Chapter 19
CROSSING
THE RHINE
ALL DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE WE continued to plan for the final offensive blows which, once started, we intended to maintain incessantly until final defeat of Germany. Operations were planned in three general phases, beginning with a series of attacks along the front to destroy the German armies west of the Rhine. The next phase would comprise the crossing of that river and establishment of major bridgeheads. Thereafter we would initiate the final advances that we were sure would carry us into the heart of Germany and destroy her remaining power to resist.1
Somewhere during this final advance we would meet portions of the Red Army coming from the east and it now became important to arrange closer co-ordination with the activities of the Red Army. During earlier campaigns we had been kept informed of the general intentions of the Soviet forces by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This provided sufficient co-ordination between the two forces so long as the two zones of operations were widely separated. Now, however, the time had come to exchange information of plans as to objectives and timing.
In early January 1945, with the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I sent Air Chief Marshal Tedder to Moscow to make necessary arrangements for this co-ordination. He was accompanied by Major General Harold R. Bull and Brigadier General T. J. Betts, two able American officers from the SHAEF staff. Air Chief Marshal Tedder was authorized to give the Russian military authorities full information concerning our plans for the late winter and spring, and was to obtain similar information concerning Russian projects.2
We already knew that the Russians were contemplating an early westward attack from their positions around Warsaw, on the Vistula. We understood that the Russians had effected concentrations for an offensive by the first of the year, but because of conditions of terrain and, more particularly, because of thick blankets of fog and cloud that interfered with air operations, they were holding up the attack until conditions should be more favorable. We learned through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, that even if these conditions failed to show improvement the Russian attack would be launched no later than January 15. It began on January 12 and made remarkable progress.
Air Chief Marshal Tedder and his associates arrived in Moscow just after this attack began. The Generalissimo and the Russian military authorities received them with the utmost cordiality and there was a full and accurate exchange of information concerning future plans. The Generalissimo informed our mission that even if the attacks then in progress should fail to reach their designated objectives the Russians would keep up a series of continuous operations that would, at the very least, prevent the German from reinforcing the western front by withdrawing forces from the Russian zone.3
As a further result of this initial effort the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized me to communicate directly with Moscow on matters that were exclusively military in character. Later in the campaign my interpretation of this authorization was sharply challenged by Mr. Churchill, the difficulty arising out of the age-old truth that politics and military activities are never completely separable.4
In modern war the need for co-ordination between two friendly forces that are attacking toward a common center is far more acute than it was in the days when fighting was confined to the ground, along a narrow band of territory defined by the range of small arms and field guns. Today the fighter bombers supporting an attacking army constantly range over the enemy lines, sometimes hundreds of miles in his rear. Their purpose is to find and destroy hostile headquarters, dumps, depots, and bridges and to attack reserve formations. Long before the two friendly armies themselves can make contact there arises a delicate problem in co-ordination to prevent unfortunate accidents and misunderstandings between allied but separated forces.
Recognition of friend or foe on the battlefield is never easy. In our own War Between the States, where one side was clad in blue and the other in gray, more than one sharp fight took place between units of the same army. In modern war, where all uniforms are designed with the idea of blending with the countryside, where the mass formations of the nineteenth century are never seen, and where the speeds of airplanes and vehicles afford observers only a fleeting instant for decisive action, the problem is difficult to solve. These matters would demand more and more detailed attention as our advance progressed. But in January 1945 we needed primarily to know the timing and direction of the next Russian attack and to lay the groundwork that would permit future battlefield co-operation.
By early 1945 the effects of our air offensive against the German economy were becoming catastrophic. Our great land advances had effectively disrupted the enemy’s air warning and defense system and had overrun many places—particularly the western European ports where submarine nests were located—which had formerly diverted much of our bombing effort from targets in the heart of Germany. Another advantage that our strategic bombers now enjoyed was better protection from accompanying fighters. Groups of fighters could be located at forward fields near the Rhine and, in spite of their comparatively short range, could operate over almost any target in Axis territory.
By this time also the air had achieved remarkable success in depleting the German oil reserves. For many months the enemy’s oil resources had been one of the principal objectives of strategic bombing and as the effects of this offensive accumulated there developed a continuous crisis in German transportation and in all phases of her war effort. It had a definite influence upon the ground battles. Germany found it increasingly difficult to transfer reserve troops and supplies from one front to another, while her troops in every sector were constantly embarrassed by lack of fuel for vehicles. The effect was felt also by the Luftwaffe, in which training of new pilots had to be sharply curtailed because of fuel shortage.5
During the long winter fighting our Intelligence staffs began to bring us disturbing information that the Germans were making great progress in the development of jet airplanes. Our air commanders were of the opinion that if the enemy could succeed in putting these planes into the air in considerable numbers he would quickly begin to exact insupportable losses from our bombers operating over Germany. Our own development of jet planes was progressing in the United States and in Great Britain but we were not yet far enough along to count on squadrons of them during the spring campaign.
