Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  Although obviously a terrible spike indeed, the U-boat successes on the North Atlantic run in March did not come close to cutting this vital lifeline to the British Isles. The sinking figures also bear repeating. Sixteen convoys composed of about nine hundred merchant ships, plus escorts, sailed east and west over this route in March. The scores upon scores of U-boats were able to mount decisive attacks on only four of the eight eastbound convoys: Halifax 228 and 229, and Slow Convoys 121 and 122. These attacks resulted in the sinking of thirty-nine out of about 450 merchant ships in the eight eastbound convoys.*

  The loss of 8.5 percent of all the laden merchant ships sailing east that month hardly constitutes a “crisis of crises.” Ninety-one and a half percent of all merchant ships that sailed east on that route in March got through to destinations. The cargoes in the thirty merchant ships of the “extra” eastbound convoy, Halifax 229A, which was not attacked by U-boats, nearly offset the cargoes lost in the four eastbound convoys that came under attack by U-boats.

  Nine German U-boats assigned to the North Atlantic run were lost, seven VIIs and two IXs. Five U-boats were sunk by British aircraft, four of these by American-built B-17s of Squadrons 206 and 220, the other by a Whitley of OTU 10. Four were sunk by British and Canadian surface ships and the Free French corvette Aconit. These lost nine were manned by about four hundred men, of which twenty-four (from U-432 and U-444) were captured. The rest of the Germans perished. The U-boats sank one escort, the British destroyer Harvester, on March 11, the first loss of an escort on the North Atlantic run since the British destroyer Firedrake in convoy Outbound North (Slow) 153 on December 16, 1942.

  In all waters, Allied forces sank fourteen U-boats in March, nine VIIs and five DCs, manned by about 650 men, of whom only the aforementioned twenty-four were captured. For the first time in the war, aircraft sank more U-boats in a given month than surface ships: nine versus five, a portent of things to come.

  MORE GERMAN FAILURES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

  The arrival in April of twenty-one new boats from Germany and two transfers from the Arctic force enabled U-boat Control to sail an unprecedented eighty-seven attack boats that month against Allied convoys in the North and Middle Atlantic. This great mass of U-boats consisted of seventy-two VIIs and fifteen Type IXs. Two of the VIIs, U-217 and U-218, both Model D minelayers, were to lay fields in the waters off England. One of the IXs, U-108, was homebound to retirement in Germany.

  Five of the VIIs were to sail from France to reinforce the Mediterranean force. The U-303 and U-414, commanded by Karl-Franz Heine and Walter Huth, respectively, got through Gibraltar Strait on the night of April 9. Horst-Arno Fenski in U-410 and Siegfried Koitschka in U-616 got through on the nights of May 6 and 7, respectively. The fifth and last boat, Friedrich-Wilhelm Bothe’s U-447, did not make it. On the night of May 7, two Gibraltar-based Hudsons of British Squadron 233, piloted by J. V Holland and J. W. McQueen, found her in the western approaches to the strait and sank her with depth charges. There were no survivors.

  Four Type XIV “Milk Cow” U-tankers backed up the swarm of attack boats in the North Atlantic. These were Bruno Vowe’s U-462, which sailed on April 1; Helmut Metz’s new U-487, which sailed from Kiel on March 27 and entered the Atlantic in early April; and two that sailed later in the month, Wolf Stiebler’s U-461 on April 20 and Georg von Wilamowitz’s U-459 on April 21. In addition, the XB minelayer U-119, which sailed on April 25 to plant a field off Halifax, was to refuel VIIs in the North Atlantic on her outward leg. After planting a minefield off Casablanca, the XB minelayer C/-777, which sailed on March 31, was to refuel about ten IXs in the Azores area.

  Most of the new VIIs sailing from Kiel were commanded by officers twenty-five or twenty-six years old who had prior experience in the Atlantic. However, the skippers of three new VIIs were younger. Gerhard Lange in U-418, age twenty-two, tied Eberhard Dahlhaus in U-634 for the dubious distinction of youngest skipper in the Atlantic force. (Lange, actually two months older than Dahlhaus, did not survive his first patrol.) Claus-Peter Carlsen in U-732 was twenty-three years old, and Werner Techand in U-731 was twenty-four.

  Dönitz and U-boat Control expected that this awesome deployment of submarine power to the North Atlantic would decisively interdict and possibly shut down the flow of cargoes to the British Isles and to Torch forces. Nothing of the kind occurred. To the contrary, the U-boats failed dramatically and decisively. For starters, ten of the eighty-seven attack boats did not reach the convoy lanes.

