The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942

by Mark Stille

  Under a barrage of gunfire, the Japanese formation broke into two groups and headed to the northwest. Aoba responded feebly with seven rounds from her undamaged aft 8in. turret. Furutaka was able to return fire with 30 8in. shells before being struck by many shells that destroyed her aft 8in. turret and hit her torpedo launchers, which created a large fire. The cruiser was also struck in two of her engine rooms, but was able to continue to the northwest. Destroyer Fubuki came under fire from Boise and San Francisco and quickly exploded and sank.

  Aoba was the only member of Sentai 6 to survive the Guadalcanal campaign. She fought into 1944, was damaged at the battle of Leyte Gulf and was finally sunk by air attack at Kure, Japan, in July 1945. (Yamato Museum, 070223)

  Destroyer Buchanan refueling from carrier Wasp on August 3, en route to Guadalcanal. The ship is in its striking Measure 12 (modified) camouflage scheme. Buchanan was a Benson-class unit and was present at Savo Island, but saw no action and fought in the Battle of Cape Esperance. Buchanan received 16 battle stars and a Presidential Unit citation, making her one of the most decorated American warships of the Pacific War. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-K-420)

  Cape Esperance: phase two

  At 2353hrs, Scott turned the remaining ships he still had control over – four cruisers and destroyers Buchanan and McCalla – to the northwest to pursue the fleeing Japanese. The Americans concentrated their gunnery on Aoba and Furutaka. Furutaka took some 90 hits, which eventually brought the cruiser to a halt and she sank later that morning, owing to flooding caused by numerous hits below the waterline. Aoba was struck by over 40 shells, but her watertight integrity was not threatened and she was able to depart the area at high speed. The outstanding performance of Kinugasa demonstrated the excellence of individual Japanese units. When the American barrage began, she turned to port and escaped the devastation that befell the rest of Goto’s command. Around midnight, Kinugasa reentered the fight by engaging San Francisco with gunfire and then launching torpedoes at Boise. When Boise unwisely employed her searchlights, Kinugasa took her under fire with 8in. shells and quickly scored. The first hit was on Boise’s forward barbette and this was followed by an 8in. hit below the waterline that entered the cruiser’s forward magazine and started a severe fire. Before the war, the Japanese designed what they called “diving shells” to penetrate below the waterline. This was the only known instance during the entire war where the diving shells performed as designed. The hit was nearly fatal, but the hole created by the shell caused the magazine to flood and saved the cruiser from destruction. Kinugasa followed up this virtuoso performance by scoring at least two hits on Salt Lake City, which had also used her searchlights and revealed her position. The first pierced the cruiser’s weak armor belt and caused minor flooding, but the second created a major fire and resulted in loss of steering. In exchange, Kinugasa suffered minor damage from four hits. Scott terminated the pursuit of the Japanese at 0028hrs on October 12, bringing the battle to a close.

  Cape Esperance: the reckoning

  The Japanese had lost their first night action of the war in convincing fashion. Of the three Japanese cruisers present, Furutaka was sunk with 258 of her crew killed, Aoba was heavily damaged and had to return to Japan for repairs (she returned to action in January 1943), and only Kinugasa survived in condition to fight again. Of the two destroyers, Fubuki was sunk with some 78 killed (unusually, the remainder of her crew, 111 men, was taken prisoner) and Hatsuyuki suffered minor damage. The only good fortune for the Japanese was that the Reinforcement Group completed its mission.

  Though they were victorious, the Americans still paid a steep price. The only ship sunk was the destroyer Duncan which was struck by shells from both sides and suffered 48 killed and 35 wounded. The damage to Boise was severe and another 107 were killed and 29 wounded. Salt Lake City was less severely damaged but still required six months’ work to repair. Damage to destroyer Farenholt, again by “friendly” fire, forced her to return to the United States for repairs.

  Cape Esperance was the first battle where radar played an important role. Scott’s indecision and the refusal of Helena’s captain to open fire after gaining inital contact largely squandered the advantage provided by radar, but the Japanese had still been surprised and suffered accordingly. The victory showed that the Japanese could be defeated at night, but lost in the victory was the fact that American losses were also high and that they would not again challenge the Japanese at night for another month. An unfortunate side effect for the Americans was that Scott’s tactics were judged to be good and were used in the next night battle with less then desirable results.

  The most heavily damaged American cruiser at the battle of Cape Esperance was Boise. She suffered eight shell hits during the battle, the most serious of which penetrated the ship under water and started a fire in the forward magazine. This view, taken at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in November 1942, shows a hit on the face of the forward triple 6in. turret that failed to penetrate the 6.5in. turret face armor. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-300232)

  What generally goes unmentioned in the aftermath of Cape Esperance is that the Japanese continued to command the nighttime seas around Guadalcanal. Goto’s abortive bombardment was a single part in a much bigger operation. The centerpiece of the Japanese plan was the movement to the island of a “High-Speed Convoy” of six fast transports escorted by eight destroyers. These ships carried 4,500 troops, some artillery and much-needed supplies. To ensure the convoy made it intact, Yamamoto unveiled a surprise. A task force led by battleships Kongo and Haruna, escorted by a light cruiser and nine destroyers, was ordered to saturate the airfield with 14in. shells. Against opposition offered by only four tardy American torpedo boats, the battleships began their methodical bombardment at 0033hrs on October 14. The effect of the shelling, which included special Type 3 incendiary shells, was devastating. By the time the bombardment concluded at 0156hrs, the two battleships had delivered a total of 973 14in. shells, making Henderson Field unusable and accounting for half of the aircraft present and most of the aviation fuel.

