The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  The columns were moving at top speed. Unfortunately, the tractor-towed corps artillery was falling severely behind; the difference in speed was slowing down the overall concentration of forces. Since [I] wanted to go into combat supported by artillery, [I] had to call for halts. Often, we were forced to stop because our columns were subjected to enemy air attacks.42

  Shortly after 2000 hours, after passing Busk, General Zhukov’s car caught up with Ryabyshev’s headquarters. After listening to Ryabyshev’s brief situation report and plans for the next day’s battle, Zhukov departed for Tarnopol and headquarters of the South-Western Front.

  Unbeknown to the command of the VIII Mechanized Corps, German aerial reconnaissance spotted its concentration in the evening of June 25. The next morning it would have to attack into alerted and prepared antitank defenses.

  Tarnopol, Headquarters of the South-Western Front

  Since his arrival at the South-Western Front in Tarnopol, General Zhukov was constantly on the move, cajoling and bullying commanders into getting their troops to the front faster. At around 1700 hours, when the outcome of the fight around Voinitsa and Lokachi still hung in the balance, he telegraphed Potapov and requested the update on the situation.

  Potapov reported that while the situation around Kovel was stable, the XXVII Rifle Corps was practically shuttered east of Vladimir-Volynskiy. Its 87th Rifle Division was fighting largely surrounded, and there was no news at all about the 124th Rifle Division. Approaches to Lutsk were being held for now, but there were no reinforcements available to shore up threatened sectors. Potapov was especially concerned that the Germans would attack Lutsk from the south, forcing him to fight on two fronts. Potapov was urgently requesting reinforcements, especially in aviation.43

  In his turn, Zhukov informed General Potapov of the overall situation on the South-Western Front, with particular emphasis being given to the German breakthrough at the juncture between the Fifth and Sixth armies and their push to Brody. He added that the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps would be attacking the German spearhead from the south. The intent of this maneuver was to destroy the enemy group of forces operating around Berestechko. This would allow the Soviet forces to reestablish the integrity of the border and, in their turn, to attack in the direction of Lyublin.

  Furthermore, Potapov was to ensure that Kovel was firmly defended, the encircled 87th Rifle Division was to be assisted by any means possible, liaison officers were to be sent to all major subordinate units, and situation reports were to be submitted every two hours. Also, in response to Potapov’s report that the 152mm cannons of his KV-2 tanks did not have armor-piercing ammunition, Zhukov advised him to use the concrete-piercing ammunition. In conclusion, Zhukov expressed his belief that Popatov and his commissar, Member of the Military Council Nikishev, would accomplish their task.

  The Military Council of the South-Western Front now had to decide whether to continue the attack on June 25 with just the XV Mechanized Corps or halt operations for one day and wait for complete arrival and concentration of IV, VIII, IX, and XIX Mechanized Corps. However, with Zhukov being present at the headquarters of the South-Western Front to ensure that Moscow’s attack orders were being carried out, there wasn’t much decision-making leeway available to Kirponos, Purkayev, and Vashugin. The XV Mechanized Corps and whatever units from the IV and VIII Mechanized Corps that reached vicinity of Brody were to attack on the 25th.44 Kirponos and his staff were not aware yet that the IV Mechanized Corps became largely entangled in fighting along the front of the Sixth Army and would not be able to take part in the general counterattack. Only one of its divisions, the 8th Tank, would make the belated entry into the fray south of Berestechko.

  Kirponos’orders read:

  The main mission of the right-flank armies of the South-Western Front for June 25th, 1941—destruction of the mobile enemy group of forces . . . and for the 8th, 15th and 4th Mechanized corps to reach the region of Voinitsa-Milyatin-Sokal. Besides destroying the main (Sokal) enemy group of forces, this maneuver [will] neutralize the threat of encirclement of the main body of our 5th Army by the enemy.

  The units of 8th, 15th and 4th Mechanized Corps are to take up starting attack positions during the night of 24th–25th of June. . . . At exactly 0700 hours on June 25th, 1941, the mechanized corps are to go onto offensive and, destroying the mechanized and infantry enemy units, by 1200 hours accomplish the immediate mission.45

  This attack was to be supported by three Soviet air force divisions.

