Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps

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Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps Page 45

by Yitzhak Arad


  Jacub Biskubicz, a prisoner who did not succeed in escaping with the bulk of the prisoners and who remained inside Camp II until late at night, testified:

  All the prisoners escaped. I remained alone. . . . I jumped over a 2 meter fence and reached the warehouse. It became dark, because in October night fell early; therefore the bullet fired in my direction didn’t hit me. Until midnight I lay on the earth. I could hear shouts and screams from all directions. At midnight, I heard shooting close to me and the voices of Germans saying: “Nobody is here.” They left. . . . I reached Camp IV. I saw the open door of a watchtower. Nobody was around. I climbed the ladder of the tower and jumped outside over the fences and mines. I fell on the railway and escaped to the forest.2

  Few of those who remained in the camp were as lucky as Biskubicz. About 150 were caught and locked into a barrack under a strong guard of Ukrainians. At midnight, the first squadron (company size) of the Mounted SS and Police Regiment III stationed in Chelm arrived by train to Sobibor as reinforcements. The commander of this squadron, Captain of the Security Police Erich Wullbrandt, testified:

  When I returned to Chelm from an operation against partisans in the Lublin district, I received an order to continue immediately to Sobibor. From the order it was clear that an uprising had taken place in the Jewish camp of Sobibor. . . . From the order we understood that the guards [in the camp] were still in danger; therefore, the commander of the Mounted Regiment III, Security Police Major Eggert, personally assumed command of our unit. It was feared that the Jews who had escaped would attack the camp to liberate the prisoners who remained there. To prevent such an eventuality, and for the safety of the Germans in the camp, our squadron, under my and Major Eggert’s command, left for the operation. . . . Upon our arrival at the railway station of Sobibor, at the entrance to the camp, we were briefed by two members of the Waffen SS [Frenzel and Bauer] about the event. . . . When we arrived, we found that the corpses of the killed German members of the SS had been collected in one barrack. I personally saw the corpses. I think there were thirteen corpses in that room. . . . According to the estimate at that time, about 50 percent of the prisoners had succeeded in escaping. The remaining Jews were kept in their barracks. The watchtowers were manned by the foreign auxiliaries [Ukrainians]. . . . In the morning, the Jewish prisoners who [had been] shot [during the uprising] by the auxiliaries inside the camp were removed to one place. Their corpses were laid at the railway spur of the camp. . . .3

  The call for help from Sobibor also reached Security Battalion 689 of the German army, stationed in Chelm. This battalion was responsible for the security of military installations, including railways and bridges, and also for fighting the partisans who operated in the district. The battalion was subordinate to the military commander of the Lublin district, Lieutenant-General Hilmar Moser. The commander of this battalion, Major Hans Wagner, testified:

  The deputy camp commander [of Sobibor] telephoned battalion headquarters at 20:00 hours on October 14 and called for urgent armed help. The call was received by the battalion adjutant, First Lieutenant Wiertz. The deputy commander reported . . . that the Jewish prisoners had seized the camp armory and that out of the twenty-nine German SS officers and soldiers twelve were on vacation in Germany and out of the remaining seventeen SS men twelve had already been killed by rebellious Jews. . . . According to this report, some of the Ukrainian guards had collaborated with the rebels, but the majority of them had remained faithful. They, under the command of the surviving Germans, stood in desperate battle against the mutinous prisoners, most of whom had already escaped to the forests. I refused to extend armed help. Under no circumstances did I want to have anything to do with this camp and its organization. . . . About fifteen minutes later, the military commander of Chelm, a major in the German army, called and ordered me to send armed help immediately.

  I again refused to extend help. . . . I have to note that for a long time there was a standing general order from the Area Military Commander from Cracow (General Haenicke, the commander of the military forces in the General Government) which stated that the German army, the Police and the SS had to extend help to each other in times of emergency without a specific order. Under such circumstances, the local military commander was empowered and obliged to issue orders and utilize those army units that were in his zone of operation.

  After my refusal, the military commander of Chelm turned to our common military superior, the military commander of the Lublin district, General Moser. The general called me fifteen minutes later. Even to him I expressed my objection to extend help. He didn’t order me, but said that he would turn to the Area Military Commander (in Cracow) to ascertain how the army should act in such a case. About a quarter of an hour later, General Moser informed me by telephone that the Area Military Commander, General Haenicke, said that we cannot forsake the fighting SS men and ordered that my battalion, with all its available forces, extend the requested help. . . . I could no longer refuse. I assigned a company of eighty men (not 100) under the command of Captain Wulf, the commander of company 4. . . . This unit arrived at the camp of Sobibor in the early morning (of October 15). By that time, the camp authorities had already quelled the uprising with its own forces, namely, with the Ukrainian guards. Most of the Jewish prisoners escaped; the remaining few hundred were surrounded. . . .4

  The killing of eleven SS men and two or three Ukrainians and Volksdeutsche guards, in addition to several wounded, produced turmoil among the German authorities in the General Government and was reported to the highest authorities in Berlin. It was a rare—and perhaps the only—case where prisoners, Jews or non-Jews, had revolted and had succeeded in a single action in liquidating such a large number of SS men.

