George Washington's Surprise Attack

by Phillip Thomas Tucker

  Under the bare apple trees which offered scant protection from neither the harsh elements nor projectiles, Rall at least gained not only a respite but also some much-needed room for tactical maneuver, however. Now the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments with their feisty fighting spirit yet intact despite the losses and setbacks suffered on this nightmarish morning, were finally united as one and in a good position for a renewal of an offensive thrust. Therefore, thanks to this timely unity of force in a more advantageous position east of town, Rall now planned to march north in an attempt to gain the strategic Princeton-Trenton Road to not only escape Washington’s trap, but also to hit the American’s left flank (Stirling’s left just beyond—or northeast—the head of Queen Street) to the right of Fermoy’s Continental brigade.

  Because of the density of the falling snow, Rall was unable to see the position of Fermoy’s brigade. Dressed in his resplendent uniform and with his men poised to strike in a new direction, a mounted Rall shouted orders for his two veteran regiments to take the offensive, “Forward! Advance! Advance!” With perfect discipline and executing Rall’s orders with alacrity, the neat ranks of two regiments, the von Lossberg Regiment on the north and the Rall Regiment on the south, marched north toward the Trenton-Princeton Road in the vicinity of the Fox Chase Tavern, operated by Mrs. Joseph Bond, northeast of Queen Street’s head. With the Rall Regiment on the left and the von Lossbergers on the right, the lengthy line advanced toward the high ground just northeast of town. Courageous color-bearers led the way for the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments, while Washington’s artillery continued to roar unceasingly, thanks to Knox’s farsighted decision to bring a sufficient supply of black powder (that had caused Glover’s men greater exertions) across the river for a lengthy battle of attrition, even during blizzard-like conditions. A long row of bayonets, dull and not reflecting light from the hidden, weak sun shrouded by the thick cloud cover, were held by veteran grenadiers and fusiliers now emboldened with the determination to drive the Americans off the high ground to reverse the day’s fortunes. Rall’s bluecoat grenadiers felt an electric surge of new confidence, especially after having only recently regained their precious battle flags, now tattered by bullets and buckshot from hunters and marksmen from across America.

  Thanks to Washington’s eternal vigilance on a morning on which he was never more perceptive and tactically astute, he was already fully prepared for Rall’s next countermove during this intricate chess game now being played out at Trenton for such high stakes. As if having already anticipated Rall’s ambitious design to make a desperate attempt to steal the tactical advantage by striking Washington’s vulnerable left flank and gain the Princeton-Trenton Road, Fermoy’s brigade already had been placed by the forward-thinking commander-in-chief in an ideal place, on the far left wing, to close the door to the north by blocking the Princeton-Trenton Road. This new threat from the resurgent Hessians was serious because the apple orchard had provided an ideal staging area for Rall’s push north across Petty’s Run, which was much narrower at this point upstream and more easily fordable compared to where it crossed King Street, around 250-300 yards to the west after curving southwestward toward the Delaware, to gain the Princeton-Trenton Road.

  In the front ranks unlike so many other eighteenth-century commanders in order to closely monitor the tactical situation, Washington early ascertained exactly what was now developing below him in the apple orchard to the southeast: Rall was now advancing in a new direction that presented an immediate threat to Washington’s exposed left flank, or the right of Fermoy’s brigade. Clearly, this new threat would steadily escalate unless decisive and quick action was taken to immediately checkmate Rall’s next maneuver. After literally reading Rall’s opportunistic mind and predicting his tactical intentions, Washington barked out new orders to parry the escalating threat just in time. Meanwhile, Rall’s two regiments had just begun to push north across Petty’s Run and up the snow-covered slope toward the strategic Princeton-Trenton Road and Stirling’s left flank and Fermoy’s right flank. Hundreds of finely disciplined Hessians surged forward in lengthy lines with businesslike efficiency. Like an experienced battlefield commander with well-honed instincts and an astute tactical sense, Rall was not wasting any time to exploit the existing tactical advantage.

