by Clay Blair
From Canadian waters, most eastbound convoys crossed the extensive and shallow waters of the Grand Banks. This area, where the warm Gulf Stream meets the cold Labrador Current, is almost perpetually fogbound and often cluttered with icebergs, and therefore it was a hazardous place for merchant ships and warships and especially so for RCAF escort aircraft. Aircraft operating in this foggy area faced an additional hazard: prevailing westerly winds on the return legs, which increased fuel consumption and thus curtailed the efficiency of the missions.
For the next one thousand miles (or four or five days) of the voyage, eastbound convoys in the fall of 1942 had no air escort. This area was the so-called Air Gap or Greenland Gap or Black Hole. Fortunately for the Allies, this was a difficult area for U-boat “wolf pack” operations. Ignoring this fact, historians and popular writers have greatly inflated U-boat successes in the “Gap” just as they have done on the Murmansk run.
Eastward of the “Air Gap,” the convoys fell under the protection of Allied aircraft based at Iceland. This, too, was a formidable force, consisting of about fifty radar-equipped frontline aircraft with experienced aircrews: twenty-four Catalinas in U.S. Navy Squadron VP 73* and British Squadron 330, twenty Hudsons in British Squadron 269, and six B-24 Liberators in British Squadron 120. The Catalinas could provide convoy protection out to about six hundred miles, the Hudsons to about four hundred miles, the B-24s to eight hundred to one thousand miles. Where formerly the Iceland-based aircraft attempted to provide all transatlantic convoys with protection, in the fall of 1942 they protected only the relatively few convoys known to be—or about to be—under U-boat attack.
From Iceland easterly toward the British Isles, the Iceland air escort was reinforced and ultimately replaced by RAF Coastal Command aircraft in about ten squadrons based in the Hebrides, Faeroes, northwest Scotland, and Northern Ireland. These units were equipped with over one hundred frontline aircraft: twenty-four B-17s (Squadrons 206 and 220), twenty-four Sunderlands (Squadrons 201 and 228), twelve Catalinas (Squadron 210), twenty-eight Whitleys (Squadrons 58 and 612), twenty Hudsons (Squadron 48), six Wellingtons (Squadron 179), and three B-24s (Squadron 120).
There were a further ten ASW RAF Coastal Command squadrons based in south and southwest England. These comprised 150 frontline aircraft: twelve B-24 Liberators (Squadron 224), twelve Halifaxes (Squadron 502), twenty-four Sunderlands (Australian Squadrons 10 and 461), forty-two Wellingtons (Squadrons 172, 304, and 311), twenty Hudsons (Squadron 500), and forty Whitleys (Squadrons 51 and 77). RAF Bomber Command Operational Training Unit 10 in southwest England provided another eight Whitleys for ASW.
In the literature of the “Battle of the Atlantic,” an abundance of pages is devoted to describing the miserable and perilous duty on surface escorts in the north, especially life on board the corvettes. But a picture of life on board the long- and very-long-range aircraft is difficult to find. The missions of the B-24s, B-17s, Catalinas, and Sunderlands were usually prolonged, often twelve to sixteen hours or more. In order to maximize the effectiveness of ASV radar, the planes usually flew at low altitudes (two thousand to four thousand feet), where rough air was commonplace. Radio or radar altimeters were not yet standard; most of the pilots had to rely on old-technology altimeters that were not always accurate, especially at the very low attack altitudes. Visibility was often poor to terrible. Occasionally these aircraft unintentionally flew right into the sea.
The ASW air patrols were relatively safe from enemy attack at this time, and therefore not unattractive to some airmen. However, the overwhelming majority of Coastal Command and aircrews found the missions to be monumentally boring and physically and mentally exhausting. Most crews flew thousands of hours over gray seas searching for or suppressing U-boats without ever seeing any sign of one.
An actual attack on a U-boat was a rare event, and usually it failed. In three years of antisubmarine warfare on the North Atlantic run—through September 3, 1942—Coastal Command aircraft had captured one U-boat (the Type VIIC U-570) with surface-ship assistance* but had positively accounted for only one kill unassisted by surface craft. That one (the “Milk Cow” Type XIV supply boat U-464) had been forced to scuttle by a U.S. Navy Catalina crew of VP 73, based on Iceland.† U.S. Navy Catalinas of VP 74 and Hudsons of VP 82 had sunk three others in North Atlantic waters: U-158, U-656, and U-503.
