Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  In view of these ten nonsnort-boat losses and aborts, on June 10 Control ordered that no more were to sail from any French base to repel Allied invaders, except for last-ditch port defense. At the same time, Control directed Rösing to pull back the eighteen surviving nonsnort boats deployed into the Bay of Biscay to static positions on a defensive line running roughly along the hundred fathom (six-hundred-foot) curve.

  From Enigma decrypts, the Allies learned of this defensive line of nonsnort boats in Biscay and sent ASW aircraft to attack it, driving the boats down. These saturation Allied air attacks caused considerable damage but sank no boats. The results were as follows:

  • On June 10, a Sunderland of Australian Squadron 10, piloted by H. A. McGregor, hit the U-333, commanded by Ritterkreuz holder Peter Cremer. His 37mm jammed after the first round, but the German 20mm gunners repelled the Sunderland. Even so, the boat incurred heavy damage. On the following day, June 11, a Sunderland of British Squadron 228, piloted by a Canadian, M. E. Slaughter, hit U-333. Cremer’s gunners shot down this Sunderland with the loss of all hands, but U-333 was so badly damaged that Cremer had to abort to La Pallice. Upon arrival at that place, Cremer left the boat and returned to Germany to command a big electro boat, taking along about half of his crew. When Rösing informed Cremer of this new assignment, Cremer wrote in his memoir, he said: “Cremer, old friend, you’re a lucky fellow.” Indeed.

  • On June 13, a B-24 of British Squadron 53 hit the U-270, commanded by Paul-Friedrich Otto. The German gunners, who had earlier destroyed a B-17 of British Squadron 206, shot down this aircraft as well. On June 13, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 172, piloted by L. Harris, hit U-270 and caused such damage that Otto aborted to Lorient. Thereupon the lucky Otto also left for Germany to command a big electro boat.

  The Allied air attacks on nonsnort boats in Biscay were so intense that it was almost impossible for the boats to charge batteries.*Therefore, on June 13, Control directed Rösing to recall the boats of this defensive line to Lorient, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice. Thenceforth, these eighteen boats were to be kept in “ready” status, to sail from those places on the briefest notice to repel an Allied invasion of Brittany. Two of the Biscay nonsnort boats, U-608 and U-993, put into Brest, joining the five others that had sailed from Brest and survived and had aborted to that place.

  Like the nine nonsnort boats that sailed from Brest, the nineteen that sailed from Biscay ports following June 6 sank no Allied ships. During this nerve-racking and fruitless week in Biscay, one nonsnort boat, U-970, had been lost, as well as the U-955, inbound in Biscay from weather patrol.

  THE “SUNDAY PUNCH”

  The fourteen snort boats that sailed from France in June to repel the Allied invaders were, in a phrase of the times, the German “Sunday Punch.” Much was expected of these boats, but all fourteen had an arduous time and achieved almost nothing. Three were lost. The stories of the first anti-Neptune snort-boat war patrols from France:

  • The veteran U-212, commissioned and commanded for two years by Helmut Vogler, age twenty-seven, sailed from La Pallice on June 6. While northbound in the Bay of Biscay the next day, two experienced Mosquitos of British Squadron 248, piloted by Douglas J. Turner and a Canadian, A.J.L. Bonnett, hit the boat with 57mm Tsetse cannon fire. Damaged, Vogler aborted to La Pallice for repairs. Two days later, pilot Bonnett and his copilot-navigator, A. McD. McNicol, were killed in a midair collision.

  Vogler resailed U-212 on June 12, but he was beset by mechanical problems and aborted to La Pallice for the second time on June 16. Thereafter, Berlin directed Rösing to load four snort boats with ammo and rush them to German ground forces that were cut off in Cherbourg. Assigned to this dangerous mission, the U-212 loaded and sailed from La Pallice for the third time on June 22. The next day, when Berlin learned that the Allies were already at the gates of Cherbourg, Control canceled the mission and U-212 again returned to La Pallice. Vogler unloaded the ammo and resailed on June 28 from La Pallice to Brest to stage for a torpedo patrol to the Allied landing area in the Bay of the Seine. He arrived in Brest on July 4.

  • The veteran U-275, commissioned and commanded for twenty months by Helmut Bork, age thirty-four, sailed from Brest on June 6. Hounded by unidentified Allied air and surface ASW forces, Bork shot a T-5 at a “destroyer” but missed. Unable to snort long enough to charge batteries in the combat zone, after one miserable week Bork put into St. Peter Port on the German-occupied island of Guernsey. While charging batteries there, he filed a lugubrious and defeatist report stating that Allied sonar could easily detect a snorting boat and that therefore the use of the snort to recharge batteries in the English Channel was “extremely hazardous.” Bork resailed U-275 on June 14. A week later Rösing directed him and some other snort boats to close Cherbourg to attack Allied heavy units that were shelling the port. Unable to offer any help there, Bork returned to Brest on June 24, at which time he went on to other duty.

