Crusade in Europe

by Dwight D. Eisenhower

  We had no intention of using the Strategic Air Forces as a mere adjunct to the Tactical Air Command. On the contrary, we were most anxious to continue the destruction of German industry with emphasis upon oil. General Spaatz convinced me that, as Germany became progressively embarrassed by her diminishing oil reserves, the effect upon the land battle would be most profound and the eventual winning of the war would be correspondingly hastened.

  My representations were accepted in early April and from that time until the critical phases of the campaign in France and Belgium were past Doolittle and Harris reported directly to me.5 Strictly speaking, however, Leigh-Mallory’s organization comprised only those air forces that were definitely allocated as a permanently integral part of the expeditionary forces. These were the British air forces supporting the Twenty-first Army Group, the Ninth Air Force supporting the U. S. Twelfth Army Group, and, later on, the American air forces that operated in support of the Sixth Army Group (French and American) in the south. His command included also large air transport, reconnaissance, and other special units.6

  For control of ground forces no special appointment as “Ground Commander in Chief” was contemplated. Since our amphibious attack was on a relatively narrow front, with only two armies involved, one battle-line commander had to be constantly and immediately in charge of tactical co-ordination between the two armies in the initial stages. Montgomery was charged with this responsibility. But plans called for the early establishment of separate British and American army groups on the Continent and it was logical that, when these were in sufficient force to accomplish a decisive breakout and begin a rapid advance through western Europe, the land force in each natural channel of march should have its own commander, each reporting directly to my headquarters.7 This plan would apply also to the army group which was later to invade France from the south. It would be completely confusing—a case of too many cooks—to place any headquarters intermediate between these three principal ground commanders and my own. As a consequence each of these three ground commanders was in effect to be a ground commander in chief for his particular zone and each would be supported by a tactical air force for day-by-day operations.

  This point was thoroughly discussed and well understood by all long before the operation was undertaken. However, a number of British officers—but not including those in my own headquarters—were by tradition wedded to strict compliance with the “triumvirate” method of command, and believed that we should have a single ground commander, installed as a deputy in my headquarters.

  Our team acquired an important member with the arrival of George Patton, whose transfer from the Mediterranean I had asked. Sometimes he would spend the evening with me at my quarters, and though this usually involved the certainty of sitting up till the wee hours of the morning, conversation with him was always so stimulating that it was difficult to remember that the work day began before dawn when operating under double daylight saving time.

  I made a particular point of directing George to avoid press conferences and public statements.8 He had a genius for explosive statements that rarely failed to startle his hearers. He had so long practiced the habit of attempting with fantastic pronouncements to astound his friends and associates that it had become second nature with him, regardless of circumstances. A speech he made to an American division shortly after his arrival in the United Kingdom caused more than a ripple of astonishment and press comment, and I well knew that it would be far easier to keep him for a significant role in the war if he could shut off his public utterances. He promised faithfully to do so.

  Later in the spring, however, another storm broke around his head. Before a British gathering he expressed indiscreet and inappropriate opinions about the need for Great Britain and America to combine to run the world after the victory should be won.9

  Because the memory of the Sicilian slapping incident was still fresh in the public mind the statement, widely publicized, attracted far more attention than it would otherwise have done. His public critics were confirmed in their conviction that he was totally unsuited to command an army. For the first time I began seriously to doubt my ability to hang onto my old friend, in whose fighting capacity I had implicit faith and confidence. However, my concern was not so much for his particular statements, which were the object of criticism at home, as it was for his broken promise with the resultant implication that he would never improve in this regard.

  Investigation quickly revealed two points which influenced my decision. The first of these was that in advance of the meeting Patton had refused to make any speech and had merely, under the insistence of his hosts, risen to his feet to say a word or two in support of the purpose of the particular gathering. The second point was that he had been assured that the meeting was a private one, with no reporters present, and that no information concerning its details would be given to anyone.

  In the meantime the incident had become one for an exchange of cablegrams with the War Department, but as usual the Secretary and the Chief of Staff left final decision to me, to be based completely upon my judgment as to the needs of battle.10

  During my investigation George came to see me and in his typically generous and emotional fashion offered to resign his commission so as to relieve me of any embarrassment. When I finally announced to him my determination to drop the whole matter and to retain him as the prospective commander of the Third Army, he was stirred to the point of tears. At such moments General Patton revealed a side of his make-up that was difficult for anyone except his intimate friends to understand. His remorse was very great, not only for the trouble he had caused me but, he said, for the fact that he had vehemently criticized me to his associates when he thought I might relieve him. His emotional range was very great and he lived at either one end or the other of it. I laughingly told him, “You owe us some victories; pay off and the world will deem me a wise man.”