In view of the enormous air-escort effort expended on the North Atlantic convoy run, the confirmed kill or capture of five U-boats in those waters (four by U.S. Navy forces) in three years of warfare was not impressive, to say the least. However, the Allied strategic policy of the time stressed the “safe and timely” arrival of convoys rather than U-boat kills. Wherever and whenever possible, convoys evaded known U-boat positions, reducing the odds of ASW aircraft finding U-boats. Nonetheless, Allied aircraft had suppressed untold scores of U-boats that were shadowing or attacking North Atlantic convoys and had damaged more than a few. These were notable protective (or defensive) achievements of the air escorts that seldom made the front pages or earned decorations.
The glory days for the Allied airmen in the Atlantic area engaged in ASW had obviously not yet arrived. But they lay just ahead. When they did finally arrive, the results were astounding.
GERMAN SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
The seventy-three attack U-boats deployed against the North Atlantic run in September and October were assigned to groups or “wolf packs.” There were usually several groups operating simultaneously, raking east or west along the Great Circle convoy routes. Dönitz or his staff rigidly controlled their operations by freely using radios. As in 1941, the composition of the groups changed almost daily as boats fell out with battle damage or ran low on fuel and/or torpedoes and left for a U-tanker or France, and new boats arrived from France or Germany to replace them. Entirely new groups sprang into being from week to week and old groups faded away or were renamed. Hence the Germans made no attempt to propagandize groups by name and the U-boats developed no lasting identification with or loyalty to any group.
The North Atlantic boats were supported in September and October by five U-tankers. These included two Type XIV “Milk Cows,” Wolf Stiebler’s U-461 and Leo Wolfbauer’s U-463, and three big “type XB minelayers on temporary tanker duty: the U-l 16, commanded by a new skipper, Wilhelm Grimme, age thirty-five, which sailed on September 22 and disappeared without a trace, probably the victim of an as yet unidentified Allied aircraft; the new U-117, commanded by Hans-Werner Neumann, age thirty-six, who first laid a nonproductive minefield off the northwestern coast of Iceland; and the new U-l 18, commanded by Werner Czygan, age thirty-seven.
All the U-boats sailing in September and October were equipped with the meter-wavelength FuMB radar detector made by Metox. The primitive but remarkably successful Metox (“Biscay Cross”) reduced U-boat losses, damage, and delays in crossing the Bay of Biscay to such a marked degree that on October 1 the British canceled the intense ASW aircraft offensive in the bay. But Metox gear was not able to detect centimetric-wavelength radar, which was fitted in the British surface escorts and the long- and very-long-range aircraft in the North Atlantic area. Although few in number, those radar-equipped aircraft were able to catch U-boats by surprise, disrupt numerous group attacks, and sink or damage an ever-increasing number of U-boats.
In the first days of September 1942, there were already three groups operating against the North Atlantic convoys: Loss, Vorwärts, and Pfeil. Acting on B-dienst information, on September 9, one of a dozen boats in the Vorwärts group, U-584, commanded by Joachim Deecke, sighted convoy Outbound North 127, about five hundred miles west of Ireland. Composed of thirty-two ships, the convoy was escorted by Canadian Escort Group C-4: two destroyers (the modern Ottawa and the ex-American four-stack St. Croix), three Canadian corvettes, and one British corvette. The Canadian vessels were equipped with the obsolescent Type 286 meter-wavelength radar, but all sets were out of commission. Only the British corvette Celandine had Type 271 centimetric-wavele
ngth radar. None of the ships had Huff Duff.
Based on Deecke’s information, several boats got ahead of the convoy on September 10, submerged, and lay in wait in fine weather to make daylight submerged attacks. Seven boats fired torpedoes in the first attacks that day and on the surface at night. Shooting first, the experienced Hans-Jürgen Hellriegel in the famous but aging U-96 severely damaged two tankers in ballast and a freighter. Next, Hans Stock, age twenty-seven, in the new U-659 damaged the 8,000-ton British tanker Empire Oil, which was sunk later by Deecke in U-584, who also sank a freighter. Then came the experienced Otto von Bülow in U-404, who damaged another tanker in ballast. Richard Becker, age thirty-one, in the new type VIID (minelayer) U-218 damaged yet another tanker in ballast. Rolf Struckmeier in the new U-608 and Adolf Oelrich, age twenty-six, in the new U-92 shot at targets but missed.
