The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  CHAPTER 12

  Fall Back to Old Border, June 29–30

  JUNE 29, 1941

  South-Western Front, Colonel General Kirponos Commanding

  IT RAINED HEAVILY ALL NIGHT, adding to the misery of both warring sides. In the drizzly morning of June 29, under the overcast sky, Major General Potapov’s Fifth Army held the line of Goryn River from the area of Klevan, northwest of Rovno, following the turns in the river south to Goscha. From there south to Mogilyani, a distance of roughly fifteen miles, the area was occupied only by small Soviet reconnaissance patrols. The Mogilyani village was the extreme right flank of Task Force Lukin, still containing the Germans in their bridgehead on the east bank of Goryn River opposite Ostrog.

  However, looking southwest from Ostrog, the situation looked tenuous for the Soviet troops. The area between Ostrog and Dubno was virtually unoccupied by Soviet forces for almost twenty miles west to Dubno-Kremenets road. The XXXVI Rifle Corps was deployed from the east bank of Ikva River to Kremenets. Going south along the Ikva River, the 14th Cavalry Division extended the line southwest to Dunayev.

  The XV Mechanized Corps was in a vulnerable position at Lopatin, northwest of Brody. The XXXVII Rifle Corps was hurrying from Busk, southwest of Brody, to shore up the escape corridor for the XV Mechanized Corps.

  As the Sixth, Twenty-Sixth, and Twelfth Armies continued falling back from the Lvov pocket, the fighting came uncomfortably close to Tarnopol. In late morning of June 29, Kirponos and Purkayev made the decision to move the headquarters of the South-Western Front farther east to Proskurov (modern day Khmelnitskiy). The evening was spent hastily packing up the headquarters, and the large convoy departed for Proskurov during the night of June 29–30. As during the previous move just one week and lifetime ago, Colonel Bagramyan was assigned to stay behind with a small staff at Tarnopol. He was to follow the main body of the Front headquarters element in the morning of June 30, after receiving the word that it arrived at Proskurov. The vacated command post of the South-Western Front in Tarnopol was to be occupied by the headquarters of the Sixth Army.

  Russian historian A.V. Isayev described the German wedge impaled between the Soviet Fifth and Sixth Armies as a giant trapezoid. Its base, anchored on Kivertsi in the north and Brody in the south, was roughly forty-five miles long. The sides of the trapezoid stretched approximately sixty miles, with its top following Goryn River for about twenty-five miles.

  Stavka continued demanding energetic offensive actions from Kirponos’ command. The only formation available to Kirponos still capable of conducting limited offensive operations was Lieutenant General Potapov’s Fifth Army. Its location, occupying the lines of Stokhod and Styr Rivers, threatened the left flank of German group of forces at Rovno. Since German command shifted its forward panzer divisions south to deal with the threat posed by the VIII Mechanized Corps, the northern side of Isayev’s trapezoid was the only visible location where the Soviet Fifth Army could achieve some small measure of success.

  Under pressure from Moscow, on June 29 Kirponos gave Potapov orders to attack on July 1 from Tsuman-Klevan area “towards the south with the goal of cutting off the moto-mechanized enemy group of forces, which crossed Goryn River at Rovno, from their bases and reinforcements and liquidate the breakthrough.”

  The forces available to the Fifth Army were the XV Rifle Corps (two rifle divisions), XXXI Rifle Corps (two rifle divisions), XXII Mechanized Corps (one tank and one motorized rifle divisions), XXVII Rifle Corps (one and one-third rifle divisions), 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 289th Howitzer Regiment from Stavka’s reserves, and 1st Separate Armored Train Detachment. The XXVII Rifle Corps was in most difficult position—it was attempting to prevent the German 298th Infantry Division from expanding its beachhead at the railroad bridge in Rozhysche the previous day. The 135th Rifle Division from this corps was reinforced by the remains of the 19th Tank Division from the XXII Mechanized Corps. This tank unit, which higher echelon commanders insisted on calling a division, had in reality a paltry sixteen T-26 tanks with six field guns, plus the remains of division’s support service units.

