Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  Leading the formation from Iceland at about noon that day, the cutter Ingham got a solid sonar contact about 3,500 yards ahead. This was Hans-Botho Bade in U-626, one week out of Bergen, on orders to join group Ungestüm’s hunt for the eastbound convoy. McCabe on Ingham did not put much store in this sonar contact, but he dutifully ran in and rolled a single, shallow-set, 720-pound Mark VII depth charge off the stern. The close explosion was so violent that it lifted the china on the wardroom table. Preoccupied with establishing contact with the Catalina and Outbound North (Slow) 152, McCabe cruised on, unaware that this perfunctorily launched single depth charge—surely the luckiest Allied shot of the war—had destroyed Bade’s U-626 with the loss of all hands.

  With the help of the Catalina, McCabe found Outbound North (Slow) 152, escorted by Canadian Escort Group C-3, and merged the twelve merchant ships from Iceland. Since this convoy was not under U-boat attack, Ingham, Babbitt, and Leary were shifted to the eastbound Slow Convoy 112, escorted by Canadian group C-4, which had reported U-boat shadowers. In his memoir, Bloody Winter, the Coast Guard officer John Waters writes that on December 17—not December 15—Ingham found and sank U-626 with massive salvos of big and small depth charges. The Admiralty’s assessment committee doubted this kill—rating it only as “possible”—but in the postwar accounting, it credited Ingham with the kill of U-626 by single depth charge on December 15.*

  Despite the hideous weather, the eleven boats of group Ungestüm intercepted and pursued the eastbound convoy (Halifax 218 or Slow Convoy 112), which had been discovered by the cadre of group Büffel. Horst Höltring in the VII U-604 of Ungestüm, who had sunk a lone 7,100-ton American vessel, Coamo, which was returning to the British Isles, clung to the formation in wild seas, but the escorts drove him off before he could bring up the other boats. Groping for the ships in gales on December 16, Loeser in U-373 of the group Büffel cadre reported that he had found the convoy again. He brought up three other boats: Fenn in U-445, also formerly of the Büffel cadre, and two Ungestüm boats, Ralph Kapitzky in the VII U-615 and Walter von Steinaecker in the new Type IXC U-524.

  Upon analysis of the reports from the boats, Dönitz concluded that Loeser had found not the eastbound convoy (Halifax 218 or Slow Convoy 112) but an Outbound North convoy, sailing in the opposite direction. However, the weather was so ghastly that he ordered group Ungestüm to temporarily give up the chase, heave to, and ride out the storm. After the storm dissipated on December 21, Hans-Jürgen Zetzsche in the VII U-591, another recent transfer from the Arctic, found and sank the 3,100-ton British freighter Montreal City, a straggler from convoy Outbound North 152. That proved to be the sole success of the dozen boats of the stillborn group Büffel and of group Ungestüm in these operations.

  The other group, Raufbold, underwent a minor change in composition. Slightly damaged by enemy bombs or depth charges, the new boat U-465, commanded by Heinz Wolf, age twenty-eight, was forced to abort to France, reducing the group to ten boats. However, the transfer of the VIIs U-610 and U-623 from Ungestüm increased the group to twelve boats. Still unaware of the loss of U-611, Dönitz believed the group had thirteen boats.

  In the terrible weather of December 15, one of the Raufbold VIIs, U-621, commanded by a new skipper, Max Kruschka, age twenty-three, found another convoy. It was Outbound North 153, composed of thirty-eight merchant ships, guarded by British Escort Group B-7, comprised of seven warships: the destroyers Firedrake and the ex-American four-stack Chesterfield, and five British corvettes. Kruschka in U-621 brought up five other boats. Despite the gales and mountainous seas, five boats were able to attack.

  • Karl Hause in U-211 hit one of the escorts, the 1,350-ton British destroyer Firedrake, which broke in half.

  • Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen in U-610 sank the 6,100-ton Norwegian tanker Bello and damaged the 9,600-ton British tanker Regent Lion.

  • Adolph Graef in U-664 sank the 5,900-ton Belgian freighter Emile Franc-qui.

  • Günther Ruppelt, age twenty-three, new skipper of U-356, claimed sinking a tanker with three hits, but it could not be confirmed.

  Verified results against convoy Outbound North 153: three ships (including one tanker) sunk for 13,334 tons, including the destroyer Firedrake; one tanker for 9,600 tons damaged.