  A group of high-ranking SS officials headed by SS Gruppenführer Jacob Sporrenberg, the SS and Police Leader of the Lublin district who was put in charge of the camps after Globocnik left, and SS Hauptsturmführer Höfle arrived in Sobibor on the afternoon of October 15. After their arrival they received reports from Frenzel and from the commanders of the units who were carrying out the search and pursuit operation. Later they inspected the corpses of the killed SS men. Sporrenberg ordered the execution of all the remaining Jewish prisoners in the camp. There were at least 150 of them.

  There were also prisoners in Camp III who had known nothing about the uprising until the shooting broke out. These prisoners were also killed, but whether they were included in the number of 150 or were in addition is unclear. All the prisoners who were in Sobibor that day were shot in Camp III by the Ukrainian guards at the command of the SS men. The shooting was carried out late in the afternoon of October 15.5 This execution was the immediate response and revenge of the Nazi authorities to the killing of the SS men and Ukrainians.

  The pursuit of and searches for the escaping prisoners began in the morning hours of October 15. The German forces included a company of Army Security Battalion 689 and the First Squadron of the Mounted SS and Police, units of the Border Police, and Ukrainian guards from Sobibor. The Second Squadron of the Mounted SS and Police, which was operating in the sector of the Bug River, joined the forces engaged in the searches on October 16. Some units of the Third Squadron of the Mounted SS and Police joined the search forces later. The total strength of these forces reached between 400 and 500 soldiers and SS men. In addition, local police units in the nearby townships were alerted to carry out searches in their neighborhoods.6

  According to the operation plan, the Second Squadron of the Mounted SS and Police and the Border Police units blocked the bridges and crossing points on the Bug River, which ran east of Sobibor. This part of the operation was to prevent the escaping prisoners from crossing the river and joining the Soviet partisans who were active there. The other forces encircled the entire area from the north, west, and south and combed the forests. The German air force, the Luftwaffe, allocated some airplanes to help the operating forces spot the escaping prisoners and guide the pursuers in the right direction. Wheth
er there was a unified command over the whole operation or whether the army units and the SS forces operated separately, each with its own sector of activity, is difficult to establish.7

  The fact that the searches and pursuit only started on the morning of October 15 gave the prisoners the entire night for an undisturbed head start. During the breakout from the camp, people ran in any direction they could in the hope of reaching the nearest forest and getting as far away as possible from Sobibor. After covering some distance from the camp, the individual escapees and small groups merged into larger groups, some of them numbering dozens of prisoners. But the prisoners were not familiar with the surrounding area of Sobibor, nor did they know in which direction to run. In some cases, after running the whole night, in the morning they discovered that they had run in a circle and were still very close to the camp.8

  The large-scale search and pursuit action, in which all the German security forces stationed in the area of Sobibor took part, lasted four days, from the morning of October 15 until the evening of October 18. During October 19–21, the two mounted squadrons of the SS and Police and a platoon of the Security Police from Lublin continued combing actions west of Sobibor in the forests of Dubeczno-Hansk and north of Chelm.9 The main problem of the escaping prisoners during that period was to evade the German forces and get out of the area of the combing actions. Pechersky describes the escape of the prisoner group he was leading:

  For some time we continued to hear shots from rifles and automatic weapons. This helped us orient ourselves. We knew that there, behind us, was the camp. Gradually the shooting became more distant, until it died down altogether.

  It was already dark when shooting broke out again from the right. It sounded distant and faint.

  I proposed that we continue going all through the night, and that we should go in a single file, one behind the other. I would be in front. Behind me, Tsibulsky. Arkady [Vaispapir] would close the line. No smoking; no talking; no falling behind; no running ahead. If the man in front lies down, all would do the same. If a rocket flared up, all would lie down at once. There must be no panic no matter what happened.

  We were out of the woods. For about 3 kilometers we walked through an open field. Then our path was blocked by a canal about 5 to 6 meters wide. The canal was deep, and it was impossible to wade through it, so we walked along the shore of the canal. Suddenly I noticed a group of people about 50 meters away. We all lay down at once. Arkady was given the task of investigating who they were.

  At first he crawled on his belly; then he rose and ran up to the group. A few minutes later he returned. “Sasha, they’re ours,” he announced. “They found wooden stumps lying by the shore and are crossing over to the other side. Kalimali [Shubayev] is with them.” We all crossed over the canal on these wooden stumps.

  Shubayev had no news about Luka, but he had seen Shlomo [Leitman]. He said Shlomo was wounded before he managed to get into the woods. He had continued to run for a distance of about 3 kilometers and then his strength gave out. He begged to be shot.

  What horrible, painful news that was! To break out of the camp and on the way to freedom to remain lying helpless.

  By now our group numbered fifty-seven people. We covered another 5 kilometers and then heard the rumble of a passing train. Before us lay a broad open stretch of land, sparsely covered with short shrubs. We stopped. It was getting close to dawn, time to give some thought to the question of where we should spend the day. It was clear that the Germans would be pursuing us during the day. The woods in these parts were not very thick and could be easily combed in all directions.

