Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  The British Escort Group B-5, commanded by Richard C. Boyle, which had brought Outbound North 168 across, was assigned to guard Slow Convoy 122. The group sailed from St. John’s on March 11 and joined the convoy a day later. It was composed of nine warships: two destroyers (the British Havelock and the American four-stack Upshur), a new 1,500-ton frigate (the British Swale), five corvettes (two manned by Belgians), and the ASW trawler Campobello. The Upshur was to peel off halfway across and escort the five ships of the convoy that were bound for Iceland.

  On March 12, Allied intelligence DFed a message from a Raubgraf boat, Max Kruschka in U-621, reporting the sinking of the Baron Kinnard, a straggler from Outbound North (Slow) 169. As a result, Allied authorities redirected Slow Convoy 122 to a more southerly route to evade Raubgraf. The maneuver worked. No boat of Raubgraf found Slow Convoy 122. However, lying ahead on a newly created north-south line were two big groups: Stürmer (Daredevil), eighteen boats; and Dränger (Harrier), eleven boats, deployed south from Stürmer. Owing to the loss of naval Enigma from March 10 to 19, Allied authorities were not fully aware of the size and locations of groups Stürmer and Dränger and were thus unable to divert Slow Convoy 122 to a safe course.

  Three days after Slow Convoy 122 sailed on March 8, the fast convoy Halifax 229 departed New York. It consisted of forty merchant ships plus a local escort group of five vessels. Two merchant ships aborted, leaving thirty-eight, one of which, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Hugh Williamson, straggled but eventually reached Northern Ireland on her own.

  From St. John’s, some warships of close Escort Group B-4, commanded by E.C.L. Day, which had brought Outbound North (Slow) 169 across, began to join convoy Halifax 229 on March 13. The group was short of Day’s flagship, the destroyer Highlander, and the Canadian corvette Sherbrooke, both delayed in dry dock. Pending the arrival of those two warships, B-4, temporarily commanded by Gordon J. Luther in the British destroyer Volunteer (borrowed from Escort Group B-5), consisted of the latter, plus two short-legged, temporarily attached British destroyers (Witherington and the ex-American four-stack Mansfield), the ex-American four-stack British destroyer Beverley, and two British corvettes. The escort for this valuable convoy was thus pitifully thin: four destroyers (two on temporary duty) and two corvettes.

  The day after Halifax 229 sailed, on March 9, a “second section,” Halifax 229A, departed New York. It was comprised of twenty-eight ships, four of them bound for Halifax, plus a local Canadian escort. A feeder convoy of sixteen ships from Halifax joined 229A, including the Lady Rodney, which went only as far as St. John’s, Newfoundland. The final composition of Halifax 229A was thus thirty-nine merchant ships. It was guarded by a thin escort group, 40, commanded by John S. Dallison, which normally guarded KM-MK Torch convoys, but had sailed to St. John’s specifically to escort Halifax 229A to the British Isles. Escort Group 40 consisted of but. six warships, all below fleet-destroyer class: two new 1,500-ton River-class frigates (Moyola, Waveney), two old 260-foot sloops, and two ex-American 250-foot Coast Guard cutters, Lulworth and Landguard.

  The lead convoy of these eastbound three, Slow 122, plodded along at about seven knots. On March 15 it ran into a furious gale. The storm was quite hard on the two smallest ships in the convoy, the 755-ton Icelandic freighter Selfoss, which had joined at Halifax, and the 550-ton Canadian-built ASW trawler Campobello, of the escort group. Selfoss left the convoy and reached Iceland safely via a direct route. Campobello developed leaks in a coal bin that could not be stopped. Escort commander Boyle sent the Belgian-manned corvette Godetia back to take off the Campobello crew and sink her. After all the crew had been transferred, Godetia destroyed Campobello with a single depth charge.

  The codebreakers at B-dienst intercepted and decrypted the orders to Slow Convoy 122 and Halifax 229 to follow a more southerly route to avoid Raubgraf. Accordingly, U-boat Control ordered Raubgraf ‘to break off the frustrating and unrewarding attack on Outbound North 170 and to intercept eastbound convoys Slow 122 and Halifax 229.

  Racing south, the Raubgraf boat U-91, commanded by Heinz Walkerling, who was embarked on his third patrol, found a convoy on March 15. U-boat Control wrongly assumed it to be Slow Convoy 122. In actuality, it was Halifax 229, which was overtaking Slow 122. U-boat Control ordered three experienced Raubgraf boats to close on U-91 and attack the convoy: Horst Uphoff in U-84, Adolf Graef in U-664, and Helmut Manseck in U-758.