  German soldiers manning an assault boat. Most of the large rivers in northern Ukraine run north-to-south, aiding the Red Army in defense. After the initial phase of the invasion, when the Germans captured border bridges intact, the retreating Soviet troops became more adept at destroying bridges behind them, requiring Germans to force river crossings frequently.

  Red Army POWs. Caught in cauldrons created by fast-moving panzers and mopping-up infantry, Soviet soldiers were being captured by the hundreds of thousands. By the end of 1941, the prewar Red Army was virtually destroyed.

  Display of captured Soviet outdated war materiel: I-153 biplane fighter and 152mm howitzer Model 1910/1937. Nicknamed Chayka (“seagull,” after the shape of its upper wing), the I-153 fighter was at the top of the biplane fighter class. However, its time had passed, and Chaykas proved to be no match for German Messerschmitt Bf 109s. The howitzer was an upgraded World War I version, suffering from slow towing speeds and limited traverse and elevation.

  Wehrmacht soldiers were eagerly welcomed by Ukrainian civilians early in the war, civilians who believed that the Germans were coming to save them from the Bolsheviks. Ukrainian nationalists provided invaluable aid to the Germans as scouts and saboteurs against the Red Army. However, the honeymoon was soon over, once the Ukrainians realized that the Germans were coming not as liberators, but as a different kind of slave master.

  T-26 light tanks, year 1933 model. The reversed turrets indicate that this unit was engaged from the rear. The two tanks in the foreground appear abandoned, rather than damaged. However, one of the tanks in the center background has its turret knocked off, which is seen lying on the ground.

  T-28 medium tank, a three-turreted machine designed for an infantry-support role. Its main turret mounted a 76.2mm cannon, while the two smaller ones each had one 7.62mm machine gun. It performed reasonably well during the Winter War with Finland in 1940. While outdated by 1941, it was the first vehicle of its class in the world to go into serial production in 1933.

  German soldiers inspecting a Soviet 120mm mortar and its limber. Almost completely lacking air defense means, the strung-out Soviet columns became easy prey for German aircraft. Especially hard hit were Soviet artillery units, which greatly reduced the Red Army’s ability to support its armor on the attack and deal with attacking German panzers. This particular limber team has its dead horses still in their traces.

  Soviet dead lie on one of the nameless roads in Ukraine. Their weapons appear to have been picked up, possibly by their own side. Note the unwound bandages spilling from the head of the figure in the foreground.

  Red Army reservist POWs. Very often called-up reservists were sent into combat without being properly equipped and outfitted, many still in their civilian clothes, as demonstrated by the two figures in the foreground. Note several other men wearing the budyonovka, a high-peaked broadcloth hat. These hats were supposed to be phased out in the mid-1930s, but large quantities of them still remained in many depots.

  BT-7 light tank. The BT series of tanks, literally meaning “fast tank” (bystrokhondiy tank), was developed to conduct break-through operations in depth. The basis for the BT series was the work of an American engineer, John Walter Christie. BT tanks operated in tracked and wheeled modes. This particular machine had its tracks removed to allow for faster movement on the road.

  This BT-7 tank bears a distinctive white triangle marker, identifying it as belonging to the 34th Tank Division of the VIII Mechanized Corps. A similar triangle can be
seen on one of the turret hatch covers. Due to its distinctive profile with the oval hatch covers raised, the Germans nicknamed the BT-7 “Mickey Mouse.”

  German soldiers posing on a KV-1 heavy tank belonging to the VIII Mechanized Corps. The appearance of new Soviet tanks like heavy KVs and medium T-34s was shocking to German troops. However, once the fighting was over, the multitude of abandoned and destroyed Soviet tanks provided a convenient and desirable background for German soldiers posing for keepsake photos..

  KV-2 heavy tank. This tank, with a 152mm howitzer in a naval turret mounted on the same chassis as the KV-1, was designed to assist Soviet infantry in breaching enemy fortifications. With its howitzer’s high trajectory, the KV-2 was never envisioned to operate in an antitank role and had no armor-piercing ammunition. During the few times KV-2s came to grips with German panzers, Soviet tankers were forced to use concrete-piercing rounds against the German machines.

