George Washington's Surprise Attack
Page 36
With muskets on shoulders, therefore, Colonels Hand and Haussegger’s troops of Fermoy’s brigade had earlier trekked offeast through the open, windblown fields of white on their key assignment to gain the Princeton Road beyond the upper town, northeast of Queen Street, and an elevated position blocking the escape northeast, between Queen Street to the west and Assunpink Creek to the east, out of town. Most importantly in overall strategic terms, Washington was about to shortly possess all three roads—blocked by Sullivan, Greene, and Fermoy, respectively, from west to east—that led north from Trenton, additionally sealing the Hessian brigade’s fate hardly before the battle had begun. Not only the whitish haze of the dropping snow but also a belt of dark woodlands masked Fermoy’s stealthy push eastward across relatively high ground from prying Hessian eyes, to the south on much lower terrain, to eventually present yet another nasty surprise for Rall and his troops when least expected this morning.14
Born in the Caribbean (like Captain Hamilton) island of the French island of Martinique around 1737, the ever-opportunistic Fermoy had only recently reached American soil to create a name for himself in battling for liberty. He claimed to have been a colonel—but most likely only a mere captain—of French engineers, a highly respected elite corps of educated officers. Seeking to add prestige to the ancient aristocratic Rochedefermoy family name and strike a blow against France’s ancient enemy, Fermoy’s hasty appointment to brigadier general came less than two months before—on November 5, 1776—from highly impressible Congressional members, who knew little about military matters. Fortunately, for America’s fortunes, the showdown at Trenton was to be the only engagement in which the liberty-loving Frenchman demonstrated the military competence that he had bragged so loudly about so often.15
Meanwhile, the rearmost of Greene’s soldiers in the lengthy Second Division column continued to be spurred onward and into their assigned positions by the sound of Sullivan’s booming artillery to the southwest, indicating the rapid progress of the lower, or right, arm of Washington’s pincer movement. Not long after the first artillery fire had erupted from the two three-pounders of the Eastern Company New Jersey State Artillery, under young Captain Neil, who was assigned to Sullivan’s vanguard brigade under Colonel Sargent, Sullivan’s other cannon of the First Division added their fury that descended so unexpectedly upon the Rall brigade. Moving up quickly behind Sargent’s onrushing troops and now assigned to Glover’s brigade, high-spirited New England gunners of the Massachusetts Company of Continental Artillery pushed their two six-pounders forward.
Working fast in the snow to get their field pieces into their assigned positions, which helped warm themselves up on the frozen morning, the 55 Bay State artillerymen of young Captain Winthrop Sargent soon blasted away with authority. Captain Sargent was an intellectual and enlightened scholar. Additionally, he was a graduate of Harvard College, hailing from the fishing port of Gloucester, Massachusetts.
The rolling peals of crashing musketry from the smoothbore muskets of Captain Flanhaven’s New Jersey Continentals, who continued to lead the way for Sullivan’s surging First Division, and the thundering First Division artillery-fire to the southwest told Washington, basking in the initial success already achieved by his double envelopment, that Sullivan was continuing to push the foremost Hessians rearward and closer to Trenton’s southwestern and lower end.
As he deployed his battle-hardened Continentals north of town with alacrity under heavy gray skies that hovered low over the whitish landscape of ice and snow, Washington relished the thought of having so easily gained the strategic high ground at the head of King and Queen Streets. From this elevated point of strategic importance, Washington could easily ascertain any future Hessian intentions, movements, or tactics on the lower ground below that was mostly open and with relatively few trees, except next to houses. Most importantly, the seasoned Virginians of Stephen’s brigade, whose right was situated near King Street’s head just to the left-rear of Stirling’s brigade, were in good position to shift farther east to fill in the gap to Fermoy’s right to the east whenever Washington felt that it was tactically necessary.
