The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Incredulously, Ryabyshev and Popel attempted to question this officer, Col. A. N. Mikhailov, who apparently did not have much information to share. Shrugging off questions by the two men, Mikhailov quickly beat a retreat and raced off to find the XV Mechanized Corps, evidently with the same instructions.

  These two conflicting sets of orders received by the VIII Mechanized Corps, even though puzzling, could be explained by the fact that command of the South-Western Front still operated in the environment of limited and late information. Knowing that the attack of the northern pincer, by the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps, was defeated, Kirponos and his command group possibly assumed that the southern pincer, the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps, were defeated as well and ordered them to pull back. Then, finding out that the VIII Mechanized Corps actually made good progress, ordered the two southern corps to turn around and continue the offensive. Off course, this is only a possible explanation, since Colonel General Kirponos’ reasoning died with him in September of 1941.

  Ryabyshev and his staff began making preparation for the renewed attack lacking any concrete information about the overall situation:

  Who were our neighbors on right and left, what will be their course of action—was unknown to me. In this case, it would be difficult for me, as the corps commander, and my staff, to make appropriate decision. We needed to know where the enemy was, what was he doing, what are his intentions and numbers. But we did not have that information. This was characteristic of the first days of war. Orders coming from Front’s headquarters, due to lack of needed information, not always reflected the current situation, which due to the fluid character of combat actions was changing hourly.40

  Taking into consideration distance to their objective and condition of his corps, Ryabyshev knew that he would not be able to start his mission at least until 0200 hours on June 28.

  Around 0900 hours on 27th, Ryabyshev gave orders to commander of 6th Motorcycle Regiment, Col. T. I. Tributskiy, to scout out enemy dispositions. The divisions were to concentrate at their staging areas by 0200 on June 28. They were to be deployed in two echelons: the two tank divisions in the first and the motorized rifle division in the second. He assigned the 12th Tank Division the main task of taking Dubno by attacking along the Brody-Dubno highway. The 34th Tank Division was to secure the left flank of the 12th. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was to follow up and exploit the 12th Tank Division’s expected progress.41

  As General Ryabyshev was poring over maps and situation reports, his adjutant announced that visitors from the South-Western Front headquarters were arriving. He remembered an uncomfortable, to say the least, scene that unfolded:

  I stepped out of the tent and saw several cars. The first one already stopped. The Member of the Military Council of the South-Western Front, Corps Commissar N. N. Vashugin, was inside. Adjusting [my] cap, I hurried up to him with a report. Vashugin’s tired face was unfriendly:

  “Why did you not carry out orders about advancing on Dubno?” interrupting me, [Vashugin] curtly asked.

  I tried again to make my report.

  “Quiet! This is treason!”

  “Comrade Corps Commissar,” interrupted Brigade Commissar N. K. Popel, standing next to me. His voice was calm and decisive. “You can demand that the order be carried out. But you need to hear us out, too.”

  [Vashugin] glared angrily at Popel. Then, glancing at a wristwatch, in calm tones ordered [us] to report the situation and decision to continue fighting.42

  When Ryabyshev reported his situation, stating that his corps would not be able to resume the offensive until the next morning, Vashugin blew up.

  “What?!” exclaimed [Vashugin]. “Make an immediate decision—and forward!”

  “With what, forward?” I asked. But he did not hear my question.

  “I am ordering you to immediately begin the offensive!” Vashugin demanded again.

  “I consider it a crime before Motherland to commit [my] forces into combat piecemeal. This means useless suicide. At most, some partial units could not attack today until after 1400 hours.”

  “Good,” agreed [Vashugin]. “I can accept the last suggestion. Make it happen!”43

  In his descriptions of the same encounter, Commissar Popel is a lot less charitable towards Vashugin than Ryabyshev was. Here’s Popel’s depiction:

  [Vashugin] walked directly at Ryabyshev, trampling bushes with his highly polished boots. When he got close, looking up at [Ryabyshev], in a voice tense with fury, he asked:

  “How much did you sell yourself for, Judas?”