  The XXII Mechanized Corps was to be Potapov’s strike force in the upcoming offensive. Its unrealistic mission was to attack from the area of Tsuman towards Dubno and capture the town. Of the other two divisions in the XXII Mechanized Corps, the 41st Tank Division still had close to one hundred T-26 light tanks and a dozen of KV-1s, plus twelve cannon. The 215th Motorized Rifle Division had additional fifteen T-26 tanks and twelve more guns.

  While the Fifth Army was conducting an organized pullback from Stokhod River and preparing for one last push, the XIX Mechanized Corps with the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade and the third division from the XXXI Rifle Corps, the 228th, was defending the Rovno-Novograd-Volynskiy highway. During June 29, Feklenko’s corps conducted a local counterattack, crossing over to the west bank of small Goscha River and coming within five mile of Rovno’s suburbs. Even though pushed back to the river, the XIX Mechanized Corps managed to maintain a small beachhead on the west bank until July 1. In the morning of June 29th, one of Feklenko’s tank divisions, the 43rd, still numbered sixty T-26 light tanks and one medium T-34. Within the next several days it lost almost half of these tanks.

  On this day, the XIX Mechanized Corps received a welcomed reinforcement of 1,950 men, arriving on foot in Goscha area. These men, all of whom were inducted into the army in May 1941, had not yet completed their basic training and were initially earmarked for the rear echelon support units of the corps. Now, armed only with rifles and ten light machine guns, these untrained men were to be used as infantry.1

  General Rokossovskiy’s IX Mechanized Corps throughout June 29 was defending the line of Olyka-Klevan, mainly against parts of the German 25th Motorized Infantry and 14th Panzer divisions from the south. Its two tank divisions by now numbered only thirty-two tanks and fifty-five cannons. Potapov’s orders to the IX Mechanized Corps concerning the counterattack on July 1 directed Rokossovskiy to utilize his two tank divisions to assist the XXII Mechanized Corps, while withdrawing his 213th Motorized Rifle Division to the area east of Kivertsi to become army’s reserve. The headquarters of Potapov’s Fifth Army were set up in Kostopil.

  VIII Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev Commanding

  During the night of June 28–29, after an attempt by the 7th Motorized Rifle Division to break through to Popel’s group near Dubno petered out, Lieutenant General Ryabyshev called for a meeting with his senior commanders. The meeting, held at the command post of the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, had a depressing background: “Vehicles destroyed by Fascist aviation were burning, as well as the German tanks knocked out by our artillery and tankers, were [scattered] throughout our positions.”2

  The VIII Mechanized Corps became separated into three distinct parts, strung out along the Brody-Dubno highway. Commissar Popel, with the 34th Tank Division and parts of 12th Tank and 7th Motorized Rifle divisions, was bottled up in the immediate vicinity southwest of Dubno. Only ten miles away, which became an inseparable gulch, Lieutenant General Ryabyshev was in direct command of the main bodies of 12th Tank and 7th Motorized Rifle divisions. The command post of the VIII Mechanized Corps, along with majority of corps’ rear echelon elements, was further fifteen miles southwest.

  Both of division commanders present at the meeting, Gerasimov from the 7th Motorized Rifle and Mishanin from the 12th Tank, reported that ammunition and fuel were alarmingly low and people were extremely exhausted. Mishanin himself was not in good shape after his ordeal of being buried by collapsing wall. He was suffering from a concussion and lost his voice. Mishanin’s deputy delivered his report for him.

  As if Ryabyshev did not have enough on his plate, a further dilemma presented itself during the command staff meeting. A Soviet pilot bailed out of his burning aircraft and landed among positions of the 12th Tank Division. The badly burned flier was able to report that he was delivering written orders to Ryabyshev from the headquarters of the South-
Western Front. The packet containing the orders burned up along with man’s aircraft, and he did not know what the packet contained. The pilot could only report that the scheduled offensive on July 1 was cancelled.

  General Ryabyshev felt himself faced with a difficult predicament: “Not having written orders, I doubted that the offensive has been cancelled. At the same time, the cancellation of general offensive did not give the right to retreat. What to do? Continue with the mission, assigned by the Front, to advance to vicinity of Dubno? The fight during the day demonstrated that we cannot break through to link up with the mobile group. To stay put and continue fighting completely surrounded, with limited ammunition and fuel, was at the very least not smart, because this would have led to complete destruction of the corps.”3

  Ryabyshev did not have communications with Popel; not only were the roads cut, but also “the cipher clerk was killed, [and] during one of the bomb strikes cipher books burned up. We did not have ciphering instructions. Therefore, we lost the ability to use radio.”4 This short paragraph underscored the casualties inflicted by German air attacks on the infrastructure of Ryabyshev’s corps. Like the systematic destruction of the Soviet airfield network throughout the border districts, the Germans were now systematically destroying the ability of Soviet tactical echelons to conduct an organized battle.

