Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  By means of encoded messages in the return mail of the families, Dönitz encouraged this scheme, code-named Elster (Magpie). He promised by encoded mail that a U-boat would appear off North Point, Prince Edward Island, in the first week of May 1943, when, it was presumed, the ice in the Gulf of St. Lawrence had melted. Whether or not Allied authorities became aware of this scheme from decrypting POW mail is unclear. In the event, the escape attempt became known to the Allies by some means and it failed. So far as is known, no POW ever reached Prince Edward Island.

  At U-boat Control, Peter Cremer selected two VIIs to carry out Elster: a lead boat, U-376, and a backup, U-262. As related, both had been diverted to escort Irene and, as also related, the U-376 was lost to unknown causes while she was searching for Irene survivors. Responsibility for the mission therefore went to the backup, U-262, commanded by Heinz Franke. On April 15, he came upon convoy Halifax 233 and shadowed, but escorts drove him off and down with guns and depth charges. When other boats responded to Franke’s report, a fierce battle ensued, as will be described later. However, U-boat Control directed Franke to break off and proceed to Prince Edward Island and carry out “special task” Elster, per the secret orders he had been provided before he sailed.

  Franke reached Cabot Strait on April 25 in fair weather.* He continued north into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where the ice became progressively worse. At one point the U-262 was trapped beneath a heavy layer of ice and Franke was forced to crash through it by blowing all ballast tanks simultaneously. The upward thrust of the boat broke the ice and the boat “surfaced,” but the effort knocked out three of U-262’s bow tubes, her deck gun, and other topside gear. Per plan, on May 2 Franke took up station off North Point, Prince Edward Island, awaiting some kind of signal from the POW escapees. He lingered there for five days, finally departing on May 6, logging that the failure of Elster was “a shame “ but not through any fault of U-262.

  After withdrawing from the gulf through Cabot Strait, on May 10 Franke signalled U-boat Control, giving his position and fuel supply and reporting that Elster had failed and that three of his bow tubes were unusable because of ice damage. In reply, U-boat Control directed Franke to return to France, refueling on the way from the XIV tanker U-459. Allied codebreakers, who had puzzled mightily over Franke’s often-mentioned but unidentified “special task” belatedly figured it out during his homeward voyage and logged: “He is thought to have been involved in a proposed escape of German P/Ws from Canada and may have been in Gulf of Maine or even Gulf of St. Lawrence.”

  Elster failed but the most famous U-boat POW, Otto Kretschmer, incarcerated in Camp 30 at Bowmanville, Ontario (forty miles east of Toronto), had set in motion a similar escape plan, which the Allies learned of in advance. Also encouraged by Admiral Dönitz and U-boat Control, it was to be attempted later in the summer.

  THE SECOND FORAY TO THE INDIAN OCEAN

  After it was reconstituted at sea in January 1943, group Seehund (Seal), the second foray to Cape Town and the Indian Ocean, resumed its long voyage. The XIV tanker U-459 accompanied the boats to the South Atlantic, where it refueled the four IXs,† then returned to France on March 8. Although designated a group, the five boats of Seehund were to patrol independently, like those of its predecessor, Eisbär.

  The first of the IXs of Seehund to sink a ship in the South Atlantic was the last to join the group, Ritterkreuz holder Georg Lassen’s U-160. It was not an easy kill. In the first attack on February 7, Lassen fired two torpedoes; one missed, one hit. The Armed Guard gun crew of the vessel, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Roger B. Taney, shot back, forcing Lassen to dive. In his second attack, Lassen again fired two torpedoes. Again he missed with one and hit with the other. This second hit put Taney under. Most of the ship’s crew perished in the sinking or thereafter, but a few were rescued from lifeboats about a month later.

  Lassen proceeded to an area southeast of Cape Town. On the night of March 2 he found the poorly organized, thinly escorted convoy DN 21, en route from Durban north to the Suez Canal. It was comprised of ten or eleven big, heavily laden merchant ships and four escorts, the British corvette Nigella and three ASW trawlers.

  Favored with a dark, moonless night and good weather, Lassen launched his attack after midnight on March 3. In all, he shot eight torpedoes, an initial salvo of six, plus two reloads. He claimed he sank six ships for 37,000 tons and possibly sank one of 5,000 tons; altogether seven ships for 42,000 tons put out of action, a telling blow of direct benefit to Axis forces in Tunisia. In reality, he sank four ships (the American Harvey W. Scott and the British Nipura, Empire Mahseer, and Marietta) for 25,900 tons and damaged two ships (the Dutch tanker Tibia, the British freighter Sheaf Crown) for 15,200 tons—altogether, hits on six ships of about 41,000 tons.

