by Clay Blair
Meanwhile, about two hundred miles farther south, group Elbe hunted for Slow Convoy 129. Consisting of twenty-six ships, this convoy was guarded by Donald Macintyre’s British Escort Group B-2, comprised of seven warships: two destroyers, Hesperus and Whitehall, and five corvettes. In the event the convoy became threatened, Macintyre had authority to request assistance from the Biter support group.
Six Elbe boats, including the new but damaged IXC40 U-533, had left the group by May 11 due to fuel shortages or for other reasons. These departures left Elbe with twenty-one boats (six of them IXCs), which U-boat Control divided into two sections. That day the veteran IXC U-504, commanded by a new skipper, Wilhelm Luis, age twenty-seven, found Slow Convoy 129. His report brought up about a dozen boats, chattering away on radios. Since the heavy U-boat traffic and Enigma decrypts indicated that Slow Convoy 129 was at risk and Halifax 237 had reached the protection of land-based Coastal Command aircraft and was outrunning groups Rhein and Drossel, Western Approaches ordered Biter and her screen to rush two hundred miles south to reinforce Slow Convoy 129.
In the nine months that he had commanded Escort Group B-2, Macintyre had not lost a ship in convoy. He was therefore humiliated and furious when a veteran Elbe boat, U-402, commanded by the Ritterkreuz holder Siegfried von Forstner, age thirty-two, slipped past his escorts submerged and in broad daylight sank two freighters by periscope attack: the 4,500-ton British Antigone and the 3,100-ton Norwegian Grado. However, the corvette Gentian got U-402 on sonar and pounded her with depth charges, inflicting so much damage that von Forstner was forced to join the parade of U-boats aborting to France. The U-402 did not sail again until September.
Later in the day, Macintyre in Hesperus got a radar contact at five miles dead ahead of the convoy. This was the Elbe VII U-223, commanded by Karl-Jürgen Wächter, age twenty-seven, making his second patrol. Macintyre put on flank speed and soon saw a wake. Too late, Wächter crash-dived. Racing over the swirl, Macintyre fired a salvo of depth charges, plus one of the experimental 2,000-pound depth charges from a torpedo tube. These missiles exploded close to U-223, causing heavy external and internal damage and flooding, and drove the boat out of control to seven hundred feet. When the engineer reported that one of the electric motors was on fire, Wächter decided to surface and run.
Macintyre heard Wächter blow his ballast tanks and was fully alert when U-223 popped up. He shot at the U-boat with his 4.7” main battery and all other guns that would bear. To Macintyre’s astonishment, Wächter counterattacked. The Germans fired five torpedoes, all of which missed, and then attempted to ram the destroyer. Macintyre maneuvered out of the way and turned about to “gently” ram U-223, nuzzling the boat over on her beam ends. Believing that U-223 was doomed, he then raced ahead to rejoin the convoy, which was thirty miles to eastward.
Wächter was by no means ready to concede defeat. When he broadcast an urgent plea for help, the VII U-359, commanded by Heinz Förster, responded. By great luck—some said a miracle—Förster found one of two crewmen of U-223 who had fallen or had jumped overboard when Hesperus pushed the boat on beam ends. When U-359 finally found U-223, Förster returned the crewman, causing a minor sensation. Förster then aborted to escort to France the wrecked U-223, which did not sail again until September.
Upon rejoining the convoy that night, Hesperus detected by Huff Duff another U-boat about ten miles dead ahead. This was the IXC40 U-186, commanded by Siegfried Hesemann, age thirty, on her second patrol. Macintyre raced ahead at flank speed. Too late, Hesemann in U-186 saw Hesperus and crash-dived. Macintyre got a good sonar contact and let go several depth-charge salvos, which fell close and destroyed U-186 with all hands. After listening to her implode and break up, Macintyre picked up some wooden debris that rose to the surface. He wrote that his men found “a gruesome piece of flesh” clinging to one piece of wood. Hesperus received sole credit for the killing of U-186.
During the next twenty-four hours, the destroyers Hesperus—low on depth charges—and Whitehall and the five corvettes raced hither and yon near Slow Convoy 129, driving off the dozen U-boats. In the face of this aggressive protection, no other Elbe boat could get into position to shoot. When Biter and her screen joined on May 13, Macintyre refueled B-2 and loaded up with depth charges from a tanker in the convoy assigned for that purpose. Swordfish from Biter augmented the escort, flying continuous patrols around the convoy, forcing U-boat Control to cancel operations.