  Faced with a certain destruction of the main body of his command should he stay put, Ryabyshev made the difficult decision to retreat while the German encirclement of his corps was still porous. Plans were quickly made to break out southwest in the direction of Radzivilov, along the Dubno-Brody highway, and take up defensive positions on the heights northeast of the town.

  Throughout the night, fighting in the area of the VIII Mechanized Corps was sporadic. The Germans mainly limited themselves to air attacks and some local probes, while bringing up more units from their infantry divisions. Ryabyshev’s main body maintained a low profile, preparing for the breakout that was to happen after dark.

  The breakout attack began at 2200 hours. Twenty KV-1s and T-34s from the 12th Tank Division charged along both sides of the highway, puncturing a hole in the thin line of German outposts. Lighter Soviet tanks and dismounted riflemen from the same division followed in the wake of heavy tanks and expanded the breach to over two miles.

  However, the German defenses quickly came alive, and a heavy artillery barrage fell on the Soviet troops escaping through the narrow gap. Following the lead elements, Ryabyshev’s and Mishanin’s tanks raced south slightly apart. Ryabyshev remembered seeing Mishanin’s tank suddenly burst in flames. Mishanin was the only person to make it out of the tank. Wobbling, he ran into the darkness. This was the last time Ryabyshev saw General Mishanin. He was reported killed, and his body was not recovered.

  Ryabyshev himself narrowly escaped Mishanin’s fate. After making it through the German artillery barrage his tank had its “turret jammed, cannon barrel damaged. We counted sixteen direct hits on the armor. Luckily . . . the vehicle could move under its own power.”

  Other than subjecting the retreating Soviet units to running the gauntlet of artillery barrage, the Germans did not pursue, and the rearguard 7th Motorized Rifle Division was able to retreat in good order. As one unit after another appeared out of the darkness, Ryabyshev directed them to the new defensive positions north of Radzivilov.

  Unbeknown to Ryabyshev, two divisions from the XXXVI Rifle Corps, the 140th and 146th, sat idle along the Ikva River, less than ten miles from both Ryabyshev’s and Popel’s groups. Both of these divisions, given halfway active leadership and adequate knowledge of situation, could have been used to link up with the VIII Mechanized Corps and create a significant threat to Dubno. None of this was done, and two invaluable rifle divisions sat on their hands as spectators.

  Task Force Popel at Dubno, Corps Commissar N. K. Popel Commanding

  Throughout June 29, German forces attempted to push Popel’s task force from the Dubno-Brody highway and relieve pressure on the rear echelons of 11th Panzer Division. Popel, occupying a narrow strip of land roughly six miles long and two miles wide, jammed between the Brody-Dubno highway and the Ikva River, from Ptycha to Tarakanov, was surrounded by four German divisions. The 44th Infantry Division was north of it, the 111th Infantry Division firmly held Dubno and extended southeast, the 16th Panzer Division was pressing from the south, and the 57th Infantry Division was coming up from the west.

  Despite severe pressure, Popel’s men hung on to their positions. Halder noted: “The Russian VIII Corps is bottled up. Some of their tanks seem to have run out of fuel; they are being dug in and used as pillboxes.”5 Offensive capability of the 34th Tank Division, which comprised the core of Popel’s task force, was spent in fighting during the previous day. Sounds of combat coming from less than twenty miles away led Popel to believe that the rest of the VIII Mechanized Corps was attempting to link up with him. However, by the time the rumble of artillery died down in the south after midnight, Commissar Popel realized that his group was on its own. There was still one communications truck with a radio available to Popel. Unfortunately, he was not able to raise any Soviet unit.

