Valentino

by Niccolo Machiavelli

that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his

  violence.

  But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent

  qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and

  acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of

  fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which

  caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and

  cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single

  murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those

  of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by

  those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the

  midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-

  like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and

  desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who

  does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the

  less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do

  any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the

  service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had

  contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily

  threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out,

  was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.

  But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to

  hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,

  and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his

  people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave

  himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he

  might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not

  maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete

  with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the

  imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being

  hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against

  and was killed.

  It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very

  warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of

  Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected

  Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two

  things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in

  Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all,

  and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his

  having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and

  taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a

  reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in

  Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that

  the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to

  fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all

  the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may

  be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting

  with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and

  fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

  I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being

  thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this

  discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have

  this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in

  a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some

  indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that

  are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as

  were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more

  necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it

  is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan,

  to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the

  more powerful.

  From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him

  twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend

  the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,

  putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them

  his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in

  the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the

  people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the

  state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason

  that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called

  either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons

  of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that

  position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only

  noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new

  principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that

  are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the

  constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive

  him as if he were its hereditary lord.

  But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will

  consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been

  fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how

  it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in

  another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to

  unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for

  Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was

  heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly

  destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated

  Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in

  his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot

  imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow

  those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which

  are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are

  proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and

  firm.

  CHAPTER XX

  ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES

  OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

  1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed

  their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by

  factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others

  have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in

  the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some

  have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a

  final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the

  particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made,

  nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself

  will admit.

  2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather

&n
bsp; when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by

  arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted

  become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your

  subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be

  armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be

  handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which

  they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the

  latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most

  danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when

  you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust

  them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these

  opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain

  unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the

  character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be

  sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted

  subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new

  principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of

  examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a

  province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of

  that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it;

  and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft

  and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all

  the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old

  state were living near you.

  3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed

  to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by

  fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their

  tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This

  may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way

  balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept

  for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;

  rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided

  cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always

  assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist.

  The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the

  Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although

  they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these

  disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their

  differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not

  afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one

  party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,

  therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never

  be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one

  the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace,

  but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

  4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the

  difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore

  fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who

  has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes

  enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may

  have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,

  as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many

  consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with

  craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having

  crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

  5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and

  assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were

  distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted.

  Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who

  had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot

  speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will

  only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom

  have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to

  support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease,

  and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity,

  inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by

  deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the

  prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who,

  serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since

  the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means

  of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider

  the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be

  not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their

  government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble

  and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And

  weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be

  taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier

  for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under

  the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those

  who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged

  him to seize it.

  6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states

  more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit

  to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of

  refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been

  made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in

  our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di

  Castello so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of

  Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by

  Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that

  province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult

  to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar

  decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to

  circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in

  another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has

  more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build

  fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the

  people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by

  Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house

  of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the

  best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,

  although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if

  the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to

  assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen

  in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince,

  unless t
o the Countess of Forli,[*] when the Count Girolamo, her

  consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the

  popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover

  her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the

  foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little

  value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the

  people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would

  have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated

  by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things

  considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as

  him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares

  little about being hated by the people.

  [*] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia

  Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli

  that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati

  to the countess announces the appointment: "I have been with the

  signori," wrote Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and

  when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young

  Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave

  with me at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini,

  translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

  CHAPTER XXI

  HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

  Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and

  setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the

  present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because

  he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to

  be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his

  deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In

  the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise

  was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and

  without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of

  Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any

  innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was

  acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of

  the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long

  war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since

  distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to

  undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to

  driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be

  a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he

  assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked

  France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great,

  and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and

  occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a

  way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work

  steadily against him.

  Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal

  affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da

  Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life

  doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some

  method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken

  about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every

  action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and

  remarkable man.

  A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a

  downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he

  declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which

  course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because

  if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a

  character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him

  or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to