In the planned campaign against German forces confronting our units the first attack was to be carried out by the Canadian Army of the Twenty-first Army Group, and the U. S. Ninth Army, temporarily attached to Montgomery. The Canadians were to attack south and southeast across the Maas River, while Simpson’s Ninth Army would cross the Roer to advance northeastward. This would bring a converging effort upon the defending forces and drive them rapidly back to the Rhine.
In this region were some of the best combat troops the enemy had remaining to him. They included his First Paratroop Army, in which men and units had been trained to a high degree of skill and hardihood. An additional difficulty on Simpson’s front was the enemy’s continued possession of the Roer dams, through which he was enabled to prevent successful assault across the Roer River. Bradley therefore ordered Hodges’ First Army to capture the dams at the earliest possible date. The attack against them was launched by the V Corps on February 4. After hard fighting the First Army captured them within six days. Even then our difficulties with the dams were not over because the Germans blocked the spillway gates in such position as to insure that overflow from the reservoirs would keep the river at flood stage for some days.15
As Montgomery began preparing for his offensive he naturally wanted the U. S. Ninth Army built up to the greatest possible strength. He recommended that Bradley be ordered to stop attacking with the First and Third Armies through the Ardennes region so as to save troops for greater concentration farther north. I declined to do this. I was certain that the continued attacks in the Ardennes would tend to keep the enemy’s forces away from the northern sector. More important than this, I was very anxious to push the American lines forward in the Ardennes region so that when the time should come to participate in major destructive attacks the troops would be in excellent position from which to start the move. I was sure that we could gain the line I wanted without interfering with the timely build-up of the Ninth Army.
Montgomery and I agreed on the proper timing for his initial attack. Originally we had wanted to make a simultaneous assault by the Canadians and Americans, both of whom could be ready to attack by February 10. However, neither Montgomery nor I felt it wise to wait until the flood waters of the Roer receded. He proposed, and I approved, that the Canadian attacks should begin as quickly as possible, even if a period of two weeks or more had to intervene before the American Army could join in the operation.16
The Canadian Army jumped off February 8. It made satisfactory initial gains but the troops quickly found themselves involved in a quagmire of flooded and muddy ground and pitted against heavy resistance. Progress was slow and costly and opposition became stiffer as the Germans began moving their forces from the Roer into the path of the Canadian advance. Montgomery was not too displeased by this transfer of German weight because of the promise it held that, once the American attack began, it would advance with great speed.17
I visited General Simpson’s Ninth Army during this period and found it keyed up and well prepared for the attack. If Simpson ever made a mistake as an army commander, it never came to my attention. After the war I learned that he had for some years suffered from a serious stomach disorder, but this I never would have suspected during hostilities. Alert, intelligent, and professionally capable, he was the type of leader that American soldiers deserve. In view of his brilliant service, it was unfortunate that shortly after the war ill-health forced his retirement before he was promoted to four-star grade, which he had so clearly earned.
Simpson’s army comprised three corps. The XVI, under Major General J. B. Anderson, was on the left. On the right was the XIX under Major General Raymond S. McLain. McLain was a National Guard officer who had entered the war as a brigadier general in command of the artillery of the 45th Division. Later he took over the 90th Division during the hard fighting just following the breakout in late July. His leadership of that division was so outstanding that when General Corlett, commanding the XIX Corps, suffered a breakdown in health, McLain was advanced to command of that corps. The center corps of Simpson’s army was the XIII under Major General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.18
In the days following upon the Canadian attack in the north the Americans could do little except watch the river and be ready to attack as soon as receding floods permitted the bridging of that obstacle. It was two weeks after General Crerar’s Canadians began the attack that this became possible. Simpson set his attack for the morning of the twenty-third.
Preceded by a violent bombardment, the Ninth Army got off as scheduled and succeeded in crossing the river. Initially the troops encountered great difficulties, particularly because of hostile artillery fire upon their floating bridges and because of destruction in the city of Jülich, caused by our aerial and artillery bombardment. The advancing units had to pass through this city, and in order to get vehicles through, it was first necessary to bring up bulldozers to shove a path through the heaps of rubble. Major General Charles H. Gerhardt’s 29th Division, veterans of the Normandy assault in the preceding June, performed splendidly as did the 30th, 102d, and 84th Divisions, also in the initial assault. These three divisions were commanded by Major Generals Leland S. Hobbs, Frank A. Keating, and Alexander R. Bolling respectively. In spite of delays, Simpson’s forces made fine progress, partially as a result of the prior transfer of German forces from this front to the Canadian battlefield. In less than a week the Ninth Army captured München-Gladbach. This was the largest German city we had captured in the war up to this time.
While going into the city with Simpson, shortly after its capture, I saw my first jet plane. It was a German fighter, flying very high. Every anti-aircraft gun in the area immediately opened intensive fire and within a few seconds fragments of exploded shells were dropping around us. For the only time in the war I put on a steel helmet. The alternative was to stop the jeep and get under it for protection. In Africa one of our finest officers had been struck by a falling shell fragment and so severely wounded that he was hospitalized for more than a year. Fortunately the hostile plane found the area uncomfortable and quickly left.