  To parry the most serious threat yet posed to his weak left flank (Stirling’s left) because he had concentrated so much infantry strength and artillery firepower in the King and Queen Street sectors and for the earlier offensive thrusts down both avenues, Washington dispatched a mounted courier with a new set of orders to the inexperienced brigade commander Fermoy. Washington directed for Fermoy and his experienced Pennsylvania brigade “to throw themselves before” Rall’s latest bid to regain the initiative and even possibly yet reap the most improbable of successes before it was too late. To counter this new threat, Fermoy’s two Pennsylvania regiments faced toward the low ground of Petty’s Run and the apple orchard from where Rall’s two advancing regiments had so suddenly emerged with disciplined step.

  After extending ranks to cover more ground to the west, Hand and Hausseggers’ regiments, consisting mostly of Pennsylvanians, then pushed south on the double to counter Rall’s determined attempt to gain Washington’s exposed left flank. Fermoy’s brigade, in double rows that blocked the vital road leading northeast toward Princeton, pushed rapidly toward the advancing Rall’s grenadiers and the von Lossberg fusiliers. Washington’s German Regiment’s disciplined Pennsylvania and Maryland Continentals surged toward the dense formation of Hessians, who now pushed up the snow-covered, barren slope in a lengthy line. But Fermoy’s onrushing troops possessed the advantages of higher ground, a clear field of fire, and more operable flintlocks and rifles than the wet smoothbore muskets and powder of Rall’s troops: a mismatch in this showdown northeast of Trenton.

  In one of the battle’s classic ironies, nearly four hundred soldiers of Washington’s largest regiment—the officially designated German Regiment—pushed down the slope beside Colonel Hand Continental riflemen of the elite First Pennsylvania. Colonel Haussegger’s German and German American Continentals, whose numbers exceeded those of Hand’s rifle regiment by more than one hundred men, were now playing the leading role in countering Rall’s desperate bid to reach the Princeton-Trenton Road and turn Washington’s left flank just northeast of the head of Queen Street. Most of all, from his high ground perch near Queen Street’s head, Washington was awed by the impressive sight of the alacrity in which Hand and Haussegger’s soldiers hurled themselves before the advancing Hessian ranks with an unsurpassed “Spirit and Rapidity” that he never forgot, especially with so much at stake.

  Indeed, Washington’s maneuver to stem this latest crisis was tactically well-conceived and most timely, having been calculated to effectively checkmate Rall’s latest gamble to turn the tide. As Washington described the pressing tactical situation: “they attempted to file off by a road on their right leading to Princeton, but perceiving their Intention, I threw a Body of Troops [638 men of two regiments] in their Way. . . .” In masterful fashion, Washington had correctly ascertained not only the extent of the most serious threat to his left flank situated on elevated terrain, but also that Rall was attempting to gain an advantageous high ground position by which to launch a breakout to gain the Princeton-Trenton Road.54

  Meanwhile, Colonel Haussegger, who had served capably beside Washington in the Virginia Regiment during the French and Indian War, led hundreds of his German Continentals, both American- and Germany-born from Pennsylvania and Maryland, onward down the open ground that descended toward Petty’s Run and the bare trees of the apple orchard just south of the little watercourse. If this experienced German colonel, born in the old country, from Pennsylvania now had any qualms about vanquishing his fellow Germans, he revealed no outward indications or overt signs to his men.

  Meanwhile, the German Regiment’s young musicians, including fifers Adam Bush and drummers Frederick Mulz and Paul Schley, who was f
ated to die in this war, of Pennsylvania, and Marylanders John Heffner and George Hyatt, who had served in the Baltimore Town Militia Battalion, provided lively martial music to encourage hundreds of patriotic Germans toward their fellow countrymen, who had no idea that they were about to face fellow Germans in battle.55

