Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45
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Neither of those reports adequately took into consideration the growing pains of the Canadian military forces or the shortcomings of their weaponry. The Canadian surface escorts were still making do with too few unimproved corvettes, green crews, and antiquated radar and sonar. The Atlantic forces had been pared to the bone to provide the seventeen most experienced and best-equipped Canadian corvettes for Torch. As for the air escorts, only two Canadian squadrons (5 and 116) had Cansos/Catalinas, and one of those units (116) had only just arrived in Newfoundland for duty. The other squadrons made do with limited-range Digbys and Hudsons.*
ASSESSMENTS
In the month of October, the Allies sailed sixteen convoys across the Atlantic, east and west,† comprised of about 725 merchant ships. The great congregation of U-boats on the North Atlantic convoy run mounted truly noteworthy attacks on only three convoys, all eastbound to the British Isles: Slow Convoy 104, Slow Convoy 107, and Halifax 212. From these three convoys the U-boats sank twenty-nine merchant ships for about 179,000 tons, all loaded with food and war materiel. Of the 725 merchant ships in all sixteen convoys, U-boats sank thirty-eight ships (5 percent),
German U-boat casualties in October were unusually heavy, indeed, by far the worst of the war to then. Twelve boats were lost on the North Atlantic run alone: the XB minelayer U-116, serving as a temporary tanker; the Type IXC U-520; and ten Type VIICs.‡ Remarkably, nine and maybe ten of the boats were sunk by Allied aircraft, unassisted by surface ships. Moreover, ten Type VIIs aborted in the month of October.§
In their rush to describe the “massacre” of merchant ships on the North Atlantic run, historians seldom, if ever, tabulate and stress the twenty U-boat casualties (sinkings and aborts) in the month of October. Doubtless these casualties provoked alarm and deeply troubling questions at U-boat headquarters. Over five hundred U-boat crewmen on the twelve lost boats had been killed or captured, not to mention other U-boat losses elsewhere in October.
When the months of September and October 1942 are combined, we see that the numerous groups of U-boats operating on the North Atlantic run mounted noteworthy attacks on six of the thirty-five convoys# that crossed the Atlantic in those months. From these convoys, comprising about 1,700 merchant ships, the U-boats sank fifty-seven cargo vessels (3 percent) plus the destroyers Ottawa and Veteran for 343,535 tons. In return, sixteen U-boats and about 720 German submariners were lost (or captured) in those two months, including U-116, the valuable XB minelayer serving as a provisional tanker. This was an intolerable exchange rate of about 3.5 merchant ships sunk for each U-boat lost. In addition, in the same two months, twelve U-boats on the North Atlantic run were forced to abort, bringing U-boat casualties (sinkings and aborts) to twenty-eight.
In this same period, American shipyards alone increased production of new merchant vessels to an astonishing rate, turning out nearly four times the gross tonnage of the ships lost in those six convoys:
Month New Ships Gross Tons
September 94 691,000
October 84 599,000
Totals 178 1,290,000*
A further close analysis of anticonvoy operations in all areas of the North Atlantic by the seventy-three attack boats sailing in September and October is also revealing. Forty-three of these patrols (59 percent) were carried out by new boats or new skippers. The fifty-seven merchant ships sunk by all the boats came to an average of .78 ships per boat per patrol. This was a marked decrease from the average .92 ships per boat per patrol achieved by the boats sailing to the North Atlantic in July and August.† Forty attack boats, or well over half of the seventy-three putting out (55 percent), sank no ships, an increase in the nonproductive trend, so ominous for the Germans:‡
These figures show that even without reading the four-rotor naval Enigma, Triton, by the fall of 1942 the Allies were fast gaining the upper hand over the U-boat threat on the North Atlantic run. Lacking search radar, a reliable magnetic pistol for torpedoes, and adequate numbers of U-tankers, unaware of shipboard Huff Duff and harassed by radar-equipped Allied aircraft, skippers of the Type VII and Type IX U-boats fought convoy battles under increasingly severe handicaps. In truth, notwithstanding the slowly growing strength of the Atlantic U-boat force, there was no longer any possibility that the obsolescent Type VIIs and IXs could pose a meaningful, let alone decisive, threat to Allied shipping on the North Atlantic run. The much-vaunted “wolf pack” tactic was a failure on many levels.
