George Washington's Surprise Attack

by Phillip Thomas Tucker

  In truth and in a compliment to superior discipline for occupation troops in enemy countryside, the only vice among the Hessian soldiers for the Yuletide was the joyous experience of smoking tobacco from long-stemmed clay pipes, as back home in Germany with family and friends. Actually at this time, of course, far more American soldiers in Washington’s two advancing columns were almost certainly taking an occasional cold mouthful of rum and whiskey, diluted and mixed in with creek or river water, from ice-crusted wooden canteens to warm themselves against the storm’s harshest offerings during the final push toward Trenton.

  Indeed, as Washington’s two columns of half-frozen soldiers relentlessly approached Trenton from the north and yet undetected by the Trenton garrison, hundreds of highly disciplined Hessians of Rall’s own grenadier regiment were sleeping in their quarters in the hours before daylight. However, they wore full uniforms with accouterments strapped on and with weapons, in excellent condition as prescribed by regulations, stacked in neat rows nearby. The Hessian regiment, therefore, was well prepared to rapidly assemble at Rall’s previously assigned points in Trenton at the first sound of an alarm.

  The fact that Washington had partly based his offensive strategy upon the belief that the Germans were wildly celebrating Christmas was in fact a dangerous assumption and a serious miscalculation. Instead on this cheerless Yultide in a silent, snow-shrouded Trenton, the Hessians, most of whom were deeply religious and strict Calvinists, had been only thinking of home, observing religious aspects of the Yuletide, and praying to survive this miserable war, which they wanted to end to be reunited with friends and families once again.

  While Washington’s troops drew closer, they now either rested or slept around their little decorated Christmas trees, according to German Yuletide tradition, set up in their quarters. Most of all, these German fighting men respected their faith and their dedicated chaplains, primarily of the Lutheran faith. As if still worshiping in a beautiful, towering Gothic Cathedral back in the old medieval towns of Marburg, Wetzlar or Eisenbach in Hesse-Cassel, they had often knelt before these revered men of God at their nightly vespers while quartered in Trenton. A favorite hymn of these battle-hardened Teutonic warriors from their respective Calvinist principalities was entitled “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God.” Even during Howe’s amphibious landing at Kip’s Bay on September 15, 1776, the Hessians, who had been as nervous as when Washington’s men crossed the Delaware because so few knew how to swim, believed that they were about to be slaughtered in a frontal attack because light defenses, with an unknown number of Americans, stood before them. Therefore, on that hot Sunday that had rang over Kip’s Bay’s sparkling waters to the amazement of Washington’s troops waiting in the sweltering trenches, these strict German Calvinists had sung their favorite Calvinist hymns in preparation for meeting their Maker.38

  One of the greatest misconceptions about the story of Trenton was that Rall’s Hessians were entirely unready to respond quickly to an attack and practically unable to defend themselves because of the alleged excessive intoxication from the Yuletide celebration, and that one “of the turning points, therefore, of American history is fixed in the decanter of Col. Abram Hunt. . . .”39 However, in truth, this overemphasized traditional explanation of Hessian surprise and defeat at Trenton was just another part of the mythical revolution, ignoring that fact of how close the Rall brigade came to nearly turning the tide of battle. This popular anti-German stereotype of excessive drunkenness and heathen-like unrestraint was first created by a highly effective American propaganda machine—and then was mimicked by generations of American historians—to demonstrate an alleged decadence and immorality in the natural process of demonizing the enemy to rally support against the invaders.

