The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Less than 100 meters before the highway, which runs transverse to it and is not visible from the staging area, the 2nd Platoon halted and sent out its first situation report. There was nothing special to report; so far everything was running smoothly, and apart from several enemy infantrymen, nothing was seen. The transmission hardly over, engine noises [arose] from right of the road leading into a small forest.

  Watch out!—then the Soviets come.

  A tank comes in sight and a second one perhaps 50 meters behind it, than a third and finally a fourth follow. It is not clear what type of tank it is. Watching the tanks, the men of the scout detachment completely get off the road. . . .

  The Russians did not see the German vehicles and continued down the road without decreasing speed. Can our combat vehicles hold against them? As an enemy panzer came exactly opposite vehicles from 2nd Platoon, Sergeant Schrodek, the gunner on platoon leader’s vehicle (vehicle #21) sent off his first armor-piercing round with his best regards at the Russians. All other vehicles of the platoon also opened fire.

  Even though at this short distance every shot was a hit, the Russians drove on without much visible effect. For God’s sake, were the Russians so superior that they could only be affected by their own tank guns?

  Only the rapid fire and repeated hits got the reactions from Russians, who turned around and quickly retreated from where they come from.

  “Second platoon, come on!—Second platoon, come on!”

  While the one-sided combat was fading away and the enemy tanks were still followed by some shells, the platoon leader received a call over the radio. He finally acknowledged it and reported: “Found ourselves in combat with four enemy tanks. Type unknown, not indicated on recognition tables. Despite repeated hits, our fire had no effect. It appears as if shells are simply bouncing off. The enemy tanks disengaged without fight and retreated. Are we to push on? Please advise.”

  The 2nd Platoon received instructions to return as soon as possible. The men of the reconnaissance detachment were only happy to follow the instructions, because it did not appeal to them to follow the enemy who shrugged off the well-placed hits without effect.

  Significant in this minor exchange of gunfire was the appearance of the new Soviet T-34 tanks. This was one of the earliest references to the arrival of T-34s. Amazement and anxiety experienced by German tankers at the sight of these new machines was clearly demonstrated in Sergeant Schrodek’s description.

  The Soviets did not pursue Lieutenant von Renesses’s detachment, and his men had a chance to refuel their tanks and replenish the ammunition, and even catch a quick cat-nap. The lull in action did not last long, shredded by a Soviet artillery barrage, as short as it was ineffective. Coming on the heels of the artillery was the main Soviet push of the 10th Tank Division from the XV Mechanized Corps. Once again, Sergeant Schrodek tells the story:

  A divisional reconnaissance plane—a Fiesseler Storch—flew over the regiment and threw out a message in the proximity of regimental commander Lieutenant Colonel Riebel’s car. Afterwards, the entire regiment received orders: “Clear for combat!”

  Soon everyone down to the last man knew that behind the heights before Radekhov a large concentration of enemy tanks set itself to intercept the regiment’s direction of march and could emerge any moment.

  Hardly quarter of an hour passes before one can see them coming. Ten—twenty—thirty—and still more coming, beginning to roll over the crest of the hill and open fire immediately. However, their fire is landing short, without seriously impacting the regiment.

  It is better to let the Russian tanks get closer still, because it is best for our tank cannons to fire from less than 400 meters. A shallow dip in the ground temporarily hides the first wave of the enemy vehicles from the view. However, if they emerge from it again, they will give the men in the combat vehicles of the regiment an ideal firing position. The gunners on all cars re-sighted their guns in such a manner as to take the enemy tanks under fire the moment they emerge from the dip.

  Then it’s time, and shell after shell flies towards the Russians. Most of the first shells were hits, some even direct hits. Others tear away whole sections of armor from the enemy combat vehicles. One can see damaged enemy tanks everywhere, with their crews dismounting the best they can. But still, tank fights tank, with new targets emerging. The Russians did not succeed [in] breaking down or breaking through the German lines anywhere, however.