  Lieutenant Colonel George Stricker, second in command of the German Regiment, led his troops southward, surging though the fallow fields, covered in white, just north of Petty’s Run. All the while, the lieutenant colonel’s son, seventeen-year-old Cadet John Stricker, who had been born on the western frontier community of Frederick, Maryland, in February 1759, marched by his side. This devoted father-son team had first fought together as members of Colonel William Smallwood’s First Maryland Battalion, in which the father had served as a captain since March 1776 before his promotion to the German Regiment’s lieutenant colonel in mid-July 1776. Mature beyond his years, the western Maryland teenager garnered a well-deserved sergeant’s rank in January 1777, thanks in part to heroism demonstrated at Trenton. John Stricker, Jr., eventually earned a general’s rank in commanding Maryland militia during the next war with Great Britain, or the Second War for American Independence. During the War of 1812, Stricker played a leading role in helping to stop the British invasion on Maryland soil just outside Baltimore, after the British’s invasion by water had been thwarted at the masonry bastion known as Fort McHenry.56

  Pushing south down sloping ground and through the open fields and meadows toward icy Petty’s Run, Washington’s onrushing German Regiment faced no natural obstacles to impede its steamrolling advance that continued to gain momentum with each passing minute, despite the thick layer of snow covering the slope. With regimental banners flying, these Pennsylvania and Maryland Continentals surged relentlessly toward the apple orchard and straight at the advancing von Lossberg and Rall Regiments while also continuing to extend Washington’s left flank by veering slightly southeastward to better protect the road. Ensuring that the Teutonic soldiers of Haussegger’s German Regiment maintained their line’s integrity, tried officers, like Colonel Rall’s own cousin, made sure that their men maintained firm discipline. Captain George Keeports, who had served in Captain Samuel Smith’s Baltimore Company of Independent Maryland Militia, which then became an elite core unit of Smallwood’s Maryland Battalion that had fought so splendidly at Long Island during the August showdown between Washington and Howe, was yet another excellent officer who now led his troops downhill before the German Regiment’s surging ranks in the aggressive bid to parry Rall’s counterstroke.57

  Washington’s adroit, timely tactical maneuver in a last-minute attempt to counter Rall’s latest offensive threat paid off handsomely. Watching from the high ground near the head of Queen Street, Washington never forgot the exhilarating sight of Fermoy’s onrushing Pennsylvania and Maryland troops fulfilling his urgent order “to throw themselves before them [which] immediately checked them” with their own timely counter stroke. Most of all, Washington’s extreme left flank (Stirling’s left) was saved by his timely reliance upon what was always the best defense: the tactical offensive.58

  Throughout this climactic Trenton showdown that was becoming ever more desperate, Washington yet remained at his tactical best, always staying one tactical step ahead of Colonel Rall. Rall continued to be out-thought, outgunned, and out-fought by Washington during this increasingly bitter struggle for Trenton’s possession. But on this snowy morning on which America’s destiny yet hung in the balance, Rall was far from finished from unleashing his increasingly desperate attempts to outwit and outfight the commander, who he had long disparaged as nothing more than a backward Virginia farmer of little ability or intelligence. Rall was learning a bitter lesson in regard to the folly of underestimating an opponent, especially one who was desperate and defending home soil.

  Chapter VIII

  Rall Lashes Back With Renewed Fury

  From the open ground just above the apple orchard, whose northern edge lay along the south bank of Petty’s Run, Rall now realized that his ambitious plan of pushing north to catch Washington by surprise by gaining the high terrain, turning the American’s left flank, and reaching the vital Princeton-Trenton Road was no longer a possibility upon seeing the dense double lines of Fermoy brigade surging south across the snow-covered slopes that descended all the way to the orchard. Likewise, Stephen’s brigade of three Virginia regiments, now positioned on the left of Stirling’s brigade, had shifted farther east to also bolster Washington’s left by this time to face Rall’s last offensive effort to fire into or strike the Hessians’ left flank if they successfully broke through, advancing south just to the right-rear of Fermoy’s brigade.

  Thanks to Washington’s quick reading of the opposing commander’s mind to decipher his ambitious tactical design and his equally swift countermove to thwart this resilient opponent, Rall was now thoroughly checkmated on the north. The timely, almost simultaneous combination of Hand and Haussegger’s precision maneuvering and swift advance across the snowy landscape to so quickly parry Rall’s latest threat on the north and Sullivan’s tactical successes, especially Glover in capturing the Assunpink bridge, to the south in the lower town continued to swiftly seal the Rall brigade’s fate.