  Lassen’s flash report electrified U-boat Control. This kind of single-handed convoy devastation was what Dönitz and the U-boat staff prized, but it was all too rare. Dönitz immediately initiated steps leading to the award of Oak Leaves to Lassen’s Ritterkreuz. The award—and the usual message of congratulations from Hitler—arrived on March 7.*

  In the week following, Lassen remained off Durban. In the four-day period from March 8 to 11, he sank the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship James B. Stephens and the 5,000-ton British freighter Aelybryn. Having sunk seven confirmed ships for 45,200 tons and damaged two others, Lassen advised U-boat Control that he was down to three torpedoes and coming home. En route he found a fast lone freighter near Freetown and shot two of his three torpedoes at her, but they missed. He arrived in France on May 10 after 125 days at sea. U-boat Control credited him with ten ships sunk for 66,800 tons and characterized his patrol as “brilliantly executed.” His confirmed bag on this patrol was six ships sunk for about 38,000 tons, plus damage to two others. He left the boat for a job in the Training Command.†

  East of Cape Town on March 7, Würdemann in the IXC U-506 sank the 5,200-ton British freighter Sabor, firing five torpedoes. While edging up submerged to the sinking ship to look her over, Würdemann hit an “unidentified object.” The collision damaged a periscope and fouled a propeller, forcing him to withdraw far to the south of Cape Town to make repairs. While so engaged on March 9, the 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter Tabor happened by and Würdemann sank her with three torpedoes and gunfire. When added to the sinkings—and overclaims—on prior patrols to the Gulf of Mexico and to the Caribbean, Würdemann qualified for a Ritterkreuz, awarded by radio on March 14.*

  After making repairs, Würdemann returned to the area east of Cape Town to interdict coastal convoys. Inasmuch as his presence was known through Enigma decrypts and DFing, the Allies rerouted convoys to avoid him. On March 19, he notified U-boat Control that the area was unpromising and that he was returning. After refueling from the XB (minelayer) U-117 near the Azores, he reached France on May 8, completing a patrol of 146 days. Crediting Würdemann with two ships sunk for about 10,000 tons, U-boat Control characterized Würdemann as a “proven captain” but the patrol as “somewhat disappointing.”

  Werner Witte in the IXC U-509, embarked on his third patrol, sank his first ship off Cape Town on February 11. She was the 5,000-ton British Queen Anne, which Witte hit with a single torpedo from four hundred yards. The British ASW trawler St. Zeno-f counterattacked U-509 with gunfire and seven depth charges, but Witte slipped away undamaged. Remaining off the Cape Town area through March 13, he shot at several ships but had no further success. Acting on a suggestion from U-boat Control, Witte doubled back to Saldanha Bay, northwest of Cape Town.

  Witte patrolled near Saldanha Bay for two more weeks without sinking a ship. Running short of food, he commenced his return voyage on March 28, holding close to the west coast of Africa. On April 2, he found a small convoy south of Walvis Bay. Approaching the ships submerged, Witte fired four torpedoes by sonar bearings at extreme range. Astonishingly, two of the four hit the 7,200-ton British freighter City of Baroda, which limped into Lüderitz Bay, Southwest Africa, and beached, a complete lo
ss. After refueling from the provisional tanker XB (minelayer) U-117, U-509 reached France on May 11, completing a frustrating 140-day patrol Witte was credited with two ships for about 12,000 tons.

  The other IXC, U-516, commanded by Gerhard Wiebe, making his second patrol, sank three ships south and southeast of Cape Town from February 11 to February 27. They were the British and American freighters Helmsprey and Deer Lodge, respectively, and the valuable 11,000-ton Dutch submarine tender Colombia. The latter ship, returning from refit in East London and escorted by the corvette Genista, sank in thirteen minutes, taking down several Dutch submarine crews. Genista’s cursory counterattack did no damage to U-516.