  Popel’s force still numbered over ten thousand men, an overwhelming majority of whom came from the VIII Mechanized Corps. In addition, several small detachments from other units that became separated from their commands linked up with Popel’s task force. Fortunately, at least for the immediate future, there was food—a small warehouse with flour was discovered at the Ptycha railroad station, and Popel’s supply officers put the local peasant women to work baking bread.

  While dashing itself to pieces against a tightening German ring, the VIII Mechanized Corps caused consternation at German headquarters:

  Army Group South reports still heavy fighting. On the right shoulder of Panzer Group 1, behind the sector of 11th Panzer Division, a deep penetration by Russian Eight Armored Corps in our lines apparently has caused a lot of confusion in the area between Brody and Dubno and temporarily threatens Dubno from the southwest. This would have been very undesirable in view of the large dumps at Dubno. Also in battle zone of Panzer Group 1, enemy elements with tanks are still active behind the front, sometimes even covering large distances.6

  XV Mechanized Corps, Col. G. I. Yermolayev Commanding

  The situation of the XV Mechanized Corps was temporarily threatened by the German reserve 9th Panzer Division moving past the northern flank of the Soviet Sixth Army. Its path lay straight at the undefended left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps. Fortunately, this corps was given orders on June 29 to begin pullback.

  The vulnerable left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps was held by the 8th Tank Division detached from the IV Mechanized Corps. It fought a sharp rear-guard action with fresh German units, allowing the rest of the XV Corps to slip through the narrow gap between the 9th Panzer Division in the south and several German infantry divisions in the north.

  Task Force Lukin at Ostrog, Lieutenant General Lukin Commanding

  Throughout June 29 and lasting through July 2, General Lukin’s force, supported by direct fire from the 404th Artillery Regiment and the Heavy Armored Train #31, continued clinging to the area immediately east of Ostrog. Two Soviet battalions which became surrounded in Ostrog were not able to break out and were wiped out by the Germans. Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Podoprigora, shattered by horrific casualties suffered by his 381st Regiment, shot himself.

  JUNE 30, 1941

  South-Western Front, Colonel General Kirponos Commanding

  In the early hours of June 30, Colonel Bagramyan received a telephone call from Proskurov informing him that the headquarters of the South-Western Front successfully completed the move and were ready to resume operations. It was time now for Bagramyan and his small detachment to follow suit.

  The rain, which was intermittent on June 28, now was falling in sheets, and the dirt roads outside Tarnopol became difficult to navigate. Luckily, Bagramyan’s small convoy soon hit cobblestone-paved highway, and the going, altho
ugh bumpy, became easier. It was roughly sixty miles from Tarnopol to Proskurov, and they made it there without incident until Bagrmayan’s ZIS-101 car, a mix of cloned 1932 Buick and 1935 Plymouth, hit a washed-out patch of road and slid into a ditch. Not having any means to extricate the vehicle themselves, Bagramyan hitched a ride on another vehicle in his convoy after leaving his driver and several men to wait for help.

  Once in Proskurov, an important hub of several major roads, and reunited with the rest of the headquarters staff, Bagramyan was brought up to speed on the situation of the Fifth Army. Liaison officers who returned from the various corps of the Fifth Army reported that orders about the offensive on July 1 had been distributed, and measures were being taken to prepare for the offensive. Despite being under heavy German pressure, the Sixth, Twenty-Sixth, and Twelfth Armies from the Lvov pocket were falling back in relatively good order and taking up positions along the Brody-Zolochev-Berezhany line.

  Soviet aviation, as attested by Gustav Schrodek, was continuing to operate a little more effectively. The IV Long-Range Bomber Corps under Col. V. A. Sudets was supporting operations of the South-Western Front. In the environment where Soviet fighter regiments took horrific losses, bomber aviation often had to operate without fighter support. This reflected in high casualty rates among bomber units: “The bombers flew without reliable [fighter] cover. Each time they were attacked by Fascist fighters and air-defense artillery. The [IV Air] Corps was suffering casualties, but time and time again the heavy planes would take to the air and fly east.”7

  Several Soviet reconnaissance aircraft also managed to fly in daytime to the border and make it back with reports, a significant feat. Unsurprisingly, they reported continuous movements of follow-on German echelons crossing into the Soviet territory. Between 0700 hours and 1000 hours, reconnaissance flights also reported small German tank columns moving from Rovno area towards Ostrog.