  Ryabyshev was standing at the position of attention in front of [Vashugin], confused, not knowing what to say; we were all were looking at [Vashugin] in confusion. Ryabyshev spoke up first:

  “Comrade Corps Commissar, if you would hear me out . . . “

  “You will be heard by military tribunal, traitor. Right here, under this fir, we’ll hear you out, and right here we’ll shoot you.”44

  Vashugin’s threat was not an idle one. Among the entourage accompanying Vashugin, Popel recognized the prosecutor and the chief of military tribunal of the South-Western Front. Vashugin even brought along a platoon of soldiers. Knowing that his fate was tied to Ryabyshev’s, Popel made an attempt to save both of their lives:

  I could not contain myself any longer and took a step forward:

  “You can accuse us all you want. However, you have to hear us out.”

  Now the torrent of curses fell upon me. Everybody knew that [Vashugin] hated being interrupted. But I had nothing to lose. I used his own tactic. This was not an intentional action; the fury guided me:

  “It is still to be determined, what was the reasoning of those who ordered us to cede to the enemy territory which we took in combat.”

  [Vashugin] halted. His voice has a barely perceptible confusion:

  “Who ordered you to cede territory? What are you babbling about? General Ryabyshev, report!” Ryabyshev made his report while [Vashugin] paced in front of him. . . . [Vashugin] understood that he was not on solid ground, but was not giving up. Consulting his watch, he ordered Ryabyshev: “You have twenty minutes to report your decision.”45

  It is interesting that while describing this encounter in his memoirs, Popel never called Vashugin by his name. He always referred to Vashugin by his rank of “Corps Commissar” or duty position “Member of Military Council.”

  While Ryabyshev and his staff officers gathered to quickly hash out possible course of action, Popel noted how Ryabyshev’s “hands were shaking and eyes were moist.”46 One can appreciate the courage that Ryabyshev summoned several minutes later to give Vashugin bad news: “[VIII Mechanized] Corps could be ready for action only by tomorrow morning.”47

  Barely containing his anger, Commissar Vashugin ordered Lieutenant General Ryabyshev to immediately renew his offensive. He gave Ryabyshev two choices: begin offensive now or be relieved of duty and court-martialed. With members of military tribunal and a platoon of enforcers present at their command post, neither Ryabyshev nor Popel had any illusion as to what would happen if Ryabyshev were to continue insisting on inability to advance. With their own side more fearsome than the enemy, Ryabyshev and Popel made “suicidal decision—commit the corps into combat piecemeal.”48

  After another brief conference, the following decision was made. A mobile group under command of Popel would be formed from Colonel Vasilyev’s 34th Tank Division, Lieutenant Colonel Volkov’s 24th Tank Regiment, and 2nd Motorcycle Regiment. This task force would advance immediately, followed the next day by the rest of the VIII Mechanized Corps. As a send-off encouragement, Vashugin told Popel: “If you take Dubno by evening, you’ll get a medal. If you don’t, you’ll be expelled from the [Communist] Party and shot.”49

  After thoroughly demoralizing everyone present, Vashugin finally departed, allowing Ryabyshev and his staff to breathe easier and get to work. At the same time, Ryabyshev ordered his combat engineers to begin setting up a new command post just south of Sitno.
The headquarters of the VIII Corps stayed put, awaiting arrival of the rest of the 12th Tank Division and the 7th Motorized Rifle Division.

  Not long after Vashugin’s departure, another representative from the headquarters of the South-Western Front arrived at Ryabyshev’s command post. This was Maj. Gen. R. N. Morgunov, chief of Armored Forces of the South-Western Front. He informed Ryabyshev that he [Morgunov] was in charge of coordinating actions of VIII and XV Mechanized Corps in destroying the enemy group of forces around Dubno. More information delivered by Morgunov surprised Ryabyshev:

  I found out that Major-General K.K. Rokossovskiy’s 9th Mechanized Corps [would] be attacking the enemy from Klevan area and Major-General N. V. Feklenko’s 19th Mechanized Corps—from the vicinity of Rovno towards Dubno. This information was not only news to me, but also unexpected. . . . [Morgunov] set off for the 15th Mechanized Corps. We were not to meet again. He did not relay any instructions for us.50

  It would not be hard to imagine Ryabyshev’s thinking. His corps fought bravely on the 26th, sustaining heavy losses in the progress. What fury he must have felt being lambasted by that party hack Vashugin! What frustration he must have felt finding out that significant results could have been gained if his efforts were coordinated with the northern pincer of the offensive!

