Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  When Dönitz learned of the fine convoy shadowing carried out by Franke in U-262 and of his attack in the middle of the merged convoys MKS 31 and SL 140, he immediately recommended to Hitler that Franke be awarded a Ritterkreuz, the only North Atlantic skipper to be so honored in the fall of 1943.* Dönitz then sent a pointed message to all U-boat commands and vessels:

  The Führer, acting on my suggestion, has awarded Lieutenant Franke a Ritterkreuz. One of the determining reasons was that Franke has repeatedly been the only one of those participating in an operation who has forced his way to the convoy against strongest air and sea defenses. In the present situation the prospects for sinkings are slight. In awarding distinctions I shall evaluate toughness and tenacity so much the more, even if they are not crowned with success.

  Allied forces sank three of the Weddigen boats:

  • On November 25, the team of frigates Bazely and Blackwood of British Support Group 4 found the veteran U-600, commanded by Bernhard Zurmtihlen, age thirty-four. In another well-executed attack with depth charges and Hedgehogs, the frigates destroyed U-600. There were no survivors.

  • On the night of November 26, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of the Azores-based British Squadron 179 piloted by Donald M. Cornish found the new IXC40 U-542, commanded by Christian-Brandt Coester. As will be described, Cornish and his crew had earlier sunk U-431 and forced U-566 to scuttle. Flying into heavy flak, Cornish dropped six depth charges that destroyed U-542, his third U-boat kill. There were no survivors.

  • On the afternoon of November 29, an Avenger from the “jeep” carrier Bogue, piloted by Bernard H. Volm, Jr., found what was thought to be the VIIB U-86—the oldest attack boat in the Atlantic force—commanded by the veteran Walter Schug. Volm radioed an alarm that brought in three more Bogue aircraft. An experienced Avenger pilot, Harold S. G. Bradshaw, led the attack. The Bogue aircraft got credit for the kill, but Niestlé writes that the cause of her loss is unknown.*

  Like the Schill groups, Weddingen was a complete failure. No boat of Weddigen sank or even hit an Allied vessel. With the help of timely Enigma decrypts, the escorts of three convoys, Outbound South 59, KMS 33, and KMS 34, and two northbound convoys, Sierra Leone 140 and MKS 31, outfought and outwitted group Weddigen. In aggregate, Allied forces sank eight U-boats from the three Schill groups and the Weddigen group.

  While crossing Biscay homebound on the night of December 13, another Weddigen boat, the new U-391, commanded by Gert Dultgen, was attacked by a Leigh Light-equipped B-24 of British Squadron 53. Flying into heavy flak, the pilot, Squadron Leader George Crawford, dropped six depth charges that destroyed U-391 with the loss of all hands. Later in the war, Crawford and most of this crew failed to return from a mission.

  Control dissolved group Weddigen on December 6 and replaced it with group Borkum, composed of thirteen boats. To maximize Luftwaffe assistance and reduce the threat posed by Allied air, newly based in Gibraltar, French Morocco, and the Azores, and to save fuel, U-boat Control deployed Borkum directly west of the Bay of Biscay. Its mission was like that of Schill and Weddigen: to intercept MKS and KMS convoys merged with convoys going to and from Sierra Leone. Control warned Borkum to stay clear of the blockade-runners Osorno and Alsterufer, which were to pass close by, inbound to France.

  From Enigma decrypts, Allied authorities were aware of group Borkum and the two inbound blockade-runners. Accordingly they rerouted the merged northbound convoys MKS 33 and Sierra Leone 142 to pass west of Borkum, and sent the merged southbound KMS 37 and Outbound South 63 east of Borkum. At the same time, they put in motion intricate plans to intercept and sink Osorno and Alsterufer. The upshot was a very busy time for both sides that, because of the secrecy imposed upon all Allied codebreaking activities, was to be confusing for historians.

  The Allies ordered a hunter-killer group built around the “jeep” carrier Card to intercept the blockade-runners. Thereupon Card and her screen of three four-stack destroyers, westbound from Casablanca in company with convoy GUS 24, hauled out and ran north toward the likely area. As the hunter-killer group drew closer to the designated site in gale weather, a Luftwaffe aircraft saw and reported it and U-boat Control ordered group Borkum to rush southwest and to attack and sink the Card.

  Shortly after midnight on December 24, the U-305, commanded by Rudolf Bahr, age twenty-seven, sighted the Card. Bahr got off a contact report, but it was DFed. One of the destroyers, Schenck, drove U-305 off and down with gunfire and depth charges. Responding to Bahr’s report, the U-415, commanded by Kurt Neide, age twenty-seven, came up, found Card, and shot three FATs, but all missed. Neide claimed that he sank a “destroyer” with a T-5, but that hit was never confirmed. Escorted by the detroyer Decatur, Card then withdrew, leaving Schenck and Leary to deal with the Borkum boats.