Nonetheless, Dönitz insisted upon continuing the convoy battles in the North Atlantic. Apart from the Allied shiping losses achieved and the propaganda opportunities these offered, the presence of U-boats perpetuated the reign of terror at sea and compelled the Allies to continue using convoys, which cut imports and delayed some military operations. However, Dönitz’s plan had to be canceled. On November 8, when Berlin became aware of the Torch landings in Northwest Africa, Hitler directed that every available U-boat of the Atlantic force be employed to repel the Allied invaders.
Thus the U-boat campaign on the North Atlantic run was again abruptly halted, this time after merely four months into the renewed assault. In canceling this campaign, Hitler provided the Allies another “breathing space” in the North Atlantic, largely free of U-boats. During that breather, hundreds upon hundreds of loaded ships in Halifax and Slow convoys delivered huge quantities of oil, food, and supplies to the British Isles.
PATROLS TO THE AMERICAS
To exploit Allied shipping traffic in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in the area of Trinidad—and to freeze ASW forces in those places and force the Allies to continue convoying—Dönitz deployed eighteen U-boats to American waters in September and October: thirteen Type IXs and five Type VIIs.
Four Type IXs sailed in September to Canadian waters for torpedo patrols within a period of one week, from September 19 to 26. One, U-518, was assigned the additional task of landing an agent of the Abwehr, the German intelligence agency, on the coast of New Brunswick.
Leaving from France, Hans-Joachim Schwantke in the aging IX U-43 and Hermann Rasch in the XB U-106 arrived in Canadian waters first. Both reported intense air patrols. Rasch likened them to the air threat in the Bay of Biscay. Newly installed Metox gear gave warning of aircraft using meter-wavelength ASV radar, but Rasch, who dived and surfaced U-106 so often that he felt like a “dolphin,” suggested that if at all possible, Metox should be upgraded to provide the range to the detected aircraft.
Both Schwantke and Rasch cruised boldly up the St. Lawrence River—Schwantke farther upstream that any U-boat skipper ever had—but attentive air patrols and noticeably improved cooperation between air and surface ASW forces thwarted attacks on convoys and single ships. Moreover, it was at about this time that Canadian authorities closed the St. Lawrence River to ocean shipping. In these arduous, nerve-racking operations, Schwantke sank no ships and Rasch sank but one: the 2,100-ton ore boat Waterton, escorted by the armed yacht Vison and an RCAF Canso. After the attack, Vison got U-106 on sonar and dropped twelve well-placed depth charges, forcing Rasch to lie doggo on the bottom at 607 feet for eight hours. Upon withdrawing from the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Schwantke advised Dönitz that Canadian ASW measures were now so effective that he should not send any more boats to the area. Rasch concurred, but Dönitz did not.
Harassed by aircraft, neither Schwantke nor Rasch had any further success. Homebound, the boats were to meet the tanker U-460, commanded by Ebe Schnoor, for replenishment. A raging storm delayed the refueling for six days, during which time they—and some other U-boats—literally ran out of fuel and drifted. Finally the refueling was carried out on November 29 and most of the boats returned to France, but Rasch in U-106 was temporarily diverted to help repel the Torch invasion convoys. For past successes and for his tenacity and aggressiveness in the St. Lawrence River, Dönitz awarded Rasch a Ritterkreuz.*
Homebound on November 17, Schwantke in U-43 found the eastbound Slow Convoy 109, whose Canadian escort had been weakened by the abort of the modern destroyer Saguena
y, severely damaged in a collision with a merchant ship. An RCAF Canso drove U-43 off, but Schwantke regained contact the following day and got in one full salvo. He claimed he sank two freighters for 10,000 tons and damaged the 9,100-ton American tanker Brilliant, in ballast. The sinkings could not be confirmed, but Brilliant was indeed hit and damaged and later sank under tow.
Outbound from Germany to Canada, the new IXC/40 U-183 and IXC U-518, commanded by Heinrich Schäfer, age thirty-five, and Friedrich-Wilhelm Wissmann, age twenty-six, respectively, were diverted temporarily to a group on the North Atlantic run. While awaiting action, Schäfer was twice bombed by aircraft, but the damage was slight. After they were released from the group, both boats proceeded to the north outlet of Belle Isle Strait, to again check out Dönitz’s firm but wrong conviction that the Slow and Halifax convoys were exiting the Gulf of St. Lawrence through the strait, when, in actuality, they were leaving from New York. During ten days of lying in wait off the north exit, neither skipper found a convoy, of course, but Wissmann shot four torpedoes at a lone “destroyer.” However, all missed.