  Destroyer Duncan on October 7,1942. Duncan was the only American ship sunk during the battle of Cape Esperance when she was caught between the opposing task forces and targeted by gunfire from both sides. Forty-eight of her crew died in this engagement. This was not the last occasion on which American sailors fired on their own ships. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH-90495)

  By midnight on October 14, the six transports arrived at Guadalcanal intact. All of their troops were landed and most of their supplies. Three of the ships were sunk by aircraft from a resurgent Henderson Field. In reply, Yamamoto ordered another heavy cruiser bombardment of the airfield on the night of October 15–16. The American position at sea looked bleak, but on land, when the newly arrived Japanese troops launched their attack on October 24–25, they were again repulsed.

  The Americans change command

  With intelligence indicating that another major Japanese effort was pending, Ghormley grew more pessimistic about whether Guadalcanal could be held. On October 15 he send a message to Nimitz describing his forces as “totally inadequate” to meet the next Japanese offensive. Having made a visit to the South Pacific from September 30 to October 2, Nimitz knew that the pessimism so prevalent at Ghormley’s headquarters at Noumea was not shared on Guadalcanal itself. Feeling that morale needed a boost and more aggressive leadership was required to support the Marines, Nimitz made the choice, approved by King, to replace Ghormley with Halsey, who was already in the South Pacific for familiarization before taking over command of the carrier task force. Immediately after assuming command of the South Pacific on October 18, Halsey promised the Marines he would provide them with all possible support. This translated into a major carrier battle in late October and two major surface battles in November.

  The battle of Santa Cruz, fought on October 26,1942, essentially removed both the American and Japanese carrier forces from further large-scal
e participation in the campaign. Of the two American carriers present, Hornet was sunk and Enterprise, shown here under attack, was damaged. Of the four Japanese carriers engaged, two were damaged and forced to return to Japan for repairs. Yamamoto was sure he had sunk three American carriers, which led him to believe the American carriers would not factor further into the battle. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-20989)

  THE FIRST NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL

  The battle of Santa Cruz, fought between the carrier forces on October 26, had been a resounding defeat for the American carrier force and Yamamoto no longer believed it would be a factor in the campaign. Now, all that was left to do was suppress Henderson Field in order to move sufficient troops to the island finally to crush the Marines. The number required would far surpass the ability of just destroyer transport runs alone. Destroyers succeeded in delivering some 8,000 troops of the 38th Division between October 23 and November 11, but to move the division’s heavy equipment, a convoy would be required. To accomplish this, the Japanese organized a convoy of 11 fast transport ships, which were scheduled to arrive on the island on November 14.

  Preceding the arrival of the convoy, the Combined Fleet had ordered a repeat of the successful October battleship bombardment against Henderson Field. This was part of a massive operation in which the convoy was escorted by 12 destroyers and supported by the 8th Fleet with its four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and six destroyers. The Combined Fleet departed Truk with a single carrier, four battleships, three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and 21 destroyers.

  The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

  Hiei, shown here in July 1942, was the most modern of the Kongo-class fast battleships following her reconstruction, completed in 1940. The ship had been demilitarized in 1929 as required by the Washington Naval Treaty. After being employed in carrier screening duties for the first part of the war, Hiei was assigned to bombard Henderson Field in November but was damaged by American cruiser and destroyer gunfire in the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The Japanese were unable to remove the wounded battleship from the waters off Guadalcanal, and she was subsequently sunk by American aircraft. (Yamato Museum, 059381)

  Such a major operation could not escape the notice of American intelligence. Halsey knew a major Japanese operation was under way and that it included a major troop convoy to Guadalcanal. Both he and Turner suspected that the Japanese would attempt a repeat of their October bombardment. To contend with the Japanese offensive, Halsey had two major forces. The carrier Enterprise, damaged at Santa Cruz, formed the center of a task force with two fast battleships, a heavy cruiser, a light antiaircraft cruiser and eight destroyers. As the timing of the Japanese move unfolded, this task force was too far from Guadalcanal to interfere with the initial Japanese assault. The only ships available to stop the expected bombardment were the escort to an American convoy which had arrived at Guadalcanal and the cruiser-destroyer force created by Ghormley before the battle of Cape Esperance. Together, this amounted to two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two light antiaircraft cruisers, and eight destroyers. The combined force was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Callaghan, who replaced Scott.

  The American task force was active in Iron Bottom Sound on the night of November 11–12, but the Japanese were not present. Callaghan was informed that the Japanese would be present in force the next night. His orders from Turner were to prevent a bombardment of the airfield. He was under no illusion about the difficulty of his mission. After escorting the transports out of Iron Bottom Sound, he turned his force back to meet the Japanese. As Scott had done at Cape Esperance, he deployed his force in a line-ahead formation. Four destroyers led the column with the five cruisers in the center, followed up by the other four destroyers.