  As a result of the intensified Coastal Command air offensive, including that in the Bay of Biscay,* five boats sailing to the North Atlantic in April were sunk by British aircraft soon after leaving port or before reaching their assigned groups.

  • The VII U-465, commanded by Heinz Wolf, age twenty-eight, sailed from Lorient for its third patrol on April 7 to join a group on the North Atlantic run. On April 10 a Catalina of British Squadron 210, piloted by Frank Squire, depth-charged the boat in Biscay and forced her to abort. After repairs at Lorient, Wolf resailed on April 29. On May 2, at the western edge of Biscay, a Sunderland of Australian Squadron 461, piloted by E. C. Smith, sank the boat with machine-gun fire and eight shallow-set depth charges. Smith’s crew saw “about fifteen” Germans in the water, but all perished.

  • The new VII U-710, commanded by Dietrich von Carlowitz, age twenty-six, sailed from Kiel on April 15. Ten days later, as she was entering the Atlantic in the Iceland-Faeroes gap, a B-17 of British Squadron 206, piloted by Robert L. Cowey (who had sunk U-627 in October), sighted the boat on the surface. Cowey attacked in the teeth of flak and dropped six shallow-set depth charges. After the boat sank, Cowey reported twenty-five Germans swimming near the debris but none was rescued.

  • The new VII U-227, commanded by Jürgen Kuntze, age twenty-five, departed Kiel on April 24. As she was entering the Atlantic in the Iceland-Faeroes gap on April 30, a Hampden of Australian Squadron 455, piloted by J. S. Freeth, age twenty-two, caught her on the surface and sank her with eight shallow-set depth charges. The aircrew reported thirty Germans amongst the debris, but there were no survivors. Pilot Freeth was killed three weeks later in a flying accident, the day after his twenty-third birthday.

  The VII U-332, commanded by Eberhard Hüttemann, age twenty-three, embarked on his second patrol, sailed from France to the Middle Atlantic on April 26. On the morning of April 29, a long-range B-24 of British Squadron 224, piloted by A. Russell Laughland, attacked U-332 on the surface in the southwest edge of the Bay of Biscay. In two runs, Laughland dropped twelve shallow-set depth charges that fell close and sank U-332. The aircrew saw “wood and canvas” in a huge circle of oil. There were no survivors.*

  • The veteran IXB U-109, commanded by her former first watch officer Hans Joachim Schramm, age twenty-six, sailed from St. Nazaire for the North Atlantic on April 28. Seven days later on May 4, a very-long-range B-24 of British Squadron 86 found U-109 on the surface, while still en route to her assigned area. The pilot, J. C. Green, caught Schramm’s bridge watch unalert and dropped four shallow-set depth charges from an altitude of eighty feet. The depth charges fell very close and blew up U-109. After the water subsided, the aircrew saw much debris, including twenty-four wooden planks about eight feet long (U-boat decking) and several floating “cylinders” (topside torpedo-storage canisters?). There were no survivors. The Admiralty assessment committee praised Green for conducting “a well executed approach and a perfect attack.”*

  Four other boats that departed on patrols in April returned prematurely to France. Three were damaged by the enemy or incurred mechanical problems. The fourth escorted one of the damaged boats back to base.

  • The veteran VII U-604, commanded by Horst Höltring, sailed from France on April 22. On the second day out, the diesel engines failed and she returned to France on April 26. Höltring suspected that the engines had been sabotaged, but no saboteurs were ever found. During an inspection of the boat before repairs commenced, workers found several dead rats in the
drinking-water storage tank, which reinforced the theory that the boat had been sabotaged. The engine repairs were lengthy, and U-604 did not resail until late June.

  • The often-damaged veteran VII U-566, commanded by Hans Hornkohl, embarked on his second patrol, sailed from Brest on April 22. On the western edge of Biscay, five days later, on April 26, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of Squadron 172, piloted by the Rhodesian Alex Coumbis, caught and damaged her with six depth charges. Unable to dive, she limped back to Brest, escorted by JU-88s and surface craft. She did not sail again until July.

  • The veteran VII U-437, commanded by Hermann Lamby, embarked on his second patrol, sailed from St. Nazaire to the Middle Atlantic on April 26. On Lamby’s first patrol he had been forced to abort with a cracked diesel-exhaust flange. Five days out from France at the western edge of Biscay, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of Squadron 172, piloted by Peter H. Stembridge, caught and straddled U-437. Lamby sent out an SOS, stating he “urgently” required help.

