by Yitzhak Arad
The next task imposed on Feldhendler was to cut the telephone wires leading from the administration building to outside the camp and to disconnect the electricity of the camp. This was carried out by Schwartz, an electrician from Czechoslovakia.16 With this, the operation in Camp II was completed. To keep the action secret, Feldhendler and his men had not permitted any prisoners to leave either the warehouse or the area of Camp II. He waited for the sound of the bugle from the forester’s tower, the signal for the end of work and the evening roll call.
At a quarter to five Tsibulsky returned to Camp I. He excitedly reported to Pechersky that all four SS men in Camp II had been finished off, the telephone wires had been cut, and the electricity was off permanently.17
Capo Pozyczka, who was in Camp IV, returned with the prisoners who had been chopping wood there. He was heading for the carpentry workshop, followed by Scharführer Friedrich Gaulstich. Leitman, who was in the vicinity, turned to Gaulstich and asked him to come in the barrack where he and his men were working, because he needed his advice to continue the work. Gaulstich went into the barrack. Capo Schmidt, who was also there, wanted to enter the barrack in case Gaulstich needed him. But Pechersky, who had observed the scene from the carpentry workshop, ran over to Pozyczka and told him to prevent Schmidt from entering the barrack. Pozyczka took Schmidt by the arm, told him what was going on and that if he wanted to remain alive, not to go inside. Schmidt was struck speechless by the news, but remained outside. In the meantime, inside the barrack, Leitman axed Gaulstich to death.18
Around five o’clock Shlomo Szmajzner, with the help of two putzers, removed from the Ukrainian barracks six rifles inside a pipe, wrapped in a blanket. No Ukrainians or Germans were around. He marched through the gate of Camp II toward the kitchen, where he delivered the rifles to the Underground members. One rifle he left for himself. He also brought some cartridges with him.19
Pechersky was informed that Engel, a locksmith, had killed Unterscharführer Walter Ryba when he came into the garage where Engel was working that day. The killing in the garage had not been planned by the Underground. It was a private, impulsive action by Engel, and Pechersky was worried that the body of Walter Ryba in the garage close to the living quarters of the SS men and Ukrainians had not been camouflaged and at any moment it could be discovered.20
For about an hour and a half, from 15:30 to 17:00, the uprising action had been carried out according to plan. Most of the SS men had been liquidated, among them three key persons: Niemann, the acting commander of the camp; Greischutz, the commander of the Ukrainian guard; and Goettinger, the commander of Camp III. The prisoners had armed themselves with pistols taken from the killed SS men and the rifles brought by Szmajzner. Up to that moment, the Ukrainians who were in guard positions and those on the watchtowers, from where they had complete visibility of all corners of the camp, had not discovered or suspected any unusual activity in the camp. In fact, the German and Ukrainian staff was now leaderless—with the exception of Frenzel, who was still somewhere in the camp. According to the plan, Frenzel was to come to the carpentry to check on a new cupboard. Semion Rosenfeld was waiting for him there, but Frenzel did not arrive. Rosenfeld testified:
On the day of the uprising, Pechersky called me and gave me an assignment. I had to kill Frenzel when he came to the carpentry workshop at 4:00 or 4:30 to receive new cupboards. I prepared myself thoroughly for this task: I sharpened the axe and selected the proper place to carry out the mortal blow. But the scoundrel did not come. Until today I am sorry for that.21
At five o’clock in the afternoon, as the time for the evening roll call approached, Pechersky faced a dilemma: whether to wait for Frenzel, the last remaining SS man who could organize the Ukrainians for an action against the prisoners and an immediate pursuit after their escape or to go ahead with the plan, leaving Frenzel alive. By that time it was difficult to keep the prisoners quiet as the tension was so high. Most of them already knew about the killings, and at any moment the Underground could lose control over the events. Capo Pozyczka was now with Pechersky, and could sound the signal for the end of work and assembly for the roll call. The killing of Walter Ryba in the garage disturbed Pechersky because it was clear that it would become known very soon. Leitman, who was with Pechersky, urged him not to wait any longer for Frenzel but to immediately begin the next stage of the uprising—the roll call and march toward the gate. It was already after five, and Pechersky decided not to wait any longer. Leitman sent a messenger to Feldhendler in Camp II to inform him of the decision, and Pechersky ordered Pozyczka to carry out his part of the plan. Yehuda the barber climbed the forester tower and blew the bugle—the signal for the whole camp to stop work and gather for roll call.22