Our only possible recourse was to attempt by our bombing effort to delay German production of this new weapon. The air forces knew that extra-long runways were required for the employment of the jet plane and whenever they found a German field with such a runway they kept it under intermittent but repeated bombardment. In addition they sought out every area where they believed these planes were under construction. This caused some diversion from our objective of depleting oil reserves but by January 1945 we had such air strength and efficiency that we could afford it without material damage to our primary mission. The effect of our bombing effort against jet production was at least partially successful because the German never succeeded in employing a sufficient number of the new planes to damage us materially.6
Information concerning all these things was gathered by our Intelligence services, which daily presented to me their calculations and conclusions. These emphasized the mounting difficulties of the German war machine and encouraged me and all my associates to believe that one more great campaign, aggressively conducted on a broad front, would give the death blow to Hitler Germany.
I found, among some of the higher military officials of Britain, a considerable and, to me, surprising opposition to my plan.
The relationship maintained by the American Chiefs of Staff with their commanders in the field differed markedly from that which existed between similar echelons in the British service. The American doctrine has always been to assign a theater commander a mission, to provide him with a definite amount of force, and then to interfere as little as possible in the execution of his plans. The theory is that the man in the field knows more of the tactic
al situation than someone removed by several thousand miles from the scene of action; and that if results obtained by the field commander become unsatisfactory the proper procedure is not to advise, admonish, and harass him, but to replace him by another commander.
On the other hand, the British Chiefs in London maintained throughout the war the closest kind of daily contact with their own commanders in the field and insisted upon being constantly informed as to details of strength, plans, and situation. This habit may have been based upon sound reasons of which I knew nothing, but it was always a shock to me, raised in the tradition of the American services, to find that the British Chiefs regularly queried their commanders in the field concerning tactical plans. For example, the British commander was required to submit to London a daily report covering every item of information that in our service would only in exceptional circumstances go higher than a local army headquarters.
My own practice throughout the war was merely to submit to Washington and London brief daily situation reports called “Cositintreps” (combined situation and intelligence reports).
When I completed my final plan in January 1945 my friend Field Marshal Brooke informally but very earnestly presented serious objections. His questions were directed against what he called the planned dispersion of our forces. He maintained that we would never have enough strength to mount more than one full-blooded attack across the Rhine. Consequently, he said, in order to assure ourselves of the strength to sustain such an attack we should, as the situation then stood, pass to the defensive on all other parts of the line.7
Dispersion is one of the greatest crimes in warfare, but as with all other generalities the proper application of the truth is far more important than mere knowledge of its existence.
In the situation facing us in January, the German enjoyed the great advantage of the Siegfried defenses in the area northward from the Saar, inclusive. As long as we allowed him to remain in those elaborate fortifications his ability was enhanced to hold great portions of his long line with relatively weak forces, while he concentrated for spoiling attacks at selected points. This meant that a large proportion of the Allied Force would be immobilized in a protective role, with only that portion on the offensive that could be maintained north of the Ruhr. In that single zone of advance we could not logistically sustain more than thirty-five divisions.8
If, however, we should first, in a series of concentrated and powerful attacks, destroy the German forces west of the Rhine, the effect would be to give us all along the great front a defensive line of equal strength to the enemy’s. We calculated that with the western bank of the Rhine in our possession we could hurl some seventy-five reinforced divisions against the German in great converging attacks. If we allowed the enemy south of the Ruhr to remain in the Siegfried, we would be limited to a single offensive by some thirty-five divisions.
A second advantage of our plan would be the depletion of the German forces later to be met at the crossings of the Rhine obstacle. Moreover, the effect of the converging attack is multiplied when it is accompanied by such air power as we had in Europe in the early months of 1945. Through its use we could prevent the enemy from switching forces back and forth at will against either of the attacking columns and we could likewise employ our entire air power at any moment to further the advance in any area desired.
I laboriously explained to Field Marshal Brooke that, far from dispersing effort, I was conducting the campaign so that when we were ready to initiate the final invasion of Germany on the other side of the Rhine we could bring such a concerted and tremendous power against him that his collapse would quickly follow. The decisive advantage in gaining the Rhine River along its length was to increase drastically the proportion of the Allied forces that could be used offensively.
I did not wholly convince him. He said, “I wish that the Twelfth Army Group were deployed north of the Ruhr and the British forces were in the center,” implying that my plans were drawn up on nationalistic considerations.
