Ambush

by Rose Mary Sheldon

  Cleon brought reinforcements,26 in a second Athenian landing and they assaulted the island at dawn from two sides (see map 2).27 According to Thucydides the Athenians landed 800 hoplites, 800 archers, 2,000 light-armed troops, Messenian reinforcements and 8,000 sailors from seventy ships hastily armed for the occasion.28 Several thousand troops against 420 Spartan hoplites may seem like overkill, but the Athenians did not know what to expect. Demosthenes did not just rely on his overwhelming numbers. He divided his troops into companies of 200, which seized all the high places on the island so that whenever the Spartans fought they would find an enemy to the rear of their flanks.

  First they attacked the small Spartan force at the southern end of the island, catching them while they were still in bed and swiftly wiped them out.29 The main body of troops under Epitadas, seeing the southern outpost cut off, tried to close with the Athenian hoplites. The light-armed troops that they were up against, however, gave the Athenians advantage because, even when the Spartans lined up to fight the Athenian hoplites, the light-armed would attack them from the side and rear. If the Spartans in heavy armour fled, the light-armed pursued them; if they turned to fight them, the light-armed could fight at a distance with arrows, javelins, slings and stones.30 The Spartans hoplites were not equipped for this type of fighting, although their helots may have been. Even Thucydides writes that the Spartans were ‘not used to this kind of fighting’ and they were thrown into disarray by the shouting and the dust clouds being caused by the melée and smoke from smouldering fires.31 Deprived of visibility and with no means of fighting back, the Spartan hoplites retreated to the fort at the end of the island and hid behind a fortification to resist further attacks.32 They held out for the rest of the day.33

  This situation was still at a stand-off when the Messenian commander, Comon, came to Cleon and Demosthenes and said that, if they were willing to give him a portion of their bowmen and light-armed troops, he could find a path around the precipitous shore of the island and take the enemy by surprise in the rear.34 He wanted these types of soldiers because they were more suited to a surprise attack on uneven terrain. With the light-armed troops, he picked his way as best he could along the steep cliffs of the island, and going by a route that the Spartans had left unguarded he managed to get behind them without being observed.35 The Spartans, having relied on the nature of the terrain to protect them, now found themselves surrounded much in the way they had at Thermopylae, when a Persian had found a path behind them.36 The Messenians suddenly appeared on high ground in their rear, striking panic into the Spartans – certainly no easy task. The Spartans had not wanted to waste troops guarding such an unlikely approach, so they were truly stunned by the appearance of Comon’s men. The Spartans had been trained for face-to-face hoplite battle. They were unable to engage with their hoplites or reap the advantages of their own specialised training. They were held up instead by weapons shot at them from both flanks by light troops – a situation that had been set up by a night landing and a surprise attack.

  Cleon and Demosthenes did not let their troops kill the Spartans, but rather took them alive as a bargaining chip.37 A proclamation was made asking the Spartans to surrender38 and the Spartans accepted.39 This was a tremendous victory for the Athenians because 120 Spartan hoplites had been captured alive.40 According to Thucydides it was the most unexpected event in the war.41

  Sphacteria brought ambush to the attention of the hoplite world and, according to some, changed the nature of the war. The feat had been accomplished by good intelligence gathering, surprise tactics and it ended the stalemate in favour of the Athenians.42 The Spartans complained about the manner of fighting being ‘unworthy of a hoplite’. In reality, there was no way the Spartan hoplites could have ‘won’ in such a desperate situation, but this did not stop even their own side from suggesting that the Spartans at Sphacteria were no match for their own ancestors.43 They should be given credit for fighting so well against a force of such great size. Modern commentators have joined in on the complaint against the Athenian tactics.44 Stahl writes about the new tactics (neue Taktik) but sneers about ‘der nicht gerade ehrenvolle Kampfesweise, deren die attische Seite sich bedient’ (‘the not entirely honourable tactics that the Attic side employed’).45 Contemptuous remarks such as these show how great the prejudice against anything that is not hoplite fighting can be. As Mao Tse Tung writes: ‘Those who condemn these methods as being a combination of banditry and anarchism have not understood the essence of guerrilla warfare.’ The efficiency of the operation and the success it brought the Athenians was its own justification. It effectively put a stop to further Peloponnesian invasions of Attica. Donald Kagan believes the outcome ‘shook the Greek world’.46

