The Shankill Butchers

by Martin Dillon

  As soon as Nesbitt saw this statement he was struck by McAllister’s reference to the size of the knife blade. The obvious inference to be drawn was that on other occasions larger knives had been used.

  Nesbitt was highly satisfied to have McAllister’s confession and he felt he had him on the spot. However, he realized that McAllister appreciated the significance of the McLaverty identification and that to get him to admit to any further crime would be exceedingly difficult. His statement demonstrated his artifice. He had named none of his accomplices, diminished his role in the attempted murder and tried to blacken McLaverty by claiming that he was a member of the Provisional IRA.

  In police interview notes of the McAllister interrogation, John Scott recorded him as claiming that McLaverty admitted knowledge of where the Provisionals kept explosives. It was also recorded that he said Moore used the knife. However, neither detail was included in the actual statement by McAllister.

  It should be stated categorically that Gerard McLaverty was never involved with any Republican grouping. He was a young man of low intelligence who may well have admitted to anything under torture. I feel that those who dealt with him had no understanding of his behaviour following the violent attack upon him. Such behaviour may well have been attributable to trauma; recent studies have shown that victims of hijackings behave irrationally during and after the event and often identify with their captors as a means of self-preservation. This could explain, perhaps, McLaverty’s visit to a bar in the Loyalist enclave of Sandy Row only a short time after his horrifying ordeal.

  With statements extracted from Moore and McAllister, Nesbitt knew he had the opening he needed and Moore was the one most likely to crack first. He was also aware of the statistic that ninety-five per cent of all criminal cases in the United Kingdom were solved by methods of interrogation. He returned to the room where Moore was held, told Fitzsimmons about McAllister’s confession and stated that the time had arrived when it should be put to Moore that he was the cut-throat murderer. The two detectives recapitulated the details of the McLaverty case for Moore’s benefit and then Nesbitt told him: ‘If you look closely at all of that, there can be little doubt that you are the Butcher we are looking for.’ Moore began to panic, and the signs were only too familiar to the two detectives. Nesbitt says he recognized that Moore’s agitation was being caused by the litany of other crimes as yet unmentioned and his desperate attempts to keep his interrogators at bay by supplying a confession on the McLaverty kidnapping.

  Nesbitt adds, ‘I thought Moore was saying to himself: “I’ve given them McLaverty and that will make them go away”, but we wouldn’t go away. The next thing he gives us Shaw and admits that he drove the car carrying Shaw’s body. We watched Moore make this admission and, again, knowing the criminal mind we knew that he was looking at Fitzy and myself thinking: “That’ll get them off my back”. I knew we had the bastard and there was a lot more to come. We pressurized him. We gave him no room for manoeuvre so he confesses that he drove the car on the night of the McQuaid shooting. You see, he was only giving us the stuff where he was not the central actor, and God we knew it. Finally, by 11.35 P.M. he tells us that he also drove the car the night that Neeson was killed but denied he was involved in the killing. I began to realize that we were dealing with someone very big and not just cut-throat killings . . . something very big. I returned him to his cell to sweat it out. I was convinced that he had a lot more on his mind and be would have all night to worry about it because he knew the two of us were going to hound him to the very end.’

  On 20 May Detectives McGahan, McCaw, Boyd, Ogilvie and Turner were assigned the task of ‘softening up’ Moore. They interviewed him, two detectives always present, in three sessions throughout the day, beginning at 10.15 A.M. and ending at 10.15 P.M. They tried to encourage him to admit to the cut-throat murders but Moore refused to comment, with the exception of two remarks: that he had only heard of the murders on television and that any man who would have committed them ‘would have to be mad’.

