by David Robson
7 See, for instance, Susan Engel’s discussion of Ruth Graner and Rachel Brown’s work in Engel, S. (2015), The Hungry Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 118.
8 See the following articles for a review of these metacognitive illusions: Bjork, R.A., Dunlosky, J. and Kornell, N. (2013), ‘Self-regulated Learning: Beliefs, Techniques, and Illusions’, Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 417?44. Yan, V.X., Bjork, E.L. and Bjork, R.A. (2016), ‘On the Difficulty of Mending Metacognitive Illusions: A Priori Theories, Fluency Effects, and Misattributions of the Interleaving Benefit’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(7), 918?33.
9 For more information about these results, read Stigler’s earlier and later research. Hiebert, J. and Stigler, J.W. (2017), ‘The Culture of Teaching: A Global Perspective’, in International Handbook of Teacher Quality and Policy, Abingdon, England: Routledge, pp. 62–75. Stigler, J.W. and Hiebert, J. (2009), The Teaching Gap: Best Ideas from the World’s Teachers for Improving Education in the Classroom, New York: Simon & Schuster.
10 Park, H. (2010), ‘Japanese and Korean High Schools and Students in Comparative Perspective’, in Quality and Inequality of Education, Netherlands: Springer, pp. 255–73.
11 Hiebert and Stigler, ‘The Culture of Teaching’.
12 For a more in-depth discussion of these ideas, see Byrnes, J.P. and Dunbar, K.N. (2014), ‘The Nature and Development of Critical-analytic Thinking’, Educational Psychology Review, 26(4), 477–93.
13 See the following for further cross-cultural comparisons: Davies, M. and Barnett, R. (eds) (2015), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education, Netherlands: Springer.
14 For a comprehensive summary of this work, see Spencer-Rodgers, J., Williams, M.J. and Peng, K. (2010), ‘Cultural Differences in Expectations of Change and Tolerance for Contradiction: A Decade of Empirical Research’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14(3), 296–312.
15 Rowe, M.B. (1986), ‘Wait Time: Slowing Down May Be a Way of Speeding Up!’ Journal of Teacher Education, 37(1), 43–50.
16 Langer, E. (1997), The Power of Mindful Learning, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, p. 18.
17 Ritchhart, R. and Perkins, D.N. (2000), ‘Life in the Mindful Classroom: Nurturing the Disposition of Mindfulness’, Journal of Social Issues, 56(1), 27?47.
18 Although Langer has pioneered the benefits of ambiguity in education, other scientists have shown comparably powerful results. Similarly, Robert S. Siegler and Xiaodong Lin have found that children learn mathematics and physics best when they are asked to think through right and wrong answers to problems, since this encourages them to consider alternative strategies and to identify ineffective ways of thinking. See, for example, Siegler, R.S. and Lin, X., ‘Self-explanations Promote Children’s Learning’, in Borkowski, J.G., Waters, H.S. and Schneider, W. (eds) (2010), Metacognition, Strategy Use, and Instruction, New York: Guilford, pp. 86?113.
19 Langer, The Power of Mindful Learning, p. 29. And Overoye, A.L. and Storm, B.C. (2015), ‘Harnessing the Power of Uncertainty to Enhance Learning’, Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 1(2), 140. See also Engel, S. (2011), ‘Children’s Need to Know: Curiosity in Schools’, Harvard Educational Review, 81(4), 625–45.
20 Brackett, M.A., Rivers, S.E., Reyes, M.R. and Salovey, P. (2012), ‘Enhancing Academic Performance and Social and Emotional Competence with the RULER Feeling Words Curriculum’, Learning and Individual Differences, 22(2), 218–24. Jacobson, D., Parker, A., Spetzler, C., De Bruin, W.B., Hollenbeck, K., Heckerman, D. and Fischhoff, B. (2012), ‘Improved Learning in US History and Decision Competence with Decision-focused Curriculum’, PLOS One, 7(9), e45775.
21 The following study, for instance, shows that greater intellectual humility completely eradicates the differences in academic achievement that you normally find between high- and low-ability students. Hu, J., Erdogan, B., Jiang, K., Bauer, T.N. and Liu, S. (2018), ‘Leader Humility and Team Creativity: The Role of Team Information Sharing, Psychological Safety, and Power Distance’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 103(3), 313.
22 For the sources of these suggestions, see Bjork, Dunlosky and Kornell, ‘Self-regulated Learning’. Soderstrom, N.C. and Bjork, R.A. (2015), ‘Learning Versus Performance: An Integrative Review’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2), 176–99. Benassi, V.A., Overson, C. and Hakala, C.M. (2014), Applying Science of Learning in Education: Infusing Psychological Science into the Curriculum, American Psychological Association.