  The Athenian general Demosthenes had scored a victory because of his use of light-armed troops that were suited to pulling off this kind of attack.47 He, perhaps, should have used the same tactics in 426 when the Messenians in Naupactus persuaded him to invade the territory of the Aetolians48 (see map 3). It was assumed that the Aetolians were lightly armed and that this would ensure an Athenian victory. Things turned out differently. Rather than wait for Locrian reinforcements, who were trained in light-armed warfare, Demosthenes decided to penetrate deep into enemy territory with hoplites and stormed Aegitium. When the Aetolians took the offensive it became clear why this was a mistake. The light-armed enemy could move swiftly, attack and retreat. The hoplites were useless and found themselves driven into a forest that was set on fire. A combination of bad planning, poor intelligence and overambition led to disaster. Demosthenes has been criticised for being ‘too fascinated’ with the idea of surprise and, as we have argued, its use does not always guarantee success. For all his tactical wiles, he clearly had not absorbed the light-infantry lessons from the Battle of Spartolus in 429. Demosthenes escaped from this debacle, and he would go on to introduce ambush tactics again in the ensuing conflict.49

  It was a much more prepared Demosthenes that Thucydides describes in his report on the Battle of Olpae in 426/5, where the general took advantage of the terrain to stage an ambush that acted as a force multiplier (see map 6). The Peloponnesian forces were larger than Demosthenes’ Athenians. For this reason, Demosthenes laid an ambush of 400 hoplites and light-armed men in an overgrown hollow. When the enemy, exploiting their superiority, made their flanking movement, the soldiers in ambush emerged from behind them. They won the battle without much trouble. The surprise attack from ambush brought victory to the numerically weaker party.50

  Many commentators have suggested that it was Demosthenes who introduced ambush as a tactic into Greek warfare at Olpae, but, as I have already argued, the technique had been around for a long time, just not used by hoplites.51 Demosthenes was probably adopting Acarnanian tactics and advice at Olpae, since they had been successfully ambushing their enemies for centuries.52 Plus, the Acarnanians knew the local terrain and were most likely to be able to find a site capable of hiding 400 men. The local intelligence provided by the allies, and their previous use of ambush, made the Acarnanians indispensable.

  In 429 the Ambraciots invaded Acarnania (see map 6) together with allies and Peloponnesian troops. One of the invading forces, the Chaeonians, rushed forward to capture the city of Stratus. The Acarnanians of Stratus set an ambush for them around the city, and in a concerted attack charged the enemy from different directions. The result was similar to that at Olpae. The enemy was caught by surprise and retreated.53

  After Olpae came a battle at Idomene in 426/25 (see map 6), which involved both a night attack and an ambush. When Demosthenes heard that the Ambraciots with all their troops were advancing his way, he decided to try an ambush again. Having successfully staged one and seen how effective it could be, and remembering his disastrous experience with the Aetolians, he did not want to leave anything to chance. He sent part of his stronger troops ahead to hide in ambushes along the roads and to occupy certain strategic positions.54 He then divided the rest of his forces, taking half by n
ight towards Idomene, where the Ambraciots had encamped. The Ambraciots, suspecting nothing, had their camp on the smallest hill of Idomene while the largest hill was occupied by Demosthenes’ men. He probably used Amphilocian troops, and indeed their light-armed javelin throwers would play a decisive part in the final stages of the battle.55 That night he attacked the unsuspecting Ambraciots in their sleep after deceiving the guards by having Messenians address them in their own language. Those who managed to escape the ensuing massacre fled into the mountains. There, the heavily-armed Ambraciots were met by the Amphilochians’ javelin throwers, who chased them to their death. Panic-stricken, some of the soldiers fled to the sea nearby, preferring to face the crews of the Athenian ships rather than be massacred by the hated Amphilochians. Only a few survived.56 Idomene was Demosthenes’ greatest triumph, and it was another success based on surprise and ambush.57