  When . . . in the afternoon of June 23rd, approached the end of the first large-scale acid test of the regiment in the Russian campaign, and the opponent withdrew to the south with heavy losses, 46 of his tanks remained destroyed on the battlefield.18

  This was the litmus test for the Soviet tanks as well, the one in which they did not perform well. This attack was a microcosm of the deficiencies which were to plague the Soviet mechanized formations throughout the early period of the war. The difficulties could be summarized by an excerpt from a Soviet report:

  At 1500 hours, the 20th Tank and 10th Motorized Rifle regiments, carrying out mission of capturing Radekhov, went onto attack in the direction of Radekhov-Sokal. The 10th Artillery Regiment by this time was [still] on the march, since at the time of sounding of alarm it was in the camps at Yanov, and the 19th Tank Regiment, due to difficulties experienced on the march, did not reach staging areas and did not take part in the attack. Attack of the motorized rifle and 20th Tank regiments (each without a battalion), without artillery support, and faced with clearly superior enemy forces deployed in an advantageous position, was unsuccessful.19

  Besides bringing only partial forces to bear, commander of the 10th Tank Division, Maj. Gen. Sergey Y. Ogurtzov, conducted the attack in the most unimaginative manner. Wave after wave, the Soviet tanks crested the hill, and they went down into a dip, all the while exposing vulnerable sides and underbellies to German artillery fire. Then, coming out of the low ground, the Soviet tanks exposed their thinly armored undersides for the second time. Even the T-34 tanks, not having their equal among the 15th Panzer Regiment, were neutralized by concentrated German point-blank fire, heavily supplemented by the versatile 88s. The fight at Radekhov demonstrated what would be a major recurring factor during the next week of fighting—Soviet armor attacks, unsupported by their own artillery, dashing themselves to pieces in front of German antitank defenses.

  The other tank division of the XV Mechanized Corps, the 37th, was already within twenty miles of Radekhov by 1400 hours when it was intercepted by corps commander Karpezo and sent chasing ghosts. Commander of the 37th Tank Division, Colonel F. G. Anikushkin, later described the events:

  Commander of 15th Mechanized Corps, Major General Karpezo, informed [me] that in the vicinity of Adama there were up to 100 enemy tanks and ordered the 37th Tank Division to [destroy them]. Reconnaissance was sent towards Adama, and the tank regiments were turned 90 degrees from their routes of march. . . . It later turned out that there were no enemy tanks in the vicinity of Adama. The tank regiments, after delaying for five–six hours in Adama vicinity, continued [their] previous mission. This resulted in 37th Tank Division not being able to reach its staging area in time.20

  Had Karpezo utilized his motorcycle regiment in its proper reconnaissance role, he would have quickly established the fact that there were no German tanks in the vicinity of Adama. Instead, he immediately diverted a whole tank division in reaction to rumors. As the result, close to 250 tanks of the 37th Tank Division which could have altered the outcome of the clash at Radekhov did not reach the town until early morning of June 24.21

  The Germans claimed forty-six Soviet vehicles destroyed at Radekhov, while losing only one of their own tanks damaged beyond repair.22 Here, a curiosity in reported losses is demonstrated. The Germans reported as lost only those tanks that were damaged beyond repair. The Soviets claimed any German tank disabled on the battlefield as a kill. However, since the Germans, at least in the beginning of the war, generally remained in possession of the battlefield, they wer
e able to evacuate and repair their damaged combat vehicles. On the same note, since the Soviets retreated from the same battlefields, their damaged tanks were irretrievably lost to them.

  Still, in this situation, both sides’ estimates of Soviet losses were close. While the Germans claimed forty-six destroyed Soviet tanks, just the Soviet 10th Tank Division stated losing twenty-six tanks, including six T-34s. We need to remember that besides the 10th Tank Division, a task force of the 32nd Tank Division from the IV Mechanized Corps fought at Radekhov as well. Given people’s tendency of lowering their own losses and inflating those of the enemy, German claims seem reasonable. On the other hand, 10th Tank Division’s claims of destroying twenty German tanks look a little high.

  As the black, oily smoke still rose from the destroyed Soviet armor near Radekhov, the Germans did not rest on their laurels. Reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Panzer Regiment, the 110th Infantry Regiment raced on and by the end of the day established a bridgehead on the Styr River, approximately fifteen miles east of Radekhov.

