Tough Love

by Susan Rice

  21 The Fourth Quarter

  WE ARE ENTERING

  THE FOURTH

  QUARTER AND

  REALLY IMPORTANT

  THINGS HAPPEN IN

  THE FOURTH

  QUARTER.

  —PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

  These were the exact words printed in black ink vertically on small, white three-by-five cards embossed with “THE WHITE HOUSE” in blue across the top. Chief of Staff Denis McDonough personally delivered these cards to White House staff in early January 2015. A tall, lean, chiseled former football player from Minnesota with close-cropped, silver hair (despite his relative youth), Denis has something of the coach in him—complete with sometimes hokey team-building techniques.

  When he came by my office to hand me my card, I probably offered a perfunctory thank-you and kept on working. Rather than toss it into the trash, for some reason I placed it on my desk next to my computer, where I kept it and saw it multiple times a day for the next two years.

  We still had a lot to get done, and no one was taking their foot off the gas, least of all the president of the United States. As evidenced by his campaigns, Obama is the classic closer—a fourth quarter player. That’s when he ups his game to even higher levels, pulling off the win, sometimes after coming from behind. That’s how 2008 felt through the primary and early general election. That’s how 2012 felt after Benghazi and a poor first debate performance.

  That’s how it felt to me as I managed Obama’s second-term national security agenda. Two thousand thirteen and 2014 were unrelenting, crisis-filled years with little to celebrate. But after Cuba in December 2014, we started racking up wins—from the Iran deal to the Paris Climate Agreement that enabled us to close with an Obama-strong fourth quarter.

  The same was true on the domestic front. One of the most joyous days at the White House was June 26, 2015, when we learned the Supreme Court had validated the right to same-sex marriage. There were hugs and whoops and tears of joy throughout the building when the president spoke in the Rose Garden, as colleagues heralded this landmark decision and friends for whom this issue was deeply personal saw their lives transformed. That evening, I celebrated with staff on a balcony of the Old Executive Office Building, watching as the White House was lit up in the colors of the rainbow when night fell. Ian and I cherish a picture of the two of us outside the colorful White House taken as we joined tourists and passersby in affirming that love is love. Two days later, we rejoiced again as the Supreme Court upheld the Affordable Care Act ensuring that millions of Americans could retain their newly accessible health insurance. We were “getting shit done.”

  Behind the scenes at the NSC, we would continue full throttle until the moment we were asked to turn in our badges and cell phones. Our aim was to leave to our successors the best possible security landscape for the American people. A tall order in a tough and unforgiving world.

  Even though, for the most part, I performed the traditional role of point guard who calls the plays, runs the offense, and passes the ball, on occasion I also played the position of shooting guard—the player on the team most expected to drive to the basket and score.

  One of my most gratifying initiatives was leading the NSC Principals’ push to diversify the national security workforce. Ever since I entered government as a twenty-eight-year-old staffer, I had been mindful that there were few like me at any given policymaking table. Few women, few minorities, and even fewer women of color. There were also few Muslims, few Chinese and Farsi speakers, too few Latinos, and almost no Native Americans. This diversity deficit didn’t concern me simply because I was outnumbered and likely more misunderstood than I appreciated.

  It troubled me mainly because I found that people from similar backgrounds—for instance, white male graduates of the Ivy League—tend to approach complex issues in similar ways. They might miss nuances of language and gender, while dismissing insights that others from different backgrounds might more readily embrace. On a wide span of issues—ranging from how many refugees to admit from each region of the world, to sexual assault in the military, how best to counter violent extremism, and the kind of support we provide families of Americans held hostage overseas—I saw firsthand the benefits of incorporating the sometimes divergent perspectives of female, LGBT, Muslim, and other minority voices in the policy debate.

  We are the most diverse nation on earth, and it benefits the U.S. to model that diversity to the world; yet all too often we fail to leverage our greatest strength. By choice, we are battling to defend our people and our interests in a complex world with the equivalent of one hand tied behind our back. It makes no sense to me. Meanwhile, numerous recent studies have validated that, whether in the private sector, nonprofit world, or government, more diverse teams make better decisions and achieve measurably better outcomes.

  The fundamental equality of all human beings is the closest thing I have to a life’s creed. My parents taught me and my brother that it is our sacred obligation to pave the pathways for those who have had fewer advantages than we. Lifting others up, diversifying opportunity, has been my family’s enterprise—from my great-grandfather’s founding of the Bordentown School in the late nineteenth century to my mother’s work to establish and sustain the Pell Grant program and my brother’s founding of Management Leadership for Tomorrow. I carry that same responsibility with me wherever I go, including to the White House—where, as an African American woman, I had the privilege of serving as national security advisor to the first African American president of the United States. How fitting and right it felt when I had the chance to tackle the diversity challenge head-on, with the full backing of my boss. I could not have slept well at night if I didn’t try.