  It was important that a long-term strategic concept of the operation—of which the amphibious assault would be merely the opening phase—should develop early. The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was very simple, merely instructing us to land on the coast of France and thereafter to destroy the German ground forces. Its significant paragraph read, “You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces.” This purpose of destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle; geographical points were considered only in relation to their importance to the enemy in the conduct of his operations or to us as centers of supply and communications in proceeding to the destruction of enemy armies and air forces.11

  The heart of western Germany was the Ruhr, the principal center of that nation’s wartime munitions industry. The second most important industrial area in western Germany was the Saar Basin. Within those two areas lay much of Germany’s warmaking power.

  Of the natural avenues for crossing the Rhine with large forces, one lay north of the Ruhr. Another good route passed through the Frankfurt area, while still farther southward, in the Strasbourg region, crossings were practicable. Of these feasible avenues the northern one was, from our viewpoint, the most important. One reason was that north of the Ruhr the terrain near the Rhine was of a more favorable nature for offensive action. Another was that in this region a relatively short advance from the Rhine would cut off the Ruhr and its war industries from the rest of Germany. A third consideration favoring the northern channel of operations was the perfect location, from a logistic viewpoint, of Antwerp, the finest port in northwest Europe. Seizure and use of that port would vastly shorten our lines of communication, and it was clear that when we once arrived on the borders of Germany logistic problems were going to be critical.

  However, our hope of destroying Germany’s final powers of resistance could not be attained merely by devoting all our resources to organizing a single thrust along a narrow channel following the northern coast. The problem rem
ained that of destroying the German armed forces in the field and it was certain those forces would be encountered head on in whatever region the enemy felt his safety to be most greatly threatened. To employ offensively only a fraction of our forces anywhere on the front would have meant merely a head-on collision between our spearheads and all the defensive forces the enemy could muster. We wanted to bring all our strength against him, all of it mobile and all of it contributing directly to the complete annihilation of his field forces.

  To avoid stalemate and to attain the position of power and mobility required to destroy the German forces, we planned, following upon any breakout, to push forward on a broad front, with priority on the left.12 Thus we would gain, at the earliest possible date, use of the enormously important ports of Belgium. This advance would also overrun the areas in which we knew some mysterious “secret weapons” were being installed, and as the advance continued we would directly threaten the Ruhr. It was additionally planned, from the start, to advance in the direction of the Saar, so far as this would be possible after assuring the capture of the Belgian ports and the arrival of the left at a location to threaten the Ruhr.13 The enemy would be sensitive about the safety of the Saar Basin, while our own forces, pushing in that direction, would soon connect with the invasion planned to come up from the south through the Rhone Valley.14 This linking up of our whole front was mandatory and would have several great and early advantages. It would liberate France. It would open up for us a great additional line of communication to insure the rapid arrival of troops from America and the sufficiency of their supply. Finally, it would cut off whatever German troops might remain behind the point of junction and so eliminate them from the war. This would allow us to use all our troops in facing and fighting the enemy and would prevent the costliness of establishing long defensive flanks along which our troops could have nothing but negative, static missions.

  If all these movements should prove successful, we next had to look forward to the final destruction of the enemy, who would then, presumably, be defending the Siegfried Line and the Rhine River.

  In May 1944 we calculated that with the ports of entry upon which we were counting we would probably have sixty-eight strong divisions available to us, not including divisions from the Mediterranean, when the time came to make our decisive thrusts across the Rhine. Allotting thirty-five of these to the advance on the axis, Amiens–Maubeuge–Liége–Ruhr, which, according to administrative estimates, was the maximum number that could be sustained along that channel of invasion, would leave us some thirty-three plus those introduced through the south of France for other operations along the long line from Wesel on the Rhine all the way south to Switzerland.15 Consequently, unless we could eliminate the Siegfried, we would be able to do little more than to defend along the front south of the Ruhr. With all the advantages the enemy would thus enjoy, he could concentrate almost at will for strong counterattack.

  However, this prospect would be completely changed provided we could gain the line of the Rhine substantially throughout its entire length. Once this was done we would enjoy a comparative degree of safety throughout the theater that would permit the assignment of offensive roles to practically our entire force instead of only to the thirty-five divisions that could be sustained along the one route north of the Ruhr.

  There were other considerations dictating the wisdom of gaining the whole length of the Rhine before launching a final assault on interior Germany. Our objective was the destruction of the German armed forces. If we could overwhelmingly defeat the enemy west of the river it was certain that the means available to him for later defense of the Rhine would be meager indeed; Soviet forces had already entered Poland and much of the German strength would be tied down to meet future Russian offensives on the eastern front. Finally, if we could not destroy the German armies west of the Rhine obstacle, where our own supply lines would be as short as possible, how could we expect to do it east of the Rhine, where this advantage would not be ours? Generals Bradley and Patton, along with my entire staff, always concurred in these planning views for advances both through the Metz gap and north of the Ardennes.