  The Schenck, commanded by Earl W. Logsdon, got a radar contact on a U-boat and pursued. The quarry was thought to be the U-645, commanded by Otto Ferro, age thirty-two, who dived and possibly fired a T-5 at Schenck. When Schenck’s sonar reported a good contact, Logsdon carried out a systematic attack with depth charges. These evidently damaged U-645 so badly that Ferro surfaced. Schenck again got the U-boat on radar and attacked with guns and drove her under and dropped more depth charges. It was believed that these destroyed U-645 with all hands, but Niestlé doubts this and writes that the cause of the loss is unknown.

  The Leary, commanded by James E. Kyes, also pursued a radar contact. Unwisely, Kyes fired star shells to illuminate the target, thereby exposing his own ship. The U-275, commanded by Helmut Bork, and the U-382, commanded by Rudolf Zorn, shot at Leary with T-5 torpedoes and sank her. Ninety-seven of Leary’s men, including Kyes, perished in the sinking or the water. Schenck rescued fifty-nine survivors and later transferred them to Card. After Reuben James and Jacob Jones, Leary was only the third American destroyer to be sunk by U-boats in the North Atlantic*

  Kurt Neide in U-415, who had missed Card with three FATs, had better luck that night, Christmas Eve. Neide got into favorable shooting position on the British destroyer Hurricane, which had left the merged southbound convoys KMS 36 and Outbound South 62 to reinforce the Card group. Neide hit and damaged Hurricane, but she did not sink. During the night the damage was found to be greater than originally estimated, and after daylight—on Christmas Day—the Hurricane crew transferred to the frigate Glenarm and British forces put Hurricane under.

  Berlin was ecstatic. Based on flash reports from Bork, Neide, and Zorn, the OKM diarist logged that the U-boats of Borkum “had sunk four destroyers in two days.” That was a 100 percent inflation. The confirmed number was two destroyers in two days.

  A Luftwaffe aircraft sighted the blockade-runner Osorno in the extreme western waters of the Bay of Biscay. Upon receiving this report, the Germans sent out a flock of aircraft and six destroyers and six torpedo boats (Operation Bernau) to escort her and the other blockade-runner, Alsterufer, into France. Operating on Enigma decrypts, the British in turn sent out aircraft and two cruisers, Glasgow and Enterprise, to intercept and sink the blockade-runners, as well as the dozen would-be German escort vessels.

  In a confused tangle of aircraft and surface ships, Allied forces humiliated the Germans, sinking the Alsterufer, the destroyer Z-27, and torpedo boats T-25 and T-26. Four Canadian corvettes rescued seventy-four Germans from Alsterufer. Two inbound and two outbound U-boats (group Hela) searched for survivors of Z-27 and the two torpedo boats. The “Hangar Queen” IXC 17-505, outbound to distant waters, picked up thirty-four survivors of T-25 and returned to France. Kurt Baberg in the inbound U-618 picked up twenty-one survivors of the destroyer Z-27 and landed them in France. The Osorno almost reached Bordeaux, but as she was going up the Gironde River, she hit a wreck and had to be beached.*

  In the four months from September 1 to December 31, 1943, U-boat Control sailed thirty-seven upgraded VIIs and IXs to groups Schill, Weddigen, and Borkum operating in a Middle Atlantic triangle lying between Biscay, Gibraltar, and the Azores. In all, these bo
ats sank one 3,000-ton merchant ship, the Norwegian Hall-fried, two destroyers, the American Leary and British Hurricane, and wrecked the British sloop Chanticleer beyond repair. In return, nine of the thirty-seven U-boats were lost, plus two (U-648 and U-536) that were shifted from North Atlantic to Middle Atlantic waters, a total loss of eleven U-boats and about 550 men. Moreover, as will be described, three other U-boats of this Middle Atlantic deployment were to be lost in January 1944. A half dozen other Middle Atlantic boats were forced to abort with battle damage.

  The outcome of these operations demonstrated that with the Allied acquisition of air and naval bases in French Morocco and the Azores and the deployment of “jeep” carriers, the waters between Gibraltar and the Azores were as perilous to U-boat groups as were the waters between Iceland and the British Isles.