  While seeking a U-tanker, Gerhard Feiler in the homebound U-653 came upon the other eastbound convoy, also believed to be Slow Convoy 122. His position report put the convoy slightly east of U-9Ps position report, which appeared to be perfectly logical. Acting on this report, U-boat Control directed the nine remaining boats of Raubgraf, plus two new additions coming from the U-tanker, to close on Feiler in U-653. In addition, Control directed eleven boats of group Stürmer, six of group Dränger, and eleven others to run west at high speed to assist Raubgraf, making thirty-eight boats. The weather was ghastly: gale-force winds and huge seas.

  The U-91 and U-653 had not found Slow Convoy 122, but rather the fast, overtaking Halifax 229, which was about one hundred miles behind, or southwest, of Slow 122, following approximately the same route. On March 16 and 17, eight U-boats (five of Raubgraf, two of Stürmer, and one, U-288, passing by homebound) attacked Halifax 229 in the mistaken belief that it was Slow Convoy 122. Results:

  • Hans-Joachim Bertelsmann in U-603, who had sunk one and a half ships from Outbound North 166, shot three FATs and one electric and sank the 5,200-ton Norwegian Elin K.

  • Helmut Manseck in U-758 sank the 6,800-ton Dutchman Zaanland and damaged the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship James Oglethorpe.

  • Siegfried Strelow, who had won a Ritterkreuz in U-435 on Arctic duty, shot two double FAT salvos and damaged the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship William Eustis.

  • Bernhard Zurmühlen in U-600 sank the 12,200-ton British whale factory ship-cum-tanker Southern Princess and damaged the 8,700-ton British freighter Nariva as well as the 6,100-ton American freighter Irenée Du Pont.

  • Heinz Walkerling in U-91 sank the 6,400-ton American freighter Harry Luckenbach and then the four damaged and abandoned ships Oglethorpe, Eustis, Nariva, and Du Pont.

  • Hans-Achim von Rosenberg-Gruszczynski in U-384 sank the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Coracero.

  • Jürgen Krüger in U-631 sank the 5,200-ton Dutch freighter Terkoelei.

  The claims amounted to twelve ships for 77,500 tons sunk and six other ships damaged. The confirmed figures to this point were ten ships for 72,200 tons sunk by seven different U-boats.

  There was no rescue ship with Halifax 229, a terrible lapse, as it turned out. One consequence was that only two of the escorts remained continuously with the convoy; the rest were trying their best to pick up survivors from the ten lost ships, American observers in London reported later. These acts of humanity, of course, further exposed Halifax 229.

  In the aftermath of these attacks, all twelve of the U-boats then comprising Raubgraf broke off the attack, six for want of fuel, six with battle damage or mechanical problems. As a result of depth-charge attacks, Manseck in U-758 had a stern tube and an air compressor out of order. Graef in U-664 said that owing to worn bearings in one or both electric propulsion motors, his port shaft was knocking loudly. Ralph Kapitzky in U-615 had incurred slight topside damage and one periscope was frozen. Bertelsmann in U-603 said his topside stern torpedo canister had washed overboard and one diesel engine was out of commission. Zurmühlen in U-600 requested permission to abort to France because both diesel engines were in need of a major overhaul and because there was chlorine gas in the number 2 battery compartment. Ritterkreuz holder Strelow in U-435 also requested permission to abort to France because of diesel-engine and electric propulsion-motor defects. He “urgently required” a major overhaul of his diesel engines and battery compartments.

  Five of these boats reached France from March 25 to March 30, but Kapitzky in U-615 repaired his damage and con
tinued to patrol. Feiler in U-653 arrived in France on March 31, completing a patrol of sixty-three days.

  The Stürmer and Dränger boats assigned to the battle went west at high speed. On the night of March 16-17, one of the Stürmer VIIs, the new U-338, commanded by Manfred Kinzel, just ten days short of his twenty-eighth birthday, unexpectedly came upon the actual Slow Convoy 122 and what remained of its close escort. The alert and opportunistic Kinzel, three weeks out from Kiel on his first patrol, slipped through the thinned-out escort (seven warships) and fired a full salvo into the convoy. Remarkably, his five torpedoes sank two British freighters for about 10,000 tons, Kingsbury and King Gruffydd, and a 7,900-ton Dutchman, Alderamin, and damaged the 7,200-ton British freighter Fort Cedar Lake. The Slow Convoy 122 rescue ship Zamalek, screened by the British corvette Saxifrage, fell out to pick up survivors.

