War Stories II

by Oliver L. North

  Then I was supposed to blow up the ECM, which was a top-secret coding machine. I didn’t put the hand grenade in the side of it, as I was supposed to do, because I was afraid I’d set it off too soon and kill myself. One of the enlisted men had a submachine gun, and he shot the thing up for me. It was just as good a job as having the hand grenade do it, I guess.

  There was a safe right outside my room with the secret documents and all the invasion plans. They were all in weighted bags, and we each got several bags and threw them overboard.

  The last one I threw overboard didn’t sink. I’d failed to put weights inside it. The captain said, “You’d better get that bag.” So I retrieved the bag and took it with me.

  They taught us in communication school that if you didn’t destroy the electric coding machine and the wheels, you’d better go down with the ship, because you would be court-martialed and be in more trouble than if you died.

  Then I decided to go up on the bridge. It was crowded up there because everybody had gathered there.

  I went back to the signal bridge, right behind the navigating bridge. And then a big explosion hit aft, and the blast came forward and knocked us all down. The signal bag caught on fire from the shrapnel. But the ship was still steaming, although they only had one fire room and two engines running.

  But then another big explosion struck aft on the port side, and with that, everything went out. The ship just stopped, a big hole in the side from the last explosion. After that there was no power and nothing much you could do.

  The air ejection for the guns had failed and the aft gun exploded. A powder bag “cooked off” in the breech of the gun because there was no air-cooling coming through. So that gun was finished. And the forward five-inch gun had run out of ammunition.

  The captain decided to carry out the destruction drill and abandon ship. That’s when we started to get off. I knew if I got off that ship alive that I was going to live.

  A group attached themselves to scaffolding that floated off the deck. I swam out to them, maybe 400 yards away, and tried to persuade them to get off that thing, and join us where we had a floater net.

  We had some water and malted milk tablets. They had nothing. We thought that they’d be better with us, and we thought as a larger group we’d be noticed. But they didn’t want to leave. They insisted on staying on that scaffolding. We took one man who was badly burned back to our group, but the rest of them refused to get off. They were never found. We learned later that they had been attacked by sharks. There were about sixteen of them.

  In the beginning, everybody was delighted just to be alive, and thinking that we’d get picked up right away. Shortly after the ship sank, a plane came over us. He buzzed us two or three times, and then wiggled his wings to signal us. We felt sure that we were going to be rescued then.

  Unfortunately he couldn’t land on his carrier, and eventually landed in Tacloban where the airfield was semi-operational. By then he’d forgotten the exact coordinates of where we were. Evidently he was struggling to find a place to land and had nothing to write with.

  As the second night approached, things really deteriorated, and it was every man for himself. We really started to lose hope, and didn’t see any way we were going to be picked up. I thought, “I’d better make peace with the Almighty.”

  The oil slick helped us though. It kept the sharks away from us. We had shark scares, but that heavy oil, almost like tar, kept the sharks away and it coated you from the sun. We were right on the equator, and during the day the sun is brutal.

  Well, we were about on our last legs, and then we saw these small vessels on the horizon, coming towards us. We were sure they were Japanese. But they were LCIs: American patrol craft. But they had their guns trained on us, because we looked like Japanese to them. We were screaming, “We’re Americans, we’re Americans!” That’s when they turned their bullhorn on and asked about the World Series. Fortunately somebody knew who won.

  So it was like a madhouse. They had to pull us out of the water. But it was great joy, I’ll tell you.

  I think that we prevented the Japanese from taking over the Gulf and isolating the troops ashore. If that had happened, I think the invasion would have been a flop. I mean, eventually it would have taken place, but I think that Taffy 3 kept things going so that the invasion was kept right on schedule.

  The battle against Kurita’s Center Force lasted more than two hours. During that time the aircraft from all three Taffy units arrived on the scene to help out. Some of them had already spent their munitions on land-based targets, but although they had no bombs or ammunition for their guns, they still dove and swooped menacingly at the Japanese ships. It was an effective feint that caused the ships to swerve and retreat in evasive maneuvers.