  The bow section of Firedrake sank within a half hour, taking down the escort commander and scores of men, but the stern remained afloat for about three and a half hours. Thirty-five men on the stern section jettisoned depth charges and torpedoes to lighten ship and prepared rafts to abandon ship. Responding to a distress flare, the corvette Sunflower closed the stern section by radar, but her captain decided to wait until daylight to mount the rescue. However, the stern section soon began to sink and in towering seas and pitch darkness, Sunflower rescued twenty-five of thirty-five survivors.

  Although this epic storm, with waves of “40 to 50 feet,” as the corvette Pink reported, raged unabated through December 16, Klaus Rudloff in U-609 hung on to the convoy, sending beacon signals. These helped five other boats maintain contact, but all reported “heavy” Catalina and B-24 Liberator air cover. Rudloff fired six torpedoes at several ships, but he wrote that all missed “despite perfect firing data.” No other boats had an opportunity to shoot. Although there was no chance that he could reorganize group Raufbold for a concerted attack, Dönitz continued the chase in case the weather had scattered the convoy and the boats might yet find and sink singles. Kruschka in U-621 found and sank the 6,200-ton British tanker Otina from this convoy, Outbound North 153, as well as another ship, a 4,500-ton Greek sailing alone. Massively reinforced by warships putting out from Canadian ports (American four-stack destroyers Cole and Dallas, four-stack ex-American Canadian Annapolis, three Canadian corvettes, and a minesweeper), convoy Outbound North 153 reorganized and proceeded westward to New York without further losses.

  After this brutal, frustrating, and largely futile chase, three skippers of Raufbold VIIs were detached for a special OKM mission although Dönitz had done his utmost to prevent it. Hans-Ferdinand Massmann in the newly joined U-409, from France; Kurt Sturm in U-410; and Max Kruschka in U-621 were to escort the blockade-runner Rhakotis into France on the last leg of her journey from the Far East. Sturm and Kruschka complied, albeit grudgingly, but inexplicably Massmann in U-409 diverted to a futile chase of a reported convoy. As a consequence, Dönitz was compelled to assign yet another VII to the task, U-659, commanded by Hans Stock, recently sailed from France. Massmann, Dönitz logged angrily, “will have to answer for this arbitrary behavior on his return.”

  By this time, British codebreakers and Rodger Winn in the Submarine Tracking Room had developed sufficient information on blockade-runners returning from the Far East to predict their courses and positions with a fair degree of accuracy. After deploying the British cruiser Scylla along the predicted path of Rhakotis, on January 1 Coastal Command sent a Sunderland of Australian Squadron 10 out to find her. Guided by the Sunderland, Scylla intercepted Rhakotis, per plan. The German crew scuttled and took to the lifeboats. The escorts, U-410, U-621, and U-659, cruising just over the horizon, never saw a thing. When the Germans learned that the British had “sunk” the Rhakotis, the red-faced U-boat escorts, as well as several other U-boats that Dönitz diverted to the scene, searched for survivors for several days. Kurt Sturm in U-410 found two lifeboats containing eighty men, took them aboard, and returned to France. Two other lifeboats reached Spain, where the Germans were “interned,” but soon repatriated.

  Several days before Christmas there were three groups deployed against convoys on the North Atlantic run: the aging Ungestüm (nine boats), the new Spitz (eight boats), and a cadre for Falke (Falcon), initially to be composed of three new boats from Germany and three veterans from France. Groups Ungestüm and Spitz were positioned to intercept convoy Outbound North (Slow) 154. When fully formed, group Falke was to intercept the fast Outbound North 155.

  The three new boats from Germany assigned to cadre group Falke we
re two VIIs, U-357 and U-384, and the IXC40 U-525, all of which sailed from Kiel at about the same time. Approaching the designated assembly area near Rockall Bank on the day after Christmas, the twenty-eight-year-old skipper of U-357, Adolf Kellner, unexpectedly spotted—and reported—an eastbound convoy, which he erroneously described as “poorly defended.” This was Halifax 219, guarded by the crack British Escort Group 2, commanded by Donald Macintyre, which had earlier captured Otto Kretschmer in U-99 and killed Joachim Schepke in U-100. Well within range of Coastal Command Hudsons, the ships of the convoy were preparing to disperse to their various final destinations.

  Macintyre in the destroyer Hesperus picked up Kellner’s Beta Beta or “B-bar” contact report on his Huff Duff. He calculated the U-boat was about fifteen miles astern of the convoy. Informing the convoy commodore of this threat, Macintyre left the merchant ships in the care of six corvettes of the group and directed another destroyer, Vanessa, commanded by C. E. Sheen, to form on Hesperus. Thereupon both warships raced down the Huff Duff bearing at maximum speed with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radars on line.