  JUNE 24, 1941 Vladimir-Volynskiy and Lutsk Direction

  Being late for the attack the previous evening, the morning of June 24 found the 135th Rifle Division deployed two miles east of Voinitsa, a small village located roughly halfway between Vladimir-Volynskiy and Lutsk. Its commander, Maj. Gen. F. N. Smekhotvorov, while preparing for the attack, did not posses information that Germans were already flowing around both flanks of his unit. Smekhotvorov’s division was deployed on the north-south axis across the Vladimir-Volynskiy–Lutsk road, its left flank resting on the Lokachi village. Behind the 135th, a powerful Soviet artillery task force was taking up its positions astride the road leading to Lutsk. This task force consisted of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 406th Artillery Regiment of the XXVII Rifle Corps, and the artillery from the 135th Rifle Division, all headed by the chief of artillery of the Fifth Army, Maj. Gen. V. N. Sotenski. Opposing the Soviet forces were the German 298th Infantry and 13th and 14th Panzer divisions.

  The two divisions from the XXII Mechanized Corps, the 19th Tank and 215th Motorized Rifle, had a busy night moving into attack positions. They were subject to constant German air strikes and mechanical breakdowns, which were severely draining the Soviet offensive capability. Part of the route of the two divisions took them cross-country, through the marshy wetlands unsuitable for mechanized formations. The 19th Tank Division was the closest to their assigned positions, but still late. The 215th Motorized Rifle fell hopelessly behind the timetable. Therefore, attack on Vladimir-Volynskiy was postponed from 0400 hours until the time both divisions would be ready to go. Moreover, commander of the XXII Mechanized Corps, Major General Kondrusev, became separated from his command and moved forward with the headquarters element of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade.

  However, the time for the Soviet attack came and went at 0800 hours, and the 14th Panzer Division, supported by aviation, preempting the Soviet forces, attacked the 135th Rifle Division and pushed it three miles east. There, the advancing Germans ran into defensive positions of two artillery battalions from the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The furious fire of the Soviet gunners finally halted German advance. Still, while stopped in the center and on the northern flank, the Germans began working around the southern flank of Soviet positions.

  Around 1300 hours, the 19th Tank Division finally arrived in the woods north of Shelnov. This division only had forty-five operational tanks and twelve armored cars remaining after losing vehicles on the march due to German air strikes and mechanical breakdowns. They were combined into a provisional regiment. After a short preparatory artillery barrage and supported by the 135th Rifle Division, the provisional tank regiment went into the offensive. By 1630 hours the Soviet troops forced the enemy to fall back towards the Voinitsa-Lokachi line.

  But the Germans were not done for the day yet. Around 1800 hours they hit back at the 135th Rifle and 19th Tank divisions and mauled them. The 19th Tank Division was particularly severely brutalized. The butcher bill of senior commanders was particularly impressive: Lt. Col. B. G. Bibik, commander of the 37th Tank Regiment—taken prisoner; Lieutenant Colonel Samsonov, commander of the 38th Tank Regiment—killed in action; Lieutenant Colonel Sokolin, commander of the 19th Motorized Rifle Regiment—mortally wounded. The division commander, Major General Semenchenko, suffered a light arm wound and narrowly escaped death after his tank was knocked out. The mauled 19th Tank Division broke, and people began streaming back in disorder, sweeping division’s rear echelons along with them. Panic and despair afflicted not just lower enlisted. Many officers were affected just as badly as their subordinates and were unable or unwilling to rally their men. When division was finally rallied and shaken to order on June 26, it mustered only four tanks, four cannons, and two under-strength motorized infantry battalions.23 However, while the 19th Tank Division was spilling its lifeblood into marshy ground at Voinitsa, its sister 131st Motorized Rifle Division, assisted by some of Moskalenko’s gunners, arrived south of Lutsk and stabilized the situation. The action was costly, leaving Major General Kondrusev, commander of the XXII Mechanized Corps, hors de combat.

  Commander of the 1st Antitank Brigade, Major General Moskalenko, described these events in his memoirs:

  Halfway between Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynskiy our advance element caught up to a small convoy of several armored cars and two tanks. It turned out that we met up with commander of the 22nd Mechanized Corps and command group of his headquarters. Introductions were quick. I informed Major-General S. M. Kondrusev and his corps Chief of Staff Major General V. S. Tamruchi about my assigned mission.