  Some of the planes still had armaments and were able to inflict mayhem on the enemy ships, bombing and strafing them with great success. The Taffy units’ planes sank three Japanese heavy cruisers and damaged a number of other ships.

  By the time the two-hour battle was over at 0945, the Hoel and Johnston and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts had been sunk by gunfire from the Japanese ships. And though at least one torpedo struck one of the Japanese ships, the Japanese finally succeeded in hitting the American carrier escort Gambier Bay. Hammered by enemy gunfire, the little carrier became dead in the water, and finally sank at 0907. And then, just minutes later, the little carrier escort St. Lo was struck four times in the first organized kamikaze attack of the war.

  At 0925 one of the sailors aboard Sprague’s flagship yelled, “They’re getting away!” Unexpectedly, Kurita ordered his ships to break off action against the Americans and retire to the north. The destroyer escort torpedo attacks on the Yamamoto had effectively slowed Kurita’s flagship, and it trailed sluggishly behind the other ships. Finally, it was so far back that Kurita couldn’t plan a strategy. He was still confused, thinking that the little Taffy units were Halsey’s Task Force 38.

  Admiral Sprague was incredulous. Kurita’s cruisers and destroyers—poised to destroy the American ships—turned and headed back out to the open ocean.

  The sinking of the Gambier Bay carrier escort affected Lieutenant Dick Roby, a twenty-four-year-old pilot of Taffy 3. He’d flown cover for the 20 October landings at Leyte and had taken part in the Battle of Surigao Strait and other action of that week. He was assigned to a different mission when his Taffy unit came under attack.

  LIEUTENANT RICHARD ROBY, USN

  Battle of Leyte

  25 October 1944

  My plane was a Grumman FM2 built by General Motors, the successor to the original F4F. It had a single-row, nine-cylinder, 1,350 horsepower engine.

  We’d provide combat air patrol either over the ships or over the island, and we’d also escort the bombers on bombing missions.

  On 21, 22, and 23 October I led eight planes to predawn combat air patrol over the Tacloban airstrip on Leyte Island. On 24 October, I had been relieved at about 7:20 in the morning and started back to the ships. All of a sudden they said, “Hold up, we’ve got Japanese bombers coming in!”

  When they radioed me that these planes were coming in, I was about probably 10,000 or 11,000 feet, and they were a little below me, so it was easy to pick up speed and go down and make a run.

  I made what they call a semi-high side run and I shot the right wing off the first one. Then I pulled up and shot another one. I went after the third one and chased him from about 6,000 feet down to sea level. I got two plus a probable that day.

  On the morning of 25 October they woke me up about one o’clock in the morning and we started loading five torpedoes.

  We were going to go chase the survivors of the Battle of Surigao Strait, which was fought the night before south of Leyte. So they expected us to go down there and bomb the second group. The battleships and cruisers had started after them, too. But then they cancelled us.

  Approximately ten minutes to seven the word came out that the Japanese fleet was twenty-fiv
e miles away. So Sykes, Dugan, a fellow named Rocky Phillips, and I got off. We were vectored northwest to take on two destroyers that were approximately twenty-five miles from the task force. We were over a thin overcast at about 2,000 feet, and they didn’t have any radar fire control and didn’t see us coming. And interestingly enough, you can sink a destroyer with .50-caliber machine guns, because every round we had was an armor-piercing round. In every three rounds, one was armor-piercing, one an armor-piercing tracer, and one an armor-piercing incendiary.

  When the four of us went down in our first run, they didn’t start to shoot at us until we were recovering because they couldn’t see us coming. All four of us made two runs.

  But when I came back up on top, I was above this 2,000-foot layer of clouds, and I couldn’t find anybody. Not a soul. I knew where the Japanese fleet was supposed to be so, I headed in that general direction.

  I ran into Fowler, the skipper of VC-5. He had about five torpedo bombers and a whole bunch of fighters. He was going to fly right by them; he didn’t see them. I finally got his attention and indicated, “They’re over that way.”

  He then turned and we went over. I probably had 1,000 rounds of ammunition left, maybe 1,200, in my four guns. I made a lot of runs after I didn’t have any more ammunition, because if I’d see one of our torpedo bombers, and he had his bomb bay doors open, I’d fly in front of him to give him cover—drawing fire to me rather than to him.