  I talked it over with Tsibulsky and Shubayev, and it was decided that the best thing to do would be to scatter around the bushes, precisely because it was an open space, not far from a railway line. Therefore it wouldn’t occur to anyone to look for us there. But we would have to camouflage ourselves well, lie motionless, and not utter a sound. Before we took to the bushes, I sent out a few people to comb through them carefully for some distance on all sides. Throughout the day airplanes circled overhead, some quite low over the bushes where we lay. We heard the voices of the Poles who worked on the railway. Our people lay glued to the ground, covered with branches. No one moved until it grew dark. That’s how the first day of our freedom passed. It was October 15, 1943.

  Night fell. As we rose from our places, we noticed two figures approaching us. They moved cautiously. We guessed at once that they were our people. It turned out they had already been as far as the Bug and were now returning from there.

  “Why didn’t you cross?” we asked.

  They reported that they had entered a hamlet not far from the river and were told that Germans had arrived at the shore during the night and that all crossings were heavily guarded.

  We walked in single file, in the same order as yesterday: Tsibulsky and I were in front; Skubayev and Arkady were the last in line. After walking for about 5 kilometers we entered the woods and stopped.

  It made no sense to continue together in so large a group. We would be too conspicuous. Also, it would be impossible to provide food for so many people. Therefore we divided ourselves into small groups, each going its own way.

  My group consisted of nine people, including Shubayev, Boris Tsibulsky, Arkady Vaispapir, Michael Itzkowitch, Semion Mazuriewitch. We headed east, with the polar stars as our compass. The nights were starry. Our first aim was to cross the Bug. To do that we had to find the proper place and the proper time. In quiet, deserted hamlets we obtained food and received vital information and directions. We were warned which places to avoid and where it would be advisable to stay over because there had been a breakout from the Sobibor camp, where people were being burned, and the Germans were combing the entire area in search of the escapees. We started out for the Stawki hamlets, about 1.5 kilometers from the Bug.10

  Pechersky’s departure raised fear and resentment among the remaining fifty prisoners. He and his men, all from the Minsk transport, took with them most of the group’s weapons and the rest were left with one rifle; they felt themselves forsaken and leaderless. Tovia Blatt, who was with this group, claims that Pechersky did not even tell them he was leaving, but that he said he was going to reconnoiter the area and would soon return. Some other testimonies of survivors confirm Blatt’s version.11

  The fate of the remaining Jews after Pechersky and his group left is related by Shlomo Alster, a Polish Jew:

  Sasha’s people left us and went away. We remained without a leader. What could we do? Without arms and without a man to lead us. Together with us were French, Dutch, and Czechoslovakian Jews. They could not find their way without knowing the language and the surroundings. Like us, they also divided themselves into small groups. They went out to the road, which was full of SS men, and all of them were caught alive. Also the local people caught them one by one and brought them to Sobibor, where they were liquidated. None of them survived.

  We, the Polish Jews, remained a small group. What should we do? To stay in the forest was dangerous, because either the Germans or the local people would catch us. We had to get away from this place, and from Sobibor—as far as possible. But this was not so simple—where could we go? I was hungry, my clothes were torn to pieces. I decided to go back to my native town, to Chelm, maybe there I could find some chance of survival. I couldn’t see any other alternative.12

  Pechersky’s assumption that it would be almost impossible to find hiding places and food and escape the pursuing forces with a group of fifty-nine people was correct. Even well-armed partisan units who knew the area well split into small units when faced with the combing actions of larger German forces. Therefore, Pechersky’s decision to split into small groups was justified from the military point of view. However, the few arms they possessed could have been divided among all the groups. Even one weapon in a group could be of help in obtaining food and sometimes even a deterrent to the local people who collaborated with the Germans.

  Pechersky and his group suc
ceeded in crossing the Bug River on the night of October 19/20, and three days later they met Soviet partisans in the area of Brest-Litovsk and joined up with them.13

  Feldhendler and a group of prisoners succeeded in hiding in the forest during the days when the German forces combed the whole area. Some other groups from among the Polish Jews also succeeded in avoiding the search units.14

  It was a tremendous achievement on the part of the Jewish prisoners that did manage to get away, despite the relatively large ground forces involved in the operation, aided by air reconnaissance. Several factors contributed to the prisoners’ success. The searches, which began only in the morning hours, allowed enough time for many prisoners to slip away from the camp area. The heavy woods in the region also hampered the searches from the planes. Furthermore, the Germans were mistaken in supposing that most of the escaped prisoners would head east to the Bug and therefore in stationing substantial forces at the Bug crossing points. In fact, most of them, especially the Polish Jews, headed into the General Government areas.

  Alexander Pechersky (third from the left) and other members of his group, former Soviet prisoners of war, Jews who were in Sobibor and who live now in the Soviet Union. A gathering in memory of the uprising.

  Of about 300 Jews who escaped from Sobibor, 100 were caught and shot during the four days that followed the uprising. All the others survived the pursuit action. In the monthly report of the First Mounted Squadron of the SS and Police, which participated in this operation, it was stated:

 

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