  U-boat Control directed all boats in the vicinity to respond to the SOS at high speed without regard for fuel consumption. In addition, German airmen provided two flights of JU-88s. The U-445, commanded by Heinz-Konrad Fenn, which sailed from France to the Middle Atlantic on April 27, found U-437 and nursed her back to St. Nazaire on April 30. The heavily damaged U-437 did not resail until late September. An epidemic of diphtheria on Fenn’s U-445 and other factors delayed her resailing to July.

  Three boats sailing in April carried out special missions before joining the other boats on torpedo patrols.

  • The XB minelayer U-119, commanded by a new skipper, Horst-Tessen von Kameke, age twenty-seven, sailed from France on her second combat mission on April 25. While she was outbound in Biscay on April 29, two unidentified enemy aircraft attacked her, killing one petty officer, but von Kameke pressed on to the Americas. After refueling six VIIs in the North Atlantic, U-119 planted sixty-six SMA (moored) mines off Halifax, Nova Scotia. The fields probably produced one sinking, the 3,000-ton Panamanian freighter Halma and possibly damaged an American Liberty ship, John A. Poor. Subsequently, von Kameke proceeded to the central Atlantic to fuel other VIIs if required and/or to attack Allied ships with his two loaded stern torpedo tubes and nine reloads.

  • The VIID minelayer U-217, commanded by Kurt Reichenbach-Klinke, sailed from France on April 19 to lay a field of fifteen SMA (moored) mines off Land’s End, the southwestern tip of England. On May 6, she withdrew from that location owing to “heavy enemy opposition” and Reichenbach-Klinke laid the fifteen mines in other areas of St. George’s Channel. However, these mines produced no sinkings. After obtaining potash cartridges for the individual respirators and binoculars from an inbound boat, U-217 set off to patrol Canadian waters near Nova Scotia, but U-boat Control diverted her to the Middle Atlantic.

  • The VIID minelayer U-218, commanded by Richard Becker, sailed from France on April 20 to lay a field of fifteen SMA (moored) mines in the North Channel. Becker planted the field on May 4 but it produced no sinkings. Afterward, U-218 sailed west to transfer an ill crewman to the XIV U-tanker U-459 and to join the groups engaged in anticonvoy operations.

  U-boat Control directed fifteen boats (four IXs, eleven VIIs) that had sailed in February or March to form a new group, Löwenherz (Lionhearted). However, as related, one of these boats, the IXC40 U-169, had been sunk in late March by a B-17 of British Squadron 206. Thus, unknown to U-boat Control, group Löwenherz had been reduced to fourteen boats. Its purpose was to intercept eastbound Slow or Halifax convoys.

  A new IXC40, U-530, commanded by Kurt Lange, age thirty-nine, spotted Halifax 231 on April 4. Composed of sixty-one ships (twenty-two loaded tankers), the convoy was thinly guarded by British Escort Group B-7, commanded by Peter W. Gretton. It consisted of the destroyer Vidette, the new frigate Toy, and four corvettes.

  While Lange in U-530 shadowed and reported the convoy’s composition, course, and speed, U-boat Control ordered the other boats of Löwenherz, plus (fuel permitting) nine other boats in the area to join in the attack, including the new VII U-229, which had been diverted to weather-reporting duty near Greenland, and the newly arriving IXC40 U-532. Three of the nine additional boats were unable to make contact. Hence the reinforced Löwenherz consisted of seventeen boats.

  Upon learning that U-boats had discovered Halifax 231, Allied authorities directed the British Support Group 4, refueling at Iceland, and Coastal Command Squadron 120, based at Iceland and Northern Ireland, to reinforce Gretton’s thin escort group. Newly created with four destroyers from the Home Fleet (Icarus, Inglefield, Eclipse, Fury), Support Group 4 was slow off the mark, ran into heavy weather, and did not meet the convoy for three days.

  Several boats attacked the first night. The new VII U-630, commanded by Werner Winkler, age twenty-five, claimed sinking two ships, but only the 9,400-ton British freighter Waroonga, which stayed with the convoy for thirty-six hours before sinking, was confirmed. Another new VII, U-635, commanded by Heinz Eckelmann, age twenty-seven (released from Regensberg escort duty), also claimed sinking two ships, but only the 5,500-ton British freighter Shillong was confirmed. The U-229, commanded by Robert Schetelig, sank a straggler from the convoy, the 3,400-ton Swedish Vaalaren.

  The surface escorts spotted and fought off the mass of U-boats near the convoy. Nonetheless, three more boats were able to shoot. The veteran VII U-706, commanded by Alexander von Zitzewitz, sank the 7,100-ton tanker British Ardour. Another veteran VII, U-563, commanded by Götz von Hartmann, hit the 9,000-ton American tanker Sunoil, which was straggling with engine trouble. Kurt Lange in U-530, who had discovered the convoy, put Sunoil under with three torpedoes. The VII U-632, commanded by Hans Karpf, sank the 7,100-ton Dutchman Blitar, also straggling.