  In his turn, Kondrusev confirmed that he received orders to attack the enemy in the area of Vladimir-Volynskiy. . . . We continued forward together, and I climbed into his tank.

  We were close to Vladimir-Volynskiy when we heard rapid artillery fire. They were coming from somewhere up ahead of us. We left the tank and climbed to the top of a small hill near the highway, from where we saw that coming towards us, to the left and right of the highway, large number of tanks and motorized infantry were advancing in combat formation. The brigade’s advance guard, located a little ahead of us, was firing upon them.

  “Please cease fire immediately,” Major General Kondrusev asked me worriedly. “It is possible they are from our 41st Tank [Division], retreating under enemy pressure.”

  The distance between us and approaching tanks was approximately [one mile], and I could clearly see through my binoculars the crosses on their sides. . . .

  Conditions of our entry into the fight were extremely unfavorable. First of all, this was a meeting engagement of artillery units on the march against enemy’s superior combined arms forces.

  In this first battle, the brigade’s gunners knocked out and burned almost seventy tanks and armored cars, many motorcycles, and other materiel of the 14th Panzer Division. Significant casualties were also inflicted upon the 298th Infantry Division. Our losses were heavy as well. The brigade lost four artillery batteries with all personnel and equipment. Major-General S. M. Kondrusev was mortally wounded by a shell fragment.”24

  At the time of Kondrusev’s death, he was completely out of touch with his mechanized corps and did not realize that it was his 19th Tank Division, and not the 41st, that was being decimated.

  The Soviet losses were not in vain. German units could not advance into the face of heavy fire from entrenched Soviet artillery. While it is highly unlikely that Germans lost seventy combat vehicles, as claimed by Moskalenko, their casualties were serious nonetheless. More significantly, they were unable to quickly break through to Lutsk along the highway and were forced to probe east along less-desirable roads.

  Still, the ever-present German reconnaissance elements found suitable roads, and strong elements of the 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions began flanking Moskalenko’s positions. By nightfall, the Germans reached so far around Moskalenko’s southern flank that he had to abandon his positions, heavily paid for in blood,
and pull back to the western outskirts of Zaturtsi. His men spent the night busily preparing new positions.

  During the night, Moskalenko deployed his brigade in three lines astride the highway to Lutsk. His last defensive positions were in the immediate vicinity of Lutsk itself. He left his reserves in the city: two of the brigade’s own battalions plus several artillery batteries and battalions that became separated from their units.25

  At the same time, a new threat developed north of Lutsk, in the vicinity of a small town of Rozhysche. At this location, German reconnaissance elements were spotted probing for fords across the Styr River. Fifth Army’s commander, Lieutenant General Potapov, ordered Moskalenko to shift part of his force there to prevent Germans from establishing a beachhead. Several other Soviet units from XXII Mechanized Corps and the 135th Rifle Division began pulling back there as well.

  Throughout June 24, the 215th Motorized Rifle Division, completely out of contact with the higher echelons or engaging the enemy, slugged on foot through the poor terrain in the triangle between Kovel-Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynskiy–Lutsk highways.

  Kovel Direction

  While furious battle raged along the Vladimir-Volynskiy–Lutsk highway, the situation north of it was more stable. In morning of June 24, the XV Rifle Corps under Colonel I. I. Fedyuninskiy, after suffering heavy casualties the previous day, was maintaining its positions. By midafternoon, after German advance along the Lutsk highway exposed Fedyuninskiy’s left flank, commander of the Fifth Army, Major General Potapov, ordered Fedyuninskiy to pull his corps back to place it on line with Kovel. The Soviet troops began steadily giving ground, not allowing the Germans to achieve a breakthrough of these positions.

  The 41st Tank Division from the XXII Mechanized Corps sat largely idle immediately north of Kovel, still protecting it from a rumored attack from northwest. In his memoirs, Fedyuninskiy bitterly claimed that the commander of the 41st Tank Division, Colonel Pavlov, was more concerned with preserving his combat vehicles than actively supporting actions of the XV Rifle Corps.26