  • The veteran U-269, newly commanded by Georg Uhl, age twenty-nine, sailed from Brest on June 6. Likewise harassed by unidentified Allied air and surface ASW forces, Uhl made no attacks and put into to St. Peter Port on June 14 to charge batteries and resailed on June 16. Also directed to Cherbourg, Uhl was unable to offer any help either. While U-269 was returning again to St. Peter Port on June 25 to charge batteries, the frigate Bickerton of British Support Group 5 detected U-269 and blasted her to the surface with depth charges. After Uhl gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship, he became entangled in the propellers of Bicker-ton and was chopped to pieces, German survivors said later. Bickerton, commanded by E. M. Thorpe, rescued thirty-nine other Germans, including two men who were trapped inside the conning tower but got out and reached the surface from a depth of about two hundred feet without escape apparatus.

  • The veteran (ex-flak) boat U-441, commanded by Klaus Hartmann, age thirty-one, sailed from Brest on June 6. Nothing further was ever heard from the boat. U-boat Control ordered U-441 to the landing area in the Bay of the Seine. In wartime, the Admiralty credited a Wellington of Polish Squadron 304 with the kill of U-441. However, in a recent reassessment, the Admiralty credited a B-24 of British Squadron 224, piloted by Canadian Kenneth Owen Moore, with the kill on the night of June 8, restoring his unprecedented claim of two sinkings in a single sortie, justifying the DSO.

  • The veteran (ex-flak) boat U-621, newly commanded by Hermann Stuckmann, age twenty-three, sailed from Brest on June 6. En route to the Bay of the Seine the next day, Stuckmann shot a T-5 at a “destroyer” but missed. On June 9 he aborted to Brest with bomb damage incurred during an attack by an unidentified aircraft and, after hurried repairs, resailed on June 12. Reaching the Allied invasion area on June 15, Stuckmann shot a T-5 at the 1,500-ton American LST 280 and sank her, the first confirmed Allied vessel to be lost to a U-boat in the Neptune phase of Overlord. Three days later, Stuckmann came upon—and shot at—two

  British battleships of a support force. However, all torpedoes missed and on June 21, Stuckmann returned U-621 to Brest.

  • The U-764, commanded by Hans-Kurt von Bremen, age twenty-five, sailed from Brest on June 6. In the invasion area on June 15, von Bremen hit and severely damaged the British frigate Blackwood with a T-5, and she sank under tow the following day. In the ensuing counterattack, von Bremen shot all the rest of his torpedoes, to no avail. In return, British warships severely damaged U-764 and forced von Bremen to abort to St. Peter Port with a broken snort. Owing to a “navigational error,” however, he entered Brest on June 21.

  • The U-984, commanded by Heinz Sieder, age twenty-three, sailed from Brest on June 6. En route to the Allied landing area, Sieder shot three T-5s at three “destroyers,” including the Canadian Saskatchewan. One torpedo prematured, one missed, and one hit the Cat Gear (towed noisemaker decoy) of Saskatchewan and exploded. Thereafter Sieder was forced back to Brest on June 9 with bomb damage from an unidentified aircraft.

  Sieder resailed from Brest to the Bay of the
Seine on June 12. Two days later he encountered a hunter-killer group and fired two T-5s at the formation. One torpedo failed to leave the tube; the other missed. Unable to get in a battery charge, on June 19 Sieder also put into St. Peter Port. Allied air was so heavy that he was not able to get a full charge in that port; nonetheless, he resailed on June 19. Once again en route to the Bay of the Seine on June 25, Sieder encountered another hunter-killer group and shot two T-5s at the formation. One missed but the other hit the 1,300-ton British frigate Goodson in the stern. Another British frigate, Bligh, towed the wrecked Goodson into Portland.

  Four days later, on June 29, Sieder came upon a loaded Allied convoy, EMC 17, and shot two torpedoes at the port column. One hit and damaged an 8,000-ton freighter that Sieder later thought he put under with a finishing shot. The other missed the port column but hit in the starboard column a 7,000-ton freighter that sank slowly, Sieder claimed. He then shot a T-5 at another freighter of 9,000 tons and got a hit in the stern. A finishing shot at this vessel missed, Sieder reported.