  Back in 2011, President Obama issued an executive order prioritizing diversity and inclusion throughout the federal workforce. From the outset of the administration’s efforts, we were mindful that one area of government lagged behind the rest: the national security agencies. Frustrated by the persistently lower levels of racial, ethnic, religious, sexual orientation, and gender diversity in the national security workforce, I decided to elevate the issue to the attention of NSC Deputies and Principals.

  Though nearly 40 percent of Americans are people of color and, by 2044, it is estimated that the U.S. will be “majority minority,” the national security workforce (especially its senior ranks) does not reflect America. Minorities collectively comprise well under 20 percent of senior foreign service officers and under 15 percent of senior military and intelligence officers. Neither I nor President Obama saw this as a human resources challenge; improving workforce diversity is a “national security imperative.” I consistently stressed the national security rationale for a diverse workforce, arguing that a collection of leaders from diverse backgrounds can often come up with more creative insights, proffer alternative solutions, and thus make better decisions.

  The best part of leading this initiative was that I met zero resistance; at every stage, I was pushing on a wide-open door. My cabinet-level colleagues were each deeply committed to this effort, and several had already taken important steps to increase diversity and inclusion. Not one cabinet secretary or agency head offered excuses. Not one delayed or deflected responsibility. In fact, they competed with each other around the Situation Room table for who could boast the most progress. Jim Clapper and John Brennan proudly detailed the strides the Intelligence Community had made in promoting the advancement of LGBT officers. Ash Carter heralded the recent advances for women, gay, and transgender people in the military, starting with the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in 2011 and culminating in the decision in 2016 to lift the ban on transgender people serving openly in the military. John Kerry lamented the State Department’s long-standing shortcomings and pledged personally to prioritize diversifying the foreign service. These were by far the easiest and most enjoyable Principals Committee meetings I chaired.

  In October 2016, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum
codifying the U.S. government’s commitment to promoting diversity and inclusion in the national security workforce. The memo, which was the product of the NSC Deputies’ and Principals’ efforts, required all national security agencies to: collect, analyze, and publicize demographic data, including on recruitment and retention; to enhance professional development opportunities consistent with merit; and to hold senior leaders accountable for their results. One of the last memos I sent to President Obama, in January 2017, was a ninety-day report on progress in implementing this new policy. Given the scope of our work over eight years, promoting diversity in the national security workforce was a relatively small effort, but it was one that I pursued with pride and personal passion.

  In the last year of the administration, I took on another responsibility for the sake of posterity—negotiating the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that would determine the specific terms and the value of the next ten-year security assistance agreement with Israel. In lengthy sessions over almost a year with my Israeli counterpart, Jacob Nagel, and many intervening engagements very ably led by NSC senior director Yael Lempert, we reached an agreement in September 2016 to provide Israel with $38 billion in military assistance over ten years (starting in 2018) and to modernize our security assistance relationship so that American defense suppliers, and no longer just Israeli defense companies, would fully benefit from this largesse.

  Our commitment provided a hugely beneficial package for Israel—the largest in history—but, of course, Netanyahu wanted more and strongly resisted changes to the traditional terms of the grant. In what was then a budget-constrained Washington, we were constantly reminded that $38 billion is a huge sum for a developed country, even one as important as Israel, and that this money might have been used for pressing domestic purposes like Pell Grants or making community college accessible to every American who wanted to attend.

  Nonetheless, President Obama gave me great latitude to do the right thing for the U.S. and Israel, even at a time when his personal relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu was sorely strained. With his support, we concluded a mutually beneficial MOU that emphatically underscored President Obama’s unshakable commitment to the security of Israel. This unprecedented package ensured that Israel will maintain its “qualitative military edge,” thus enhancing Israel’s ability to defend itself by itself.

  Despite this and other achievements, I was disappointed to find after I returned to Washington to become national security advisor that some of Israel’s staunchest advocates came to cast me as a grudging partner, at best, and, at worst, as hostile to Israel. In the wake of the Iran negotiations and nuclear deal, the relationship between Obama and Netanyahu deteriorated, and supporters of Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party increasingly leveled dishonest ad hominem attacks against the president and his closest advisors, including me. I found these charges frustrating and unfair, particularly in light of the work I did every day to defend and support Israel at the U.N.

  Nevertheless, when we gathered on September 14, 2016, in the Treaty Room at the State Department to sign the MOU, I spoke from my heart:

  For as long as the state of Israel has existed, the United States has been Israel’s greatest friend and partner. That ironclad bond has endured l’dor v’dor—from generation to generation—across parties and administrations.

  This is the single largest pledge of military assistance to any country in U.S. history. At a time when we’re tightening our belts across the board… this MOU nonetheless greatly increases our military assistance commitment to Israel. And that’s not an accident. It’s a reminder of the United States’ unshakeable commitment to Israel’s security.