  Commissar Popel found Colonel Vasilyev’s 34th Tank Division in its old positions. Receiving neither the initial orders to withdraw and nor their reversal, Vasilyev was blissfully unaware about the night’s travails. After Popel brought him up to date, they worked out their plan of action for the day. The attack would be led off by the Major Trubitskiy’s 2nd Motorcycle Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Volkov’s 24th Tank Regiment, advancing along the highway and the railroad. Vasilyev further detached two units from his own 34th Tank Division to go round the woods southwest and west of Dubno to attempt to further expand the attack frontage.

  The attack began shortly after 1400 hours. Initially it met with success. A small German detachment in Granovka village was brushed aside, and the Soviet tanks and motorcycle troops reached the highway. Some rear echelon units of German 11th Panzer Division were caught in a surprise attack and almost wiped out. In some cases, the Soviet motorcyclists raced along the German truck columns and hosed them down with their machine guns. Several Soviet tanks rammed German trucks, turning the enemy vehicles into bloody wrecks.

  A small German artillery detachment opened fire upon the attacking Soviets from the outskirts of Verba village, but Popel and Vasilyev continued pushing their men and machines forward. Racing past Verba, Lieutenant Colonel Volkov’s T-34 was knocked out, and he, wounded in arm, climbed into another tank, this one without a radio.

  A spirited fight developed around Tarakanov village, roughly six miles southwest of Dubno. When Lieutenant Colonel Bolokhvitin’s 67th Tank Regiment struck the village from the west, the pendulum of the fight swung in Soviet favor. The struggle was costly, with Bolokhvitin’s own tank being one of the lifeless burned-out hulks left in the oat fields.

  Aftermath of the fight for Tarakanov was brutal:

  Dead bodies are everywhere—in the street, in the smoking wrecks of cars, motorcycles’ sidecars. Pieces of bodies in shreds of gray-green uniforms are even in the trees. . . . It’s terrible to look at our tanks now. It is difficult to believe that their initial paint scheme is green, and not reddish-brownish, which even the light rain cannot wash off.”51

  Maj. A. P. Sytnik, who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Bolokhvitin at the helm of the 67th Tank Regiment, reported to Popel that Germans fought very stubbornly, refusing to surrender.

  That night Popel’s task force could not move any farther than Tarakanov and took up defensive positions around the village. The soldiers from the units that fought that day were so exhausted that Popel released them to rest, while utilizing the men from support units to work on creating defensive positions.

  By late evening, the situation southwest of Dubno resembled a layered cake. Rear echelons of German 11th Panzer Division, leading elements of 16th Panzer Division, rear elements of Vasilyev’s 34th Tank Division, and approaching small units of the VIII Mechanized Corps became intermixed in the dark.

  Despite its best efforts, the main body of the 7th Motorized Rifle Division could not link up with Popel’s force. Two battalions from this rifle division’s 27th Motorized Rifle Regiment that did reach him became cut off with Popel.

  While the 34th Tank Division fought southwest of Dubno and the 7th Motorized Rifle Division raced to reinforce it, their sister 12th Tank Division remained behind the lines of the XXXVI Rifle Corps, not receiving notification for renewal of the offensive. Even if it would have, the 12th Tank could not move. Its tanks and other vehicles were nearly out of fuel, and division’s commander Colonel Mishanin was urgently requesting that fuel tankers be sent to him.

  By the early morning of June 28, Lieutenant General Ryabyshev’s corps was effectively cut into three parts. The 34th Tank Division was cut off immediately southwest of Dubno, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division was strung out along the Dubno-Brody highway, and the 12th Tank Division bivouacked near the town of Kremenets.

  South-Western Front, Colonel General Kirponos Commanding

  At the headquarters of the South-Western Front, senior officers were desperately scrambling for any forces that they could place in the way of the advancing German 11th Panzer Division at Ostrog. There were no direct communications with General Lukin, who was commanding the fight at Ostrog from Shepetovka, so Colonel Bagramyan’s deputies reached him by routing the calls through Front’s headquarters in Kiev and by going through the military commandant of Shepetovka railroad station. This link, however, was intermittent and unreliable.