  The following morning at 10.00 A.M. Coulter, Turner and Stockdale met Moore once again in Castlereagh Holding Centre and told him they believed him to be responsible for the cut-throat killings. Moore replied: ‘I had nothing to do with them. It was the UDA in the lower Shankill who committed those murders.’ The interview ended at 11.15 A.M. The questioning was resumed with Detective Constable John McCawl and Detective Sergeant Jim Reid present. What transpired is contained within John McCawl’s notes as follows:

  I introduced Detective Sergeant Reid to Moore and reminded him that he was still under caution. We put it to him that he was involved in the cut-throat murders. He denied this but I said I could tell from his attitude that he still had something on his mind. He said that he had nothing on his mind and that he had told us everything. Detective Sergeant Reid asked him if he could account for his movements on the dates of the murders. He said he couldn’t remember any of them or where he was. We continued interviewing him and putting it to him that he was involved in these murders and that his attitude convinced us that he was involved. He continued to deny it but became more hesitant in his denials. At 12.25 P.M. Detective Sergeant Scott came into the room. He introduced himself and told Moore he was also investigating the cut-throat murders. Detective Sergeant Reid left at 12.30 P.M. We continued the interview until 1.30 P.M. On the way back to the cell, he stopped Detective Sergeant Scott in the yard and said, ‘Wait, I want to see you.’ Detective Sergeant Scott asked him why and he replied that he could help us. He said: ‘I know about the cut-throatings.’ Detective Sergeant Scott reminded him that he was still under caution and we took him back to the interview room. He said: ‘I don’t know what to do, I’m scared. I want time to think this thing over.’ I told him he could have time to think it over. He said: ‘I’m scared. I don’t know what to do. Will you two see me again?’ Detective Sergeant Scott told him to think it over and we would see him after tea. He agreed to do this and we returned him to his cell. At 7.35 P.M. Detective Sergeant Scott asked him if he’d had plenty of time to think during the afternoon. He said he had. I asked him what he was going to tell us about the throat-cut murders. He said he had been involved in them all. Detective Sergeant Scott asked him if he had done any of the throat slashings himself. He said: ‘Murphy done the first three and I done the rest.’ He added: ‘It was on Murphy’s instructions when he was in gaol to take suspicion off Murphy.’ He broke down and cried and said: ‘It was that bastard Murphy led me into all this. My head’s away with it.’ He asked us did we think he was wise. Detective Sergeant Scott asked if he could give us details of each murder and he said: ‘Go ahead and ask and I’ll tell you.’

  This session ended at 8.30 P.M. by which time Moore had named most of his accomplices in the cut-throat killings, most of the members of the UVF Brigade Staff and the manner in which the victims had been killed. Nesbitt was informed immediately and made his way to Castlereagh with all the files available on killings in the Shankill area at the time of the Butcher murders. He also issued orders that those mentioned by Moore as his accomplices be arrested. Scott and McCawl were in the interview room with Moore when Nesbitt arrived at 8.30 P.M. to undertake the harrowing job of recording the details of Moore’s involvement in the Butcher murders.

  That evening while Moore was being interviewed, McAllister was also being questioned in a room less than twenty yards away. The policeman in charge of McAllister was the experienced murder squad detective from C Division, Jim Reid. His notes contain this entry:

  At 7.30 P.M. I had a general conversation with McAllister regarding his movements on the nights of the murders involving the knife slashing. He denied being involved in any of these murders and I put it to him that I could not believe him and that no other reasonable man could believe him when they knew that knives had been found in his house and also that the victim of a knife attack could identify him as one of the men who had beaten him up. He continued to deny that he was involved in any of these m
urders and stated: ‘What can I say to convince you?’ At this stage McAllister said he wanted to speak with Billy Moore. I asked him how he knew that Billy Moore was here and he replied: ‘I can hear him next door.’ He added: ‘If I can speak with him, I will tell you all. I swear by my child’s life that if I can speak with him I will clear it all up for you.’ He again stated that if he could speak to Moore he would clear up his part in the cut-throat murders, and he began to cry.

  McAllister persisted with his request that if he were allowed to see Moore they could ‘clear it up together’. While McAllister continued to cry, Jim Reid contacted Scott, Fitzsimmons and Nesbitt and told them of McAllister’s request. Nesbitt detected McAllister’s ploy. ‘I knew’, says Nesbitt, ‘that McAllister was thinking that if he could see Moore and know that Moore had not confessed then McAllister would keep his trap shut.’

  The events which followed are not recorded on official police files because they represented an unorthodox practice but they are evidence of Nesbitt’s determination. He told Fitzsimmons to drag the crying McAllister from his interview room and give him a quick look at the broken Moore who was, by now, revealing all the details of the murders. McAllister was bundled into the doorway of the room containing Moore and told in front of Moore that his accomplice had confessed. Then he was summarily returned to his cell. The glimpse of Moore was enough to convince McAllister that he had been exposed by Moore’s testimony.