  A sad end for this T-34 medium tank. Often regarded as the best tank of World War II, the highly maneuverable T-34, with its thick sloping armor, was more than a match for any German machine. However, poor Soviet command and tactics negated the tremendous advantage afforded by this excellent tank. Gen. Heinz Guderian was so impressed with this machine he insisted that a team of engineers be dispatched to the eastern front to study this model.

  T-38 amphibious reconnaissance tank with its turret reversed. In the swimming mode, this tank was propelled by a three-bladed propeller mounted in the rear. This tank was designed to operate as a scout. However, due to the very small number of radios actually installed in them, the T-38’s performance in its reconnaissance role was very limited. After 1941, it was rarely used in combat, most often relegated to the role of artillery tractor.

  T-35 heavy tank. The two German soldiers in the photo illustrate the scale of this machine. The huge tank weighed in at fifty tons, mounting five turrets and operated by crew of eleven. Only sixty-one of these machines were produced, with the majority of still-operational vehicles concentrated in the VIII Mechanized Corps. Plagued by a multitude of mechanical difficulties, almost all of these tanks were abandoned before coming to grips with the enemy.

  CHAPTER 9

  Piecemeal Forward, June 25

  JUNE 25 WAS A DIFFICULT DAY for the South-Western Front, resulting in the loss of the important cities of Lutsk and Dubno.

  The command group of the South-West Front recognized the danger which the German armored group operating in the area of Berestechko and Dubno posed to its sector. There was a real danger that after passing Dubno, the German mechanized forces would turn south, attempting to envelope the bulk of the armies of the South-Western Front still holding the Lvov salient.

  Therefore, Kirponos ordered Potapov to vigorously attack towards Dubno with the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps. The IX and XIX Mechanized Corps would be attacking Dubno from north and northeast, while the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps would be attacking towards Dubno and Berestechko from south and southwest. At the same time, Kirponos deployed the XXXVI and XXXVII Rifle Corps and bulk of the 2nd Antitank Brigade in line anchored on Kremenets and facing north to parry the expected German attack south. The offensive was planned for 0900 hours on June 26.

  The attack of the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps against the Radzekhov enemy group of forces was designated as primary. The IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were delegated the supporting role. In a follow-up move, after destroying the Dubno enemy group of forces, Potapov was to turn northwest and attack the Lutsk German group of forces.1

  After General Zhukov returned from his inspection tour of the Fifth Army, he approved Kirponos’ overall plan. However, Zhukov also wanted the XXXVI and XXXVII Rifle Corps to take part in the offensive, instead of remaining in static positions against the possibility of German flanking move.2

  Kirponos’ staff spent the whole of the 25th gathering information about the status of the mechanized corps that were supposed to take part in the attack. Lieutenant General Ryabyshev, commanding the VIII Mechanized, reported that he would be ready for the offensive in the morning, but with only his two tank divisions. His motorized rifle division fell behind and would not be ready to start off on time.

  Major General Karpezo, commanding the XV Mechanized, reported that only small part of his depleted corps would be able to participate in the offensive. He also requested that the time of the attack be postponed to allow the 8th Tank Division from the IV Mechanized Corps to link up with him. Karpezo was disappointed when informed that the 8th Tank Division would need at least another day to arrive. He was ordered by Kirponos to attack at the assigned time with whatever forces available.3

  Potapov reported that the bulk of the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps would not be completely ready for attack until the afternoon of June 26. Like Karpezo, Potapov was ordered by Kirponos to attack with whatever was available.

  Potapov’s reconnaissance finally confirmed that there were no large mobile enemy forces north of Kovel. With the loss of Lutsk, the center of the Fifth Army’s front lines was deep behind its right flank. In order not to have more of his forces suffer the fate of 87th and 124th Rifle divisions, Potapov ordered the troops holding Kovel to begin retreating east. All too happy, the 41st Tank Division and its supporting 285th Howitzer Regiment started pulling back.