  While Bagramyan was establishing communications with Lukin, Nikita Khruschev, the future Soviet premier, who was now more or less permanently at Kirponos’ headquarters, got on the phone with Moscow to request permission to temporarily delay full departure of Lukin’s Sixteenth Army until this situation was dealt with. He was unsuccessful.

  Being stymied in their efforts to refit and reorganize their mechanized corps behind the infantry screen, Kirponos and his staff continued working on the renewed counterattack plans. The overall objective for all the four mechanized corps was to link up around Dubno and cut off and encircle the German armored spearhead. Staff officers were sent out to hand-deliver orders to the involved formations. Ominously, Front’s commissar Vashugin decided to follow them to familiarize himself with the situation up front. We already know the results of his encouragements from Ryabyshev’s and Popel’s descriptions of his visit.

  Despite this being the fourth day of war, communications were still spotty. Bagramyan described the situation of controlling large numbers of troops in an information vacuum:

  The hours of painful waiting dragged on. It seemed that the headquarters of the Fifth Army disappeared: not a single report. Headquarters of various mechanized corps were silent as well. How are they doing? Did they begin the offensive? I could not answer any of these questions posed by Chief of Staff of the Front. I sent out the most capable officers from the Operations Section. So far none of them came back yet. . . . Only General Astakhov was providing us with some information: his pilots can see where the fighting is the heaviest. However, they are having difficulty making sense of the situation from high altitude: there are no clearly defined front lines, instead some sort of a “layered cake” developed: ours and enemy units are intermingled. It goes without saying how difficult it is to direct troops dispersed over a huge territory.52

  It is interesting to note that in the previous passage Bagramyan described the Soviet reconnaissance flights as being conducted at high altitude. This is a good illustration of German complete dominance of the air space above the battlefield, testament to effective German air defense and tactical fighter operations.

  Only after the officers sent to the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps returned in the afternoon, the situation cleared up somewhat. They universally describe
d difficulties imposed on the mechanized formations by the conflicted orders:

  During the night, after receiving orders about pulling back, some divisions already left positions and, under cover of rear guards, began moving east. Then orders came in about returning and continuing the offensive in the same direction. Ryabyshev and Yermolayev barely had time to halt the retreating units, when new instructions came in: change direction of the attack.53

  There was still no news from the northern wing of the attack:

  Situation on the right flank continued to be unclear. We did not know results of Rokossovskiy and Feklenko corps’ attacks. Communications with Ryabyshev was intermittent, and we did not know if he took Dubno. [Lukin] also did not inform us if he was able to create a strong barrier to halt the enemy racing to take Ostrog.

  In his memoirs, Bagramyan mentioned the previously described incident which occurred at Lieutenant General Ryabyshev’s headquarters. Bagramyan’s knowledge of the event was secondhand, possibly relayed to him by his liaison officer to the VIII Mechanized Corps: “Hot-tempered, energetic, [Vashugin] angrily berated [Ryabyshev] for delaying, and insisted that a mobile group be formed immediately.”54

  No known memoirs exist about what transpired at the headquarters of the XV Mechanized Corps; however, Bagramyan writes: “[Vashugin’s] insistency was in vain. [XV Mechanized] Corps was heavily pinned down by constant enemy attacks and could not advance. Upset, Vashugin returned to Tarnopol.”55 Knowing the extent of his rage displayed at Ryabyshev headquarters, where he at least obtained a small measure of compliance, it is easy to imagine the torrent of abuse and accusations that Vashugin must have heaped upon Colonel Yermolayev and the staff of XV Mechanized Corps’s headquarters.

  After Zhukov departed Tarnopol for Moscow in the evening of June 26, Kirponos allowed himself to be swayed by Purkayev’s defensive strategy. A major factor in Kirponos’ decision-making was an incorrect belief that the German mobile group of forces would turn south from Dubno and Berestechko, with the goal of cutting off the Soviet armies in the Lvov pocket. This defensive posture is illustrated in the intelligence report issued by Kirponos’ staff at 2200 hrs the previous evening: