George Washington's Surprise Attack

by Phillip Thomas Tucker

  As never before seen in this war, Washington was now maintaining the initiative, advantage, and the momentum in a new kind of waging war, based on stealth, rapid movement, and hard-hitting offensive capabilities for him. After unleashing what was a brilliant pincer movement to confound his opponent, he now sought to exploit the element of surprise to the fullest. Because Washington realized that Rall’s troops never had been caught by a surprise attack in wintertime and in an urban environment, he hoped that these legendary professional soldiers, who had never lost a battle, would be so confused that they would not have sufficient time to form in neat lines to either resist his attack from two directions simultaneously or to launch their own counterattack with the bayonet.100

  A Natural Bowl and Trap

  From the snow-covered head of King Street where the bone-numbing winter gales swept off the heights, Washington viewed the swirling chaos of Trenton that lay before him on lower ground to the south. Feeling an intoxicating sense of exhilaration in having caught the Hessians by surprise to fulfill the coveted requirements of the most elusive and coveted tactical movement in the art of war, Washington almost certainly now felt less of the biting cold. Instead, he was warmed by the soothing glow of having achieved a most impressive initial tactical success by catching the Rall brigade by surprise with a masterful double envelopment maneuver.

  At the top of his lungs, an ecstatic Washington shouted to his onrushing troops who had never acted with more confidence, Captain Washington and Stephen’s Virginians, respectively, who led the way, for all to hear: “There, my brave fellows, are the enemies of your country. Remember now what you are about to fight for!” Washington’s soldiers in the forefront of Greene’s fast-moving column felt reinvigorated by the inspiring sight and the words of their animated commander, who had finally placed his troops in excellent positions with a decided tactical advantage while bestowing them with the opportunity to reap a remarkable tactical success.101

  Clearly, as planned, Washington now possessed a host of distinct and unprecedented tactical advantages, which had absolutely nothing to do with alleged drunken state of the Rall garrison and now could be exploited to the fullest. Once again as in escaping Cornwallis’s grasp earlier in December by crossing the Delaware that provided a timely natural barrier, so favorable geography once again now bestowed Washington with key advantages: Trenton and the entire Hessian brigade were situated not only on open ground but also on lower terrain, which was dominated by Washington’s newly secured advanced position on the heights overlooking the town on the north. Only around fifty feet above sea level at the town’s southern end in the Delaware’s bottoms, Trenton, which was the northernmost city in the broad Delaware Valley, was dominated by the high ground, now teeming with invigorated Americans, on the north.

  Washington easily gained his most important tactical advantage by taking full possession of the heights above Trenton after the stubborn Hessian pickets had been pushed aside. All in all, the Hessian brigade could not have been assigned to a more ill-suited place—first known as “Trent-towne” by William Trent—in all Hopewell Township, New Jersey, to defend. An important communications hub on the King’s Highway, or the Old Post Road, that stretched from New York City to Philadelphia and where four roads intersected, Trenton was a strategic crossroads in the fertile Piedmont.

  Situated between the pine barrens of southern New Jersey and northern New Jersey’s Highlands and west of the state’s central plains, this attractive (at least before the war) commercial town had long been a key trading center and relatively prosperous for its small size because of its key location at the head of navigation for merchant ships plying the Delaware. Thanks in part to geography and the town’s size, and fortunately for Washington, Rall’s garrison of around 1,500 troops was much too small to defend all of Trenton and its sprawling environs.

  Washington’s reliance upon the well-honed abilities of experienced officers, who could make their own tactical decisions in the confusion and heat of battle, continued to pay off. Like Captain Washington’s accomplishment in in clearing Hessians off the strategic Pennington Road, Flahaven also continued to push some very good opposing troops, the jaegers, down the River Road while leading the attack of Sullivan’s First Division down the River Road. Also known as chausseurs, or light troops, these tough jaegers were primarily the sons of foresters and gamekeepers of vast royal estates owned by wealthy German aristocrats. Unlike the Pennsylvania and Maryland riflemen who placed their faith in the Long Rifle and dry black powder, the German jaegers carried well-balanced, beautifully crafted short rifles known for their deadly accuracy, which were far superior to the large caliber Brown Bess smoothbore muskets carried by British soldiers.