23 See, for example, the following blog post by psychologist and musician Christine Carter for more information: https://bulletproofmusician.com/why-the-progress-in-the-practice-room-seems-to-disappear-overnight/.
24 Langer, E., Russel, T. and Eisenkraft, N. (2009), ‘Orchestral Performance and the Footprint of Mindfulness’, Psychology of Music, 37(2), 125–36.
25 These data have been released on the IVA’s website: http://www.ivalongbeach.org/academics/curriculum/61-academics/test-scores-smarter-balanced.
Chapter 9
1 Taylor, D. (2016, June 27), ‘England Humiliated as Iceland Knock Them Out of Euro 2016’, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/27/england-iceland-euro-2016-match-report.
2 See, for example, http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/england-vs-iceland-steve-mcclaren-reaction-goal-euro-2016-a7106896.html.
3 Taylor, ‘England Humiliated as Iceland Knock Them Out of Euro 2016’.
4 Wall, K. (27 June 2016), ‘Iceland Wins Hearts at Euro 2016 as Soccer’s Global Underdog’, Time, http://time.com/4383403/iceland-soccer-euro-2016-england/.
5 Zeileis, A., Leitner, C. and Hornik, K. (2016), ‘Predictive Bookmaker Consensus Model for the UEFA Euro 2016’, Working Papers in Economics and Statistics, No. 2016–15, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/146132/1/859777529.pdf.
6 Woolley, A.W., Aggarwal, I. and Malone, T.W. (2015), ‘Collective Intelligence and Group Performance’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(6), 420?4.
7 Wuchty, S., Jones, B.F. and Uzzi, B. (2007), ‘The Increasing Dominance of Teams in Production of Knowledge’, Science, 316(5827), 1036?9.
8 Woolley, A.W., Chabris, C.F., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N. and Malone, T.W. (2010), ‘Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups’, Science, 330(6004), 686?8.
9 Engel, D., Woolley, A.W., Jing, L.X., Chabris, C.F. and Malone, T.W. (2014), ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes or Reading between the Lines? Theory of Mind Predicts Collective Intelligence Equally Well Online and Face-to-face’, PLOS One, 9(12), e115212.
10 Mayo, A.T. and Woolley, A.W. (2016), ‘Teamwork in Health Care: Maximizing Collective Intelligence via Inclusive Collaboration and Open Communication’, AMA Journal of Ethics, 18(9), 933?40.
11 Woolley, Aggarwal and Malone (2015), ‘Collective Intelligence and Group Performance’.
12 Kim, Y.J., Engel, D., Woolley, A.W., Lin, J.Y.T., McArthur, N. and Malone, T.W. (2017), ‘What Makes a Strong Team? Using Collective Intelligence to Predict Team Performance in League of Legends’, in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, New York: ACM, pp. 2316?29.
13 See, for example, Ready, D.A. and Conger, J.A. (2007), ‘Make Your Company a Talent Factory’, Harvard Business Review, 85(6), 68?77. The following paper also offers original surveys as well as a broader discussion of our preference for ‘talent’ at the expense of teamwork: Swaab, R.I., Schaerer, M., Anicich, E.M., Ronay, R. and Galinsky, A.D. (2014), ‘The Too-much-talent Effect: Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Enough’, Psychological Science, 25(8), 1581?91. See also Alvesson, M. and Spicer, A. (2016), The Stupidity Paradox: The Power and Pitfalls of Functional Stupidity at Work, London: Profile, Kindle Edition (Kindle location 1492?1504).
14 This work was a collaboration with Cameron Anderson, also at the University of California, Berkeley. Hildreth, J.A.D. and Anderson, C. (2016), ‘Failure at the Top: How Power U
ndermines Collaborative Performance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110(2), 261?86.
15 Greer, L.L., Caruso, H.M. and Jehn, K.A. (2011), ‘The Bigger They Are, The Harder They Fall: Linking Team Power, Team Conflict, and Performance’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 116(1), 116?28.
16 Groysberg, B., Polzer, J.T. and Elfenbein, H.A. (2011), ‘Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How High-Status Individuals Decrease Group Effectiveness’, Organization Science, 22(3), 722?37.
17 Kishida, K.T., Yang, D., Quartz, K.H., Quartz, S.R. and Montague, P.R. (2012), ‘Implicit Signals in Small Group Settings and Their Impact on the Expression of Cognitive Capacity and Associated Brain Responses’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367(1589), 704–16.