  Wiebe reported on March 5 that he had accidentally rammed wreckage and was withdrawing to the south to make repairs and to fix an oil trace. Then, five days later, U-516 reported that she had withdrawn because Wiebe had “stomach pains” so severe that it was necessary to abort the patrol. Temporarily commanded by the first watch officer, U-516 sailed northward, like U-509, close to the west coast of Africa. On March 20, U-516 sank the 3,700-ton Panamanian freighter Nortun. Subsequently, Wiebe’s engineering gang discovered “severe corrosion” in the pressure hull, adjacent to a battery compartment. Since the sea pressure of a deep dive might crack the hull and flood the battery compartment with salt water, causing deadly chlorine gas to form, the boat sped home at the highest practical speed. She arrived in France on May 3, completing a 132-day patrol. Although Wiebe had sunk six ships on his first patrol to the Caribbean and four for 25,600 tons on this patrol, the illness and other factors led to his transfer from U-516 to other duty.

  The new IXD2 U-cruiser U-182, loosely attached to Seehund, was commanded by the old hand Nikolaus Clausen, who had sunk eighteen confirmed ships on the VII U-37 and the IX U-129, and had won a Ritterhreuz. He sailed U-182 from Norway on December 9, intending to patrol to Madagascar to attack shipping directly supporting the British Eighth Army in North Africa. Southbound in the area west of Freetown, Clausen sank the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Ocean Courage. Rounding the Cape of Good Hope on February 17, he sank the 4,800-ton British freighter Llanashe.

  Clausen cruised Mozambique Channel to Durban, Lourenço Marques, and the west coast of Madagascar. The outcome was a great disappointment. In a full month of operations—all of March—Clausen sank only one ship, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Richard D. Spaight. On the return voyage Clausen got two more freighters: the 5,000-ton British Aloe and the 5,800-ton Greek Adelfotis and captured both captains. These sinkings raised Clausen’s score on this patrol to five ships for 30,000 tons.

  By the night of May 16-17, the 160th day of U-182’s voyage, Clausen had reached a point about 250 miles west of the island of Madeira. Apparently by chance he met a subsection of convoy UGS 8, en route from the United States to Gibraltar. Two warships of the escort, the new (1942) American destroyers Laub and MacKenzie, were guarding fourteen LSTs. MacKenzie got U-182 on radar at 7,200 yards. Reacting promptly and efficiently, MacKenzie notified Laub and raced down the bearing, but for reasons unrevealed, she did not open fire with her main batteries as required by operational doctrine. At 2,700 yards, the radar contact disappeared, indicating that the target had dived. MacKenzie soon got a good sonar contact and carried out several attacks, dropping fifteen depth charges.

  Laub, which had not had a radar or sonar contact, joined the hunt skeptically. From that point onward, neither destroyer could get a sonar contact. Then, mysteriously, at forty-five minutes and fifty-four minutes after MacKenzie’s depth-charge attack, the ships heard and felt “heavy explosions.” The destroyers remained in the area nearly three hours, searching in vain for evidence of a U-boat kill or an explanation for the explosions. Impatiently, the senior vessel, Laub, canceled the search at dawn, and the two ships rejoined the convoy and went on to Casablanca.

  Allied AS W authorities were irate when they received reports of this encounter. “A sad pair of attacks,” one assessor wrote. MacKenzie should have opened fire with her main batteries at four thousand yards. Laub should have reacted more quickly and joined the attack. Moreover, the destroyers should have remained at the scene for at least twelve hours, hunting the U-boat to exhaustion. This episode, wrote another assessor, “brings up forcibly the need for better [ASW] training.” The conclusion of the highest assessor was: “No evidence of damage.”

  However, in the postwar analysis, Allied naval authorities concluded that MacKenzie had in fact sunk U-182 with the two Allied POWs on board. How MacKenzie sank U-182 is not known. Nor is there a satisfactory explanation of the two “heavy explosions” that occurred nearly an hour after MacKenzie’s attack. Possibly the depth charges weakened some of U-182’s twelve topside torpedo canisters, causing them to belatedly implode at great depth and flood, sinking the boat. Or perhaps Clausen fired two torpedoes at the-MacKenzie that malfunctioned and circled back to hit and sink U-182. Whatever the case, nothing further was ever heard from U-182*

  On the whole, Seehund, the second foray to; the Indian Ocean, was judged to be only a modest success. The five boats sank twenty confirmed ships for about 123,000 tons, about half the bag of Seehund? s predecessor, Eisbär. Lassen in U-160 sank seven; Clausen in the IXD2 U-cruiser U-182, five; the ailing Wiebe in U-516, four; and Wiedemann in U-506 and Witte in U-509, two apiece. That was an average of about four ships per boat per patrol, but the patrols of these IXs averaged 136 days, nearly four and a half months,†

  Like the boats patrolling to American waters, those of group Seehund were frustrated by intensified ASW measures, by convoying, and by information derived from Enigma decrypts that enabled naval authorities in the Cape Town and Durban areas to hold up shipping or to divert it around known U-boat positions. However, no U-boats had been lost in South Atlantic waters: U-182 went down in the dangerous Madeira-Azores area in the Middle Atlantic.