To this I retorted: “I am certainly no more anxious to put Americans into the thick of the battle and get them killed than I am to see the British take the losses. I have strengthened Montgomery’s army group by a full American army, since in no other way can I provide the strength north of the Ruhr that I deem essential for the rapid execution of my plans. I have not devised any plan on the basis of what individual or what nation gets the glory, for I must tell you in my opinion there is no glory in battle worth the blood it costs.”
Field Marshal Brooke expressed the hope that things would work out as I believed they would; but he was apparently doubtful of Allied ability to destroy the German forces between us and the Rhine River by a succession of crushing blows.
At the same time there was again suggested to me the establishment of an over-all “ground commander” to operate directly under SHAEF. I repudiated this suggestion, as I always had before. I was certain that our plans for the completion of the German defeat were the best that could be devised. Entirely aside from my feeling that the proposed arrangement would be futile and clumsy, I was determined to prevent any interference with the exact and rapid execution of those plans.9
In early January, I learned that the President, the Prime Minister, and their staffs were again to meet with Generalissimo Stalin, this time at Yalta. General Marshall proceeded separately from the rest of the American group into Europe, and I arranged to meet him secretly at Marseille. I went there on January 25 and we had a long talk about the situation as we then saw it.
In Washington he had heard rumblings of the British Staff’s dissatisfaction with our plans and had also heard the proposal that a single ground commander be set up. I explained our situation and outlined the exact steps by which we planned the defeat of Germany. He was in full agreement.10
At that time, however, there was one miscalculation in our plans, based upon faulty technical information. The engineers had made many studies of the Rhine River, based upon statistics covering a long period. They had reported to me that successful assaults could probably not be made over the Rhine until about the first of May. This opinion was so forcibly expressed that in my own mind I had accepted the necessary delay and was planning not to start our major assaults across the river until about that time. This did not, of course, affect any part of our plans that were to be executed before the time came to cross the river. Later our technical advice on this point was markedly changed and we found that it was feasible to cross the river, establish bridges, and maintain ourselves long before the first of May.
General Marshall was so impressed by the soundness of the whole plan that he suggested I send my chief of staff, General Smith, to Malta to participate in a conference that was to take place there between the President, the Prime Minister, and their respective staffs before they went on to Yalta. He remarked: “I can, of course, uphold your position merely on the principle that these decisions fall within your sphere of responsibility. But your plan is so sound that I think it better for you to send General Smith to Malta so that he may explain these matters in detail. Their logic will be convincing.”11 I was glad to agree because I well knew that with General Marshall backing me up there would be no danger of interference with our developing plans.
Field Marshal Brooke’s arguments in the matter were founded in conviction. There was no petty basis for his great concern. This was proved by the fact that only a few weeks later, when the destruction of the German armies west of the Rhine had been accomplished and he stood with me on the banks of the river to witness the crossing by the Ninth Army and the Twenty-first Army Group, he turned to me and said: “Thank God, Ike, you stuck by your plan. You were completely right and I am sorry if my fear of dispersed effort added to your burdens. The German is now licked. It is merely a question of when he chooses to quit. Thank God you stuck by your guns.”12
The operational schedule for the first phase of our strategic plan—destruction of the enemy strength west of the Rhine—contemplated three
major assaults. The first would be by the Twenty-first Army Group at the northern flank of our lines; the second, by Bradley’s group in the center; and the third, a converging attack by Bradley and Devers to eliminate the enemy garrison in the Saar Basin.
As soon as the First and Third Armies had joined forces at Houffalize on January 16, 1945, Montgomery returned to specific preparation for the first of these three attacks.13 West of the Rhine the Siegfried Line extended southward from the confluence of that river with the Maas, down to include the defenses of the Saar Basin. Immediately south of the Saar a few German detachments remained in the Alsace plain, while farther south we were plagued by the Colmar pocket.
In January, with the Germans recoiling from their disastrous adventure in the Ardennes, I turned my attention again to Colmar. The existence of this German position in a sensitive part of our lines had always irritated me and I determined that it was to be crushed without delay. The French First Army began attacks against it on the twentieth of January but these, handicapped by bad weather, made little progress. There were two French corps surrounding the pocket, but in my determination to get rid of this annoyance once and for all I gave additional strength to Devers so that he could support the French with an entire United States corps of four divisions. He assigned the XXI Corps under Major General Frank W. Milburn to the task, with the 3d, 28th, and 75th Infantry Divisions and the French 5th Armored Division. Later the 12th Armored Division and French 2d Armored Division were also used in the XXI Corps zone. With the American corps as the spearhead, the two French corps and the American attacked simultaneously. German defenses quickly disintegrated. Colmar surrendered February 3 and by the ninth of the month such Germans as survived in that region had been driven across the Rhine. In this operation the enemy suffered more than 22,000 casualties and heavy losses in equipment.14
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