These massive U-boat attacks on Halifax 237 and Slow Convoy 129, which, in aggregate, comprised seventy-two merchant ships, yielded the Germans little. Four boats of groups Rhein and Drossel sank three confirmed ships for about 22,000 tons from Halifax 237. One boat, von Forstner in the Elbe U-402, sank two ships for about 7,600 tons from Slow Convoy 129. Total for the three groups: five confirmed ships for about 30,000 tons sunk. In return, the two convoy close escort groups, B-2 and C-2, Biter’s Swordfish, and long-range aircraft sank five U-boats and severely damaged several others.*
Most of the surviving Rhein, Elbe, and Drossel boats returned to France. There was little to celebrate, nor was there grist for the propaganda mills. Most skippers and crews were grateful to have escaped death, especially those of group Drossel. Of its original twelve boats and two later reinforcements (U-221 and U-753), seven boats had been sunk and four had aborted to France early in their patrols. Only four of its fourteen boats (U-221, U-230, U-436, U-607) carried out full patrols.
Nor was that all the bad news from group Drossel. While homebound, Ritterkreuz holder Güinter Seibicke, age thirty-one, in U-436, who had sunk no ships, came upon a big (sixty-ship) convoy, southbound to Gibraltar. There is no indication in the U-boat Control war diary that he reported the convoy, but he got very close submerged, apparently in an attempt to attack alone. Two of the British escorts, the frigate Test and the corvette Hyderabad, detected and attacked U-436 with accurate depth charges on May 26, destroying the boat. There were no survivors. This kill brought the losses of group Drossel to eight out of the fourteen boats assigned.
ACTION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC IN MAY: II
The various U-boat actions of late April and early May left no group directly south of Greenland to intercept the oncoming Outbound North and Outbound North (Slow) convoys. However, on May 6, U-boat Control began filling the gap with a new group of what it believed to be twenty-five boats, about half veteran or experienced ones from France and half new ones from Germany. Initially the group was to include three IXs, two of which were veterans (U-66 and U-109) and one (U-190) on its second patrol. However, as related, U-109 had been lost on May 7. The U-66 and U-190 were soon detached and went on to the Americas, replaced by VIIs. One of the new VIIs was the U-954, on which Dönitz’s son Peter, age twenty-four, was a watch officer.
As the supposed twenty-five boats were assembling, Control divided the group into smaller task forces, as it had divided group Amsel earlier. The result was five subgroups, named for German rivers: Isar (five new VIIs), Lech (the lost U-109 and three VIIs, all veterans), Inn (four VIIs, two of them veterans), Iller (six new VIIs), and Naab (six VIIs, one new and five veterans, including the VIID minelayer U-218).
The new VII U-640, commanded by Karl-Heinz Nagel, age twenty-six, outbound from Germany to join group Iller, spotted a westbound convoy on May 13. This was Outbound North (Slow) 7, composed of forty merchant ships, guarded by British Escort Group B-5. Commanded by Richard C. Boyle, B-5 consisted of eight warships: the frigates Swale and Nene, the sloop Wren, and five corvettes. Inasmuch as there were no other U-boats in the immediate vicinity, Control authorized Nagel to attack. At the same time, Control ordered the five other outbound boats of the still-forming group Iller to join Nagel as rapidly as possible. It also repositioned and combined the four groups west of Iller to promising locations to intercept the convoy. These were groups Isar and Inn (nine boats), renamed Donau (Danube) 1, and groups Lech and Naab (nine boats), renamed Donau 2.
Nagel in the VII U-640 attacked the convoy after dark,
firing four torpedoes at two different ships. He presumed both had sunk, but in fact, no hits were confirmed. Aircraft from Iceland bombed U-640, forcing the boat to crash-dive and lose contact with the convoy. Another Iller boat, the new VII U-657, commanded by Heinrich Göllnitz, age thirty-three, assisted U-640 in the hunt; the other four Iller boats joined the north end of the Donau 1 and Donau 2 line, extending southeast from Greenland.
A Catalina of the Iceland-based U.S. Navy Squadron VP 84, piloted by P. A. Bodinet, hit and destroyed Nagel in U-640 with a Fido homing torpedo on May 14, presumably the first success with that new weapon. Three days later, Göllnitz in U-657, a former Arctic boat, found the convoy and sank the 5,200-ton British freighter Aymeric. Boyle’s close escort group counterattacked with twenty depth charges and two Hedgehog salvos and the frigate Swale sank U-657. There were no survivors from either of these U-boats.*
Two other VIIs outbound from Norway and Germany to join the boats hunting this convoy were themselves sunk by Hudsons of British Squadron 269 from Iceland. The first, on May 17, was U-646, commanded by Heinrich Wulff, age thirty-four, who had made one patrol in Arctic waters before his boat was transferred to the Atlantic force. The pilot, Francis H. W. James, destroyed U-646 with four Torpex depth charges. The second, on May 19, was the new U-273, commanded by Hermann Rossmann, age twenty-four, merely twelve days out from Kiel. The pilot, J.N.P. Bell, sank the boat with four Torpex depth charges. There were no survivors from either U-boat.