  Ironically, Washington and his men now failed to realize how a devout Calvinism ensured that these Hessians at Trenton never observed this Yuletide Season in the manner of the debauched, ancient Roman ruling class at a drunken orgy or annual festive to celebrate and pay homage to the gods. In fact, unlike the Brunswickers from north Germany (mostly Catholic), Rall’s soldiers were mostly of a strict Calvinist faith, and they did not celebrate the Christmas Holiday. Emphasizing the drunken Hessian stereotypical perspective that has endured to this day, Colonel Fitzgerald, of Washington’s staff, penned in his diary how the Germans “make a great deal of Christmas in Germany, and no doubt the Hessians will drink a great deal of beer and have a dance to-night. They will be sleepy to-morrow morning. Washington will set the tune for them about daybreak.”40 In truth, a far greater liability for the Rall garrison was not the effects from drunken and unrestrained celebration, but a host of cardinal violations of Frederick the Great’s central axioms of war, which condemned “wars of position” and relied instead upon mobility and flexibility to reap decisive victories across Europe: essentially Washington’s brilliant tactical formula for success on December 26.41

  By this time, the Hessian garrison at a quiet, serene Trenton, now seemingly entombed in blizzard-like conditions, were indeed vulnerable, but not from excessive Yuletide drinking. Almost all sound was muffled by the softly cascading snow, casting a comforting spell, while an eerie silence pervaded over Trenton. Starting on December 22, Rall’s troops were worn down by the monotonous series of alarms and threats, both real and imaginary, emitting hauntingly from the dark woodlands of the hostile, mysterious New Jersey countryside that looked so unlike their native homeland across the sea.

  While Rall’s men were indeed the undisputed masters of Trenton, the western New Jersey countryside was an entirely different matter and situation altogether. By late December, this ever-rising tide of insurrection mocked Howe’s overconfident December 20 words to Lord George Sackville Germain, King George III’s powerful Secretary of the State for the Colonies, that New Jersey was in “almost general submission.” Ironically, Germain had grown up in Ireland and helped to smash yet a new generation of Scottish rebels, among them was Washington’s friend General Mercer, at bloody Culloden in 1746.

  As in most guerrilla wars with foreign invaders deep in hostile territory and occupying stationary, defensive positions during active insurgencies, effective Hessian control of their environment ended at the town’s limits. Therefore, new, aggressive tactics of insurgency warfare initiated by the roving bands of New Jersey militia had recently ensured that the Trenton garrison was almost constantly on alert while facing an increasingly hostile environment on consecutive days before Washington struck. Conducting surprise mini-raids and intelligence-gathering missions in the brown-hued countryside both north and south of Trenton to draw attention away from Washington’s selected multiple crossing points along the Delaware, these wide-ranging New Jersey and Pennsylvania militia strikes, both dispatched by Washington and with aggressive independent officers acting on their own initiative to strike on their own, helped to pave the way to the Hessian brigade’s doom in the end. Consequently in overall tactical terms, Colonel Rall and his troops were blind and bottled up in their cozy, winter quarters in Trenton on December 25 and 26, while Washington’s two columns—Sullivan’s First and Greene’s Second Divisions—steadily approached from the north with an unexpected blend of stealth and audacity not previously seen on this scale with American troops in this war.

  By this time, even Rall’s small detachment of British light cavalry had been cowed into remaining safely in Trenton rather than out on the necessary long-distance reconnaissance assignments to ascertain any new developments, especially at McConkey’s Ferry, and sound early warning of Washington’s approach across country. Commanding the New Jersey militia brigade of Hunterdon County soldier-farmers, who fought by day and then went home to families and firesides by night in true guerrilla fashion, Colonel Philemon Dickinson, who was stationed on Pennsylvania soil just across the river from Trenton, had repeatedly launched small-scale strikes this December.

  Even though these were mere pinpricks, they proved highly effective in harassing the beleaguered Trenton garrison, wearing down e
ven the best troops, who were not accustomed to the inscrutable ways of insurgency. Acting on well-honed instincts and a high level of experience, Rall had always taken the bait, overreacting to perceived threats in an aggressive manner. Rall had repeatedly sent out detachments to meet the expected attack that never came because the savvy New Jersey militiamen, in classic guerrilla style, simply melted away into the thick forests along the Delaware or retired back across the river to the Pennsylvania shore before late-arriving Hessians came to grips with their most persistent irritant (and one that was growing) this winter.