  On a combat ship, you know the destroyer is armed, but they’ve got basically no armor. So, our fifties go right through them. But, on the cruisers and battleships, you’re talking armor. They’ve also got a lot of guns on the flight decks. So you aim for those. By the time that day was over we had sunk three cruisers.

  USS NEW JERSEY

  BATTLE OF CAPE ENGAÑO

  25 OCTOBER 1944

  0845 HOURS LOCAL

  Halsey’s race to the north wasn’t a total waste. Though he had taken the bait and left his station to chase after Ozawa’s flattops, he did manage to catch the Northern Force early in the morning of 25 October. At 0540, his dawn patrol found the Japanese carriers and their escorts about 200 miles east of Cape Engaño, on the northern coast of Luzon.

  The first American aircraft appeared over Ozawa’s fleet shortly after 0710. The Japanese admiral had no intention of trying to wage a serious battle against waves of American dive- and torpedo-bombers. But, in hopes of delaying Halsey as long as possible, he sent up his last twenty-nine fighters. In a matter of minutes they were all downed.

  While the futile aerial battle was being waged, Ozawa, unaware that Kurita’s badly battered First Attack Force had retired, desperately tried to summon help. There was no help available. The land-based Japanese air armada on Luzon had been all but destroyed in four full days of aerial combat with the U.S. Navy pilots.

  At 0820, just as Halsey’s pilots were lining up to make their first dive-bomb and torpedo runs on Ozawa’s now undefended carriers, he received a message from Kinkaid informing that Kurita was at that moment engaging the Taffy carrier escorts. The crusty admiral was stunned. But before he could act, his pilots were engaging Ozawa’s carriers.

  They first clobbered the Japanese aircraft carrier Chitose with bombs and torpedoes and then went after the destroyer Akatsuki, which exploded and sank. Next, they hit two more carriers, the Zuiho and the Zuikaku—Ozawa’s flagship. Then, at about 0900, shortly after Zuiho was struck by an American torpedo, damaging her rudder, Halsey received another urgent message from Kinkaid: “OUR CVES BEING ATTACKED BY 4 BBS PLUS 8 CRUISERS AND OTHERS STOP REQUEST LEE COVER LEYTE AT TOP SPEED STOP REQUEST FAST CARRIERS MAKE IMMEDIATE STRIKE.”

  Halsey, preoccupied with the battle against Ozawa, replied to Kinkaid’s plea for help with a position report for TF 38 reasoning that Kinkaid, once he knew their location, would know that it was impossible to come to Sprague’s aid in time.

  Kinkaid replied with a message he didn’t even bother to put into code. In plain English, he asked, “WHERE IS LEE? SEND LEE.” But Admiral Lee was with Halsey, doing battle with the Japanese Northern Force.

  By now Halsey’s second wave of American attack aircraft were attacking the carrier Chiyoda. It was dispatched later in the day by the guns of closing American ships. The Japanese cruiser Tama was also struck and later sank.

  About 1000, there was a lull in the one-sided battle and Ozawa decided to move his flag to the Oyodo, a light cruiser. He knew that staying with Zuikaku was dangerous as well as pointless. His flagship aircraft carrier was already a main target of the persistent 3rd Fleet aircraft. His intuition was correct: Moments after he moved over to the Oyodo, two more carriers were sunk—the Zuiho and Zuikaku.

  But the aircraft of the 3rd Fleet couldn’t do it all. Some of the remaining Japanese ships were heavily armored, and American bombs seemed to bounce off their decks. Two Japanese battleships—the Ise and Hyuga— became the targets of the U.S. Navy’s big guns.

  In the heat of battle, Halsey continued to ignore Kinkaid’s requests for help, not viewing it as his responsibility—he’d already advised the 7th Fleet that he was exercising his prerogative of going after the Northern Force.

  At 1000 hours, Halsey received a message from Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii, who had been monitoring the two different battles taking place around the Philippine Islands. Anxious to know the answer to Kinkaid’s question regarding the whereabouts of Lee’s Task Force 34, he sent a dispatch to Halsey: “WHERE IS REPEAT WHERE IS TASK FORCE 34 RR THE WORLD WONDERS.”