  John Scott recalls how shocked he was when he saw ‘Big Sam crying like a baby’. ‘I never thought that McAllister, hard as he was, would break down like that’, he says. During the remainder of the interview McAllister agreed to make statements about his role in the murders but insisted he would not name anyone else.

  Armed with Moore’s and McAllister’s statements Nesbitt issued instructions for Bates and Townsley to be arrested and this was done at 6.00 A.M. on 23 May. Nesbitt believed Townsley, a juvenile, might prove less formidable in interrogation than his elders.

  ‘Townsley you would think would have been easy but he was tough and stubborn’, says Nesbitt. Townsley did make a series of confessions in the presence of Cecil Chambers and Detective Constable Tom Starrett. Nesbitt decided to send for Townsley’s father at the time of the interview.

  Nesbitt kept the following notes on the Townsley episode:

  At 9.10 P.M. I saw the accused, William Townsley, in an interview room at Castlereagh RUC Station in the presence of Detective Sergeant Cecil Chambers. The accused’s father had come to the station by arrangement and I showed Mr Townsley senior into the office. He sat beside the accused and said to him: ‘Did you confess?’

  The accused replied: ‘Yes I did but Moore and Big Sam are here and they made theirs first.’ The accused and his father had a conversation during which they discussed how Townsley senior was going to convey all the details to the accused’s mother. I asked the accused to tell his father whether it was true, the statement he made, and he replied that it was so. I asked Townsley senior if he would witness the statement which had been made by his son and he agreed to do so and signed it.

  Nesbitt had got what he wanted. When I put it to Jimmy Nesbitt that his handling of the Townsley interrogation might be questioned he was adamant that it was the right thing to do because of the nature of the crimes and the people with whom Townsley associated. ‘I knew he was another one who had to be taken out of circulation. For his age he was hard, a confirmed terrorist,’ adds Nesbitt.

  By 25 May McClay, Bates, Waugh and Bell were also in custody. After constant interrogation they all made statements implicating themselves and other members of the Brown Bear team. None of these statements provided the extensive information given by Moore, which included references to the participation of Mr A. and Lenny Murphy. The others determinedly avoided naming accomplices, in particular Mr A. and Mr B. Meanwhile, Edwards and McIlwaine were on the run, in the certain knowledge that warrants had been issued for their arrest. Edwards was discovered hiding in a flat in the Woodvale area on 13 June and McIlwaine was detained on the same day. Nesbitt contends that McIlwaine was dismissed from the Ulster Defence Regiment before his arrest but my belief is that the dismissal came about as a result of a communication from the police that he would shortly be questioned about serious crimes.

  Mr A. disappeared from the Shankill area after the initial arrests and was not located until July. After two days of police interrogation he was released. In the autumn of 1977 Mr B. was also questioned but was released after two days in custody. Nesbitt says there were no means by which they could have been encouraged to admit their guilt.

  On 1 June, at Moore’s request, Nesbitt visited him in Crumlin Road Prison, where he was being held on remand, and was told by Moore that there had been an operation which he had forgotten to mention: the attack on the lorry transporting workmen in Cambrai Street.

  During the weeks following Moore’s arrest, charges were preferred against most of the gang. In each case Moore replied ‘guilty’ and his accomplices ‘nothing to say’.

  John Scott feels it is debatable whether the murder squad would have apprehended the Butchers without McLaverty’s identification of McAllister and Edwards. There were further fears at the time that, after charges had been preferred, McLaverty might prove to be a poor witness in court.

  Of Moore and his confession which provided the breakthrough, Scott says: ‘I think it was a relief for Moore to get it all off his chest. He had a big barrier to cross before he admitted to the cut-throat jobs. He wanted clear. He wanted out and finally he behaved in a manner which implied that he was ashamed of what he had done. I think he was more concerned about his mother because she was dying of cancer and was disgusted by her son’s actions, and Willie Moore knew that. He was rock bottom when we were interviewing him, until he admitted all the crimes.’

  He says the following about McClay: ‘McClay was the last one to be interviewed and it took us three days to break him. He had never before been interrogated but we knew he had received tuition in anti-interrogation techniques while he was on the run.’