After the two boats had patrolled that area for ten fruitless days, Dönitz released them to penetrate the Gulf of St. Lawrence, via Cabot Strait. Proceeding slowly south along the east coast of Newfoundland toward St. John’s, Wissmann boldly entered Conception Bay, where he sank the 5,600-ton Canadian freighter Rose Castle and a 5,600-ton British ore carrier in the Wabana Roadstead. Schäfer fired two torpedoes at a tanker and a destroyer. He heard two detonations and claimed the tanker sank, but it could not be confirmed in postwar records.
Wissmann entered the gulf via Cabot Strait on November 2, en route to New Brunswick to land the Abwehr agent. A radar-equipped Canadian ASW aircraft caught U-518 in the strait and dropped four shallow-set depth charges, but Wissmann crash-dived and went deep. That maneuver and the sudden onset of fog thwarted a second air attack.
Running submerged most of the time to avoid ASW aircraft, Wissmann slowly proceeded westerly to Baie des Chaleurs. In the early hours of November 9, he carefully beached the bow of U-518 on a sandbar and landed the agent, Werner Alfred Waldmar von Janowski, on a deserted shore via an inflatable dinghy. When the dinghy returned, Wissmann backed off the sandbar and ran for the open waters of he gulf that same night. He reported to Dönitz that his special mission had been carried out without notable incident.* Finding no targets inside the gulf, Wissmann departed the area on November 17.
That same day, Schäfer in U-183 found the westbound convoy Outbound North (Slow) 142 on the Grand Banks. As he was preparing to attack, an RCAF aircraft escorting the convoy saw U-183 and dropped six close depth charges. Schäfer survived, but he had no further opportunity to get at the convoy. Furthermore, he reported mechanical defects that precluded any immediate convoy attacks.
Four days later, on November 21, Wissmann in U-518 found and attacked another incoming convoy, Outbound North 145, which, owing to a foul-up in communications between Canadian and American ASW forces, had no air cover. Wissmann sank the 6,100-ton British freighter Empire Sailor and damaged two tankers sailing in ballast, but his boat, too, was badly damaged.
Homebound, both skippers sank ships: Schäfer in U-183 got the 6,000-ton British freighter Empire Dabchink from convoy Outbound North (Slow) 146; Wissmann in U-518 got a lone 10,200-ton American tanker, Caddo, from which he captured the captain and first mate. Schäfer in U-183, like Rasch in U-106, was temporarily diverted to help repel Torch invasion convoys.
This four-boat foray into Canadian waters thus had to be deemed a failure. Only one boat, U-106, sank a ship inside the Gulf of St. Lawrence and that ship, Waterton, was merely 2,100 tons. Two boats, U-43 and U-183, sank one ship each outside the gulf. Apart from landing the agent, Wissmann in U-518 sank four ships for 29,748 tons—and damaged two tankers—all outside the gulf.
Before learning of the poor returns from these September IXs, Dönitz ordered three new IXCs sailing in October (U-520, U-521, U- 522) to patrol the Gulf of St. Lawrence. As related, while en route to Canada, all three boats became entangled in North Atlantic convoy battles; none reached Canada, and U-520 was lost. In the event, with icing, the closure of the St. Lawrence River to oceangoing traffic, and the onset of another bitterly cold winter, U-boat incursions became impractical.
Seven U-boats sailed to the area near Trinidad in September: four Type VIIs and three Type IXs. These four VIIs were the last of that type to conduct strictly torpedo patrols in American waters in 1942.
Rolf Mützelburg in U-203, who wore Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz, was the first of the VIIs to sail. After he crossed the Bay of Biscay, U-boat Control assigned him to chase a couple of convoys, but owing to foul weather, the chases came to naught, and upon release he proceeded to a rendezvous with Ebe Schnoor’s tanker, U-460.
Fourteen days out from France on September 11, Mützelburg hove to and announced a swim call. When he dived overboard, he slipped and hit his head on a saddle tank, incurring fatal injuries. Assuming temporary command of the boat, the first watch officer, Hans Seidel, age twenty-four, elected to head at maximum speed for Schnoor’s tanker, U-460, which had a doctor. However, after only a few hours, Mützelburg died and Dönitz directed Seidel in U-203 to return to France. When this melancholy boat reentered Lorient on September 18, Seidel left to commission and command a new Type VII in Germany. His predecessor as first watch officer, Hermann Kottmann, who had returned to Germany to command a new boat, was recalled to command U-203.
