The Warsaw Uprising: 1 August - 2 October 1944 (Major Battles of World War Two)

by George Bruce

  No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to the Hitler power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for decisive action.

  The Polish Army now entering Polish territory, trained in the USSR, is now joined by the People’s Army to form the corps of the Polish Armed Forces, the armed arm of our nation in its struggle for independence.

  Its ranks will be joined tomorrow by the sons of Warsaw. They will all… pursue the enemy westward, wipe out the Hitlerite vermin from the Polish land, and strike a mortal blow at the beast of Prussian imperialism.

  For Warsaw, which did not yield, but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived. The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw, and add new destruction and thousands of victims. Our houses and parks, our bridges and railway stations, our factories and our public buildings will be turned into defence positions.

  They will expose the city to ruin and its inhabitants to death. They will try to take away all the most precious possessions and turn into dust all that they have to leave behind.

  It is therefore a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by heroic effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, its houses, factories and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation but also save the nation’s property and the lives of our brethren.

  Poles, the time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms! There is not a moment to lose!

  A Soviet manifesto[109] signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Edward Osobka-Morawski, head of the Moscow-sponsored Committee of National Liberation, echoed this appeal. It began: ‘Poles! The time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms!… Every Polish homestead must become a stronghold in the struggle against the invader… There is not a moment to lose.’

  These appeals for immediate armed action were also printed on leaflets and dropped over the city by Russian aircraft. Their note of urgency suggested that the Red Army’s attack on Warsaw was imminent. For, reasoned the Poles, there could otherwise be no object in urging the citizens to start an uprising which, unsupported, would be bound to end in carnage, with no gain to the Red Army. ‘No one in the city doubted for a moment,’ Colonel Rzepecki noted in his diary on 29 July, ‘that the Russian front had arrived at the gates of Praga and that a great battle would start any day now, the battle for Warsaw. But the military situation is still very unclear and this is only the beginning of a battle whose end cannot be foreseen. Monter (Chrusciel) claimed on the 29th that Russian armoured reconnaissance units had actually entered Praga. He reported that the German bridgehead was only held very weakly and that there are no proper defences on the Vistula line.’ Rzepecki also noted that the Globe Reuter news service on 29 July quoted its Moscow correspondent as reporting that Soviet units ‘are probing the outlying regions of Warsaw and that a heavy battle is starting near by’.

  During the afternoon of 29 July another event pushed Komorowski a few steps nearer the brink. The people were surprised to find the city walls plastered with posters signed by Colonel Julian Skokowski, commander of the Communist People’s Army in Warsaw, stating that Jan Jankowski, the Government delegate, the Home Army Commander, Komorowski, and his staff had fled the city. Skokowski was taking over command of all Secret Army units and would mobilize them to fight the Germans.[110] Following the declaration of the Moscow-sponsored National Committee of Liberation repudiating the London Government it seemed to indicate the Soviets were trying to gain control of the planned uprising.

  Komorowski was determined this should not happen. He at once instructed Colonel Chrusciel to order his troops to be ready for the Uprising from 1700 hours the next day, 30 July.[111]

  But the fortune of war was no longer with Komorowski. ‘In Central Poland, Marshal Rokossovsky’s tanks, motorized infantry and Cossack cavalry, powerfully supported by the Red Air Force, pressed on towards Warsaw and were heavily engaged about 20 miles south-east with German lorry-borne reinforcements rushed to the front to stem the advance,’[112] a Soviet bulletin said on 29 July.

  A German counter-attack against Rokossovsky’s 2nd Soviet Tank Army was about to begin.

  Chapter Eight: Soviet defeat in the suburbs

  From 29 July onwards the boom of artillery across the Vistula and the bombing of German targets in Praga rattled the windows of Warsaw day and night. Several times on 30 July Moscow Radio broadcast another urgent appeal from the Polish Communists to the men and women of Warsaw to rise against the Germans. ‘Warsaw is shaking in its foundations from the roar of cannons, the Soviet armies are violently attacking and approaching Praga,’ it began, on a high note of excitement.