All of Washington’s well-conceived chess-like moves in a complex series of unit deployments on carefully chosen ground were calculated to firmly set in place his most reliable commanders and his finest veteran troops, who were most capable of handling important assignments, in the most advanced positions from where they could either inflict the most damage or make the most staunch defense in case the Hessian brigade counterattacked. Washington’s uncanny ability to match up just the right assignment to best fit his subordinate commander’s capabilities and his troop’s overall quality resulted in the lead regiment of Stirling’s brigade, Weedon’s Third Virginia which was now the right-center of Stirling’s brigade, having been deployed for action at the head of King Street.
Demonstrating additional sound tactical judgment, Washington also set Captain Washington’s vanguard, Third Virginia boys who had been long infused with a crusading fervor by Chaplain Griffith, at the most advanced position at the top of King Street, before the nondescript ranks of Weedon’s Virginia Regiment. Washington ensured that he now had his crack Virginians, both Captain Washington’s vanguard and the Third Virginia Continental Regiment, in ideal positions to lead an infantry attack straight down King Street whenever he gave the word. Seemingly thinking of everything, he now allowed his more exhausted vanguard troops of Stephen’s brigade some badly needed rest just to the left-rear of the Third Virginia, after having shifted his relatively better conditioned troops—the Third Virginia Continental Regiment—into the key position on the high ground at King Street’s head: the perfect location to not only open the main battle, but also to play a leading role, defensive or offensive, once the fighting began in earnest.
Meanwhile, the pounding of the beating instruments of young Hessian drummer boys and the crisp blasts of a cavalry bugle blown by a sleepy-eyed redcoat musician of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, part of the British detachment of only twenty finely uniformed light horse cavalrymen stationed at Trenton, blared loudly. While the bugle’s sharp notes slanted through the cold air and across the relatively narrow east-west (compared to north-south) width of Trenton in the bugler’s frantic attempt to rally the Hessian brigade, Washington barked out orders for Knox’s guns to hurry forward and deploy along the commanding high ground.
Drawn by weakened horses that were as worn as the weather-beaten gunners of Captain Forrest’s Pennsylvania Second Company of the Pennsylvania State Artillery, and with the usual sound of the cannon’s movements yet muffled by the freshly fallen snow, these foremost field pieces and the wooden powder carts had kept up with the head of Mercer’s brigade as ordered. Demonstrating a more thorough appreciation—almost an advanced, Napoleon-like understanding—of artillery’s decisiveness on the battlefield, especially a wintery one, than ever before, Washington personally accompanied the first two guns at the column’s head, encouraging them forward on the double. Most of all, he was determined to make sure that these Pennsylvania cannon and their well-trained gunners were deployed correctly at the best terrain and in the most advantageous position to reap the greatest dividends: the commanding high ground perch at King Street’s head around 250 yards directly north of the town’s center.
Utilizing the keen tactical sense and well-honed instincts of a veteran artillery commander, Washington knew that a proper deployment of these two big six-pounders and two five and a half-inch howitzers of Forrest’s Pennsylvania battery along the high ground overlooking Trenton might well spell the difference between success and failure on this momentous morning upon which the winner would take all. As Knox and Washington fully realized, Forrest’s long six-pounders packed the most devastating punch, especially against infantry: double the firepower of the Hessian’s six bronze three-pounders, and almost equal in firepower to the hard-hitting eight-pounders. Such a decided firepower advantage on the battlefield, especially in an engagement’s beginning, was
a fundamental reason why the master artilleryman Napoleon had made sure that the reliable six-pounder became his army’s primary field gun for his unbeatable French armies that rampaged across Europe and toppled one opponent’s army after another for years.
What has been most often overlooked by generations of historians is Washington’s acute tactical sense in regard to artillery prioritization and careful placement, based specifically upon his artillery’s capabilities that rose to an unprecedented height, revealing his insights as to gun size, the quality of artillery leadership, and the capabilities of his high-spirited gunners. Frederick the Great understood that a great commander possessed what was known as coup d’oeil, or the “sweep of the eye,” that instantly ascertained the advantages of terrain and immediately exploited it to the fullest: exactly what Washington quickly accomplished in so early and firmly securing the high ground at the head of King and Queen Streets and the careful placement of artillery to dominate all of Trenton.
