Hipper thumb his nose at the Grand Fleet at Flamborough Head, Dogger Bank and up to this point at Jutland were finally of no avail. Between 19:14 and 19:18, it is estimated that the ship was hit by four 15 inch, five 13.5 inch and nine 12 inch [149] shells before the British shifted their fire from the stopped, smoking wreck and on to the German battleships. The exact sequence of events on board Lutzow is unknown but at 19:20 she capsized and sank shortly after. Only 121 members of her crew were rescued, Admiral Hipper was not among them.