  Upon receiving the report of this inbound convoy from U-357, Dönitz was not overjoyed. The convoy was too close to the British Isles to mount a group attack; there was not enough time or sea room. The only U-boats within reach were the other two that had sailed from Germany with Kellner to cadre group Falke, U-384 and U-525. Although he saw little possibility of success and the risks were great, Dönitz nonetheless directed these three green boats to attack the convoy. Despite several serious mechanical defects, Kellner in U-357 did not hesitate to comply, but neither U-384 nor U-525 ever found the convoy.

  Running down the Huff Duff bearing, Hesperus and Vanessa found U-357 on the surface and drove her under. Kellner boldly fired a single torpedo at Vanessa, but it missed. Spotting U-357’s periscope, Macintyre charged it and threw over a pattern of depth charges to distract and frighten Kellner and ruin his aim. Thereafter Hesperus and Vanessa conducted a well-organized and prolonged hunt, which finally brought U-357 to the surface after dark. When she came into view on radar, Macintyre in Hesperus rammed U-357, cutting the U-boat in half and badly damaging the bottom of his own ship. The British could find only eight German survivors; Kellner and about thirty-five others perished. After makeshift repairs, Macintyre got Hesperus into Liverpool on her own steam to a cheering reception, but the ship was in repair and refit for the next three months. British intelligence officers who interrogated the survivors of U-357 reported that only four of the crew had made prior war patrols; all others were fresh from U-boat school.

  On the day Macintyre sank U-357, December 26, Adolph Graef in the VII U-664 of group Spitz found convoy Outbound North (Slow) 154 about six hundred miles due west of Brest. It was “three days late,” Dönitz logged, probably because of the stormy weather. The convoy consisted of forty-four merchant ships, the rescue ship Toward, and a small, French-manned catapult merchant ship, Fidelity (the former Le Rhin), equipped with two floatplanes. The escort was the Canadian group C-l, commanded by the new skipper of the destroyer St. Laurent, Guy S. Windeyer. Normally the ex-American four-stack British destroyer Burwell sailed with C-l, but she was forced to abort at the eleventh hour with mechanical defects and no replacement destroyer was provided. St. Laurent and the five Canadian corvettes of the group were newly fitted with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar, but the operators were green. St. Laurent, Toward, and Fidelity had Huff Duff, but not all the sets were properly calibrated.

  Dönitz ordered groups Spitz and Ungestüm, comprising about twenty boats, to attack the convoy. Graef in U-664 hung on tenaciously and brought up three VIIs: U-356, U-441, and U-662. In the early hours of December 27, Günther Ruppelt in U-356 launched the attack. Shooting with skill—and the advantage of surprise— he sank three British freighters for 13,600 tons and damaged a 7,100-ton Dutch freighter, which Klaus Hartmann in U-441 sank later in the day. Windeyer in St. Laurent and some of the corvettes counterattacked and one of them unknowingly sank Günther Ruppelt in U-356 with the loss of all hands. After the war, when the kill was discovered in German records, the Admiralty credited it to the Canadians: the destroyer St. Laurent and three of the corvettes, Battleford, Chilliwack, and Napanee.*

  The Admiralty had routed the convoy southwesterly toward the Azores to avoid the North Atlantic storms. The route was too long for the corvettes to travel without refueling, so the convoy included a British oiler, the 7,100-ton Scottish Heather. On December 27, while the corvette Chilliwack was alongside, refueling—a first for the Canadian Navy—Wolfgang Leimkühler in the new VII U-225 torpedoed Scottish Heather. The oiler was not seriously damaged, but she was forced to return to the British Isles. Resorting to a contingency plan, Windeyer made arrangements for some of the corvettes to temporarily fall out and refuel in the Azores.

  The U-boats lost track of convoy Outbound North (Slow) 154 for about twenty-four hours, but on the morning of December 28, Hubertus Purkhold in U-260 found it again and cannily hung on through a densely foggy day. His beacon signals brought up nine other boats, six from group Spitz and three from group Ungestüm, Later that evening, three other boats of group Ungestüm also made contact, bringing the number of U-boats stalking the convoy to thirteen. In an emergency measure to reinforce the weak and dwindling escort, the Admiralty shifted the British destroyers Milne and Meteor from a Torch convoy to Outbound North (Slow) 154, but these ships were not to arrive until December 29.