The German forces in the area were now feeling the effect of the powerful converging attack and began to retreat toward the Rhine. By March 3, Simpson’s left corps, the XVI, had swung forward, joined the Canadians, and was driving toward the river. The whole area was rapidly cleared of the enemy. In this battle, because of the proximity of the defending Germans to their bridges over the Rhine, we did not succeed in capturing the same proportions that we did in later assaults.
With the Rhine’s west bank cleared in the northern sector it became Montgomery’s task to prepare, for an early assault across the river. For that operation he would need greater strength than the Twenty-first Army Group could possibly provide. Consequently I directed the Ninth Army to remain attached to him.19 As those forces turned their attention to preparation for the crossing, events to the southward were proceeding remarkably well.
When Simpson began his assault on February 23 it was the signal for Bradley, in the center of our long line, to begin a series of attacks which were brilliantly managed and swiftly conducted. He then had two armies under his operational command, the First on the left, the Third on the right. As a result of the late January and early February fighting along the fronts of these two armies they had secured good positions from which to make a major assault. Bradley’s first move was made by Hodges, who sent forward the VII Corps, the left of his First Army, simultaneously with Simpson’s attack. The first mission of the VII Corps was to support Simpson’s right as the Ninth Army moved to the assault. Success in this move would tend to uncover the right flank of the Germans to the southward and as quickly as this happened the VII Corps was to turn to its right to attack the Germans in flank. The remainder of Hodges’ army, facing eastward, would then take up the assault. Still farther to the south Patton would then begin to attack in the effort to cut off and surround the Germans and to capture or destroy them in place.20
Everythi
ng went like clockwork. The VII Corps, on Simpson’s right, was quickly able to begin its southward attacks, and from that moment on success attended us everywhere along the front.
The VII Corps first overcame heavy opposition near the Erft Canal. It continued a spectacular advance and on March 5 was on the outskirts of Cologne. We had calculated that this city would be stubbornly defended, as Aachen had been. However, the hastily trained and astonished defending troops were by no means the equal of those we had met earlier in the campaign. By the afternoon of the seventh of March, Collins had taken over the whole of the city. Since we had estimated that his corps would be engaged there for a period of days in a heavy siege, the quick capture had the effect of providing us with additional divisions to exploit other victories to the south.21
While Collins’ VII Corps was making these great advances Hodges launched the III and V Corps southeastward toward the Rhine. The III Corps reached the river at Remagen on March 7. Here it encountered one of those bright opportunities of war which, when quickly and firmly grasped, produce incalculable effect on future operations. The assaulting Americans found the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine was still standing at Remagen.
The Germans had, of course, made elaborate advance preparations to destroy the Rhine bridges. The Ludendorff Bridge was no exception. However, so rapid was the advance of the American troops and so great was the confusion created among the defenders that indecision and doubt overtook the detachment responsible for detonation of the charges under the bridge. Apparently the defenders could not believe that the Americans had arrived in force and possibly felt that destruction of the bridge should be delayed in order to permit withdrawal of German forces which were still west of the river in strength.
The 9th Armored Division, under General Leonard, was leading the advance toward the bridge. Without hesitation a gallant detachment of Brigadier General William M. Hoge’s Combat Command B rushed the bridge and preserved it against complete destruction, although one small charge under the bridge was exploded.22
This news was reported to Bradley. It happened that a SHAEF staff officer was in Bradley’s headquarters when the news arrived, and a discussion at once took place as to the amount of force that should be pushed across the bridge. If the bridgehead force was too small it would be destroyed through a quick concentration of German strength on the east side of the river. On the other hand, Bradley realized that if he threw a large force across he might interfere with further development of my basic plan. Bradley instantly telephoned me.
I was at dinner in my Reims headquarters with the corps and division commanders of the American airborne forces when Bradley’s call came through. When he reported that we had a permanent bridge across the Rhine I could scarcely believe my ears. He and I had frequently discussed such a development as a remote possibility but never as a well-founded hope.
I fairly shouted into the telephone: “How much have you got in that vicinity that you can throw across the river?”
He said, “I have more than four divisions but I called you to make sure that pushing them over would not interfere with your plans.”
I replied, “Well, Brad, we expected to have that many divisions tied up around Cologne and now those are free. Go ahead and shove over at least five divisions instantly, and anything else that is necessary to make certain of our hold.”
His answer came over the phone with a distinct tone of glee: “That’s exactly what I wanted to do but the question had been raised here about conflict with your plans, and I wanted to check with you.”
That was one of my happy moments of the war. Broad success in war is usually foreseen by days or weeks, with the result that when it actually arrives higher commanders and staffs have discounted it and are immersed in plans for the future. This was completely unforeseen. We were across the Rhine, on a permanent bridge; the traditional defensive barrier to the heart of Germany was pierced. The final defeat of the enemy, which we had long calculated would be accomplished in the spring and summer campaigning of 1945, was suddenly now, in our minds, just around the corner.