With an amazing perceptiveness and quick decisiveness in a key situation, Washington had early tailored his cannon and their capabilities to precisely meet a host of specific and key mission requirements: first and foremost, in deciding that the most lethal of Knox’s artillery—the four guns of Forrest’s elite Pennsylvania artillery company—should advance at the head of Greene’s column, proper, with Mercer’s brigade. Then, to ensure their swift deployment as early as possible on the high ground north of Trenton, Forrest’s guns had advanced with Weedon’s Third Virginia, which led Stirling’s brigade, just behind Stephen’s Virginia vanguard brigade, after the Maryland, Connecticut, and Massachusetts infantry of Mercer’s brigade shifted south from the main column to advance westward.
With a most keen eye for securing the most advantageous terrain that dominated the town on the north, Washington was already familiar with Trenton’s environs and its most advantageous geography that he exploited to his maximum benefit: timely, insightful knowledge originally gained from the observant Virginian’s close attention to detail that he had long kept sequestered in his agile, reflective mind—not unlike Arthur Wellesley, or the Duke of Wellington, in regard to vividly recalling and then utilizing the most favorable terrain on the battlefield of Waterloo, Belgium, to decisively defeat Napoleon—and now exploited in masterful fashion.
Washington’s relatively easy securing of the strategic high ground north of Trenton for his judicious placement of his artillery to command the entire town now combined nicely with his greater appreciation of his artillery arm’s capabilities and decisive potential, which mirrored Knox’s own forward-thinking opinions about artillery’s decisiveness on the battlefield. All in all, Washington now demonstrated distinguished trademark of a great commander: virtually winning an important battle before the first shot in anger is fired.
Washington’s eagerness to place his largest guns, best led, and finest trained artillerymen atop the commanding perch above Trenton as soon as possible clearly indicated that he realized exactly what the key to victory was this morning. Like Napoleon from an early date, Washington fully appreciated and acted upon the axiom that “battles are won by artillery,” in the Corsican’s words. At long last, the farsighted wisdom of Washington’s tactical sense and keen insight in regard to artillery’s decisiveness began to be fulfilled in its most tangible form when his first cannon, Captain Forrest’s guns, neared the most advantageous position, as designated by Washington, on the commanding terrain that overlooked Trenton. To fulfill his ambitious tactical vision of a lengthy, neat row of Knox’s finest artillery pieces set up along the high ground to dominate the town and hence the fast-forming Rall brigade, Washington ordered the Pennsylvania guns to be hurried into their key position.
Clearly, the Virginian wanted to make sure that Forrest’s cannon were placed at exactly the right spot along the heights. Washington continued to benefit from his prior decisions of not only adding far more guns to his strike force than usual, but also from the novel process of integrating artillery with infantry to enhance the combat capabilities of both arms. As early envisioned by Washington, Knox’s artillery pieces were about to be employed as highly effective assault weapons to maximize hard-hitting capabilities by transforming a single Continental infantry brigade into a much more formidable fighting machine. This was a wise tactical decision because the “true secret” of Napoleon’s remarkable battlefield successes across Europe called for a close, mutually supportive, and precise coordination of infantry and artillery into “one continuous process of attack,” with each arm bolstering the capabilities of the other to maximize the hard-hitting power of a combined one-two offensive punch of artillery and infantry to destroy the enemy’s will to resist as soon as possible.