  … I’ll note that this MOU is not just good for Israel, it’s good for the United States. Our security is linked. When allies and partners like Israel are more secure, the United States is more secure. Moreover, our Israeli friends will be able to buy more of the advanced capabilities produced by the United States, which will support American jobs. Like so many aspects of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, this MOU is a win-win.

  At the signing ceremony, I was also proud to offer tribute, one last time, to my friend and hero Shimon Peres. He had recently fallen gravely ill at ninety-three, and his prognosis was not good.

  Twelve days later, on September 28, 2016, Shimon Peres passed away. I was honored to join President Obama in paying our last respects at his funeral in Jerusalem and took some small measure of comfort from knowing that the MOU had come to fruition on his watch.

  Sadly but not unexpectedly, Peres’s life dream of achieving two states for two peoples—a secure Jewish state of Israel living in peace alongside a viable, contiguous Palestinian state—never came to pass during his lifetime. This long-standing, bipartisan objective of U.S. policy remains in my view the only way to resolve the conflict, meet legitimate, long-deferred Palestinian aspirations, and preserve Israel as both a Jewish state and a democracy.

  For five years, until 2014, the Obama administration expended great effort and political capital trying to achieve this goal, hoping that both sides would view the U.S. as a committed, honest broker. It was deeply disappointing, if not surprising, to find yet again that neither party was interested in making the hard compromises necessary for peace. President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority consistently lacked the will and the confidence to make a deal, despite knowing that he would likely not again find a more fair or sympathetic American partner. Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel never seemed interested in a two-state solution, but rather spent eight years thwarting any progress toward peace.

  In late 2016, following years of intensified and accelerated Israeli settlement activity that rendered the prospect of a viable Palestinian state ever more remote, the Obama administration decided to take a different approach. At the U.N., Ambassador Power was instructed to abstain on a British-drafted security council resolution, allowing to pass by 14–0 a text that condemned settlements and reaffirmed that their establishment “has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-state solution.” In a significant rebuke to the Palestinians, the text also condemned “all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, as well as acts of provocation, incitement and destruction.”

  The Obama administration’s decision to abstain was harshly criticized by Israel, some American Jewish organizations, and by the incoming Trump team, which worked improperly behind the scenes during the transition to try and thwart adoption of the resolution. Despite the negative reaction our abstention engendered in some quarters, I thought it was appropriate to demonstrate that America would not continue to defend at all costs an eroding status quo. Clearly, neither party was interested in peace; meanwhile the Netanyahu government continued to build settlements with abandon and take other steps that dim any prospect for peace through a two-state solution.

  The U.S.-China relationship, as President Obama often said, is the “most consequential bilateral relationship in the world.” And, as a matter of history, custom, and efficacy, it fell to me as national security advisor to manage it on behalf of the president. Ever since 1972, when Henry Kissinger occupied my NSC office, U.S.-China relations have been led from the White House. State, DOD, and Treasury, of course, play vital roles, but China has long preferred dealing directly with the White House on bilateral affairs. More importantly, from the U.S. point of view, given the complexity of the relationship, its many economic and strategic facets, and the need to ensure that multiple, disparate agencies sing from the same hymnal, strong White House leadership makes sense.

  As NSA, I embraced this responsibility. Having dealt intimately with China as U.N. ambassador, I had gained a good understanding of their interests and idiosyncrasies. In that period, at least, played correctly, the U.S.-China relationship need not have been dangerously adversarial, nor zero-sum, but rather more of a potentially combustible mix of competition and cooperation. The challenge, as President Oba
ma and I viewed it, was to manage our economic and strategic competition effectively—gaining advantage for the U.S. wherever possible while avoiding unnecessary conflict—and, at the same time, maximizing our cooperation.

  We had vigorous disagreements with China over its trade policy, currency manipulation, theft of intellectual property, and the disadvantageous restrictions it places on U.S. businesses operating in China. The U.S. strongly opposed China’s aggressive acquisition of and construction on disputed land in the South China Sea, its cyber-enabled theft of proprietary American commercial information, its pressure on Taiwan and Hong Kong, its crackdown on NGOs and religious freedom, and its myriad human rights abuses. We also sought closer Chinese cooperation and stepped up economic pressure to address the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. These were among the most contentious issues in the bilateral relationship that risked conflict, if not managed effectively.

  In 2011, President Obama implemented the “rebalance” to Asia, shifting more of our strategic assets and focus to optimize U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Under this policy, the U.S. augmented its military presence. We reinforced our alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines (until the May 2016 election of President Rodrigo Duterte whose erratic and authoritarian leadership limited the potential to do more). We strengthened ties to the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, joined the annual East Asia Summit, and secured the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement to establish a high-standards free trade network among a dozen of the world’s economies. The objective of these combined efforts was to advance U.S. interests and check China’s expanding role in Asia. Our approach to China was not reactive but rather embedded in a far-sighted and multifaceted strategy for the Asia-Pacific region and India.