  They are coming to bring you freedom. The Germans will try to hold Warsaw when they have been pushed out of Praga. They will destroy everything. Bialystok they destroyed in six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. We must do everything in our power not to let them repeat this in Warsaw. People of Warsaw! To arms! Let the whole population stand up as a wall around the National Council of the Homeland, around the Warsaw Underground Army. Attack the Germans. Arrest their plans to destroy all public buildings. Help the Red Army in its crossing of the Vistula. Send information, indicate routes. May the million inhabitants of Warsaw become a million soldiers who will expel the German invaders and win freedom.[113]

  Komorowski and his staff were fairly well advised of the Soviet pressure towards the end of July on the German forces defending the Praga approaches although they lacked precise knowledge of the Red Army’s whereabouts. On 30 July one of Colonel Iranek-Osmecki’s intelligence officers had talked with officers of a Soviet tank patrol at Radosk, within ten miles of the capital. They confidently expected to enter it any day.

  At the 30 July morning staff meeting Komorowski maintained that there were still no grounds for starting fighting the next day; the Germans were not retreating from Warsaw and the Soviets were not yet in Praga. Colonel Bokszczanin contended that ‘until the Soviets open artillery fire on the city we must not make a move’. Colonel Pluta-Czachowski stressed the lack of operational liaison and argued that only when the Soviets were crossing the Vistula bridge should they start the fighting.[114] Any chance of joint military action with the Communists had ended finally after the Skokowski attempt to gain control of the Secret Army.

  On that same day, 30 July, Colonel Iranek-Osmecki told two of his intelligence officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Herman and Captain Muszczak, that the Uprising was imminent and might start at any time. Herman argued that in view of the strength of German forces in the region it would be madness to do so. Iranek-Osmecki refused to discuss this senior staff decision with two subordinate officers. He requested Captain Muszczak to inform the Polish Workers’ Party leaders in Warsaw as an act of courtesy that fighting was about to begin. The Communists were not to be consulted and there was no question of liaison with them.[115]

  Meantime, both the troops and the civil administration needed to be protected from future possible German or Soviet reprisals. Komorowski and Jankowski therefore jointly requested the Government in London to obtain recognition of the Home Army as an integral part of Allied Forces, and of the civil administration as part of Allied Military Government.

  Lieutenant Jan Nowak, a courier, parachuted in from London on 30 July with an important message from the Polish Government stating that the Home Army was unlikely to receive the large-scale British help requested in Komorowski’s 25 July message. This asked for German-held airfields near Warsaw to be bombed; for Polish RAF squadrons to fly to Poland, and for the Polish Parachute Brigade to be dropped near the capital.

  Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador, had requested Mr Anthony Eden to arrange for these operations to be undertaken, but Sir Orme Sargent, of the Foreign Office, informed the Ambassador on 28 July that ‘operational considerations alone preclude us from meeting the three requests you made for assis
ting the rising in Warsaw’.[116]

  It would not be possible to fly the parachute brigade over German territory as far as Warsaw without risking excessive losses. The dispatch of fighter squadrons to airfields in Poland would also be a lengthy and complicated process which could, in any case, only be carried out in agreement with the Soviet Government. It could certainly not be accomplished in time to influence the present battle.

  As regards bombarding Warsaw airfields, Warsaw is beyond the normal operational range of Royal Air Force bombers and the bombing of airfields would in any case be carried out much more appropriately by bombers operating from Soviet-controlled bases.

  Insofar as your authorities may have had in mind shuttle-bombing… this is carried out by the American Army Air Force and not by the Royal Air Force. I am afraid, therefore, that there is nothing that His Majesty’s Government can do in this connection.

  The London Polish Government now knew without any shadow of doubt that the aid which they had requested was impossible. But apart from sending the British refusal on to Warsaw in a less categorical form they made no attempt to restrain Komorowski and the Home Army GHQ by, for example, making the Uprising conditional upon the actual crossing of the Vistula by Soviet forces. No doubt they had Mikolajczyk’s visit to Stalin in mind.