Five of the six escorts counterattacked, throwing out depth charges. One escort hit Hans Stock in U-659. He reported “a loud knocking” in the tankage or propeller shafts, which forced him to abort to France. One corvette, Sherbrooke, was designated to fall back and sink by gun two ships damaged by Hellriegel in U-96: the 4,200-ton Belgian freighter Elisabeth van Belgie and the 6,300-ton British tanker Sveve. The British at Western Approaches sarcastically criticized the Canadians for, as they put it, “helping to reduce our tonnage by weakening the escort and completing the enemy’s work.” The other three damaged tankers limped to port and were saved.
In the second wave of attacks during the next forty-eight hours, five boats fired torpedoes. Von Bülow in U-404 claimed sinking three freighters for 17,000 tons with a full bow salvo, but only damage to a 9,300-ton tanker in ballast was confirmed in postwar records. Karl Hause in the new U-211 fired four torpedoes at four ships and damaged two, a 14,000-ton British whale factory ship and a 6,800-ton British freighter, both of which were subsequently sunk by Struckmeier in U-608. Josef Röther in the new U-380 fired four torpedoes at three targets and heard three detonations, but the hits could not be confirmed. Friedrich Mumm in U-594 also missed with four torpedoes. Oelrich in U-92 fired four torpedoes at a “destroyer” and claimed sinking it, but this success was never confirmed either.
Again the escorts counterattacked vigorously. One found and depth-charged Becker’s big, clumsy VIID (minelayer) U-218, inflicting such heavy damage that he was forced to haul out, then abort to France. In the melee, Röther in U-380 lost a diesel engine, which he could not repair and he was also forced to haul away. An escort fired at Heinz Walkerling, age twenty-seven, in the new (7-97, causing “slight” damage, but Walkerling pressed on. Another escort thwarted a third attack by Struckmeier in U-608. Hellriegel in U-96 lost a diesel engine chasing down a 400-ton Portuguese sailing trawler and, as a result, declared himself temporarily unfit for convoy attacks.
In a noteworthy achievement, two Canadian Cansos from Botwood, Newfoundland, made contact with Outbound North 127 six hundred miles out on September 13. They drove the U-boats under and off, but two boats continued the battle under cover of darkness. Oelrich in U-92 fired three torpedoes and claimed hits on three freighters, but these hits could not be confirmed. Firing two torpedoes, Walkerling in U-91 hit and sank the Canadian destroyer Ottawa, with the loss of 114 men. Shortly thereafter, two other destroyers from Halifax, the ex-American four-stack Annapolis and the old British Witch, joined the escort and, helped by the fog on the Newfoundland Bank, thwarted any further attacks.
Based on the flash reports from the boats of group Vorwärts, Dönitz had good reason to be pleased. He believed that twelve of the thirteen boats of the group—eight of them on maiden patrols—had attacked Outbound North 127 successfully, sinking nineteen ships for about 118,000 tons, including two destroyers and a corvette, and damaging six or more other ships. No U-boats had been lost. It was believed that only one boat, U-659, had been forced to abort with battle damage. The captains deserved “special recognition” for efficiency and tenacity, Dönitz logged. The one regrettable aspect of the battle was that torpedoes fitted with impact pistols had “such small effect” Would the technicians ever release the newly designed magnetic pistol for combat service?
The confirmed score from convoy Outbound North 127 was substantially less than the claims: the destroyer Ottawa and seven merchant ships for about 51,500 tons sunk and four tankers for about 27,000 tons damaged. Not one but two boats, U-659 and U-218, aborted with battle damage, and U-608 also limped home prematurely.
One of the boats of group Pfeil, the new Type VIID (minelayer) U-216, commanded by Karl-Otto Schultz, age twenty-seven, found a fast eastbound convoy on September 13. This was Halifax 206, comprised of forty-six heavily laden merchant ships protected by the well-equipped, experienced British Escort Group B-l: two destroyers (Hurricane and Watchman) and four corvettes. Schultz attempted to shadow, but the escorts used direction-finding gear to locate his signals and drove him under. Nonetheless, Dönitz directed the rest of group Pfeil to close on the convoy. Another Pfeil boat, the new U-440, commanded by Hans Geissler, age twenty-five, not yet two weeks out from Kiel, attempted to attack, but an escort also drove this boat off and down, inflicting such heavy damage that Geissler was forced to abort to France. Inasmuch as the convoy reached air cover from Iceland before group Pfeil could properly assemble, Dönitz canceled the attack. The British praised the good performance of Huff Duff in this engagement.