My guests at the dinner table were infected by my enthusiasm. Among them were veterans of successful aerial jumps against the enemy and of hard fighting in every kind of situation. They were unanimous in their happy predictions of an early end to the war. I am sure that from that moment every one of them went into battle with the élan that comes from the joyous certainty of smashing victory.
By March 9 the First Army had enlarged the Remagen bridgehead area until it was more than three miles deep. It took the enemy a considerable time to recover from his initial surprise and confusion, and by the time he could bring up reinforcements against our bridgehead troops we were too strong to fear defeat. As usual the enemy attacked piecemeal with every unit as soon as it could arrive in the area but such feeble tactics were unable to combat our steady enlargement of the hold we had on his vitals.
From the day we crossed the river the enemy initiated desperate efforts to destroy the Ludendorff Bridge. Long-range artillery opened fire on it and the German Air Force concentrated every available plane for bombing attacks upon the structure. None of these was immediately successful and we continued to pour troops across the bridge, but at the same time we established floating Treadway bridges.
The Treadway bridge was one of our fine pieces of equipment, capable of sustaining heavy military loads. It was comparatively easy to transport and was quickly installed. After General Collins and his VII Corps crossed the Rhine he was of course concerned with getting his floating bridges established as quickly as possible. He called in his corps engineer, Colonel Mason J. Young, and said: “Young, I believe you can put a bridge across this river in twelve hours. What kind of a prize do you want me to give you for doing it in less time than that?” Young reflected a second and then said, “I don’t want anything but if you can promise a couple of cases of champagne to my men we shall certainly try to win them.” “All right,” said Collins, “I’ll get the champagne if you get me a bridge in less than twelve hours.”
In ten hours and eleven minutes the 330-yard bridge was completed and the first load crossed the river.23 Collins gladly paid off. I heard that even this creditable record was later broken.
The accumulated effects of the German effort against the Ludendorff Bridge finally began to weaken it seriously. After the fifth day, by which time our Treadways were fully capable of sustaining the troops on the far side, we ceased using the Ludendorff structure. American engineers, however, stubbornly and persistently continued the effort to strengthen the weakened members of the bridge so that it would be of future use. In this they failed. On March 17 the center span—the one which had been damaged by the unsuccessful German attempt to blow the bridge on March 7—fell into the river. It carried with it a number of our fine engineers, some of whom we were unable to rescue from the icy waters of the river.24
The diversion of five divisions to seize the Remagen bridgehead in early March did not modify or interfere with the development of the plan for destroying the German armies north of the Moselle. All during February the Third Army was engaged in necessary preparation for its attack toward the Rhine. Middleton’s VIII Corps advanced east beyond Prüm and Major General Manton S. Eddy’s XII Corps captured Bitburg. The XX Corps, under General Walker, eliminated resistance in the Saar–Moselle triangle by February 23, and a bridgehead was established over the Saar. The Siegfried defenses were penetrated and Trier was captured March 2. Two days later the XII Corps secured bridgeheads over the Kyll River.25
This was the signal for the main advance of the Third Army to begin. The VIII Corps attacked toward the northeastward and, breaking through all German resistance, reached Andernach on the Rhine on March 9, where it soon joined up with the First Army. The XII Corps launched a simultaneous attack northeastward along the northern bank of the Moselle and reached the Rhine March 10. Both these corps made great captures of enemy supplies and equipment and, as their spearheads joined up alon
g the Rhine, they surrounded entire combat units of the enemy.26
The stunning victories by the First and Third Armies completed the second step in the planned destruction of the German forces west of the Rhine. There now remained only the great hostile garrison in the Saar Basin. These troops were situated in a huge triangle that had its base along the Rhine, with the two sides meeting in a point seventy-five miles to the west. The northern leg of this triangle was protected by the Moselle River and the southern by some of the strongest sections of the Siegfried Line. In retrospect it is difficult to understand why the German, as he saw his armies north of the Moselle undergo complete collapse and destruction, failed to initiate a rapid withdrawal of his forces in the Saar Basin, in order to remove them from their exposed position and employ them for defense of the Rhine.
More than once in prior campaigns we had witnessed similar examples of what appeared to us sheer tactical stupidity. I personally believed that the cause was to be found in the conqueror complex: the fear that to give up a single foot of ravished territory would be to expose the rotten foundation on which was built the myth of invincibility. Some of my staff thought that in the Saar the Germans were influenced to stand where they were by their faith in the defensive strength of the Moselle and the Siegfried Line. In addition the enemy was probably ignorant of the strength of the Seventh Army lying to the south of the Saar salient.
Such reasons as these would imply a woeful stupidity on the part of the German commanders and staffs. When free to act, they had proved their capacity too often for me to believe that the failure to pull back their exposed troops was a military decision—it was more of Hitler’s intuition in action!
Crusade in Europe Page 47