18 ‘Group Settings Can Diminish Expressions of Intelligence, Especially among Women’, Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, http://research.vtc.vt.edu/news/2012/jan/22/group-settings-can-diminish-expressions-intelligen/.
19 Galinsky, A., Schweitzer, M. (2015), ‘The Problem of Too Much Talent’, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/hierarchy-friend-foe-too-much-talent/401150/
20 Swaab, R.I., Schaerer, M., Anicich, E.M., Ronay, R. and Galinsky, A.D. (2014), ‘The Too-much-talent Effect’.
21 Herbert, I. (27 June 2016), ‘England vs Iceland: Too Wealthy, Too Famous, Too Much Ego ? Joe Hart Epitomises Everything That’s Wrong’, Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/england-vs-iceland-reaction-too-rich-too-famous-too-much-ego-joe-hart-epitomises-everything-that-is-a7106591.html.
22 Roberto, M.A. (2002), ‘Lessons From Everest: The Interaction of Cognitive Bias, Psychological Safety, and System Complexity’, California Management Review, 45(1), 136?58.
23 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/everest/stories/leadership.html.
24 Schwartz, S. (2008), ‘The 7 Schwartz Cultural Value Orientation Scores for 80 Countries’, doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3313.3040.
25 Anicich, E.M., Swaab, R.I., & Galinsky, A. D. (2015). Hierarchical cultural values predict success and mortality in high-stakes teams. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(5), 1338?43.
26 Jang, S. (2017). ‘Cultural Brokerage and Creative Performance in Multicultural Teams’, Organization Science, 28(6), 993–1009.
27 Ou, A.Y., Waldman, D.A. and Peterson, S.J. (2015), ‘Do Humble CEOs Matter? An Examination of CEO Humility and Firm Outcomes’, Journal of Management, 44(3), 1147?73. For further discussion of the benefits of humble leaders, and the reasons we don’t often value their humility, see Mayo, M. (2017), ‘If Humble People Make the Best Leaders, Why Do We Fall for Charismatic Narcissists?’ Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2017/04/if-humble-people-make-the-best-leaders-why-do-we-fall-for-charismatic-narcissists. Heyden, M.L.M. and Hayward, M. (2017), ‘It’s Hard to Find a Humble CEO: Here’s Why’, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/its-hard-to-find-a-humble-ceo-heres-why-81951. Rego, A., Owens, B., Leal, S., Melo, A.I., e Cunha, M.P., Gonçalves, L. and Ribeiro, P. (2017), ‘How Leader Humility Helps Teams to Be Humbler, Psychologically Stronger, and More Effective: A Moderated Mediation Model’, The Leadership Quarterly, 28(5), 639–58.
28 Cable, D. (23 April 2018), ‘How Humble Leadership Really Works’, Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/04/how-humble-leadership-really-works.
29 Rieke, M., Hammermeister, J. and Chase, M. (2008), ‘Servant Leadership in Sport: A New Paradigm for Effective Coach Behavior’, International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching, 3(2), 227?39.
30 Abdul-Jabbar, K. (2017), Coach Wooden and Me: Our 50-Year Friendship On and Off the Court, New York: Grand Central. The following article provides a more in-depth discussion of Wooden’s coaching style and the lessons it may teach business leaders: Riggio, R.E. (2010), ‘The Leadership of John Wooden’, Psychology Today blog, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201006/the-leadership-john-wooden.
31 Ames, N. (13 June 2016), ‘Meet Heimir Hallgrimsson, Iceland’s Co-manager and Practicing Dentist’, ESPN blog, http://www.espn.com/soccer/club/iceland/470/blog/post/2879337/meet-heimir-hallgrimsson-icelands-co-manager-and-practicing-dentist.
Chapter 10
1 See, for instance, Izon, D., Danenberger, E.P. and Mayes, M. (2007), ‘Absence of Fatalities in Blowouts Encouraging in MMS Study of OCS Incidents 1992–2006’, Drilling Contractor, 63(4), 84–9. Gold, R. and Casselman, B. (30 April 2010), ‘Drilling Process Attracts Scrutiny in Rig Explosion’, Wall Street Journal, 30.
2 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/07/transocean-oil-rig-north-sea-deepwater-horizon.
3 Vaughan, A. (16 January 2018), ‘BP’s Deepwater Horizon Bill Tops $65bn’, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/bps-deepwater-horizon-bill-tops-65bn.
4 Barstow, D., Rohde, D. and Saul, S. (25 December 2010), ‘Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours’, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html. And Goldenberg, S. (8 November 2010), ‘BP Had Little Defence against a Disaster, Federal Investigation Says’, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/nov/08/bp-little-defence-deepwater-disaster.