  Komorowski was still keeping a cool head, refusing to be jockeyed into starting the fighting prematurely, and for the time being during these momentous days holding a tight rein on his more impetuous staff members. Reports were received at the staff meeting on the morning of 31 July of the Soviet force’s advance towards Wolomin and Radzymin, twelve and sixteen miles respectively north-east of Warsaw. Some of the officers present — Pelcyznski, Chrusciel, Okulicki, Rzepecki, Iranek-Osmecki, Pluta-Czachowski, Szostak and Bokszczanin — saw this as a reason for starting the fighting at once; others good cause for further waiting. Iranek-Osmecki warned strongly of the danger of a German counter-attack.

  Komorowski therefore asked everyone to say in turn whether or not they believed the moment had come. Four of them, Colonels Chrusciel, Bokszczanin, Iranek-Osmecki and Pluta-Czachowski, favoured waiting, while General Okulicki and Colonels Szostak and Rzepecki demanded an immediate uprising. Neither Komorowski nor Pelczynski stated their views, but the meeting ended at noon with Komorowski concluding that ‘the struggle will not be undertaken on 1 August and it is not very likely that it will be the next day either’.[117]

  The politicians had to be told of this decision, and in the early afternoon Komorowski met Jankowski, Deputy Premier and Government Delegate, with the four members of the Council of National Unity, led by Kazimierz Puzak, the Socialist chairman. Komorowski gave them a very bleak analysis of the situation. On the one hand there were altogether an estimated twelve German divisions in the region; on the other, his shortage of ammunition, and the improbability of capturing very much now that the Germans had removed most of it out of the city westwards, meant that he could depend on keeping on the offensive for only one and a half to four days.

  He therefore believed that the operations planned for the last days of the German retreat from the capital were not a realistic proposition[118] in the very near future. It was a categorical statement and hearing it, the politicians, especially Kazimierz Puzak, strongly emphasized the need for maximum caution.

  Thus, at noon on 31 July, the Secret Army C-in-C and the underground political leaders were agreed not to make a battleground of Warsaw for the time being. It was an important change of policy.

  Colonel Iranek-Osmecki left before the meeting ended, to meet at a house in Napoleon Square various members of his intelligence department who were returning from reconnaissance in the Praga district. One of them, Captain Jozef, arrived late with the important news of a German counter-attack about to be launched, he was reliably informed, by units of four Panzer divisions — the ‘Hermann Goering’ Division, the Fourth Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division, and the SS Panzer ‘Viking’ Division. The Germans were for the time being stronger and were likely in the battle that was developing to throw the Soviets back temporarily.

  Colonel Iranek-Osmecki knew that this information made further postponement of the Uprising absolutely imperative. For if GHQ were to launch it now, when the Soviets in the Praga sector were about to receive the full weight of von Vormann’s armour and could not come to their aid, the outcome would be disastrous.

  He left the house in Napoleon Square at about 16.45 hours, expecting to get to the staff meeting with this vital piece of news by the time it began, at 17.00 hours. Fusillades of shots broke out and died away here and there in the city. Ahead of him near a railway bridge he saw a crowd of people and heard loud commands shouted in German. The Gestapo and the Schutzpolizei had set up a cordon and were arresting anyone who approached. Iranek-Osmecki turned quickly in the opposite direction. He realized with a sense of alarm that he would have to make a detour of two or three kilometres and might not get to the meeting in time.[119]

  Punctually at five o’clock, an hour or two after Romorowski had said that an uprising was not a realistic proposition, the afternoon staff meeting began. Apart from Komorowski, only Pelczynski, Okulicki and Rzepecki attended, because nothing of note had occurred — no Soviet advances, for example, which could precipitate a decision. Nevertheless, tension and anxiety weighed heavily on these weary wanted men, faced now with the onus of a terrible decision. Chrusciel was due later, but he arrived suddenly a little after five. Subduing his excitement he said he had received a report that Soviet tank forces had entered Praga. He insisted that his report was correct and argued that they should start fighting at once.[120]

  Alarmed at this report, according to Rzepecki, but without checking it in any way Komorowski at once sent for Deputy Premier Jan Jankowski and briefly put the situation before him. He said, in contrast to his clearly stated opinion that morning, that he believed it was the right time to begin the fight.