  Proceeding to the next step from this one, we reasoned that the Ruhr, which we expected to be defended by the strongest forces the enemy could provide, would be best reduced by a double envelopment. To achieve it we planned to make the northern attack as strong as the lines of communication would sustain, and the Frankfurt attack as strong as remaining resources would permit. We believed further that once these two attacks had joined in the vicinity of Kassel, east of the Ruhr, there would be no hope, in the military sense, remaining to Germany. In any event we believed that, once established in the Kassel region, we could easily thrust out offensively on our flanks. This would mean the end of the war in Europe.

  All these successive moves with possible alternatives were the subjects of long discussions but the general plan approved as the outline of the operation we intended to conduct was:

  Land on the Normandy coast.

  Build up the resources needed for a decisive battle in the Normandy–Brittany region and break out of the enemy’s encircling positions. (Land operations in the first two phases were to be under the tactical direction of Montgomery.)

  Pursue on a broad front with two army groups, emphasizing the left to gain necessary ports and reach the boundaries of Germany and threaten the Ruhr. On our right we would link up with the forces that were to invade France from the south.

  Build up our new base along the western border of Germany, by securing ports in Belgium and in Brittany as well as in the Mediterranean.

  While building up our forces for the final battles, keep up an unrelenting offensive to the extent of our means, both to wear down the enemy and to gain advantages for the final fighting.

  Complete the destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine, in the meantime constantly seeking bridgeheads across the river.

  Launch the final attack as a double envelopment of the. Ruhr, again emphasizing the left, and follow this up by an immediate thrust through Germany, with the specific direction to be determined at the time.

  Clean out the remainder of Germany.

  This general plan, carefully outlined at staff meetings before D-day, was never abandoned, even momentarily, throughout the campaign.16

  The timing of the operation was a difficult matter to decide. At Teheran the President and the Prime Minister had promised Generalissimo Stalin that the attack would start in May but we were given to understand that any date selected in that period of the year would fulfill the commitments made by our two political leaders.17

  In order to obtain the maximum length of good campaigning weather, the earlier the attack could be launched the better. Another factor in favor of an early attack was the continuing and frantic efforts of the German to strengthen his coastal defenses. Because of weather conditions in the Channel, May was the earliest date that a landing attempt could be successfully undertaken and the first favorable combination of tides and sunrise occurred early in the month. Thus early May was the original and tentatively selected target date.

  Alarming Intelligence reports concerning the progress of the Germans in developing new long-range weapons of great destructive capacity also indicated the advisability of attacking early.

  From time to time during the spring months staff officers from Washington arrived at my headquarters to give me the latest calculations concerning German progress in the development of new weapons, including as possibilities bacteriological and atomic weapons. These reports were highly secret and were invariably delivered to me by word of mouth. I was told that American scientists were making progress in these two important types and that as a result of their own experience they were able to make shrewd guesses concerning some of the details of similar German activity. All of this information was supplemented by the periodic reports of Intelligence agencies in London. In addition, aerial photographs were scrutinized with the greatest care in order to discover
new installations that would apparently be useful only in some new kind of warfare.

  The finest scientific brains in both Britain and America were called upon to help us in evaluation and in making estimates of probabilities. Our only effective counteraction, during the preparatory months of 1944, was by bombing. We sent intermittent raids against every spot in Europe where the scientists believed that the Germans were attempting either to manufacture new types of weapons or where they were building launching facilities along the coast.18

  During this long period the calculations of the Intelligence agencies were necessarily based upon very meager information and as a consequence they shifted from time to time in their estimates of German progress. Nevertheless, before we launched the invasion, Intelligence experts were able to give us remarkably accurate estimates of the existence, characteristics, and capabilities of the new German weapons.

  Two considerations, one of them decisive in character, combined to postpone the target date from May to June. The first and important one was our insistence that the attack be on a larger scale than that originally planned by the staff assembled in London under Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan. He was an extraordinarily fine officer and had, long before my arrival, won the high admiration and respect of General Marshall. I soon came to place an equal value upon his qualifications. He had in the months preceding my arrival accomplished a mass of detailed planning, accumulation of data, and gathering of supply that made D-day possible. My ideas were supported by General Morgan personally but he had been compelled to develop his plan on the basis of a fixed number of ships, landing craft, and other resources. Consequently he had no recourse except to work out an attack along a three-division front, whereas I insisted upon five and informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that we had to have the additional landing craft and other gear essential to the larger operation, even if this meant delaying the assault by a month. To this the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed.19