  Kinzel’s battle report caused confusion at U-boat Control. The position he gave was more than one hundred miles from what Control believed to be (the lone) Slow Convoy 122. In the ensuing hours, reports from other boats correctly suggested that there were actually two eastbound convoys about one hundred to 125 miles apart. Control wrongly surmised that Kinzel had attacked the fast convoy, Halifax 229, and the Raubgraf boats had attacked Slow Convoy 122. In reality, it was the other way around.

  After Kinzel’s attack, the escort commander of Slow Convoy 122, Richard Boyle, reported that he was under attack and requested that surface-ship reinforcements sail at once from Iceland; he also asked for heavy air cover at first light. In response, Allied authorities sent the Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter Ingham and the American four-stack destroyer Babbitt to Slow Convoy 122. When Allied authorities realized Halifax 229 was also under heavy attack, they diverted Babbitt as well as the British destroyer Vimy, which also sailed from Iceland, to assist that convoy. Meanwhile the B-4 escort commander, E.C.L. Day in the destroyer Highlander, with the Canadian corvette Sherbrooke (both delayed in dry dock), raced east to join the very thin escort of Halifax 229. The five reinforcing warships ran into hurricane-force winds (70 knots, Ingham reported), which slowed them considerably.

  Convoy Halifax 229 had sailed with six MOEF escorts—four British destroyers and two British corvettes. Two of the short-legged destroyers (Witherington and Mansfield) returned to Newfoundland, to be replaced by the British destroyers Highlander and Vimy. When the American destroyer Babbitt arrived from Iceland and two more corvettes arrived from Newfoundland, the escort numbered nine warships: five destroyers and four corvettes, but most escorts were still picking up survivors.

  During the early hours of March 17, Coastal Command launched the first of what was to become a powerful air umbrella over both convoys. Very-long-range B-24s from British Squadrons 120 (at Iceland) and 86 (Northern Ireland) covered Slow Convoy 122 in the morning and afternoon. Very-long-range B-24s (from Iceland) covered convoy Halifax 229 in the late evening. These aircraft sighted numerous U-boats and carried out depth-charge attacks on five. They did not score a kill, but they harassed the U-boats, making it difficult for them to shadow or to home on the shadower, upsetting the massing of U-boats for battle.

  Despite the addition of surface escorts and heavy air cover from March 17, three more U-boats had successes against the remaining twenty-eight ships of Halifax 229.

  • Hans Trojer in U-221, who had sunk five ships for about 30,000 tons in Slow Convoy 104 on his first patrol in October and rammed and sank U-254 on his second, got two big ships: the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Walter O. Gresham and the fast British refrigerator ship Canadian Star, which usually sailed alone but was ordered into convoy because her 4” gun was broken. Thirty of her eighty-seven passengers and crew perished in the sinking. For these two successes and prior sinkings and claims on this patrol, Dönitz awarded Trojer a Ritterkreuz by radio on March 24.*

  • Herbert Uhlig, age twenty-seven, in the new IXC40 U-527 of the Stürmer group, got two hits and seriously disabled the American freighter Mathew Luckenbach (not to be confused with the lost Harry Luckenbach, also in Halifax 229). She was a “romper”* from the convoy, which had fled ahead after the attack of the first wave of U-boats. The Coast Guard cutter Ingham and the American destroyer Upshur, assigned to protect Slow Convoy 122, came upon the abandoned ship and rescued her entire crew from lifeboats. After dark, Uhlig in U-527 returned to the scene to give his victim a finishing shot, but another new Stürmer IXC, U-523, commanded by Werner Pietzsch, age twenty-five, got there first and sank the derelict Mathew Luckenbach with one torpedo.

  By March 18, the two convoys were about 250 to three hundred miles west of Iceland. Coastal Command sent four very-long-range B-24s of Squadron 120 to meet convoy Halifax 229, but owing to a failure of homing procedures, they could not find the convoy. However, one B-24 spotted a U-boat and attacked, but made no kill. Five B-24s of Squadron 120 provided cover for Slow Convoy 122 for a period of ten hours. These made four attacks but no kills.

  The next day, March 19, Coastal Command mounted the largest air umbrella yet to protect a North Atlantic convoy. It consisted of eleven sorties by B-24s of Squadrons 86 and 120 and long-range B-17s of Squadrons 206 and 220, plus five by Sunderlands. These aircraft carried out six attacks on U-boats, but achieved no kills.