  The contrasting outcomes of the Aetolian and Acarnanian campaigns can be explained by the intelligence collected on each. In Aetolia, Demosthenes relied on sources that were foreign to the country he invaded and was ignorant of the enemy’s movements and the local terrain. In Acarnania and Amphilochia local allies provided better-quality intelligence, making the surprise attack possible. Many commentators consider Demosthenes ahead of his time in the use of light-armed troops, intelligence collecting and ambush tactics. What he was doing, rather, was incorporating tactics already known to other Greeks, but now used successfully by the Athenians and their allies in this campaign.58

  Brasidas

  Not only the Athenians used surprise and ambush. It has been suggested that Demosthenes influenced his contemporaries in their strategies. The Spartan Brasidas, like any good commander, Greek or not, was an opportunist. He preferred to take his enemies by surprise rather than to attack them when they were in a position of strength. The Battle of Amphipolis in 422, for which both Brasidas and Cleon recruited peltasts, provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory (see map 4). The importance of this battle lies in the fact that both opponents had been closely involved in the events at Pylos and had witnessed the success that Demosthenes had had with his light-armed troops.59 If the Athenians could recapture Amphipolis, Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace would lose most of its effect. He also believed Amphipolis had ‘an embarrassment of potential traitors’ to help the Spartans get through the gates.60 Even with a strong edge in both light foot troops and cavalry, however, Brasidas relied on surprise.61

  As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians advancing, he withdrew his troops from the hill to the city of Amphipolis. He did not consider marching against the enemy with his entire army to fight a pitched battle, since he feared that the Athenians with their hoplites would win against his peltasts and cavalry. Instead, he decided to launch a surprise attack on the Athenians and fight a battle before the Athenian reinforcements arrived. He selected 150 hoplites and put the rest under the command of Clearidas. Brasidas wanted to charge with his men against the core of the unsuspecting Athenian forces that were stationed in front of Amphipolis. After that, all of Clearidas’ troops would sally forth from another gate, and rush into the midst of the confused Athenians. This second, ‘surprise’ attack was meant to frighten the unsuspecting Athenians. The horsemen and peltasts, who could not be used to full advantage in a pitched battle, could undertake actions for which they were more eminently suited.62

  The Athenians drew up in battle order on the road facing the city where they could watch for activity within the city and be ready to repel attackers. But when the scouts reported to Cleon that an enemy attack through the Thracian gates seemed imminent he decided on an immediate withdrawal to Eion (see map 4). He made the fatal mistake, however, of giving the orders simultaneously by trumpet signal and by verbal messages.63 Some men moved on hearing the trumpet, while others stood waiting. This threw the whole line into confusion. The lack of cohesion exposed the entire Athenian army to attack on their unshielded right. As they moved past the southernmost gate, Brasidas sprang his trap.

  The southern gate swung open and Brasidas himself rushed out at the head of 150 picked men. He charged at the double downhill to the road, probably only a few hundred yards. The Athenians would have had barely a minute to prepare before the enemy group struck the centre of the column like a projectile. Simultaneously, the rest of the Spartan army under Clearidas poured through the northern gate and attacked the Athenian right wing, throwing the whole line into confusion. The leading left wing bolted down the road towards Eion. The right wing put up more resistance, some of them rallying higher up on the hill, but they were finally surrounded and massacred by the Chalcidian cavalry and peltasts. Others got away over the mountains and, if not mopped up later, made their way to Eion. In all, the Athenians lost 600 hoplites, about one-seventh of their total strength. This would have been a total Spartan success except that Brasidas was fatally wounded early in the conflict; Cleon, too, was killed.64 This is the only occasion where Brasidas was supreme commander in a major battle, and it was probably his greatest victory – a well-planned and well-executed surprise attack. Unfortunately, by staging a surprise attack and leading it himself, he had to bear the brunt of the fighting. Scholars have wondered whether he might have trapped even more Athenians, and incidentally saved his own life, if he had split his forces more evenly instead of handing over practically the whole army to his junior colleague and placing himself at the head of a small suicide group, but that consideration aside the surprise operation was a success.65

  Demosthenes continued to fight the war, and he attached a great deal of importance to mobile troops. He recruited no less than 1,300 peltast mercenaries from the Thracian tribe of the Dii for the auxiliary expedition to Sicily in 413.66 We see their use in a night attack in Thucydides67 during the siege of Syracuse when Demosthenes decided on a surprise attack against Epipolae,68 the ancient fortified plateau west of Syracuse (see chapter 6).