  In serving as highly mobile light infantry, the jaegers had early struck fear into American soldiers because of their deadly sharpshooting skills, which had been well honed from former occupations as foresters and hunters in the mountainous region of the evergreen-dominated Black Forest of Bavaria in southwest Germany. Therefore, they had rightly earned the respectful reputation among Washington’s men as the deadly “foresters from Hell.” But at Trenton the German jaegers (hunters) now found themselves caught amid what was becoming a fast-paced urban battle: the ultimate conundrum and nightmare scenario for these men, who fought best in thick woodlands. The jaeger’s dark green uniform coats blended well with America’s forests, but these elite German soldiers were now exposed in the open on a white landscape, ideal targets for Washington’s marksmen.

  Worst of all for Colonel Rall’s troops, who were trained to face a conventional opponent in open, level fields that resembled the finely trimmed parade grounds back in faraway Hanover or Heidelberg, were now situated in a snow-covered urban environment in a bowl-like depression, especially at the low-lying foot of King and Queen Streets near the river, surrounded by high ground on the town’s outskirts, especially on the north. In addition, Trenton was generally an open town and not overly congested, which was to the attacker’s advantage, thanks also to the two parallel avenues that passed through the town.

  Also to Rall’s tactical detriment in mounting a sturdy defense, Trenton was nestled in a blind corner confined by two deep watercourses, the Delaware River and Assunpink Creek, a tributary now swollen by winter rains and runoff. The Assunpink’s brownish waters flowed southwest into the Delaware at Trenton’s southern end. Once Washington’s troops secured all of the high ground north of town, then the Rall brigade would have to make the best of it in attempting to fight back from lower ground and with the Assunpink to its back. Quite simply, the Rall brigade had no man-made or natural defenses from which to make a defensive stand.102 As if to signify that the commander-in-chief’s luck had finally come full circle, Rall’s disadvantageous tactical, psychological, and geographical situation was eerily almost identical to Washington’s disastrous decision to defend low-lying Fort Necessity, the French and Indian War fiasco. Washington must have basked in the fact that he now controlled the strategic high ground, placing him for once on the right side of the ever-elusive tactical formula for success.103

  Equally significant in bestowing yet another distinct advantage to Washington this early morning was the fact that not only the Hessian garrison but also its six bronze cannon were not in advantageous positions to defend the town’s outskirts, especially on the north. Instead, the brigade’s cannon were located in the town’s center and a good distance (nearly a quarter mile directly south) from the heights north of town.

  The Rall Regiment’s bronze guns were now positioned in front of the King Street guardhouse near Rall’s headquarters near the town’s center, while the von Lossberg Regiment and Knyphausen Regiment’s cannon were situated just southeast in the Anglican Church’s rear. And by the time that Washington gained the heights above town, the Rall Regiment’s two guns—now under Lieutenant Friedrich Fischer who was second-in-command—were not ready for action, thanks to Dechow’s cancellation of the usual 4:00 a.m. morning patrol. The fact that tw
o guns were assigned to each Hessian regiment instead of a single artillery corps went against the wise tactical philosophy of the importance of artillery concentration—Napoleon always placed supreme importance on massing artillery—at all times to reduce “long-arm” capabilities, especially the possibility of a solid defense of Trenton.

  Because the available housing in Trenton was inadequate to house an entire brigade, Rall’s infantry were widely scattered throughout the town on the night of December 25. Except for the old French and Indian War-period barracks, which was located at the town’s southwest edge between Front Street, an east-west running street that was closest to the river, and the parallel Second Street a block north, the Trenton garrison was not concentrated in military-like sleeping quarters. Instead, the Rall brigade’s soldiers were housed primarily in private homes, mostly deserted, from Trenton’s northern end, where the von Lossbergers were quartered on King Street, to the southern end of town, especially around the lower end, or foot, of Queen Street, where the Knyphausen Regiment was quartered east of King Street.