  When the thirty-two losses on the North Atlantic run from September through December 1943 were added to the eleven losses in the Middle Atlantic in the same period, the result was forty-three U-boats. Two other VIIs returning from the. Americas (U-669 and U-760) were also lost in the Middle Atlantic or the Bay of Biscay, bringing the total losses for the period to a disastrous forty-five U-boats and about 2,200 men.

  THE MEDITERRANEAN: FURTHER GERMAN SETBACKS

  The shrinking Mediterranean U-boat force, based at Toulon and still commanded by Leo Kreisch, suffered yet another loss on the night of October 21. This was the aforementioned U-431, sunk by the Canadian Donald M. Cornish, piloting a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 179. Cornish attacked into heavy flak and dropped six depth charges. These destroyed U-431 with the loss of all hands, including her skipper, Dietrich Schöneboom, but in the absence of positive evidence, the British did not credit Cornish arid his aircrew with the kill. Instead, the Admiralty mistakenly gave the credit to the British submarine Ultimatum, commanded by the able and highly decorated W. Hedley Kett, who attacked a German U-boat off Toulon ten days later.*

  In compliance with Hitler’s oders, after the new Naxos radar detector had been installed, five more VIIs set sail from Atlantic bases for the Mediterranean in the second half of October. The result was even more setbacks for the Germans. Two boats, U-450 and U-642, commanded by Kurt Böhme, age twenty-six, and Herbert Brünning, age twenty-eight, slipped through the Strait of Gibraltar, but Allied forces sank three others:

  • In the early hours of October 24, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 179, piloted by the same Canadian, Donald Cornish (who had sunk U-431 inside the Mediterranean just two days earlier), found Hans Hornkohl in the often bombed U-566 off Vigo, on the northwest coast of Spain. Cornish attacked into heavy flak, dropping six depth charges that wrecked the boat beyond repair. Like Brandi in U-617, Hornkohl nursed his stricken boat into shallow water and scuttled. A Spanish fishing trawler, the Fina, rescued the Germans and put them ashore in Vigo, They were “interned” briefly by Spanish authorities but returned to Brest by train on October 31. Thereafter, Hornkohl and crew commissioned a new VII.

  • On the afternoon of October 31, a British surface-ship patrol detected Claus-Peter Carlsen in U-732 at the western mouth of the Gibraltar Strait. The big ASW trawler Imperialist, commanded by A.R.F. Pelling, attacked, dropping ten depth charges. These exploded directly below the keel of U-732 and blew her to the surface. Before Carlsen could get the boat under water again, Imperialist opened fire with her main gun and scored several hits. When the boat dived, Imperialist dropped twenty-eight more depth charges that drove U-732 to the bottom, where Carlsen lay doggo for about six hours.

  After dark, Carlsen surfaced to escape at full speed on the diesels. One hour later an unidentified British aircraft got U-732 on radar and flashed an alarm. Unable or unwilling to dive again, Carlsen gave orders to scuttle. As the men were jumping overboard, the British destroyer Douglas, commanded by K.H.J.L. Phibbs, attacked, dropping ten depth charges close to the sinking boat. Douglas rescued eight Germans; the British destroyer Witherington picked up another ten. A Red Cross ship found Carlsen, bringing the number of survivors to nineteen.

  • Only a few hours later, in the early minutes of November 1, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 179, piloted by Arthur H. Ellis, found Hans-Joachim Klaus in U-340 also at the mouth of Gibraltar Strait. Ellis attacked, dropping six depth charges, but an engine malfunctioned, forcing the Wellington to abort.

  Later in the day another British surface patrol located U-340 with sonar. Three British warships, the destroyers Active and Witherington and the sloop Fleetwood, pounded the boat with depth charges. Still later that day, Klaus elected to scuttle close to shore so the Germans could swim to Spanish soil. After the forty-eight Germans had been in the water about four hours, a Spanish fishing trawler came along and picked them up. The Germans celebrated their rescue, but, as it turned out, prematurely. The sloop Fleetwood came up and captured all the Germans.

  Apparently some of the sixty-seven Germans captured from U-732 and U-340 talked freely. From them the British obtained detailed information about the T-5 Wren (or GNAT) “antidestroyer” homing torpedo, the ineffective Wanze and the new Naxos radar detectors, the Aphrodite radar decoy, and the quad 20mm and twin 20mm flak guns.

  Allied ground forces in rugged Italy, inching northward up the “boot” toward Rome, liberated Naples, crossed the Volturno River, and finally bogged down at the so-called German Gustav Line above the Rapido River at the monastery of Monte Cassino. To crack this line and liberate Rome, Allied planners conceived Operation Shingle, a large-scale amphibious landing at Anzio, on the west coast of Italy behind the Gustav Line opposite Rome. To carry out this ambitious new task, in January 1944 a great many Allied naval assets (particularly LSTs) were retained temporarily in the Mediterranean, ultimately resulting in a postponement of Overlord.