  Dawn Attacks

  A common way of achieving surprise was to attack at dawn while the enemy was asleep or at least unprepared. There are at least seventeen cases of dawn attack used in the fifth and early fourth centuries. There were seven cases of dawn attacks that involved naval assaults or descents on the coast, and six assaults on towns, forts or heavily fortified positions such as the wall at the Isthmus of Corinth in 369.69 Xenophon offers the best rationale for dawn attacks on a fortified position: attacking just when the night watches are finishing and the rest of the men are either rising to go about their tasks or still sleeping. You can attack while in good order whereas your opponents are unprepared and in disorder.70

  One classic example of this has already been discussed – the Athenian disembarkment on Sphacteria (see map 2).71 The Athenians attacked the first guard post and killed all the hoplites in their sleep or while they were trying to arm themselves. There are many such examples already given by Herodotus dating back to the Persian wars.

  Sailing at sea at night with a plan to attack at dawn was a common ploy. This stratagem was used already in 480 at Salamis.72 At Sybota in 432 the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, put off by night from Chimerium (see map 3) with the intention of engaging the enemy. At daybreak they came in sight of the Corcyraean ships already in the open sea and bearing down upon them. As soon as they saw each other, both sides took up their positions for battle. Evidently, neither side got the jump on the other.73

  A dawn attack is related by Polyaenus in the story of an ambush set up by Nicias against the Corinthians at Solygeia in the summer of 425. The Athenians made an expedition into Corinthian territory with eighty ships and 2,000 Athenian hoplites, together with 200 cavalry on board horse transports; allied forces also went with them. The Corinthians had had previous intelligence from Argos that the Athenian expeditionary force was coming towards them, and they had accordingly occupied the isthmus with all their forces, except for those who dwelt north of the isthmus and the 500 Corinthians who were away doing garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucadia. All the rest were
in full force, watching to see where the Athenians would land. The Athenian force set sail at night and put in to land between Chersonese and Rheitus at the beach in the country overlooked by the hill on which Solygeia sits (see maps 8 and 10). After landing 1,000 hoplites and stationing them in an ambush in various places, Nicias sailed away. At daybreak he sailed against Corinth again, this time openly. The Corinthians charged out quickly, intending to prevent him from disembarking. The men in ambush rose and killed most of them.74

  In Sicily

  The Sicilian expedition of 415–413 created many opportunities for surprise attack. There was no hope of taking the city of Syracuse by surprise, and it would have been difficult for the Athenians to land at Syracuse at all. So the Athenians, instead, tricked the Syracusans into leaving their city. They sent a man from Catana who was known well to the Syracusan generals. He told them that, on a date of their choice, his friends in Catana would shut the gates on the Athenians in the city and set fire to the Athenian ships. The Syracusans could then capture the Athenian camp by assault. The Syracusans took the bait and set out for Catana in full force, and camped for the night by the River Symaethus, in the territory of Leontini (see map 7). As soon as the Athenians learned of their approach, they took their entire force, including any Sicels and others who had joined them, put them all aboard their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. At dawn, the Athenians landed opposite the Olympeium and fortified their camp unimpeded. The Syracusan cavalry, having ridden all the way to Catana and found that the Athenian expedition had already put to sea, turned back and reported the news to the infantry. They were all forced to return to Syracuse to defend their city. In the time it took the Syracusans to march home, the Athenians had plenty of time to set up their forces in an excellent position where the Syracusan cavalry could do little damage to them.75 This incident became famous and was picked up by many ancient historians including Plutarch, who declared it to be the best generalship Nicias showed in Sicily.76 It certainly does not fit the agonistic model of Greek warfare. The Syracusans preferred a surprise attack, and the Athenians wanted to fight where obstacles protected their wings. Both sides wanted to gain what advantage they could.77