5 Spicer, A. (2004), ‘Making a World View? Globalisation Discourse in a Public Broadcaster’, PhD thesis, Department of Management, University of Melbourne, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35838.
6 Alvesson, M. and Spicer, A. (2016), The Stupidity Paradox: The Power and Pitfalls of Functional Stupidity at Work, London: Profile, Kindle Edition (Kindle Locations 61?7).
7 Alvesson and Spicer, The Stupidity Paradox (Kindle Locations 192?8).
8 Grossman, Z. (2014), ‘Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences’, Management Science, 60(11), 2659?65.
9 Spicer has written about this research in more depth for The Conversation: Spicer, A. (2015), ‘ “Fail Early, Fail Often” Mantra Forgets Entrepreneurs Fail to Learn’, https://theconversation.com/fail-early-fail-often-mantra-forgets-entrepreneurs-fail-to-learn-51998.
10 Huy, Q. and Vuori, T. (2015), ‘Who Killed Nokia? Nokia Did’, INSEAD Knowledge, https://knowledge.insead.edu/strategy/who-killed-nokia-nokia-did-4268. Vuori, T.O. and Huy, Q.N. (2016), ‘Distributed Attention and Shared Emotions in the Innovation Process: How Nokia Lost the Smartphone Battle’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 61(1), 9?51.
11 Grossmann, I. (2017), ‘Wisdom in Context’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(2), 233?57; Staw, B.M., Sandelands, L.E. and Dutton, J.E. (1981), ‘Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(4), 501?24.
12 The entire slideshow is available here: https://www.slideshare.net/reed2001/culture-1798664.
13 Feynman, R. (1986), ‘Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident’, Volume 2, Appendix F, https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/rogers_commission_report.pdf.
14 Dillon, R.L. and Tinsley, C.H. (2008), ‘How Near-misses Influence Decision Making under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning’, Management Science, 54(8), 1425?40.
15 Tinsley, C.H., Dillon, R.L. and Madsen, P.M. (2011), ‘How to Avoid Catastrophe’, Harvard Business Review, 89(4), 90?7.
16 Accord, H. and Camry, T. (2013), ‘Near-misses and Failure (Part 1)’, Harvard Business Review, 89(4), 90?7.
17 Cole, R.E. (2011), ‘What Really Happened to Toyota?’ MIT Sloan Management Review, 52(4).
18 Cole, ‘What Really Happened to Toyota?’
19 Dillon, R.L., Tinsley, C.H., Madsen, P.M. and Rogers, E.W. (2016), ‘Organizational Correctives for Improving Recognition of Near-miss Events’, Journal of Management, 42(3), 671?97.
20 Tinsley, Dillon and Madsen, ‘How to Avoid Catastrophe’.
21 Dillon, Tinsley, Madsen and Rogers, ‘Organizational Correctives for Improving Recognition of Near-miss Events’.
22 Reader, T.W. and O’Connor, P. (2014), ‘The Deepwater Horizon Ex
plosion: Non-Technical Skills, Safety Culture, and System Complexity’, Journal of Risk Research, 17(3), 405?24. See also House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (25 May 2010), ‘Memorandum “Key Questions Arising From Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill” ’, online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/homepage/memo_bp_waxman.pdf.
23 Tinsley, C.H., Dillon, R.L. and Cronin, M.A. (2012), ‘How Near-Miss Events Amplify or Attenuate Risky Decision Making’, Management Science, 58(9), 1596?1613.
24 Tinsley, Dillon and Madsen, ‘How to Avoid Catastrophe’.
25 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2011), Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, p. 224, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
26 Deepwater Horizon Study Group (2011), ‘Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout’, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley, http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/dhsgfinalreport-march2011-tag.pdf.
27 Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M. and Obstfeld, D. (2008), ‘Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness’, Crisis Management, 3(1), 31?66. Plain-language explanations of the characteristics of mindful organisations were also inspired by the following paper: Sutcliffe, K.M. (2011), ‘High Reliability Organizations (HROs)’, Best Practice and Research Clinical Anaesthesiology, 25(2), 133?44.
28 Bronstein, S. and Drash, W. (2010), ‘Rig Survivors: BP Ordered Shortcut on Day of Blast’, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/06/08/oil.rig.warning.signs/index.html.
29 ‘The Loss of USS Thresher (SSN-593)’ (2014), http://ussnautilus.org/blog/the-loss-of-uss-thresher-ssn-593/.
30 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2011), Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, p. 229, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.