Three destroyers of J. W. McCoy’s Support Group 3 arrived from St. John’s on May 18 to reinforce Boyle’s Escort Group B-5. These and aircraft from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland helped shepherd Outbound North (Slow) 7 to a rendezvous with the local Canadian escort without further damage from U-boats. Allied decrypts of naval Enigma and use of Huff Duff had enabled the convoy to evade groups Iller and Donau 1 and Donau 2.
If the early sinking of the IXB U-109 of group Lech is included, to this point the chase and sinking of one merchant ship from Outbound North (Slow) 7 cost the Germans five U-boats: U-109, U-273, U-640, U-646, and U-657. There were no survivors from the approximately 250 crew of these boats.
The next eastbound convoys were Halifax 238 and Slow Convoy 130. Relying on good information from B-dienst, Control established a new patrol line running southeast from Greenland comprised (north to south) of twenty-two boats: group Iller (four new boats), group Donau 1 (seven boats, five new), and group Donau 2 (eleven boats, three new). A fourth group, Oder (eight veteran boats), backstopped the Iller and the two Donau groups.
Acting on Enigma decrypts and Huff Duff information, Allied authorities diverted Halifax 238 to the south of the Iller-Donau patrol line. Guarded by Canadian Escort Group C-3 (the destroyers Skeena, the ex-American four-stack Burnham, and five corvettes), Halifax 238 (forty-five merchant ships) reached the British Isles undetected by the Germans. The other, Slow Convoy 130 (thirty-nine merchant ships), guarded by Peter Gretton’s British Escort Group B-7 (nine warships), was not so fortunate.
A new VII of Donau 1, U-304, commanded by Heinz Koch, age twenty-eight, found Slow Convoy 130 on May 18 sailing under a full moon, and gave the alarm Control ordered the twenty-one surviving boats of groups Iller and Donau 1 and 2 to join U-304 at highest speed. By that time, two merchant ships of the convoy had aborted, one escorted back to port by the ASW trawler Northern Spray. That left thirty-seven merchant ships guarded by Gretton’s Escort Group B-7, reduced to eight warships: two destroyers, Duncan and Vidette, the frigate Tay, and five corvettes. By prearrangement, later on the following day, Godfrey Brewer’s British Support Group 1 (three frigates, Jed, Wear, Spey, and the former Coast Guard cutter Sennen) from Newfoundland was to reinforce the convoy, raising the number of warships to a formidable twelve: two destroyers, four frigates, one cutter, and five corvettes. The rescue ship Zamalek, the Sennen, and two other warships had Huff Duff. Most warships had Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar.
The convoy and Allied authorities ashore DFed the U-boat beacons and radio chatter and quickly realized that Slow Convoy 130 was in peril. During the night of May 18-19, Gretton in Duncan and some other escorts chased off U-boats or forced them to dive and lose contact, but other U-boats replaced them. However, none of the gathering Germans attempted to attack that night.
In the early hours of May 19, the first of five B-24s of British Squadron 120, based in Iceland, arrived to provide air escort. The pilot, W. Stoves, saw a U-boat crash-dive. He descended and launched two Fido homing torpedoes and three 250-pound depth charges at the swirl. The airmen saw two “small upheavals” in the water but no debris that would confirm a kill.*
During that day several B-24s provided nearly continuous coverage to the convoy. Stoves’s B-24, or others, attacked several more U-boats with depth charges and Fidos and drove them off and marked the sites with smoke flares. The destroyer Vidette, the frigate Tay, and the corvette Pink raced separately to the flares and hunted. The corvette Sunflower loosely cooperated with a B-24 to drive a U-boat under, but neither the corvette nor the B-24 had any luck. Peter Gretton later wrote that with better communications between aircraft and ships, he believed both could have carried out additional kills.
Some of the twenty-one remaining Donau U-boats near the convoy attempted to make submerged daylight attacks. Adolf Oelrich, age twenty-seven, in U-92, embarked on his fourth patrol, later reported that he sank one 6,500-ton freighter and hit another, but no sinkings or hits were confirmed. The approach of Gustav Poel, age twenty-five, in U-413, embarked on his third patrol, was spoiled when, as he later reported, the convoy made a sudden change of course. Three boats—the new U-645, commanded by Otto Ferro, age thirty-two; the new U-952, commanded by Oskar Curio, age twenty-five; and the U-707, commanded by Günter Gretschel, age twenty-eight, on his second patrol—reported that they were continually driven down by aircraft and destroyers and therefore could not attack.