Feldhendler lined up the prisoners in Camp II. It was difficult to organize them into an orderly column similar to the everyday routine march at the end of work because of the tension. But slowly they started to move in the direction of Camp I. Dov Freiberg, who was among the prisoners in Camp II, described the march:
When we marched to Camp I we were singing a German song in order not to provoke any suspicion. . . . We arrived there after all the other groups had already gathered. There was great excitement. Some of the Jews were armed with rifles and pistolets. . . . A Jewish boy climbed the Forester Tower and trumpeted for the roll call. . . .23
Pechersky described what happened in Camp I after the signal for roll call was given:
People came streaming from all sides. We had previously selected seventy men, nearly all of them Soviet prisoners of war, whose task it was to attack the armory. That was why they were in the forefront of the column. But all the others, who had only suspected that something was being arranged but didn’t know when and how, now found out at the last minute. They began to push and jostle forward, fearing they might be left behind. In this disorderly fashion we reached the gate of Camp I.
A squad commander, a German from Near-Volga, approached us. “Hey, you sons-of-bitches,” he shouted, “didn’t you hear the whistle? So why are you pushing like a bunch of cattle? Get in line, three in a row!”
As though in response to a command, several hatchets suddenly appeared from under coats and came down on his head.
At that moment, the column from Camp II was advancing toward us. Several women, shaken by the unexpected scene, began to scream. One prisoner was on the verge of fainting. Another began to run blindly, without any direction. It was clear that under these circumstances it would be impossible to line up the people in an orderly column.
“Comrades, forward!” I called out loud.
“Forward!” Someone on my right picked up the slogans.
“For our Fatherland, forward!”
The slogans reverberated like thunder in the death camp, and united Jews from Russia, Poland, Holland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. Six hundred pain-wracked, tormented people, surged forward with a wild “hurrah” to life and freedom. . . .24
According to the plan, a group of prisoners under the command of Nachum Plotnicky and Alexey Vaitsen were supposed to penetrate the armory and take control of the arms there. This attack prompted some controversial testimonies. According to Pechersky, “the attack on the armory did not succeed; a barrage of automatic fire cut us off.”25 In truth, the initial stage of the attack did succeed, and the prisoners penetrated the armory. Scharführer Werner Dubois, who was in charge of the armory, testified:
On the day of the uprising, in the afternoon, I was in the armory together with some Ukrainian guardsmen. The door was open. I saw a group of Jewish prisoners with axes approaching the armory. I thought that this was an ordinary working group. This group of five or six men passed by the armory. They went around the armory, crashed into the room, and hit me with axes. My skull was fractured with an axe. Other axe blows wounded my hands. In spite of it, I succeeded in extricating myself and escaping outside the armory. After running about 10 meters, I was shot in the lung and lost consciousness. Some Ukrainian guards treated me wi
th vodka and I returned to consciousness. Then I learned that an uprising had broken out.26
Mordechai Goldfarb, who was with the attacking group, described what was happening in the armory: “Four of us ran to the armory. . . . There was an SS man. . . . He wanted to shoot at us, but Boris threw sand into his eyes, we jumped at him and killed him. We grabbed some rifles and ran to the fence.”27
A short time before the sound of the bugle announced the end of work, a truck with provisions and liquor driven by Scharführer Erich Bauer returned to camp and drove in the direction of the forester’s house. Crossing close to Camp I, Bauer came across two prisoners, Jakub Biskubicz and David (family name unknown), who were repairing the gate of Camp I. He ordered them to follow the truck to unload it. The truck stopped in front of the forester’s house in Camp II. Biskubicz testified:
As we were unloading the first box from the truck, we saw inside the forester house a German whom we stabbed in the back. As we were taking the second box, a Ukrainian came running and called to Bauer, “A German is dead.” Bauer did not immediately understand what he meant. But David, who had heard it, started to run in the direction of Camp I. Bauer shot at him twice and ran after him. I remained alone. Then I heard a cry, “Hurrah!” from Camp I and shooting.28