  Allied records showed that Sieder did better than his claims and in so doing, delivered the only really significant blow to the Neptune invasion forces in June. Apart from the damage to the frigate Goodson, his torpedoes hit four 7,200-ton American Liberty ships, some carrying troops. One, Edward M. House, reached England and was repaired. The other three, Henry G. Blaisdel, James A. Farrell, and John A. Treutlen, had to be scrapped. Seventy-six American soldiers were lost on Blaisdel, manned by Coast Guard personnel.

  Upon the arrival of U-984 in Brest on July 4, Dönitz awarded Sieder a Ritterkreuz, the first of four such awards presented to U-boat skippers engaged in attacking Neptune invasion forces.

  • The veteran (ex-flak) U-953, commanded by the experienced Karl-Heinz Marbach, age twenty-four, sailed from Brest on June 6. En route to the invasion area, Marbach shot four T-5s at four destroyers of the Canadian hunter-killer Sup port Group 12, which included Ou’Appelle, Restigouche, Saskatchewan, and Skeena. He claimed—and was credited with—sinking three destroyers, but Allied records revealed that his torpedoes exploded harmlessly in the wakes of the ships, probably on Cat Gear decoys. Before reaching the invasion area, Marbach had a serious mechanical breakdown that forced him to abort to Brest, where he arrived on June 18.

  After hurried repairs, Marbach resailed U-953 to the Bay of the Seine on June 24. Snorting and making good about forty miles a day, he reached the Allied landing area on July 5, where he sighted three large convoys. He attacked one, firing three torpedoes. He claimed two freighters for 11,000 tons sunk, but Allied records confirmed only the sinking of one small freighter, the 1,927-ton Britisher Glendinning.

  A week later, on July 11, Marbach attacked another big convoy and shot five torpedoes into the rows of overlapping ships. He claimed sinking another “destroyer” and a 9,000-ton freighter, both of which “hit bottom with a wallop,” but Allied records do not substantiate either of these sinkings. Generously credited with sinking four “destroyers” and three freighters for 20,000 tons in two brief patrols, upon the return of U-953 to Brest on July 21, Dönitz awarded Marbach a Ritterkreuz, the second such award to U-boat skippers engaged against Neptune forces. Marbach then left U-953 and returned to Germany to command a big electro boat.

  • The U-763, commanded by Ernst Cordes, age thirty, sailed from La Pallice on June 11, but on June 16 he aborted to Brest, reporting a broken periscope. After repairs he resailed but on June 18, he again aborted to Brest with mechanical problems.

  Cordes resailed from Brest to the Bay of the Seine yet again on June 20. En route, air and surface forces continually hounded, bombed, and depth-charged the boat. Cordes counterattacked “destroyers” on two separate occasions with T-5s, but both torpedoes missed.

  In the Allied landing area on July 5, Cordes found and attacked convoy ETC 26. He shot five torpedoes: three at the mass of overlapping ships, one T-5 at a 4,000-ton freighter and one T-5 at a “destroyer.” A hunter-killer group pounced on U-763, Cordes reported, and chased the boat for thirty hours, dropping an astonishing total of 550 depth charges, according to the German count.

  Cordes escaped this hunt to exhaustion but lost track of his position. On July 7, when he saw land in the periscope and touched bottom at fifty-two feet, he assumed he had drifted close to the French coast. In fact, he had drifted in the opposite direction (north) and was on the south coast of England in the Portsmouth roadstead—Spithead, gateway to the home of the Royal Navy! He lay doggo and undetected off Nab Light, then escaped south to deeper water.

  Approaching Brest on July 11, Cordes shot two torpedoes at warships of a hunter-killer group. Upon his arrival, Cordes was credited with hits on two freighters and a “destroyer,” probably sinking one freighter and a probable hit on another “destroyer.” Allied records confirmed only the sinking of the 1,500-ton Norwegian freighter Ringen. Cordes turned over command of U-763 to another skipper and returned to the Baltic to command a new VII, attached to the Training Command.

  • The U-390, only recently fitted with a snort and commanded by Heinz Geissler, sailed on June 21 from St. Nazaire to deliver a load of ammo to Cherbourg. When that mission was canceled, Geissler put into Brest on June 24 to take on torpedoes, and resailed for the Bay of the Seine on June 27. In the early hours of July 5, Geissler came upon a convoy and fired two torpedoes at two vessels. It is believed that torpedoes hit both targets, sinking the British ASW trawler Ganilly and inflicting damage on the 7,900-ton American ship Sea Porpoise.