Another Pfeil boat, the new U-221, commanded by Hans Trojer, age twenty-six, found a convoy sailing in the opposite direction on September 15. It was Outbound North 129, protected by Canadian Escort Group C-2: two British destroyers, four Canadian corvettes, and a British corvette. Dönitz ordered the other Pfeil boats to converge on Trojer, but foul weather blew up, preventing a mass attack, and all but one ship of the convoy got away. She was the 3,000-ton Norwegian freighter Olaf Fostenes, sunk by thirty-four-year-old Josef Röther in the new U-380. Rushing to join Pfeil for this attack on September 15, the new U-261, commanded by Hans Lange, age twenty-seven, merely one week out from Kiel, was caught and sunk near Rosemary Bank by a Whitley of RAF Squadron 58, piloted by B. F. Snell. There were no survivors of U-261.
Acting on B-dienst information, a boat of group Loss, U-599, commanded by Wolfgang Breithaupt, age twenty-nine, intercepted another eastbound convoy on September 18. This was Slow Convoy 100, a group of twenty-four heavily laden merchant ships, escorted by Paul R. Heineman’s American Escort Group A-3: the big Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters Campbell and Spencer and five corvettes, plus two Canadian corvettes en route to the British Isles for duty in Torch.*
At this time the Admiralty deployed to the North Atlantic an experimental hunter-killer group, designated the 20th Support Group. It originally included a “jeep” carrier, but that had been diverted to augment Torch forces. Now composed of ten warships (four destroyers, four River-class frigates, and two sloops), the group sailed from the British Isles in late September in conjunction with convoy Outbound North (Slow) 132, which included a tanker, Laurelwood, to refuel the group at sea. Unattached to any convoy, the purpose of the experimental 20th Support Group was to patrol the convoy routes and to rush in on call and attack any U-boats that might find Outbound North (Slow) 132 and/or the inbound Slow Convoys 100 and 102.
Breithaupt in U-599 shadowed and sent beacon signals to bring up the other boats of group Loss to eastbound Slow Convoy 100. Next to arrive was the new U-755, commanded by Walter Göing, age twenty-eight, fresh from sinking an American warship.* Next came Klaus Köpke, age twenty-seven, in the new U-259 and Hans Peter Hinsch in the veteran U-569. While attempting to attack submerged, Köpke collided with a merchant ship and had to break off the attack and surface. Later a “destroyer” came out of the fog, forced Köpke and Hinsch to dive, then pasted both boats with numerous depth charges. Low on fuel, Hinsch in U-569 headed for France; Köpke in U-259 remained with the pack.
Eager for another big convoy victory, Dönitz ordered the boats of group Pfeil to join group Loss for a combined attack of about twenty-one
U-boats. Meanwhile, the Loss boats still in contact with the convoy were authorized to shoot, Paul-Karl Loeser, age twenty-seven, in the new U-373, and Günter Jahn, age thirty-two, in the new U-596 fired almost simultaneously. Loeser thought he hit a corvette (the Canadian Rosthern), but he missed. Jahn hit and sank a 5,700-ton British freighter.
A massive storm, described by the U-boat skippers as a “hurricane,” blew into the battle scene, spoiling the merger of Loss and Pfeil Hanging on doggedly, Breithaupt in U-599, Jahn in U-596, Göing in U-755, and Ralph Kapitzky, age twenty-six, in the new U-615 sought to outmaneuver or outguess the escorts and shoot. Kapitzky had to forgo an opportunity to shoot at “two destroyers,” he reported, because “the seas were too big.” In truth, the seas were so wild that the convoy had to heave to and ride out the storm. Unaware that several boats were still in contact, Dönitz prematurely canceled operations because of the hurricane.
On the third day of the storm, one of the Pfeil boats, U-617, commanded by Albrecht Brandi, age twenty-eight, making his maiden patrol, relocated Slow Convoy 100. He shot at and sank three ships: the 8,900-ton British tanker Athelsultan, the 2,300-ton British freighter Tennessee, and a straggler, the 3,600-ton Belgian freighter Roumanie. Brandi reported his successes and the position of the convoy, but U-boat headquarters did not receive the message. As a result, no boats came up to assist him.