  British aircraft from Iceland and Northern Ireland arrived on the afternoon of April 5 to support convoy Halifax 231. Over the next forty-eight hours the aircraft drove the U-boats down or off and sank two VIIs:

  • On April 5, an Iceland-based very-long-range B-24 of British Squadron 120, piloted by Gordon L. Hatherly, got the new U-635, commanded by Heinz Eckelmann, three weeks out of Kiel. Hatherly dropped six shallow-set depth charges, which destroyed the boat with the loss of all hands.*

  • On April 6, a very-long-range B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by Cyril W. Burcher, got the U-632, commanded by Hans Karpf, embarked on his second patrol. In two attacks, Burcher dropped eight shallow-set depth charges. There were no survivors.

  Gretton’s British Escort Group B-7, finally reinforced by the four destroyers of British Support Group 4 from Iceland and Coastal Command aircraft, thwarted further U-boat attacks on convoy Halifax 231, and on the evening of April 7, U-boat Control unhappily canceled this operation. It chided the Löwenherz skippers for broadcasting too many nonessential messages and for too much chasing of stragglers rather than the main body. It credited the seventeen U-boats operating on or near the convoy with sinking eight ships for 58,000 tons, plus a “destroyer,” and hits on three other ships. The confirmed score was six merchant ships sunk (two tankers) for 41,600 tons and no warships. The other fifty-five ships (twenty tankers) of the convoy reached their destinations.†

  The attack on Halifax 231 was costly for the Germans. In addition to the loss of the VIIs U-632 and U-635 with all hands, Control noted “a further five U-boats were heavily damaged by aircraft bombs or by depth charges.” A “destroyer” attacked and “rammed” one of these five, the U-572, formerly commanded by the disgraced Heinz Hirsacker. Presumably the new skipper, Heinz Kummetat, age twenty-four, embarked on his second patrol, was seeking to restore the boat’s honor. Ironically, he sank no ships on either of these patrols and was forced to abort the second.

  Three other VIIs also aborted: the U-563, U-564, and U-594. The last named, commanded by Hans Fiedler, was hit by a B-24 of British Squadron 120, piloted by John K. Moffatt, but the boat reached France on April 13.

  U-boat Control directed ten of the boats that attacked
Halifax 231 to form a new group, Lerche (Lark). On April 11, one of the ten, the veteran U-584, commanded by Joachim Deecke, found the next eastbound convoy, Halifax 232. Composed of forty-seven merchant ships, it was guarded by the British Escort Group B-3, commanded by M. J. Evans, replacing A. A. Tait, who had been killed when his flagship, the destroyer Harvester, was sunk on March 11 defending Halifax 228. The group consisted of seven warships: three destroyers (British Escapade and Witherington, Polish Garland) and two British and two Free French corvettes. The British Support Group 4 (four Home Fleet destroyers) provided backup.

  Adroitly shadowing, Deecke in U-584 brought up three other Lerche boats. Helmut Pich in the new IXC40 U-168 attacked first, firing a salvo of six torpedoes. He heard two explosions and believed he had hit two ships, but these were not confirmed. Götz von Hartmann in the aborting VII U-563, who had survived a close air attack in the battle with Halifax 231 (and lost two men overboard), attacked next. He claimed sinking three ships for 26,000 tons and damage to a fourth. In reality he sank two freighters for 9,800 tons and damaged the 7,300-ton British freighter Fresno City, which Alexander von Zitzewitz in U-706 put under with a finishing shot. Upon return to France, Götz von Hartmann, who had made three patrols and sunk only two ships (plus damage to Sunoil), left U-706 and was assigned to another boat.

  By April 10 the U-615, commanded by Ralph Kapitzky, had been at sea for fifty-two days, assigned to three different groups, and had sunk no ships. En route to yet another group, Kapitzky found a straggler from Halifax 232, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Edward B. Dudley. Kapitzky fired a full bow salvo at the ship, but apparently he got only one hit and that one was a dud. The Liberty ship rang up flank speed; Kapitzky commenced a prolonged stern chase. Finally U-615 caught up, closed to point-blank range, and again shot torpedoes. These hit and the ship, loaded with ammunition, blew up with an awesome explosion. Some of the debris landed on the bridge of U-615, severely injuring Kapitzky. He recovered in a Paris hospital, but the boat was out of action for nearly two months.