  The heavy air and sea escorts thwarted further U-boat attacks on Halifax 229. Altogether, ten U-boats were credited with sinking thirteen confirmed ships for 93,502 tons, making this battle (after PQ 17) the second most remunerative in tonnage—repeat tonnage—sunk by German U-boats in the war. Moreover, the victory was achieved with the loss of only one U-boat: von Rosenberg-Gruszczynski in the new VII U-384, sunk with the loss of all hands by a B-17 Flying Fortress of British Squadron 206, flown by Leslie G. Clark, who had damaged U-632 two months earlier.

  After Kinzel in the new U-338 found Slow Convoy 122 on March 16-17 and sank three and damaged one of its merchant ships, U-boat Control directed other boats of groups Stürmer and Dränger to close on U-338 at maximum speed, without concern for fuel consumption. For those boats critically low on fuel, Control promised to send a U-tanker northward, closer to the battle scene, or to designate a newly arrived boat to share its fuel.

  Two Stürmer boats, Hans-Jürgen Haupt, age thirty-two, in the new VII U-665, and Rudolf Bahr, age twenty-six, in the new VII U-305, arrived at the convoy first. Haupt sank the ship Kinzel in U-338 had damaged, the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Fort Cedar Lake. Bahr sank two British vessels: the 8,800-ton refrigerator ship Port Auckland and the 4,300-ton Zouave, loaded with iron filings. Kinzel in U-338 sank his fourth ship from this convoy, the 4,100-ton Panamanian freighter Granville. These attacks raised the losses in Slow Convoy 122 to seven ships for 42,106 tons sunk by three U-boats.

  During the night of March 17-18, a storm of “near hurricane” fury struck Slow Convoy 122 and the thirteen pursuing U-boats. After daylight, when the B-24 aircraft appeared over the convoy, they drove the U-boats off and under. Thirsting for a dramatic massacre of this slow formation, U-boat Control directed the boats to ignore the aircraft, maintain contact at all costs, and haul ahead of the convoy to obtain a good position for night attacks. While exhorting the boats, Control did not spare feelings. It singled out the veteran Walter Schug in the Dränger boat U-86 for unbridled criticism, which all boats could read: “Your position 120 miles behind convoy without [any] action can be explained only as absolute faulty operation. Pursue at top speed.”

  The Treasury-class cutter Ingham, from Iceland, reinforced the escort of Slow Convoy 122 on March 18 and the corvette Godetia rejoined after picking up survivors. These additions raised the close escort back to nine warships: Ingham, two destroyers (British Havelock and American Upshur), one frigate (Swale), and five corvettes. The air and surface escorts hounded the Stürmer and Dränger boats. Kinzel in the new U-338 and Haupt in the new U-665 reported major depth-charge damage that forced them to abort. While Haupt in U-665 was inbound in Biscay on the night of March 22, a Whitley of Bomber Command’s Operational Training Unit
10, piloted by J. A. Marsden, found and, with six depth charges, sank her with the loss of all hands.* Helmut von Tippelskirch, age twenty-five, new skipper of the VII U-439, reported that he had been hunted and depth-charged for eight hours. Max Wintermeyer in the new IXC40 U-190 said he had been hunted and depth-charged for nine hours. Hans Möglich in the new IXC40 U-526 and Herbert Uhlig in the new IXC40 U-527 reported diesel-engine problems that forced them to break off pursuit. Four other Type VIIs also reported diesel-engine breakdowns.

  U-boat Control did not achieve a massacre of Slow Convoy 122. In this second assault, a half dozen boats got into shooting positions, but only three managed hits:

  • Herbert Engel in the new VII U-666 severely damaged the 5,200-ton Greek Carras. In return, a B-17 of Squadron 220, piloted by William Knowles, who had sunk U-633 earlier in March, hit U-666 with a close straddle of four depth charges, forcing Engel to abort to France.

  • Werner Schwaff in the veteran U-333 came along and sank the abandoned hulk of Carras.

  • Heinrich Schmid in the VII U-663, fresh from France, probably sank the 5,800-ton British freighter Clarissa Radcliffe, which had been straggling for days.

  Confirmed sinkings in Slow Convoy 122: nine ships for 53,094 tons by six U-boats.

  Wittingly or unwittingly the Germans viewed Slow Convoy 122 and Halifax 229 as a single convoy. Berlin propagandists gloated that the thirty-eight to forty U-boats engaged sank thirty-two enemy merchant ships for 186,000 tons. U-boat Control also bestowed effusive private praise:

  Appreciation and recognition for the greatest success yet achieved against a convoy. After the extraordinarily successful surprise blow on the first night, tough and energetic pursuit despite strong air and surface defense brought splendid successes to the submarines in their attacks both by day and night.