  Therefore, Washington benefitted from the prior actions of Ewing’s Pennsylvania militia, just below Trenton, which had played its part in harassing the Rall garrison. This December, the beleaguered Trenton garrison had been seemingly sandwiched between Dickinson’s threats from the north and Ewing’s activities from the south, with each commander having utilized their wide-ranging militiamen, New Jersey (mostly Hunterdon County boys) and Pennsylvania, respectively, to cross the river at almost any time to unleash roving bands of partisans. Attempting in vain to confront the baffling fine art of asymmetrical warfare for which they were neither prepared nor trained, the Hessians had understandably become disillusioned, disgruntled, and mentally exhausted by Christmas Day. Therefore, a deep feeling of frustration, combined with anxiety, infiltrated the mindset of the young Hessian soldiers, eroding the recent sky-high morale that had already peaked with the series of New York Campaign victories. In a completely unexpected development, the Hessian’s one-sided victories at Long Island, White Plains, and Fort Washington had only built up an overblown confidence that had been easily deflated in short order by a new, fast-moving type of unconventional warfare that was unfamiliar to them, thanks to an escalating insurgency that seemed to have no end.42

  Another forgotten advantage now possessed by Washington lay not as much in Rall’s alleged incompetence, drunkenness, and negligence as a commander as in his ambition that had served him well in the past. What historians have most often overlooked was the simple fact that explained some of Rall’s seemingly wrongheaded decisions, especially in regard to not erecting defenses to protect the town, since arriving with his brigade at Trenton on December 14; quite simply, he never planned to spend the winter on the Delaware’s east side with his brigade.

  In truth, Rall’s greatest failing at Trenton was that he in fact possessed not too little, but too broad of a strategic vision that was as bold as it was right on target. Like Washington, he was planning to unleash his own masterstroke that might end the war. Therefore, from Howe, Colonel Rall had early requested not only his own regiment, but also two other regiments to be stationed at Trenton, while Donop had initially planned for the garrisoning of only a single regiment at Trenton. Donop viewed Trenton as little more than an isolated picket outpost of relatively little strategic importance and just another winter quarters. Howe gave Rall all that he had asked for—the ordering of the entire brigade to be stationed at Trenton—not simply as a reward for his past battlefield accomplishments, but more importantly to fulfill a most ambitious plan to yet capture Philadelphia this winter.

  Explaining in large part why he in fact had ignored the seemingly prudent orders from Donop and suggestions from his subordinate officers, like the respected Major Dechow, to fortify the town, the strategic-minded Rall was in fact merely biding his time at Trenton. As he advised his top lieutenants, Rall was only waiting for the arrival of colder winter weather to freeze the Delaware so that he could lead his three regiments and artillery across the river and capture America’s vulnerable capital. Besides driving another nail into the coffin of rebellion and achieving a significant political and strategic coup, Rall also wanted to gain better winter quarters for his well-deserving troops in Philadelphia compared to the small, mostly vacant, houses of Trenton.

  Therefore, Washington was correct in his obsessive fear of the Delaware freezing to permit the British-Hessian Army to resume offensive operations: a key factor that fueled his decision to launch his bold preemptive strike on Trenton because he knew that he could not possibly stop such an operation. Indeed, on December 20, Howe wrote to Lord Germain in London to inform him that he was only awaiting the Delaware’s freezing to resume the advance, spearheaded by the crack Rall brigade, upon Philadelphia. What the ever-aggressive Rall had in mind, with Howe’s blessings and full support, was the boldest of strokes that could not possibly fail under the circumstances unless Washington launched his own preemptive strike.

  Rall, therefore, never planned to defend Trenton or to remain idle along the Delaware’s east bank for the entire winter: a forgotten factor that fully explained why he erected no defenses. In consequence, no vast amount of supplies, “or no stores of any Consequence,” as a surprised Washington later wrote much to his disappointment after the town’s capture, had been stored in Trenton for the long winter, because Philadelphia was still Howe’s and Rall’s strategic objective during this winter of opportunity.