  During the night of December 28-29, the U-boats attacked from all quarters, completely overwhelming the escorts. A slaughter ensued:

  • In two separate attacks, Leimkühler in U-225 sank the 5,300-ton British freighter Melmore Head and damaged and stopped three other ships: the 5,100-ton British freighter Ville de Rouen, the 5,000-ton Belgian tanker President Francqui, and the 7,100-ton British freighter Empire Shackleton.

  • Wolfgang Hermann in U-662 sank the damaged Ville de Rouen.

  • Hans Hunger in U-336 sank the damaged President Francqui.

  • Horst von Schroeter, age twenty-three, new skipper of the famous Type IXB U-123* further damaged the Empire Shackleton, which was finally sunk by the Ritterkreuz holder Siegfried Strelow in the veteran U-435, another recent transfer from the Arctic.

  • Horst Dieterichs in the veteran U-406, who carried some pattern-running FAT torpedoes, damaged and stopped three British freighters: the 3,400-ton Baron Cochrane, the 4,500-ton Zarian, and the 5,000-ton Lynton Grange.

  • Von Schroeter in U-123 sank the damaged Baron Cochrane.

  • Hans-Jürgen Zetzsche in U-591 sank the damaged Zarian and damaged the 5,700-ton Norwegian freighter Norse King.

  • Heinz Hasenschar, age twenty-six, in the new U-628, sank the damaged Lynton Grange.

  • The tenacious shadower, Hubertus Purkhold in U-260, sank the 4,900-ton British freighter Empire Wagtail.

  • Strelow in U-435 sank the damaged Norse King.

  • Hermann Kottmann, age twenty-seven, new skipper of the veteran U-203, shot at a 9,000-ton “ocean liner” but missed.

  • Strelow and Hasenschar missed the destroyer St Laurent and a corvette, which had stopped to rescue survivors.

  • Ralph Kapitzky in U-615 fired five torpedoes at the catapult merchant ship Fidelity, which he identified as a “Q” ship, but all missed or hung up in Fidelity’s net defense.

  • Hans-Martin Scheibe, age twenty-four, new skipper of U-455, fired a full bow salvo at overlapping ships, all of which missed.

  Losses in this mass attack: nine ships for 46,200 tons. In addition, one of two floatplanes from the catapult ship Fidelity crashed during its launching. The destroyer St Laurent rescued its two aircrew.

  After daylight on December 29, the U-boats veered off to avoid the escorts and to submit shooting reports to Dönitz. During the forenoon, the modern British destroyers Milne and Meteor arrived, increasing the escort to three destroyers and five corvettes. Milne and Meteor drove off the shadowing U-boats and helped to t
hwart a third attack on the night of December 29-30. But both destroyers were low on fuel and on the afternoon of December 30, they and the corvettes Battleford and Shediac had to divert to the Azores, leaving only the destroyer St Laurent and three corvettes to cope with the U-boats. Later that day, Strelow in U-435 sank the 2,500-ton catapult merchant ship Fidelity, with the loss of her Free French crew, in all 334 men. Anticipating another savage attack that night, Windeyer gave permission to the ships Calgary and Adrastus—both carrying large numbers of passengers—to proceed independently, but they remained in formation.

  During this long, hard chase, the U-boats had also consumed much fuel. One by one they were forced to fall out and return to France. By the night of December 30-31, only five boats had sufficient fuel to continue the hunt and none had the convoy in sight. Unaware that there were only four escorts left to guard the convoy—all critically low on fuel—Dönitz canceled further operations. That same day the veteran destroyer Fame, flagship of British Escort Group B-6, was shifted from convoy Outbound North 155 to reinforce the escort. Her experienced commander, R. Heathcote, assumed command of the escort from Canadian Guy Windeyer in St Laurent, who collapsed from stress and exhaustion and on arrival in Canada was sent to other duty.

  In all, convoy Outbound North (Slow) 154 lost fourteen ships of about 69,378 tons (plus two 10-ton LCV landing craft) and 486 men killed. Those numbers ranked it as one of the half dozen worst North Atlantic convoy disasters of the war. Even though the Admiralty had sailed the convoy shy a veteran British destroyer, had routed it beyond reach of air escort in the areas of highest risk, and had not made adequate provisions for refueling the escorts at sea, the British put all the blame for the disaster on the Canadians for failing to aggressively and efficiently repel the U-boats. Doubtless, too, the loss of the 334 men of the small Free French catapult merchant ship Fidelity tainted the Canadians. Had it been known that the Canadians had sunk U-356, the criticism might have been muted somewhat.