  Detective Inspector John Fitzsimmons has a lasting impression of McAllister during the days of interrogation which, he says, is revealing about the way in which McAllister viewed himself and, more particularly, Moore. He expresses it in the following: ‘I remember going into the room to confront “Big Sam” with the fact that his leader [Moore] had said that Sam used a hatchet on Neeson. McAllister was forced to admit it and that annoyed him. Afterwards, in conversation with me, he returned to the question of his relationship with Moore and said: “Billy Moore’s a fuckin’ nutcase.” In my mind this was his way of retaliating by implying that Moore was the man who was sufficiently crazy to be responsible for the cut-throat murders.’

  With the Butcher gang in prison, Nesbitt now turned his mind to a matter which constantly exercised his thoughts: how to make Lenny Murphy accountable for the murders he had committed. He also wanted Mr A. and Mr B. brought to justice and he figured that the only means of achieving this would be to encourage one or two of the Butchers already in custody to make formal statements implicating these three leading terrorists. He proceeded with his plan to obtain accomplice evidence by having secret consultations in Crumlin Road Prison with both Moore and Bates. I have been unable to discover whether Nesbitt took the decision to follow such a course of action with the authority of his Divisional Commander and the advice of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. His meetings were designed to persuade Moore and Bates to put in writing their knowledge of the roles played by Murphy, Mr A. and Mr B. Each visit necessitated sealing off part of the prison building and placing prison staff known for their trustworthiness in charge of the interview area. A prison officer who was serving in Crumlin Road Prison at that time told me that only two or three officers were chosen for the task and no one else was allowed near the interview room. Nesbitt is reluctant to confirm that this was the case because it is an indication of how the police viewed the loyalties of som
e of the prison staff.

  Murphy was capable of murdering an accomplice in prison and in view of the fact that Major Mullen believed at the time that some of his staff in Crumlin Road Prison may have colluded with Murphy on that occasion, it is natural to assume that Nesbitt and the Prison Authorities were apprehensive about the type of person selected for the aforementioned task. In sealing off the prison for the exercise, CID and the Prison Administration attempted to ensure that any suggestion that Moore and Bates were cooperating with the police was information to which only a few would be privy. There were staff within the Prison who were known for their political loyalties and others who were likely to be vulnerable to Loyalist paramilitary pressure. The Prison Administration chose prison officers who were unquestionably men of integrity to assist Nesbitt who eventually persuaded both Moore and Bates to agree to his plan. He says no deal was done and he intended the statements to be presented to the Director of Public Prosecutions for a case against the three ringleaders. Moore and Bates both gave statements containing the evidence required by Nesbitt, who is adamant that no incentive was offered. However, soon afterwards, both the accused were moved into a wing of the prison which housed ‘ordinary’ criminals. If, as Nesbitt claims, there was no incentive offered and their removal to another wing containing different category prisoners was not reward for their compliance, the question is raised as to why they risked their lives by acceding to Nesbitt’s request. The risk would have been a very real one, inasmuch as they were about to begin life sentences in a prison where they would encounter Murphy, who had already killed a fellow prisoner, and where they would be in the company of other paramilitaries who would regard them as informers and traitors. It is possible that Nesbitt suggested, particularly to Moore, that the statements made in Castlereagh compromised leading members of the UVF and as a consequence his life would be placed in danger throughout his long term in custody but, if he co-operated with the police, they could arrange for him to remain in Crumlin Road in the company of common criminals. Crumlin Road Prison offered the opportunity to be free from the pressure of fellow members of paramilitary organizations and in particular the UVF. At this time Murphy was in the H Block of the Maze Prison outside Belfast where the presence of fellow members of the UVF ensured that there was a degree of discipline required and where Moore and Bates would be at risk if it was suspected that they had assisted the RUC. In the company of common criminals in Crumlin Road their safety could be guaranteed and they could escape the influence of the UVF. Murphy demonstrated in the early seventies that he preferred Crumlin Road Prison because it possessed a relaxed atmosphere and was less regimented than the Maze Prison but perhaps the most salient reason why life in Crumlin Road would have appeared attractive at this time to Moore and Bates was that it contained fewer prisoners and it would prove easier to maintain a separation from convicted terrorists who could harm them if Murphy or the UVF leadership so ordered. So was such an offer made to them?