At that point, the “quiet” part of the uprising came to an end. The killing of the Volksdeutsche, a squad commander of the Ukrainians, which took place in the open, close to the gate of Camp I, was spotted by the guards. When the attack on the armory was carried out, in addition to the SS man Werner Dubois, who was badly wounded, there were some Ukrainians present. Automatic fire from a watchtower and some other directions was opened on the prisoners running toward the camp’s main gate. Scharführer Frenzel, who until then had not been seen, came out from a barrack close to the main gate and opened automatic fire on the escaping prisoners.29 The prisoners who had run through the gate killed the Ukrainian guard posted there, but further escape through the camp’s main gate was cut off by the fire of Frenzel and some guards. The prisoners ran toward the fences and minefields. Pechersky and the other leaders of the uprising had lost all control over the events and the mass of prisoners, who were running in all directions. This was around 17:15.
With the escape through the main gate cut off by gunfire, the prisoners who were still in Camp I, which constituted the majority, ran toward the fences and minefields, south and southwest of the camp. The prisoners who were first to cross the minefields were killed or wounded. They remained lying in the field, just behind the fences. Those who followed them had clear passage through the minefields, because the mines had blown up with the first wave of escapees. Ada Lichtman wrote:
Suddenly we heard shots. In the beginning only a few shots, and then it turned into heavy shooting, including machine-gun fire. We heard shouting, and I could see a group of prisoners running with axes, knives, scissors, cutting the fences and crossing them. Mines started to explode. Riot and confusion prevailed, everything was thundering around. The doors of the workshop were opened, and everyone rushed through. . . . We ran out of the workshop. All around were the bodies of the killed and wounded. Near the armory were some of our boys with weapons. Some of them were exchanging fire with the Ukrainians, others were running toward the gate or through the fences. My coat was caught on the fence. I took off the coat, freed myself and ran further behind the fences into the minefield. A mine exploded nearby, and I could see a body being lifted into the air and then falling down. I did not recognize who it was. Many were shot on the fences. Behind the mines was a ditch, luckily without water. With the help of two other women, I crossed the ditch and reached the forest.30
Unterscharführer Franz Wulf, whose brother Josef had been the first one killed in the storeroom in Camp II, was also in the camp at the time. When the shooting started, he was accompanying a group of Jewish women who worked in the garden to Camp I. He testified:
I went into the garden between Camp I and Camp II. On the way back with the Jewish women, I suddenly heard shots. I ran to the office which was in the forester’s house. I found Beckman and another member of the permanent staff there; both had been shot. I ran back to Camp II to the sorting barrack to find my brother. Later, when the shooting stopped, I ran to the guard in the Forward Camp. There were more dead and Werner Dubois, who was badly wounded.31
When the shooting started it was already dusk. At least two SS men, Frenzel and Bauer, and about a dozen Ukrainians who were on guard duty opened fire from machine guns, rifles, and pistols on the escaping prisoners. The most dangerous gunfire was from the two watchtowers in the southern corners of the camp. From these towers the Ukrainians had full control of gunfire on Camp I, on the Forward Camp, and on the southern fences and camp’s gate—all the places through which the prisoners tried to escape. Those Underground members who were armed returned fire, trying to silence the guards on the watchtowers and cover the escape of the prisoners. Pechersky described the situation at this stage:
The guards on the watchtower opened intensive machine-gun fire on the escaping prisoners. The guards who were at and between the barbed-wire fences joined them. Yanek the carpenter aimed and shot at the guards on the watchtower. The machine gun fell silent. The locksmith Henrick used the captured submachine gun to silence the gunner from the second watchtower. But this machine gun continued to fire incessantly. The remaining SS men tried with automatic fire to cut off the way of the crowd of prisoners. . . . The main body of the prisoners turned toward the fences of Camp I. Some ran directly over to the minefields. According to the plan, stones and planks had to be thrown on the mines to explode them, but in the confusion nobody did it. Many found their death there, but they paved the way to freedom for the prisoners who followed them. A special group started to cut the fences close to the house where the commander of the camp lived. . . . When I passed by this house, I saw Frenzel crouching behind another house and shooting with a submachine gun. I shot at him twice with my pistol but missed him. I did not stop. A large group of prisoners under the command of Leitman tried to cross the barbed-wire fences close to the main gate. The guards on the watchtower aimed his fire on Leitman’s group. I was one of the last to leave the camp.32
Pechersky’s assumption that the field behind the camp commander’s house was not mined was correct. He and the prisoners with him reached the forest without crossing any mines.