Under dark, cloud-covered skies that blocked the frigid sun of late December, a mounted Washington shouted to Captain Forrest, whose Pennsylvania battery had advanced in the van of Greene’s column proper, to set up his first two cannon along the heights. As Napoleon himself would accomplish in so many key battlefield situations across Europe, Washington carefully directed the Pennsylvania gun’s placement along the open high ground, which was just south of a brown-hued belt of leafless trees that ran along the road’s north side, about 250 yards north of Trenton’s center and perpendicular to the two parallel main streets, King and Queen. As both exhausted artillery horses and cannoneers, led by Forrest’s top lieutenants, Hercules Courtney, Francis Procter, and Patrick Duffy, struggled through the snow, while the frozen breath of both exhausted animals and gunners hung momentarily in the cold air, the first two cannon of Greene’s column gained their key positions—as assigned by Washington—on the most strategic high ground position at Trenton.
In record time, Forrest’s two Pennsylvania cannon were then dragged into position and wheeled into line by enthusiastic young cannoneers. Knowing the importance of their key role and with adrenaline rushing through reinvigorated systems to negate some lingering effects of weariness, sleeplessness, and even the bone-numbing cold, Forrest’s gunners worked faster than usual. The two guns were quickly loaded by expert artillerymen, who then took their assigned firing positions. With the seconds passing like ages to these cannoneers, including smooth-faced teenagers, in awaiting the order to fire, anxious Philadelphia gunners felt especially eager to punish the Hessians on the lower ground below them to eliminate potential threats to their own hometown, the new republic’s capital, located farther down the Delaware. Meanwhile, at Washington’s incessant urging, Captain Forrest’s other two cannon were coming up quickly through the now-furrowed snow to add more muscle to the elevated position at King Street’s head.
At this critical moment, Washington wanted all four guns—the two six-pounders and the two five and a half-inch howitzers—of Forrest’s Second Company, Pennsylvania State Artillery, which was the largest and best trained battery in Knox’s Regiment of Continental Artillery, to be positioned along the commanding ground at King Street’s head. Some of Washington’s heaviest guns, the two long-barreled six-pounders that fired solid iron cannonballs, were large enough to adequately safeguard his east-west-stretching formation of Continental troops in static defensive positions, while Forrest’s two short- and wide-barreled howitzers were more effective in firing explosive shell at high angles. And both the six-pounders and five and a half-inch howitzers were especially deadly at close range when firing grapeshot or canister.
Forrest’s long six-pounders and his most prized guns—the versatile howitzers—once placed at this most advantageous commanding point (ironically the exact location where a disinterested Rall had been advised by Donop’s engineer to erect the artillery redoubt) allowed Washington’s most lethal firepower to thoroughly dominate the open lower ground of Trenton below while yet situated comfortably beyond range of Hessian’s smoothbore muskets and artillery in the river valley below. In a masterful orchestration, Washington had carefully calculated in getting his largest caliber and best serviced guns—the iron six-pounders of Knox’s artillery arm consis
ting mostly of small three-pounders—aligned on the most dominant terrain on the Trenton battlefield as soon as possible. Fulfilling his lofty ambition on his finest hour, the Virginian knew that the battle’s course depended upon just such a timely, judicious placement of artillery.
Destined for a well-deserved lieutenant colonel’s rank largely because of what he accomplished during this winter campaign, Captain Forrest was an officer of considerable talent and ability. Forrest, a future Pennsylvania Congressman, was determined to make a name for himself and his Pennsylvania artillery unit on his lofty perch overlooking the commercial town draped in a whitish pall. Most importantly, Forrest’s largest guns now commanded not only Trenton but also the primary avenue, King Street, of approach into the town, if the Hessian brigade counterattacked north up the gently slope ground upon which this main thoroughfare ran in a straight line.
In overall tactical terms, Washington’s cannon poised across the high ground also supported the advance of Mercer’s brigade, west of King Street, Stirling’s brigade mostly west of King Street, and Fermoy’s brigade, consisting of a Pennsylvania regiment and the German regiment, east of these twin avenues, King and Queen Streets. To protect Knox’s cannon and this vital road intersection on the high ground if Rall organized his forces and mounted a counterattack up King Street, both Stirling and Stephen’s infantry brigades were now situated in a foremost position across commanding terrain to provide fire support.16