  Altogether, these IXs had sunk twelve ships for 71,000 tons in the month of March. A Japanese submarine, 1-27, operating off India in March, sank one 7,100-ton British ship, Fort Mumford. That brought the Allied losses in March in this area to thirteen ships for 78,000 tons, contributing to the misimpression that U-boats nearly cut the lifeline between the Americas and the British Isles.

  U-boat Control mounted a special mission in the Indian Ocean at this time. The task was to meet a Japanese submarine at sea for the purpose of exchanging personnel and cargo, including weaponry.

  The German boat chosen for this mission was a U-cruiser, the new IXD1 U-180, commanded by Werner Musenberg, age thirty-eight. The boat was a failed design. Powered by six Mercedes-Benz 1,500 horsepower water-cooled diesels, adapted from the engines in German PT boats, the 1,600-ton U-180 had a top speed of 20.8 knots, making her the fastest diesel U-boat built by the Germans in World War II. But the engines were not suitable for submarines. They smoked “like an old coal-burning tramp,” as Musenberg put it, and generated nearly unbearable heat throughout the boat, particularly in tropical waters. Like the other U-cruisers, U-180 had four bow and two stern torpedo tubes, could carry twenty-seven torpedoes (including twelve in topside canisters), and mounted a 4.1” gun on the forward deck. She had a crew of sixty-three men, including a physician.

  On the eve of his departure from Kiel, Musenberg embarked a VIP and his aide, who were to be transferred to the Japanese submarine. The VIP was the leftist Indian political activist Subhas Chandra Bose, son of a knighted Indian scientist and president of the Indian National Congress party and, as such, a protégé of Mohandas Gandhi, who was then “interned” in India. Jailed in Britain in 1940 for his pro-Axis (i.e., outspoken anti-British) views, Bose had escaped and fled to Germany. His ambition was to create and lead an “army of liberation,” cadred by Indian soldiers captured by the Japanese in Southeast Asia. Although Tokyo doubtless viewed this grandiose scheme with skepticism, some Japanese believed Bose might be useful for fomenting anti-British sentiment in India and had arranged to transfer him and his aide, Abid Hasan, from U-180 and carry them onward to Si
ngapore or to Japan.

  Allied codebreakers who were decrypting Japanese diplomatic codes picked up Japanese messages from Berlin to Tokyo reporting the departure of Bose by U-boat from Kiel on February 9. This and other information from diplomatic traffic was passed to Kenneth Knowles and Rodger Winn in the American and British Submarine Tracking Rooms. They were able to identify the departing boat as “U-Musenberg” and tracked it as it made its way to meet the Japanese submarine in the Indian Ocean.

  The Japanese submarine was the 1-29, commanded by Juichi Izu. Like the 1-30 (code-named “Cherry Blossom”), which had briefly called at Lorient in August 1942,* the 1-29 was a large U-cruiser, 354 feet long, displacing 2,500 tons. It had a floatplane stored in a hangar on the deck immediately forward of the conning tower as well as a catapult. It was armed with six torpedo tubes with eleven reloads in the bow compartment and a 5.5” gun on the deck aft of the conning tower. A veteran of several Indian Ocean patrols, 1-29 had sunk six Allied ships.

  Musenberg in U-l 80 entered the Atlantic and sailed southward toward Cape Town. Inasmuch as the six engines consumed large amounts of fuel, it was necessary to replenish U-180 from a U-tanker. Accordingly, Musenberg met the XIV U-462 in the Middle Atlantic on March 3. Allied codebreakers saw that on March 20, Musenberg was to meet an Italian U-cruiser (probably Da Vinci) near the equator and provide unspecified medical assistance, but Musenberg could not find the Italian and the rendezvous was canceled. After rounding the Cape of Good Hope and sailing onward to the southeast, on April 18 Musenberg found and sank a loner, the 8,200-ton British tanker Corbis. Two days later, during a submerged attack on another loner, U-180 broached and her victim escaped.