The first stage of the uprising—the quiet liquidation of the majority of the SS staff in the camp, among them the commanding officers—had been accomplished successfully. The only exception was Frenzel. However, the second stage of the uprising, the “ordinary” roll call and march toward the gate, was not carried out according to plan. A combinatain of events—among them the survival of Frenzel, the killing of the Volksdeutsche Kaiser near the gate of Camp I, which was seen by the Ukrainian guards, and the unexpected return to the camp of Erich Bauer—contributed to the fact that the second stage of the plan was carried out only in part. And although the leaders of the uprising had taken into account such a development and had formulated an alternative escape route through the fences and minefields, this alternative was not planned in detail. It remained more of a general idea than a true plan of action. Therefore, when the shooting began and the majority of prisoners began running in their confusion in all directions, the Underground leadership lost control. Still, over half of the prisoners, about 300 out of the 600 who were in the main camp, succeeded in the evening twilight in crossing the fences and minefields and escaping into the forests.
41
Pursuit and Escape from Sobibor
Disorder and chaos prevailed in the camp until late into the night of October 14. The darkness that fell over the camp soon after the mass escape of the prisoners and the lack of electricity, which had been cut off by the rebels, made it very difficult for the few remaining SS men to take control and reinstate order in the camp. Only two of the five surviving SS men, Frenzel and Bauer, were active. Dubois was wounded, and the two others
, Franz Wulf and Willi Wendland, were somewhere in hiding during those hours. It took Frenzel and Bauer two to three hours to organize the Ukrainians and to gather part of the prisoners who had remained in the camp and lock them up in a barrack under strong guard. In the camp there were still prisoners who continued to resist; some of them were armed with axes or firearms. Searches were conducted to locate the killed SS men and hours passed until their bodies were discovered and gathered in one place.
While all this was going on, efforts were also made to contact the German security forces, who were stationed in the vicinity of Sobibor, request their help in restoring order in the camp, and organize a pursuit after the escape. However, only close to eight o’clock in the evening did Frenzel and Bauer succeed in reestablishing telephone communication with the outside world and issuing a call for help.
This call reached the SS, police, and army units stationed in the city of Chelm, 40 kilometers south of Sobibor, since the area of Sobibor was under the administrative and security jurisdiction of the German authorities of Chelm. The first to arrive at Sobibor was a small unit of Border Police, which was in charge of the border between the General Government and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and subordinate to the Security Police and SD. This unit numbered seven SS men under the command of SS Untersturmführer Adalbert Benda. They, with the help of the Ukrainian guards in the camp, succeeded in overcoming the last of the resisting prisoners and restoring control inside the camp. Benda wrote in his report:
The operation commando sent from the Border Police Commissariat in Chelm combed the separate sub-camps inside the camp. Our men were fired at many times by the prisoners caught in the camp during the night of October 15, 1943, and in the early hours of October 16. [It should be October 14, 1943, and in the early hours of October 15. This report was submitted on March 17, 1944, and the dates given are mistakes.] During the combing of the camp itself, arms were used because the prisoners resisted arrest. A great number of prisoners were shot. . . .1