  In addition, the Knyphausen troops were also assigned in houses on the south side of Assunpink Creek. Ensuring a lengthier assembly time to meet the surprise attack, the Knyphausen Regiment soldiers were divided by the swollen creek when Sullivan’s First Division struck with a vengeance. Occupying small, modest houses on both sides of King Street in the town’s center and lower end, therefore, the Rall Regiment of grenadiers were sandwiched between its two sister regiments.

  When Washington attacked in the pale winter light of early morning and much to his advantage, the garrison’s sleeping quarters were widely scattered in the majority of the hundred private homes, mostly small, wood-frame structures, located throughout the town. Befitting their higher status and upper class antecedents, Hessian officers had taken up residence in the best houses, especially large brick structures, and separate from the enlisted men: another liability for rapidly organizing an adequate defense of the vital river town by an entire brigade. Sheer exhaustion also played a role in reducing the Rall brigade’s response time and overall defensive capabilities due to so many recent sleepless nights from answering alarms and mounting patrols that resulted in soldiers not having taken their cartridge-boxes “off for eight days,” wrote Rall on December 20. For a variety of reasons, consequently, Rall’s scattered brigade would neither unite nor fight as one this morning to confront Washington’s attackers of either division.104

  Additionally, Lieutenant Jakob Piel, an experienced von Lossberg officer and Rall’s capable adjutant who detested the “so called Jankees” and was aware that the enlistments of so many Continental soldiers expired on January 1, 1777, revealed one of Washington’s most invaluable psychological advantages that ensured maximum shock on this morning, “In truth I must confess we have universally thought too little of the rebels. . . .”105 General Grant, therefore, had refused to send Rall his repeatedly requested reinforcements—including to guard Washington’s crossing point at Johnson’s Ferry— and even three separate appeals in one day, December 20, and as revealed in his missive to General Alexander Leslie, who commanded British troops at the pretty college town of Princeton, just northeast of Trenton and on the King’s Road to New York City: “I do not believe [Washington] will attempt it.”106

  Equally important, Washington was fortunate in other ways this Thursday morning, which so much was at stake. Dechow’s cancellation of the early morning patrol, with Lieutenant Fischer’s two cannon of the Rall Regiment, to the “Doctor House”—situated along the river just north of the South Trenton Ferry immediately below Trenton and where Ewing’s Pennsylvania Militia brigade was to have crossed to gain the New Jersey side of the Delaware—to watch this key ferry located just below the turbid Assunpink, was a godsend, because this usual morning patrol of grenadiers and artillerymen, both of the Rall Regiment, would have early detected Ewing’s attempt to cross the river.

  Consequently, the Rall brigade’s six bronze three-pounders, with two field pieces assigned to each of the three regiments, were now located far inside the town’s depths. They should have been positioned on the town’s outskirts, especially on the north, along the high ground perimeter. Instead Rall’s half dozen cannon were disadvantageously situated in a relatively low-lying area in contrast to the heights north of town. This ill-advised placement made the brigade’s artillery incapable of “immediate use in the event of an attack [with] them parked, first, in the graveyard back of the English [Anglican] church.” Near the town’s center, the Rall brigade’s half dozen cannon were now in relatively useless positions by the time that Washington struck and possessed the luxury of deploying his troops at will.107

  Most of all, the Rall brigade was not only completely surprised but also in overall poor shape when Washington unleashed his pent-up fury from two directions. Not only were the German troops more vulnerable because they were worn out—physically and mentally—from constant patrols, alarms, and extra duties, but also because they were not prepared for winter combat. Without warm winter uniforms, especially the traditional woolen greatcoats long worn by European soldiers, the Hessians now possessed only thin summer uniforms. Expressing bitterness in his diary about his brigade’s thorough unpreparedness for winter combat and hence Washington’s early morning onslaught, a frustrated Lieutenant Wiederhold complained: “Our army’s exhausted and destitute of small clothes [and] whether the soldiers were wearing pants, shoes, shirt, etc.”108