  Thanks to the ambitious Howe-Rall plan to push on to Philadelphia once the Delaware froze, the six artillery pieces of the Rall brigade were not placed at any point on the town’s outskirts in a defensive stance or behind any newly built earthworks. Ideally, two guns seemingly should have been situated in the engineer’s recommended redoubt at the head of King and Queen Streets as advocated by Donop’s knowledgeable engineer, but they would have been easily outflanked on both sides and early overwhelmed by Greene’s Second Division vanguard Virginians and the hundreds of men who followed close behind. On this cold night, consequently, these German light bronze guns now remained “uselessly” in rearward positions—close to Rall’s headquarters near in the town’s center—rather than in defense of the town’s northern perimeter.

  Yet planning to soon push southwest on America’s undefended capital, Hessian soldiers had previously boasted that they would shortly celebrate Christmas in a captured Philadelphia. A German officer assigned to Howe’s headquarters described how Rall had already requested permission to continue the advance on Philadelphia once the Delaware froze over. Therefore, by way of verbal rather than written orders, Howe had ordered for the Rall brigade to remain in readiness at Trenton in preparation for the final push to Philadelphia once the Delaware sufficiently froze. Howe later admitted after his return to England that Rall and his three regiments were situated “so near to Philadelphia [so] that we might possibly have taken possession of it in the course of the winter,” after the Delaware froze over. In this regard, Howe could not have chosen a better or experienced commander in a more advanced position to gain his politically vital objective, America’s capital. Howe’s heavy reliance on Rall’s aggressiveness and tactical skill had been repeatedly demonstrated in the past, and it was now no different in regard to the tantalizing prospect of capturing Philadelphia, America’s most important city. After all, Rall now commanded the most lethal warriors in America, whose reputations had preceded them for ample good reason.

  In fact, Colonel Rall’s tough, disciplined grenadiers had already killed more Americans than any regiment in Howe’s victorious army. However, the Rall Regiment was a Landgrenadiere command, or a militia-like unit, consisting mostly of young farm boys, or peasants in European terminology, from the infertile, rocky land of Hesse-Cassel. Launching a final drive upon the virtually undefended capital and America’s largest city would be a most audacious stroke calculated by Howe to end the rebellion with one blow while bestowing ever-lasting glory to Rall and his German soldiers and, of course, their British commander in New York City. Even if Washington attempted to defend the capital, such a guaranteed feeble, if not disastrous, effort in a stand up fight would be just another mismatch and inevitable defeat, as so often in the past.

  Therefore, fortunately for Washington and his bold preemptive strike to reverse the war’s disastrous course, Trenton was now ripe for the taking, because Philadelphia yet remained Howe’s and Rall’s most pressing strategic objective. In a desperate race in which the st
akes could not possibly have been higher for both sides, Washington’s surprise attack on Trenton was calculated to catch Rall and his Hessian brigade by surprise before they themselves could catch the Americans by surprise by launching their own strike upon Philadelphia once the Delaware froze over.43

  In response to Rall’s growing concerns about escalating guerrilla activities, especially from Dickinson’s New Jersey and Ewing’s Pennsylvania emboldened militiamen, an apathetic Grant remained comatose, basking in the comfort of faraway New Brunswick on the Raritan River. Rall’s desperate messages for assistance had to be written out in French, as Rall knew little English. Then these urgent pleas were translated into English for Grant by an English regiment commander: yet another liability that additionally slowed the already laborious flow of communications, relayed by mounted courier, between Rall and his incompetent superiors.

  Despite Rall’s repeated messages for assistance, Grant continued to be dismissive of threats to Trenton, partly because of his jealousy toward Rall’s winning ways and an almost xenophobic contempt for German soldiers, especially Colonel Rall, in the tradition of British career officers. Blinded by a dangerous blend of national and cultural arrogance, the high-ranking Briton viewed Rall as needlessly concerned about his own safety and only exaggerating his vulnerability. Unfortunately for Rall and his isolated brigade, General Grant failed to perform his duty in protecting Trenton.