  As if these significant tactical setbacks were not sufficient to additionally sink the Rall brigade’s fortunes, a breathless Hessian officer, gasping for air, suddenly brought more bad news to Rall: the two captured three-pounders of Rall’s own regiment were now in action against their former owners to deliver insult as well as injury. Therefore, with tactical alternatives diminishing until seemingly no realistic options remained, Rall was completely frustrated by the most vexing tactical dilemma and no-win situation that he had ever faced after he returned with his troops to the apple orchard. Rall’s tactical quandary seemingly could not be overcome, despite all the Hessian courage, discipline, training, sacrifice, and shiny bayonets. Quite simply, Rall was fundamentally without a tactical solution by this time after having been repeatedly checkmated on every front. Then, all of a sudden, a never-say-die junior officer snapped Rall out of his seemingly multiple setback-induced daze by offering the most radical of all tactical decisions: to now turn his two regiments entirely around, march out of the apple orchard, and mount a headlong attack straight west and back into the heart of Trenton!

  The most audacious of tactical ideas that appealed to his aggressive instincts well-honed by decades of wartime experience, Rall warmly embraced the audacious concept this last remaining—and almost unthinkable—tactical option now left open to him: relying on the bayonet in one last gamble to attempt to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat. As Rall now realized, launching a frontal assault back into Trenton’s center made good sense for a variety of reasons. First, simply engaging Fermoy’s brigade, which had deployed in a lengthy line for action north of the apple orchard, in an indecisive slugfest of exchanging volleys across the open ground would accomplish nothing but inflicting additional casualties that Rall’s already two decimated regiments could ill afford.

  In addition to Rall’s reasoning based upon years of experience, after crossing the Delaware, marching at night, and fighting all morning, the Americans had to be so physically exhausted as now to be vulnerable. And even more weapons of Washington’s troops were inoperable from wetness and fouled by this time, and American ammunition was beginning to run low, as revealed by a gradual diminishing rate of fire that was discernable to Rall’s trained ear. And, best of all, reinforcements were nearby. Hurled by the onrush of Sullivan’s attackers out of the lower town, the Knyphausen Regiment now retired slightly northeast of Queen Street and the Quaker Meeting House. With Dechow’s fusiliers getting closer to his position, Rall ordered the Knyphausen Regiment farther north to unite with his other two regiments in preparation for the maximum offensive effort calculated to yet win the day. Even now and despite its mauling in the lower town, the Knyphausen Regiment was in overall better shape than its two sister regiments. For t
he first time all day and at long last, Rall was seemingly about to have his entire brigade united and together to strike back with a concentrated offensive blow.

  Ironically, Sullivan’s hard-hitting team of top lieutenants, Stark, Sargent, Glover, and St. Clair had finally driven all of the Knyphausen Regiment out of the lower town to make the vital linkage—more by accident than deliberate tactical design—possible with Rall’s other two regiments to the north at exactly the right time. Most of all, the resilient Rall brigade was yet proving that it possessed plenty of fight remaining. At long last, fortune seemed now to be smiling and swinging in Rall’s favor.

  As an ironic fate would have it, Washington’s checkmate of Rall’s determined effort to gain the Princeton-Trenton on the north combined with Sullivan’s success to the south created the possibility for the uniting of all of Rall’s three regiments and the launching of his most powerful Hessian counterattack this morning. And because Washington’s forces were divided into two divisions and widely extended in advancing over a lengthy front to nearly encircle Trenton, Rall actually enjoyed a numerical advantage whenever and wherever he confronted Washington’s troops at a single point. He, therefore, would now possess an even greater numerical advantage with the impending arrival of the Knyphausen Regiment for one final, united offensive effort to reverse the day’s fortunes by turning around and pushing the Americans out of Trenton once and for all.