  Something strange had happened to Komorowski since the morning’s meeting. Gone was his caution, his prudence, his realism. On the foundation of this single, unchecked report and without even waiting for the return of Colonel Iranek-Osmecki, who he knew had been gathering information from his agents in the field, he was ready to order now an immediate uprising.

  Launched in Warsaw at this moment it would turn the German defeat into complete disaster, he told Mr Jankowski. It would cut their supply lines to their troops in the entire Warsaw sector, prevent them reinforcing their 73rd Division before Praga and guarantee an easy success for the Soviet outflanking movement to the east, north-east and north of Warsaw he thought was then beginning.

  He admitted that even if the Secret Army managed to overthrow the German garrison and seize the city with its first onslaught, they had only enough arms and food for at the most seven days. He also knew, although he did not seem to make this very clear to Jankowski, that he could not count on any substantial aid from Britain. ‘So far as we could foresee, our success depended upon not striking too soon. The Red Army must enter Warsaw within a week after we struck the first blow.’[121]

  General Komorowski was about to try to secure the capital for the London Polish Government before the arrival of the Soviets, yet militarily he depended on them for its accomplishment. Instead of a prudent, realistic general, he had somehow become in the space of one morning a desperate political gambler.

  Jankowski listened to him ‘and then put questions to various members of the Staff’.[122] What those questions were, to whom they were put and what the answers were, neither Komorowski nor anyone else has ever stated.

  Upon this brief discussion with Jankowski the existence of an ancient city and its million inhabitants depended. Yet all we have from Komorowski is: ‘Having completed his picture of the situation, he turned to me with the words: “Very well, then. Begin.”’[123]

  Komorowski told Chrusciel, upon whose report the decision rested, and who was in command of the fighting: ‘Tomorrow, at seventeen hours precisely, you wi
ll start operations in Warsaw.’ Chrusciel at once left the room for his own operations HQ.

  Thus, in half an hour, the final decision was made on the foundation of evidence which General Komorowski had not checked and which ran counter to the advice of his own intelligence chief. Certainly it is easy to be wise after the event, but the desperate haste with which the insurrection was launched after ten days’ marking time has a sorry sound to it.

  Iranek-Osmecki arrived breathless half an hour later. He brought the even more dramatic news that the Germans were about to counter-attack and that their troops defending the outer ring of the Praga sector were holding on. Komorowski simply looked at his watch and said: ‘Too late. It’s done. Stalo-sie! We have decided to fight tomorrow.’[124] That was all.

  Iranek-Osmecki insisted that the information he had just received from Praga made it clear that Chrusciel’s report was optimistic or exaggerated at least. Fresh German reinforcements were still concentrating for the tank battle with the Soviets.

  Just after 6 PM Colonel Pluta-Czachowski arrived. He brought reports that the German counter-attack had actually begun. Komorowski now had clear evidence that tomorrow’s uprising would be premature. Yet he repeated what he had already said — the orders to fight were issued and it was too late to countermand them.[125]

  In fact, Chrusciel had still not issued the battle order and did not do so until an hour later, at 7 PM.[126] It had then to be coded and given to the messenger girls for distribution to area commanders. On 31 July this was impossible because the Germans had that day brought the curfew forward to 8 PM. So it was just possible that Komorowski might have been able to repeal the order, or could at least have tried to do so, but he refused. ‘It’s too late now,’ he contended.

  Colonel Szostak then arrived and heard news of the order and his colleagues’ objections. He had earlier urged an immediate uprising; now he had doubts. He asked Komorowski why he had heeded neither his chief of Operations nor his chief of Intelligence before deciding. Komorowski’s answer was hardly convincing in view of his earlier realism. He said that had he waited it might have been too late to have started the fighting before the Soviets entered the city.[127]