  One of the convoy close escorts, the British frigate Tavy, commanded by F. Arden, got U-390 on sonar and attacked immediately with depth charges. Geissler may have counterattacked with a T-5 that malfunctioned or missed. Tavy then carried out three Hedgehog attacks that severely damaged U-390 and drove her to the bottom. Another escort, the old British destroyer Wanderer, commanded by Reginald (“Bob”) Whinney, who had earlier sunk the VII U-305 and had shared credit for sinking the IXC U-523, joined the hunt and carried out two Hedgehog and one depth-charge attack.

  Below in U-390, all was chaos. Fuel oil and seawater flooded the boat. Men gathered in the control room with escape gear. However, only one man, chief engineer Erich Tein, got out. When he popped to the surface unconscious, Tavy fished him out and medics revived him. He was the lone survivor of U-390’s forty-eight-man crew.

  • The U-309, also recently fitted with a snort and commanded by Hans-Gert Mahrholz, sailed from La Pallice on June 21 to deliver ammo to Cherbourg. When that mission was canceled, Mahrholz also put into Brest on June 25 to unload the ammo and take on torpedoes. He resailed for the Bay of the Seine on June 29.

  Owing to the absence of reports from the first wave of snort boats and to a British propaganda claim of sinking ten U-boats in the English Channel, on July 2 Rösing recalled U-309 and other newly sailed snort boats to Brest until the situation clarified. Rösing rescinded these orders the very next day. By that time Mahrholz had encountered a hunter-killer group of four “destroyers.” He shot two torpedoes at two “destroyers,” claiming he sank one and missed the other, but the sinking could not be confirmed in Allied records. Ignoring orders to continue on to the Bay of the Seine, Mahrholz put into Brest to replenish his torpedo supply on July 6.

  • The U-741, commanded by Gerhard Palmgren, took on a load of ammo for Cherbourg and sailed from Brest on June 20. When that mission was canceled, Palmgren returned to Brest on June 27 to unload the ammo and take on torpedoes and sail to the Bay of the Seine.

  In addition to these attack snort boats, the two remaining Type VIID (minelayers), U-214 and U-218, both fitted with snorts, were ordered to plant minefields off the southwest coast of England.

  • The U-214, commanded by Rupprecht Stock, age twenty-eight, sailed on June 11 from Brest to lay fifteen SMA mines in the western English Channel off Plymouth. Unidentified Allied aircraft hit U-214 and forced Stock to abort to Brest on June 14. He resailed on June 16, planted the mines on June 26, and returned on July 1, but the mi
nefield produced no sinkings.

  • The U-218, commanded by Richard Becker, age thirty-three, sailed from Brest on June 13 to lay fifteen SMA mines in the western English Channel off Falmouth. While en route, Allied surface ships hunted and depth-charged U-218 for sixty hours. The snort exhaust backed up and carbon monoxide felled Becker and about two-thirds of his crew. After planting the mines on July 1, Becker returned to Brest on July 9. At that time Rupprecht Stock from U-214 relieved Becker, who returned to Germany to command a big electro boat. Becker’s minefield at Falmouth damaged one ship, the 7,200-ton British Empire Halberd on July 6.

  So much for the German “Sunday Punch.” In these first forays, the fourteen snort boats (including the minelayers U-214 and U-218) sailing from France in June to repel Allied invaders sank or destroyed only eight ships: three warships for 3,100 tons (LST280; frigate Blackwood; ASW trawler Ganilly) and five freighters for 25,000 tons (Blaisdel, Treutlen, Farrell, Glendinning, Ringen). The U-boats also damaged one warship for 1,300 tons (frigate Goodson) and two freighters for 15,000 tons (Sea Porpoise and Empire Halberd). In return for these slight successes, three snort boats (U-269, U-390, U-441) were lost with about 150 submariners (forty captured).

  U-BOAT REINFORCEMENTS SAILING FROM NORWAY TO FRANCE

  Eleven Type VII snort boats survived the intense preinvasion Allied ASW campaign in Norwegian waters and sailed to join the Atlantic U-boat force in June.

  U-boat Control radioed these reinforcements Hitlerian orders:

  Attack the invasion fleet without consideration for anything else whatsoever. Each enemy vessel which serves his landing, even if it delivers, say, 50 troops or 1 tank, is a target demanding all-out U-boat attack. It is to be attacked even at risk of losing your own U-boat. When it is a matter of getting at the enemy invasion fleet, have no regard for danger from shallow water, or possible minefields or any misgivings at all. Each enemy man and each enemy weapon destroyed before landing diminishes the enemy’s prospects of success. But the U-boat which inflicts losses on the enemy during his landing has fulfilled its supreme task and has justified its existence, even if it accomplishes nothing more.*