  At the same time, the XXIV Mechanized Corps began moving towards positions of the XXXVI Rifle Corps at Kremenets.4 However, this weak formation did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting at Dubno.

  LUTSK DIRECTION

  While the situation on Potapov’s right flank in the area of the XV Rifle Corps was holding, his left flank was in tatters.

  The forces which carried out the feeble initial counterattack the previous day, the 135th Rifle, 215th Motorized Rifle, and 19th Tank Divisions and 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, not only were unable to destroy the Vladimir-Volynskiy enemy group of forces, they themselves were threatened with being cut off from Lutsk by the 13th Panzer Division. The Germans steadily advancing on Kovel from the west were beginning to work around the right flank of the XV Rifle Corps, threatening it with encirclement. Likewise, after collapse of the XXVII Rifle Corps, the XV Corps was also threatened on the left flank as well.

  With the destruction of the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions, 135th Rifle Division was holding the area of operations of the XXVII Rifle Corps. The rear echelon support services of Potapov’s army were in disarray. Many round-out units were not mobilized due to the suddenness of the German attack. Numerous supply depots that were positioned too close to the border fell into German hands.

  Realizing the severity of the Fifth Army’s situation, command of the South-Western Front approved Potapov’s request to begin pulling troops from Kovel, at the same time transferring the IX and XIX Mechanized and XXXI Rifle Corps under his direct command. The 193rd and 200th Rifle divisions of the XXXI Rifle Corps began taking up positions along the Ikva River, from Dubno to Kremenets. These two divisions had been marching to the border on foot since June 18 and were thoroughly physically exhausted. In addition, as they got closer to the front, their strung-out columns were subjected to numerous air attacks and suffered casualties and loss of equipment. This corps, under Comcor (Corps Commander, an older Soviet rank, roughly equivalent to Lieutenant General. By the start of the war, some Soviet commanders had not yet received their new rank designations.) A. I. Lopatin, received its orders on June 16 to start moving to the border and concentrate in the area roughly five miles northwest of Kovel by June 28.5

  The third division of the corps, the 195th Rifle, remained in the reserve of the South-Western Front.

  Like probing pincers, three battle groups of the 14th Panzer Division were extremely active in the vicinity of Lutsk during June 25. Representing a mission-oriented balanced all-arms task forces, each of these combat groups was capable of carrying out independent tasks:

  • Kampfgroup Stempel. 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (minus 2nd Battalion), 36th Panzer Regiment (minus one tank company)
, one battalion from the 3rd Artillery Regiment, one battery from 607th Mortar Battalion (corps assets, 210mm mortars), one battery from 60th Artillery Regiment (corps assets, 100mm cannons), one company of 4th Antitank Battalion, 2nd Company of 13th Motorized Engineer Battalion, and several smaller support detachments.

  • Kamfgroup Falkenstein. 103rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment, one tank company of 36th Panzer Regiment, 2nd Battalion of 4th Artillery Regiment, 4th Antitank Battalion (minus one battery), and several small platoon-sized detachments.

  • Kampfgroup Damerow, holding defensive positions near a bridge at Rozhysche. One battalion of 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, one battalion of 4th Artillery Regiment.

  • Division was reinforced by corps artillery: 511th Artillery Regiment (150mm howitzers), 2nd Battalion of the 60th Artillery Regiment (100mm cannons), 607th Heavy Artillery Battalion (210mm mortars, minus one battery), 731st Heavy Artillery Battalion.6

  Other German panzer divisions were similarly formed into mission-oriented combat packages, generously sprinkled with corps artillery. This would prove to be an all-important factor in the upcoming straggle over the next several days.

  While pulling back the XV and XXVII Rifle Corps, Potapov began preparing plans for IX and XIX Mechanized Corps’ attack on June 26. Severe shortage of staff and communications officers prevented Potapov from setting up a command group to coordinate the activities of the two corps involved in the counterattack. To better exercise control of the attacking mechanized corps, Potapov moved his headquarters closer to the front line. He set up his command post roughly six miles north of Klevan, not far from the headquarters of Rokossovskiy’s IX Mechanized Corps.