  The message delivered to Halsey contained the usual “nonsense” padding at the front and back of the actual message. These short, frivolous phrases were intended to confuse enemy code specialists. The radio operator aboard the New Jersey removed the one at the front of the message, but left in the phrase following the double consonants, which indicated where the padding started. So, the message delivered to Halsey contained the added words of padding: “THE WORLD WONDERS.”

  Halsey interpreted it as a harsh rebuke—with the “REPEAT” intended for great emphasis and “THE WORLD WONDERS” intended as sarcasm. He was infuriated. To comply with Kinkaid’s request for help meant that he’d have to break off his attack on Ozawa and let him get away rather than finishing him off right there.

  But Halsey also sensed that Nimitz was alarmed about the fate of Kinkaid’s Fleet and was convinced that the 3rd Fleet battleships ought to be in action off Samar with Sprague. So just before 1100, Halsey ordered Admiral Lee’s Task Force 34 and Rear Admiral Bogan’s carrier group to withdraw from the attack on Ozawa’s force and race south to provide support for Sprague.

  Four hours into the battle, Halsey’s Task Force 38 turned away. The only capital ships Ozawa had left were the six battleships that Halsey wanted to destroy. But now, to the Japanese admiral’s surprise, the attackers were turning around and retiring.

  Ironically, if the 3rd Fleet had stayed to protect the San Bernardino Strait, Halsey would have had the great battle he’d wished for and Kurita wouldn’t have done nearly the damage to Sprague’s ships. Or, if he’d have stayed in the area east of Cape Engaño, the Northern Force might well have come farther south and Halsey would have been able to finish off Ozawa’s fleet. Either one of the two actions would have been the great victory he sought. He got neither.

  HQ PACIFIC FLEET COMMAND

  PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

  28 OCTOBER 1944

  Despite Halsey’s decision to chase the decoy Ozawa had set for him, the four-day Battle of Leyte Gulf was a profound American victory. In the largest naval engagement in history, the Japanese lost almost half their naval forces in the Philippine waters—twenty-eight of sixty-four ships—including four aircraft carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and eleven destroyers. More than 10,500 Japanese sailors and airmen were also killed.

  The Americans lost just six ships, including two escort aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, two destroyers, and a destroyer escort.

  When it wa
s all over on 27 October, the Imperial Navy was all but finished. It would never again be able to mount a significant challenge to the U.S. fleet.

  HQ 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION

  BREAKNECK RIDGE AT ORMOC, LEYTE

  PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

  26 DECEMBER 1944

  The sea battles of Leyte Gulf lasted four days. Taking Leyte, the steppingstone to the rest of the Philippines, would take four more months. It had begun with a “feasibility raid” against the Philippines by carrier aircraft in September, followed by the decisive sea battles in the surrounding waters. It continued on the ground as foot soldiers pushed across Leyte. In early November, the Japanese were able to get 13,000 reinforcements and hold the American soldiers at bay.

  The ten days of brutal combat on Leyte that took place between 7 and 17 November turned out to be some of the bloodiest of the entire war. Soldiers from the 24th Infantry Division had to use rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, satchel charges, and flame-throwers on entrenched enemy emplacements. At a hill dubbed “Breakneck Ridge,” the troops of the 24th Infantry Division had to fight for every inch of ground. When the fighting there was over, some 2,000 Japanese soldiers were dead but the Americans had progressed only a mile closer to their objective.

  A few weeks later, in desperation, more than 1,000 Japanese troops carried out a banzai charge on three captured American airfields. It was a nightmare of automatic weapons, swords, and grenades. Japanese infiltrators destroyed a dozen American aircraft, burned down buildings, and caused heavy American casualties in a forward hospital. However, by early December nearly all of the enemy soldiers had been killed and the island of Leyte was finally secured by U.S. troops.

  The invasion of Leyte cost the Japanese more than 70,000 lives. But more than 15,500 Americans were killed or wounded trying to ensure that General Douglas MacArthur kept his promise to return to the Philippines.