The other three VIIs followed U-203 from France by a week. While outbound in the Bay of Biscay, one, U-202, was bombed by a Coastal Command aircraft. Although two torpedoes were damaged, the boat continued its voyage. On September 17, all three boats refueled in mid-Atlantic from Schnoor’s U-460.
These three VIIs patrolled east and southeast of Trinidad. The experienced Johannes Liebe in U-332 was first to sink a ship: the 6,000-ton British freighter Registan. That same day, September 29, Günther Poser, age twenty-six, the new skipper of U-202, shot at but missed a big tanker and was in turn bombed by an aircraft on ASW patrol. The shock of the depth-charge explosions knocked out an air compressor, limiting U-202’s diving ability and forcing Poser to remain well to the east of Trinidad. On October 1, Günther Rosenberg, age twenty-five, the new skipper of U-201, and Poser in U-202 sank two small freighters sailing in company: the 2,100-ton American Alcoa Transport, and the 1,800-ton Dutch Achilles. Attempting to mount a second attack, Rosenberg was heavily depth-charged and driven off. Still working together on October 7 and 8, Rosenberg and Poser each got two hits to sink the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship John Carter Rose. On the following day, October 9, Rosenberg missed a big freighter, the 6,400-ton Dutch Flensburg, but after a hard chase, sank it by torpedo and gun. Reporting a double miss on a lone freighter, Poser informed U-boat Control that all his torpedoes were expended and that he was homebound. Rosenberg followed by a day or so.
These departures left one Type VII in American waters, Liebe’s U-332. An ASW aircraft knocked out his attack periscope, but Liebe pressed on, sinking a second freighter, the 5,000-ton British Rothley on October 19. Assured of a second refueling on the homebound leg, Liebe remained in waters off Trinidad until November 1, but he sank no more ships. Total bag for the three Type VIIs on this foray to Trinidad waters: six ships for 28,500 tons.
Liebe crossed the Atlantic to the Freetown area, where he refueled from the tanker U-462, which was supporting U-boats in the South Atlantic. Owing to the diversion of U-boats to the Torch invasion in November, and to his abundance of fuel and torpedoes, Liebe’s patrol was extended a full month, a very great hardship on the crew.
Three veteran Type IXs sailed from France to areas near Trinidad in mid- to late September. En route, Hans Witt in U-129, who had sunk eleven ships on his one prior patrol to the Americas, got the 5,500-ton Norwegian freighter Trafalgar.
Arriving in the area first, Ritterkreuz holder Georg Lassen in U-160 promptly picked up a small convoy outbound from Trinidad vi
a the Tobago Passage. After flashing an alert, which was heard by another of the arriving skippers, Günther Müller-Stöckheim in U-67, Lassen lay in wait submerged and attacked. He managed to sink only one 730-ton British freighter and to damage a 6,200-ton American freighter before the escorts picked him up on sonar and pounded him with depth charges in shallow water. Müller-Stöckheim arrived too late to help.
All three IXs patrolled the Atlantic east and southeast of Trinidad during the last days of October. Witt in U-129 sank two American freighters for 12,400 tons. Müller-Stöckheim in U-67 hit the 4,400-ton Norwegian vessel Primero with two torpedoes. Seeing that it did not sink, he dived and approached his victim to inspect her at periscope depth. Then, as he was preparing to surface for a gun action, Primero veered into U-67’s path and smashed into the conning tower, crippling both periscopes. Rising to the surface, Müller-Stöckheim sank Primero with two more torpedoes, then hauled away to repair damage and to download the topside torpedoes. During the latter operation, a crewman was killed when excessive air pressure in a topside-storage canister blew the door into his chest.
Witt in U-129 and Lassen in U-160 entered the Caribbean, Witt via Mona Passage, Lassen via Tobago Passage. Encouraged to shell the refineries and tank farms on Aruba and Curacao, Witt planned to cruise far to the west, but that plan was shelved when Lassen in U-160 reported a westbound convoy, TAG 18, en route from Trinidad to Guantánamo Bay via Aruba.
Lassen estimated that the convoy consisted of about twenty freighters and tankers. On November 3, he attacked with great skill and coolness. He claimed sinking five ships for 31,500 tons; four for 25,600 tons were confirmed. Witt in U-129 raced up and attacked the convoy on November 5. He thought he sank five ships (three tankers, two freighters) for 31,000 tons within the space of ten minutes, but only two tankers for 14,600 tons were confirmed. Accepting the overclaims, Dönitz awarded Witt a Ritterkreuz.*