  The Japanese force assigned to conduct the bombardment was commanded by Rear Admiral Abe. He did not expect the Americans to be present after dark, but he was taking no chances. He detailed one of his destroyer squadrons with five destroyers to scout ahead of his main body, which included his two battleships escorted by another destroyer squadron with a light cruiser and six destroyers. During the run to the island, Abe’s force had encountered poor weather, which included very heavy thunderstorms, bringing visibility down to zero. At 0005hrs on November 13, he ordered a 180-degree turn to get out of the bad weather. This was followed by another 180-degree turn at 0038hrs after the weather had cleared. The net effect of the poor weather on the approach and the enforced maneuvering was to disperse the Japanese formation and make it vulnerable to surprise.

  FIRST NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL ORDER OF BATTLE

  UNITED STATES NAVY

  Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan on San Francisco

  Heavy cruisers San Francisco, Portland

  Light cruisers Helena, Atlanta, Juneau

  Destroyers (Van) Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, O’Bannon (Rear) Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, Fletcher

  IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY

  Bombardment Group Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki on Hiei

  Sentai 11

  Battleships Hiei, Kirishima

  Destroyer Squadron 10 Rear Admiral Kimura Satsuma on Nagara

  Light cruiser Nagara

  Destroyer Division 6 Akatsuki, Ikazuchi, Inazuma

  Destroyer Division 16 Amatsukaze, Yukikaze

  Destroyer Division 61 Teruzuki

  Sweeping Unit

  (Destroyer Squadron 4) Rear Admiral Takama Tamotsu on Asagumo

  Destroyer Division 2 Harusame, Murasame, Samidare, Yudachi

  Patrol Unit (assigned to cover the area between Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands, and did not see action)

  Destroyer Division 27 Shigure, Shiratsuyu, Yugure

  The most vicious night battle of the war

  Instead of having his destroyers 8,750 yards ahead of his battleships as planned, only two of Abe’s five lead destroyers were in the proper position, and these were only a few thousand yards in advance of his main body. The other three destroyers of the lead destroyer squadron were actually behind his battleships. Abe knew nothing of this. Since he had heard nothing from his scouts, he decided to commence the bombardment at 0138hrs. Accordingly, the battleships began loading the Type 3 high-explosive shell filled with incendiaries. These were not suited for engaging warships.

  As Abe was deciding that the coast was clear, Callaghan had already received information on the approaching Japanese. The SG radar on Helena detected the Japanese at 0124hrs. The lead Japanese destroyer was picked up at 27,000 yards and the battleships at 32,000 yards. Minutes later, at 0128hrs, Callaghan ordered a course change to the northwest, directly at the oncoming Japanese. Subsequently, he planned to come to starboard to cross the T of the Japanese. At 0137hrs, Callaghan ordered his lead ship, the destroyer Cushing, to head directly north. Within minutes, at 0141hrs, Cushing spotted ships crossing her bow and turned to the left to bring her guns and torpedoes to bear. The ships spotted by Cushing were the lead Japanese destroyers, Yudachi and Harusame. As Callaghan tried to make sense out of Cushing’s report and the increasing number of radar reports from other SG radar-equipped ships, he did alert his command at 0145hrs to be ready to fire.

  THE FIRST BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (pp. 62–63)

  On the night of November 12–13, a large Japanese task force including two battleships was headed toward Guadalcanal to conduct a bombardment of Henderson Field. In order to save the airfield from devastation, the Americans were forced to intercept the Japanese with a smaller force of cruisers and destroyers. Both sides closed until the formations were almost intermingled. At 0148hrs, the lead Japanese battleship, Hiei, used her searchlights to illuminate targets for the rest of the fleet (1). These lights settled on the lead American cruiser, Atlanta (2). At a range of only 1,600 yards, Atlanta fired the first shots of the battle to take out the lights on Hiei. This scene shows the opening moments of the most vicious night battle of the war. Both Atlanta and Hiei would be severely damaged during this encounter. Atlanta could no
t be salvaged and sank later that afternoon. Hiei came under concerted American air attack and also sank, the first Japanese battleship to sink during the war. The cost of battle was high for both sides. Of the 13 American ships engaged, only two destroyers emerged undamaged. Of the five cruisers, Atlanta was sunk, Juneau heavily damaged and sunk later in the day by submarine attack, heavy cruisers San Francisco and Portland were heavily damaged, and light cruiser Helena suffered moderate damage. Four of the eight destroyers involved were sunk (Cushing, Laffey, Monssen and Barton, and another two heavily damaged. Seven of the 14 Japanese ships engaged were damaged or sunk. Hiei’s fate has already been mentioned, and destroyers Akatsuki and Yudachi were also sunk. Two destroyers were heavily damaged and another two suffered light damage. Though the cost was high for the US Navy, the Japanese bombardment failed which led to the destruction of the large convoy headed to Guadalcanal and the ultimate failure of the last Japanese attempt to retake the island.