  The Mediterranean U-boat force contributed little to the campaign in Italy. The most significant strike was made by Egon-Reiner von Schlippenbach in U-453. On November 11, he planted minefields off Brindisi and Bari, seaports on the east coast of Italy. The British fleet destroyer Quail hit one of the mines and incurred such heavy damage that she had to be scrapped. Another of these mines destroyed the 800-ton fleet minesweeper Hebe. Second in importance during November was the work of Ernst-Ulrich Brüller in U-407, who late in the month damaged by torpedo the 9,100-ton British cruiser Birmingham. Two other veteran boats, U-73 and U-81, each sank medium-size Allied freighters for an aggregate 7,400 tons.

  The most notable German naval success in the Mediterranean in November was achieved by the Luftwaffe. The HE-177 squadron, equipped with HS 293 smart bombs, which had failed against Atlantic convoys, hit the 8,600-ton British troopship Rohna off Bougie on November 26. Jammed with Allied soldiers, she was en route from the British Isles in convoy KMF 26. Altogether 1,149 men perished. Of these, about one thousand were U.S. Army, the worst loss of American soldiers at sea in all of World War II. This appalling British troopship disaster was not revealed during the war, and the full dimensions of it have come to light only recently.*

  Notwithstanding the urgent orders and exhortations from Berlin, only three U-boats had actually reached the Mediterranean in the fall of 1943: Wächter’s U-223, Böhme’s U-450, and Brünning’s U-642. Inasmuch as two more U-boats had been lost (U-617 and U-431) inside the Mediterranean during this period, the flotilla increased by only one boat to fourteen. Moreover, Allied forces sank two more Mediterranean boats in December.

  • Off Algiers on December 11, Karl-Jürgen Wächter in U-223 hit and wrecked beyond repair with a T-5 Wren homing torpedo the British frigate Cuckmere, which was escorting convoy KMS 34. The next day, a little farther east near Djidjelli, Ritterkreuz holder Gerd Kelbling in U-593 sank with a T-5 Wren the British Hunt-class destroyer Tynedale. The loss of these two British warships in Algerian waters prompted Allied authorities to deploy a hunter-killer group of five surface ships. In the early hours of December 12, the group located U-593, but her skipper, Kelbling, sank yet another British Hunt-class d
estroyer, Holcombe.

  Assisted by aircraft, the four remaining warships of the hunter-killer group carried out a relentless search for U-593. Late in the afternoon of December 13, the American destroyer Wainwright finally got an unambiguous sonar contact. She and another British Hunt-class destroyer, Calpe, conducted a brutal depth-charge attack that drove U-593 to the surface, whereupon both warships opened fire with guns. Hopelessly trapped, Kelbling scuttled and abandoned ship. Wainwright arid Calpe picked up all fifty-one of the U-593 crew and took them to North Africa.

  • Westward of that U-boat kill, near Oran, on the afternoon of December 16, Horst Deckert in U-73 found convoy GUS 24 and hit the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship John S. Copley, which, however, limped into port. In response, a hunter- killer group, composed of three American destroyers, left Mers el-Kébir and raced to the scene. About an hour into the hunt, the Woolsey got a positive sonar contact and attacked with depth charges. The close explosions cracked the pressure hull of U-73 and caused flooding that could not be stanched. Deckert surfaced to fight it out, whereupon Woolsey and Trippe opened fire with guns that killed many Ger mans, riddled the boat, and forced Deckert to scuttle and abandon ship. The Woolsey and the other destroyer, Edison, picked up Deckert and thirty-three other Germans, including two wounded men and a doctor, and took them to North Africa, where the crew of U-593 was also temporarily imprisoned. Sixteen Ger mans perished in this sinking.

  Both American and British warships were involved in the kills of U-73 and U-593. As a consequence, Allied authorities fell into a minor bureaucratic spat over where the POWs should be sent, Washington or London. During this delay, the second watch officers of both boats, Kurt Kinkele and Armin Weighardt, “hid in a closet” in Algiers, escaped to Spain, and ultimately reached Germany.

  These two losses reduced the Mediterranean force to twelve U-boats, three of which had been damaged during a heavy Allied bomber raid on Toulon on November 24. On December 5, the experienced U-230, commanded by Paul Siegmann, got into the Mediterranean, raising that force once again to thirteen boats.