  Immensely benefitting Washington’s plan, Wiederhold also explained the Rall brigade’s central dilemma of the boy who cried wolf syndrome: “Where the enemy always caused us false alarms, [we] sent more than enough troops, and where the actual attacks were to be expected and actually did occur, [we] gave little consideration.”109 Given a host of such key advantages, Washington had placed himself in the best position to succeed. He had gained a host of key advantages from a masterful, imaginative, and flexible tactical plan of a daring double envelopment, especially when combined with effective diversions, an effective intelligence network, and just good fortune.

  Washington’s most important diversion was in having ordered fellow Virginian Samuel Griffin to capture Mount Holly to ensure that Donop and his Hessian reinforcements remained too far from Trenton to assist Rall when under attack. Most of all, Rall had been victimized by Washington’s brilliant surprise attack from two directions because of the lack of support, organizational and command structure limitations, failures at regimental, brigade and headquarters levels, an overabundance of contradictory and confusing intelligence, and the firm conviction that the optimal time for the ragtag Americans, if they dared to stir which seemed most unlikely, to unleash a possible surprise attack had already passed.110

  Chapter IV

  Washington Pouncing Like “An Eagle Upon a Hen”

  On this sleety New Jersey morning, meanwhile, Washington’s onrushing troops of Greene’s Second Division continued to converge on Trenton en masse from the northwest. A mounted Washington shouted encouragement and orders, infusing even more confidence among the Continentals surging forward with fixed bayonets. All morning, he had been effectively “Encourageing [sic] the Soldiers” of all ranks, and exactly when his half-frozen men had most needed inspiration. For the upcoming battle in blizzard-like conditions and low visibility in a restricted urban area that was guaranteed to be confusing, Washington emphasized that his “Soldiers keep by your officers.”1

  Twenty-six-year-old Colonel Clement Biddle hailed from a leading Quaker family. The Biddle family had migrated to the Pennsylvania Colony in 1681, during the first wave of migration of this pious Puritan sect that embraced “covenant theology” and broke away from the Anglican, or Church of England, because they considered it too restrictive and Catholic-like. Now serving as the army’s deputy quartermaster-general, he had early formed a volunteer company that he proudly named the Quaker Blues. Biddle was the privileged son of a wealthy Philadelphia importer and shipper who also owned the imposing
three-story Indian King Tavern and Inn in Philadelphia. Biddle and his gracious wife were known for their “gracious hospitality” in operating the popular tavern.

  However, Biddle was fated to lose his beloved tavern when the British captured Philadelphia in 1777 and promptly renamed the establishment the British Tavern. Amid the cascading snow flakes, this devoted staff officer now rode beside Scottish General St. Clair, who led his New Hampshire and Massachusetts brigade, in Sullivan’s column now advancing rapidly south along the River Road and toward southwest Trenton.

  The debonair Major Wilkinson married Biddle’s very attractive sister, Ann, who was known by friends and family as Nancy, in Philadelphia in 1778. Watching in amazement while Washington’s soldiers surged onward, he long remembered how he “never could conceive that one spirit should so universally animate both officers and men to rush forward into action” as on this cold morning when the stakes could not have been higher.2

  Like Washington, the contemplative Greene was now enjoying his finest day, leading his Second Division with skill into the fray and encouraging his men onward through the snow flurries. Colonel Biddle and General Greene were second generation Quakers (the sons of Quakers) who had become thoroughly radicalized—or Americanized in this case by the Age of Enlightenment ideology—to forsake their pacifist upbringing and Quaker leaders’ advice to remain neutral to become some of Washington’s most fiery revolutionaries. They were now leading hundreds of American soldiers upon this suddenly strategic mercantile town that had been established by Quakers just barely a century before, while inspired by the nationalistic words of Thomas Paine, whose father was a Quaker.