The corvette Snowflake saw a periscope not fifty yards away. Her captain, the Australian Harold G. Chesterman, notified Gretton in Duncan and simultaneously launched a depth-charge attack. The target was thought to be the U-381 on its third patrol under the command of Wilhelm-Heinrich von Pückler und Limpurg, age thirty. Gretton in Duncan hurried over, got a solid sonar contact, and fired a salvo of ten depth charges, followed by three separate Hedgehog attacks. The first Hedgehog salvo fell wide, but the second and third might have caused severe damage to U-381. There were no survivors. The Admiralty divided credit for the kill between Chesterman in Snowflake and Gretton in Duncan but in a postwar reassessment declared U-381 to have been lost to unknown causes.
Later in the day, the four warships of Brewer’s Support Group 1 from St. John’s came up close astern of the convoy. Upon establishing contact with this group, Gretton, as planned, detached the Canadian corvette Kitchener to join the escort of convoy Outbound North 184, passing nearby. The three frigates of Brewer’s support group, Jed, Wear, and Spey, and the cutter Sennen all saw, chased, and depth-charged U-boats that were trailing Slow Convoy 130 or attempting to circle ahead for a better shooting position. Cooperating in one furious depth-charge attack, Jed and Sennen afterward found a pool of oil and debris (splintered wood, some of it painted white, a twenty-pound lump of tallow or fat, a piece of blue paper or cloth) and claimed a kill, which the Admiralty credited.*
After the four warships of Support Group 1 joined, the escort of Slow Convoy 130 increased to eleven warships plus the B-24s. In the very late evening of May 19, the frigate Toy, commanded by R. E. Sherwood, carried out an aggressive attack on the new U-952, commanded by Oskar Curio. For the second time in as many patrols, the boat was heavily damaged, but it survived and limped into France on May 31, and did not sail again until September. No other boat got near the convoy that night.
The B-24s returned at dawn on May 20. One, from Squadron 120 based in Iceland and piloted by J.R.E. Proctor, dived out of low-hanging clouds and caught the experienced U-258, commanded by Wilhelm von Mässenhausen, age twenty-eight
, on the surface. Too late, Mässenhausen crash-dived. Proctor raked the boat with machine-gun fire, then dropped four shallow-set depth charges that destroyed U-258. There were no survivors.
Proctor in his B-24 and other B-24s from Iceland and Northern Ireland chased and attacked U-boats during the forenoon. Whenever possible, the surface escorts cooperated, but the communications between ships and aircraft remained poor, Gretton wrote. Owing to the heavy air and surface escorts, at noon that day U-boat Control canceled operations against Slow Convoy 130. Control believed that group Donau, which opened the battle with twenty-two U-boats, had sunk only one freighter, but, in fact, the Germans had sunk no ships whatsoever.
The Admiralty credited four or five U-boat kills but the official records confirmed only three U-boats sunk attacking the convoy: von Mässenhausen’s U-258; von Limpurg’s U-381; and Odo Loewe’s U-954. As related, there were no survivors from any of the U-boats. The loss of Peter Dönitz on U-954 weighed heavily on the Dönitz family and on U-boat Control as well.
While group Donau was mounting its costly and futile attack on Slow Convoy 130, B-dienst provided information on two fast convoys: the eastbound Halifax 239 and the opposite-sailing Outbound North 184.
U-boat Control had by then created a new group on a line running southeast from Greenland, Mosel, composed of twenty-three boats. These included the eight boats of group Oder, which had backstopped the Iller-Donau line, and fifteen others arriving from U-tankers or from France or Germany. Group Mosel included two Ritterkreuz holders: twenty-seven-year-old Hans Trojer in U-221 and the old hand Günther Krech, age twenty-eight, in U-558.
As Mosel was assembling, three of its assigned boats were bombed by Allied aircraft or depth-charged by warships. The first was the veteran Type VIID minelayer U-218, commanded by Richard Becker, age thirty-two. Although the U-218 was badly damaged by surface ships, Control directed Becker to stay put with Mosel until the next convoy came along. Second, a Catalina of the Faeroes-based British Squadron 190, piloted by F. J. Gosling, hit U-229, commanded by Robert Schetelig, age twenty-four. Bombs from another aircraft (as yet unidentified) flooded the conning tower of U-231, commanded by Wolfgang Wenzel, age thirty-three, who was merely ten days out from Kiel. In the crash dive a man was left topside and drowned. The U-229 and the U-231 were so badly damaged that they were forced to abort to France. Schetelig in U-229 gave some of his reserve fuel to the damaged, homebound U-377, commanded by Otto Köhler, and to the tanker U-461. Although Wenzel in U-231 was hit by another (unidentified) aircraft, he reached France on May 30. Schetelig and Köhler got in on June 7. The aborts of U-229 and U-231 reduced Mosel to twenty-one boats.